Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Aporetics

  • Notes on Nicholas Rescher, “Nonexistents Then and Now”

    0. This entry is relevant to my ongoing dialog with Dr. Novak about reference to the nonexistent. I hope he has the time and the stamina to continue the discussion. I have no doubt that he has the 'chops.' I thank him for the stimulation. We philosophize best with friends, as Aristotle says somewhere. But…

  • The Aporetics of Existence: Do Existing Things Have Existence?

    A reader inquires, I have been wondering about whether existing things have existence. This seems obvious to me, but Bradley's regress makes me think twice. For if existing things have existence, then given that existence exists, existence also has existence. And since this latter existence also exists, it also has existence. And so on.  …

  • Can a Dead Animal be Buried?

    Arguably not. Here is an argument: 1) A dead animal can be buried if and only if it is identical to its corpse. 2) A dead animal is not identical to its corpse. Therefore 3) It is not the case that a dead animal can be buried. Argument for (2): 4) If a dead animal…

  • Which Side Are You On?

    A snatch of dialog in illustration of the aporetics of our political predicament: A. It's a war! Don't say anything bad about our guys! Which side are you on? Don't preface your defense of Trump by conceding that he has these and these negative qualities. Don't give ammo to the enemy!  In a gunfight against…

  • Something about Nothing

    Consider the following contradictory propositions: 1) Something exists. 2) Nothing exists. (1) is plainly true. It follows that (2) is false.  So much for truth value. What about modal status?  Is (1) contingent or necessary? If (1) is contingent, then its negation is possible, in which case it is possible that (2) be true.  If…

  • A Reader Poses a Question about the Extent of My Solubility Skepticism

    M.M. writes, I understand that your method is aporetic – you argue that the great problems of philosophy are genuine problems but also insoluble, at least by us here below.    [. . .]   My question is: do you think that  — even if all positions in some metaphysical disputes have their problems —…

  • Presentism: Safe Passage between Tautology and Absurdity?

    Can presentism navigate between the Scylla of tautology and the Charybdis of absurdity? Let's see.  We begin with a datum, a given, a Moorean deliverance that I think most would be loath to deny: DATUM: if it is true that a was F, or that a F'ed, then it was true that a is F, or that a Fs. For example, if it is true…

  • Being and Time: Another Presentist Puzzle

    One type of presentism makes a double-barreled claim about the Being of all beings:  All beings are (i) in time (ii) at the present time. There is nothing 'outside' of time, and the there is nothing 'outside' of the present time.  To be just is to be temporally present.  Being = Presentness.  Since identity is…

  • Continuing the Discussion of Time, Tense, and Existence

    This just in from London.  I've intercalated my responses. Here is another take. We agree on our disagreement about the following consequence (A)  X is no longer temporally present, therefore X has ceased to exist. You think it is not valid, i.e. you think the antecedent could be true with the consequent false. I think…

  • Presentism and the Determinacy of the Past

    On presentism, the present alone exists, and not in the trivial sense that the present alone exists at present, but in the substantive sense that the present alone exists simpliciter.  But if so, then the past is nothing, a realm of sheer nonbeing. But surely the past is not nothing: it happened, and is in…

  • World + God = God? The Aporetics of the God-World ‘Relation’ (2020 Version)

    This from a reader: I just started reading Philosophy for Understanding Theology by Diogenes Allen. The first chapter is devoted to the doctrine of creation.  These two sentences jumped out at me: "The world plus God is not more than God alone. God less the world is not less than God alone." Do you agree? How would…

  • The Euthyphro Dilemma, Divine Simplicity, and Modal Collapse

    The Question God commands all and only the morally obligatory. But does he command it because it is obligatory, or is it obligatory because he commands it? The question naturally arises, but issues in a dilemma. A dilemma is a very specific sort of problem in which there are exactly two alternatives, neither of which…

  • Schlick’s Scientism: An Antilogism

    Remember Moritz Schlick?  He wrote, "All real problems are scientific  questions; there are no others." ("The Future of Philosophy" in The Linguistic Turn, ed. R. Rorty).  The Schlickian dictum sires an antilogism. 1) All real problems are scientific. 2) The problem whether all real problems are scientific is real. 3) The problem whether all real…

  • Pain and Time: An Aporetic Triad

    Here are three extremely plausible propositions that cannot all be true: 1) A wholly past (felt) pain is not nothing: it is real. 2) For (felt) pains, esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. 3) Wholly past (felt) pains are not perceived. Ad (1): To say that an item is wholly past is…

  • Democratic Socialism?

    The label smacks of an oxymoron. Essential to socialism is collective ownership of the means of production. Democratic socialists will presumably want to distinguish socialism from statism, which may be defined as state control of the economy, where the state control is not in turn democratically controlled. Historically, however, the tendency is for supposedly collective,…