Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Aristotle

  • Substance, Supposit, Incarnation, Trinity, and the Heresy of Nestorius

    I need to answer three questions.  This post addresses only the first. 1. What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)? 2. Is there any non-theological basis for this distinction?  3. If the answer to (2) is negative, is the addition of suppposita to one's Aristotelian ontology  a case of…

  • After MacIntyre: Is and Ought

    This follows up on yesterday's discussion.  Thanks to Hodges for getting me started on this, to Milos for reminding me of MacIntyre, and to Peter for agreeing with me so far. Are there any valid arguments that satisfy the following conditions:  (i) The premises are all factual  in the sense of purporting to state only…

  • Defending the Distinctio Realis Against Anthony Kenny

    This post defends the real distinction between essence and existence.  For some background, see Geach on the Real Distinction I. In Aquinas on Being (Oxford 2002, p. 45), Anthony Kenny writes, "Peter's continuing to exist is the very same thing as Peter's continuing to possess his essence; if he ceases to exist, he ceases to…

  • Is A Primary Substance Minus its Accidents a Primary Substance?

    I return to a question I was discussing back in August with John the Commenter and more recently with Lukas Novak.  The question concerns how to define 'primary substance.'  I suggested the following:  ". . .  an individual or singular complete concrete entity together with its accidents. "  But why include the accidents?  I gave the following…

  • Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics

    This is a really good collection of state-of-the-art essays that comes at the right time in my philosophical development.  I thank Ed Feser, editor and contributor, for sending me a complimentary copy. (I didn't ask for one, and you shouldn't either.) Here is Dr. Feser's summary of the contents.  And while you are at Feser's…

  • Is Socrates a Substance or a Cross-Categorical Hybrid?

    0. I wanted to explore supposita in their difference from primary substances, but John the Commenter sidetracked me into the aporetics of primary substance.  But it is a sidetrack worth exploring even if it doesn't loop back to the mainline.  For it provides me more grist for my aporetic mill. 1. Metaphysics is a quest…

  • On Primary Substances and Accidental Unities

    I asked genuinely, not rhetorically : What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)?  The latter figures prominently in the  philosophy of the School, as some call it, and I need to get clear about what supposits are, how they differ from primary substances, and whether there are any…

  • What is the Difference Between a Substance and a Supposit?

    I need to answer three questions.  This post addresses the first. 1. What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)? 2. Is there any non-theological basis for this distinction?  3. If the answer to (2) is negative, is the addition of suppposita to one's Aristotelian ontology  a case of legitimate metaphysical…

  • Accidents of a Substance: Simple or Complex?

    Dr. Novak is invited to tell me which of the following propositions he accepts, which he rejects, and why: 0. I have reservations about an ontology in terms of substances and accidents, but anyone who adopts such an ontology needs to provide a detailed theory of accidents.  This post sketches a theory. It has roots in Aristotle,…

  • Bare Particulars and Lukáš Novák’s Argument Against Them

    In his contribution to the book I am reviewing, Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic (Ontos Verlag, 2012), Lukáš Novák mounts an Aristotelian argument against bare particulars.  In this entry I will try to understand his argument.  I will hereafter refer to Professor Novák as 'LN' to avoid the trouble of having to paste in the diacriticals…

  • Transitivity of Predication?

    I dedicate this post to London Ed, who likes sophisms and scholastic arcana. Consider these two syllogistic arguments: A1. Man is an animal; Socrates is a man; ergo, Socrates is an animal.A2. Man is a species; Socrates is a man; ergo, Socrates is a species. The first argument is valid.  On one way of accounting for its…

  • Via Platonica Versus Via Aristotelis

    I have spoken more than once of the fruitful tension between Athens (philosophy) and  Jerusalem (Biblical revelation). But there is also a tension, and it is also a fruitful one, within Athens. It is depicted, if such a thing can be depicted at all, in Raphael's School of Athens.   Take a gander at the close-up below.  Plato…

  • Another Round with Hennessey on Accidental Predication

    Having had my say about what is known in the trade as Occam's Razor, and having secured some welcome agreement with the proprietor of Beyond Necessity in the combox of the aforelinked post, I am now ready to address the meat of Richard Hennessey's response to my three-post critique of what I took to be…

  • The Use and Abuse of Occam’s Razor: On Multiplying Entities Beyond Necessity

    Self-styled neo-Aristotelian Richard Hennessey's response to my three posts concerning his theory of accidental predication is now online.  He graciously declines my suggestion that he make use of accidental compounds or accidental unities in his theory despite the excellent Aristotelian pedigree of these items, a pedigree amply documented in the writings of Frank Lewis and Gareth…

  • Accidental Sameness and its Logical Properties

    I should thank Richard Hennessey for motivating me to address a topic I haven't until these last few days discussed in these pages, namely, that of accidental sameness.  Let us adopt for the time being a broadly Aristotelian ontology with its standard nomenclature of substance and accident, act and potency, form and matter, etc.  Within such a…