Category: Aporetics
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Caesar Is No More: The Aporetics of Reference to the Past
Here is London Ed's most recent version of his argument in his own words except for one word I added in brackets: 1. There is no such thing as Caesar any more. 2. The predicate 'there is no such thing as — any more' is satisfied by Caesar. 3. If a relation obtains [between] x…
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The Aporetics of Existence and Self-Identity
Andrew B. made some powerful objections to a recent existence post. His remarks suggest the following argument: Argument A 1. Existence is self-identity2. My existence is contingent: (∃x)(x = I) & Poss ~(∃x) (x = I)Therefore3. My self-identity is contingent: I = I & Poss ~ (I = I) Argument A may be supplemented by…
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The Modal Aporetics of Existential Generalization
Consider this trio of propositions: 1. '~(∃x)(x = Venus)' is possibly true. 2. Existential Generalization warrants the inference of '(∃y)~(∃x)(x = y)' from '~(∃x)(x = Venus).' 3. '(∃y)~(∃x)(x = y)' is logically self-contradictory, hence necessarily false. Solve the triad, either by showing that the limbs are (collectively) logically consistent or by rejecting one or more…
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Existence and Plural Predication: Could ‘Exist(s)’ be a First-Level Non-Distributive Predicate?
'Horses exist' is an example of an affirmative general existential sentence. What is the status of the predicate '___ exist' in such a sentence? One might maintain that 'exist(s)' is a second-level predicate; one might maintain that it is a first-level distributive predicate; one might maintain that it is a first-level non-distributive (collective) predicate. 1. Frege famously maintained…
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Moksha: Soteriological Riddles
Over lunch Friday the topic of moksha (release or liberation from samsara; enlightenment) came up in the context of Advaita Vedanta. Moksha is attained when the identity of Atman and Brahman is realized. My interlocutor wanted to know how such realization is possible. If I realize my identity with the Absolute, then I cease to exist as something…
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Time, Truth, and Truth-Making: An Antilogism Revisited and Transmogrified
Earlier, I presented the following, which looks to be an antilogism. An antilogism, by definition, is an inconsistent triad. This post considers whether the triad really is logically inconsistent, and so really is an antilogism. 1. Temporally Unrestricted Excluded Middle: The principle that every declarative sentence is either true, or if not true, then false…
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Excluded Middle and Future-Tensed Sentences: An Aporetic Triad
Do you remember the prediction, made in 1999, that the DOW would reach 36,000 in a few years? Since that didn't happen, I am inclined to say that Glassman and Hasset's prediction was wrong and was wrong at the time the prediction was made. I take that to mean that the content of their prediction…
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Butchvarov on Semi-Realism about Facts
This post takes up where Butchvarov Against Facts left off. See the latter post for bibliographical data concerning the essay "Facts" which I presently have under my logical microscope. And if you are a fan of Butch's work, all of my Butchvarov posts are collected in the aptly entitled Butchvarov category. (The following is also…
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The Problem of the Existence of Consciousness
I tend to the view that all philosophical problems can be represented as aporetic polyads. What's more, I maintain that philosophical problems ought to be so represented. You haven't begun to philosophize until you have a well-defined puzzle, a putative inconsistency of plausibilities. When you have an aporetic polyad on the table you have something…
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Sentences as Names of Facts: An Aporetic Triad
There are good reasons to introduce facts as truth-makers for contingently true atomic sentences. (Some supporting reasoning here.) But if there are facts, and they make-true contingent atomic sentences, then what is the semantic relation between these declarative sentences and their truth-makers? It seems we should say that such sentences name facts. But some remarks…
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Are Facts Perceivable? An Aporetic Pentad
'The table is against the wall.' This is a true contingent sentence. How do I know that it is true except by seeing (or otherwise sense perceiving) that the table is against the wall? And what is this seeing if not the seeing of a fact, where a fact is not a true proposition but…
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Indeterminate Yet Existent? The Aporetics of Prime Matter and Pure Consciousness
Scott Roberts e-mails in reference to my post Hylomorphic Ontological Analysis and the Puzzle of Prime Matter: I have also been perplexed at hylomorphism's dependence on something called [prime] 'matter', for the same reason as you give. But I think there is a way out, though perhaps not one a hylomorphist will like. You say…
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Hylomorphic Ontological Analysis and the Puzzle of Prime Matter
Recent posts have discussed hylomorphic dualism in the philosophy of mind. It is a serious contender in the arena of competing positions — unlike say, eliminative materialism, which is not. (If you think I'm just gassing off about EM, read the entries in the eponymous category.) But now I want to take a step back from…
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On Temptation and the Perfection of Jesus
Joshua Orsak e-mails: Your recent posts on temptation got me thinking (again) about a problem I've wrestled with a long time. I'm a Christian minister and I've long thought about a tension between Jesus Christ's focus on intentions and sin in the internal life of man and the Christian conviction summed up in Hebrews 4:15…