Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Axiology

  • The Ambiguity of Vows

    Vows make for stability of life and put a brake on the mercurial and fickle in us. They must be taken seriously or not taken at all. But rigid commitments immaturely or prematurely entered into  are sometimes better broken than kept. Sometimes, not often. Rigidity and flexibility, both physical and psychological, are values, competing values.…

  • Nietzsche, Salvation, and the Question of the Value of Life

    Substack latest.

  • After MacIntyre: On Deriving Ought from Is

    Are there any (non-trivial*) valid arguments that satisfy the following conditions:  (i) The premises are all purely factual  in the sense of purporting to state only what is the case; (ii) the conclusion is normative/evaluative?  Alasdair MacIntyre gives the following example (After Virtue, U. of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 55): 1. This watch is…

  • Steven Nemes’ Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Ethics: Some Questions

    The review is a well written and very fair summary of von Hildebrand's book. (I read portions of the latter in graduate school days but I do not currently have it in my library.)  Here is the review's main critical passage together with my remarks. [Von] Hildebrand’s arguments for the objectivity of value therefore seem…

  • Is Life Good? Questioning the Question

    I do not begrudge the man who exults: Life is good! For it is good for some at some times and in some places. Such a one is living and exulting, not philosophizing. He is expressing his experience of his particular life: he needn't be trying to be objective, even if he expresses himself in…

  • A Relativist Cannot Rationally Object to the Imposition of One’s Values on Others

    Here, at MavPhil Strictly Philosophical

  • The Generalized Ought-Implies-Can Principle and Novák’s Objection

    This entry is an addendum to my Prague paper (see link below) in which I deploy a principle I call GOC, a principle that comes under withering fire in the ComBox from Dr. Lukáš Novák.  Here is my reformulation of his objection.  You will have to consult my Prague paper to see what I mean by…

  • Is the Quality of Life Objectively Evaluable on Naturalism?

    This is the penultimate draft of the paper I will be presenting in Prague at the end of this month at the Benatar conference. Comments are welcome from those who are familiar with this subject. ……………………………………………….   IS THE QUALITY OF LIFE OBJECTIVELY EVALUABLE ON NATURALISM? William F. Vallicella Abstract This article examines one of…

  • Franz Brentano on the Charge of Excessive Rigorism

    On his Facebook Page, Vlastimil V. quotes Franz Brentano, approvingly, I think: It is certain that no man can entirely avoid error. Nevertheless, avoidable or not, every erroneous judgement is a judgement that ought not to have been made, a judgement in conflict with the requirements of logic, and these cannot be modified. The rules…

  • Bourgeois Norms and Race

    This from an alt-right correspondent. My responses in blue. For the record, I am not alt-right, neo-reactionary, or dissident right (except for my contempt for the yap-and-scribble, do-nothing, anti-Trump, elitist, bow-tie brigade). ………………….. As part of my ongoing attempt to nudge you further to the right . . . consider these "life-enhancing bourgeois values preached…

  • Prudential Anti-Natalism

    Karl White writes: If one assumes life has a negative value, or at the very least is a problem that needs solving, then surely it would follow that antinatalism is the prudential course. If we are unable to discern a meaning or a solution to life, then there can hardly be any justification for dragging…

  • A Relativist Cannot Rationally Object to the Imposition of One’s Values on Others

    The following argument is sometimes heard. "Because values are relative, it is wrong to impose one's values on others." But if values are relative, and among my values is the value of instructing others in the right way to live, then surely I am justified in imposing my values on others. What better justification could…

  • Is Moral Relativism Dying?

    In a recent Atlantic article we read: . . . the prevailing thought of the second decade of the 21st century is not like the mid-to late-20th century. Law, virtue, and a shame culture have risen to prominence in recent years, signaling that moral relativism may be going the way of the buggy whip. [.…

  • Are Values Objective? Can Values be Universal but Non-Objective?

    Commenting on a recent post of mine, Malcolm Pollack takes issue with the notion that values are objective.  While granting that there are objective truths, he denies that there are objective values because of a theory of value that he holds according to which values have their origin in valuing beings and merely reflect the…

  • Is Nothing Sacred?

    Near the end of Assassins of the Mind, Christopher Hitchens states that nothing is sacred: In the hot days immediately after the fatwa, with Salman [Rushdie] himself on the run and the TV screens filled with images of burning books and writhing mustaches, I was stopped by a female Muslim interviewer and her camera crew…