Author: Bill Vallicella

Existence: Some Responses to Pavel Materna

For context see Pavel Tichy on Existence, the posts chained to it, and the comments to these posts.

My view is that existence belongs to individuals in the way it would not belong to them if Frege and Russell and Pavel Tichy were right about existence. These three maintain that existence is exclusively a property of concepts, propositional functions, and offices, respectively. I maintain that there are legitimate first-level uses of ‘exist(s)’ in addition to the legitimate second-level uses. This commits me to saying that, in a suitably broad sense of ‘property,’ existence is a property of individuals. No doubt it is a very peculiar property, indeed a sui generis property, but it is a property nonetheless. Or so I maintain. Sometimes I avoid the potentially misleading term ‘property’ altogether and simply say that existence belongs to individuals in the way it would not belong to them if Frege and Russell were right. If Russell is right, then existence is like numerousness. Plainly, one cannot predicate being numerous of an individual, e.g., ‘Socrates is numerous’ and ‘This pencil is numerous’ are nonsense. I say Russell’s view is mistaken. Although second-level uses of ‘exist(s)’ are like the uses of ‘numerous,’ ‘exist(s)’ has legitimate first-level uses unlike ‘numerous’ which has no legitimate first-level uses.

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The Presumptuousness of Blogging

Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties/Der Streit der Fakultäten, tr. Gregor (University of Nebraska Press, 1979), p. 177:

To want to entertain others with the inner history of the play of my thoughts, which has subjective importance (for me) but no objective importance (valid for everyone), would be presumptuous, and I could justly be blamed for it.

There is no doubt about it: we bloggers are a presumptuous and vain lot. We report daily on the twists and turns of our paltry minds. In mitigation, a couple of points. First, I don’t force my posts on anyone. If you are here, it is of your own free will. Second, there is something fascinating to me about the origin of my own and others’ ideas and how they in their abtractness percolate up out of the concretion of their authors’ Existenz. The blogs of most interest to me combine the existential with the theoretical, the autobiographical with the impersonal. The question of the origin of ideas must not be confused with the question of their validity or lack thereof. (Got that, Fritz?) But both questions are fascinating, and how exactly they connect is even more so. Now if I find the intertwinement of the existential and the theoretical interesting, then perhaps you do as well; herein may reside some justification for reports on “the inner history of the play of my thoughts.”

I oppose the nomenclature whereby individual weblogs (as opposed to group weblogs) are referred to as ‘personal’ weblogs. This blog is more impersonal than personal and I fret over the ratio. Objektive Wichtigkeit should predominate over subjektive. But by how much?

By the way, Streit der Fakultäten is a fascinating book. I’m an old Kant man; I wrote my dissertation on the ontological status of the transcendental unity of apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason. But it is only recently that I cracked The Conflict of the Faculties. This is a nice edition: German Fraktur on the left, good English translation on the right.

Nature’s Jealousy and Modesty

During almost any solitary hike through the wild there comes a moment of enchantment when the beauty of nature stands forth as if enframed. But the qualifier ‘solitary’ is necessary. Bring along a companion and you bring along society – and drive away nature. She is both jealous and modest: she doesn’t like to share her charms, and she won’t expose them to the merely social animal with his endless yap, yap, yapping about noth, noth, nothing.

The Perversity of the Philosophy Professors

The philosophy professors treat philosophy as a means to an end when it is an end in itself. And they treat it as a means to something, whether money, social status, or whatever, which cannot be an end in itself but only a means to an end. They pursue philosophy for the sake of money when they ought to pursue money for the sake of philosophy. Doubly perverse, they turn an end into a means, and a means into an end. I like the Turkish word for human being, Insan, because it reminds me of ‘insane.’

You will tell me that there are exceptions. No doubt. But they prove the rule.

What It Takes to Appreciate Nature

Those who must wrest a living from nature by hard toil are not likely to see her beauty, let alone appreciate it. But her charms are also lost on the sedentary city-dwellers for whom nature is little more than backdrop and stage-setting for what they take to be the really real, the social tragi-comedy. The same goes for the windshield tourists who, seated in air-conditioned comfort, merely look upon nature as upon a pretty picture. The true acolyte of nature must combine in one person a robust and energetic physique, a contemplative mind, and a healthy measure of contempt for the world of the human-all-too-human. One thinks of Henry David Thoreau. Of the same type, but not on the same lofty plane: Edward Abbey.

Francesco Orilia on Facts and Bradley’s Regress Part I

I was invited to attend a workshop on Bradley’s Regress at the University of Geneva this December. Francesco Orilia will also be in attendance. He and I corresponded about Bradley and facts four or so years ago. He has read some of my work and I have read some of his. This series of posts is a new attempt at understanding his position and differentiating it from mine. It is based on his “States of Affairs: Bradley vs. Meinong” in Venanzio Raspa, ed., Meinongian Issues in Contemporary Italian Philosophy, Ontos Verlag, 2006, pp. 213-238.

1. The Problem in a First Rough Formulation

A fact or state of affairs (STOA) is a contingent unity of certain ontological constituents, for example, a (thin) particular and a universal. It is this unity that is responsible for a fact’s being a truth-maker, as opposed to a mere collection of entities. Obviously, it is Al’s being fat, rather than the mere collection of Al and fatness, that makes true the proposition that Al is fat. We take as given the difference between a fact and its constituents, between a’s being F, on the one hand, and the set or sum consisting of a and F-ness, on the other. The difference is clear if one notes that, for example, Al and fatness can exist without it being the case that Al is fat. (The converse of course does not hold.) There is more to Al’s being fat than Al and fatness. The problem is to give an account of this ‘more.’ What is it that makes a fact more than its constituents?

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Louis Lavelle on the Stoic Wisdom

I am a lover of the Stoics. Why waste time on New Age hucksters when one can read Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius? But while the Stoics can take us a good stretch down the road to wisdom, they cannot bring us to the end — a fact long appreciated by first-rate minds. In late antiquity, Aurelius Augustinus offered a critique of the Stoics in Book XIX, Chapter 4 of The City of God, a critique worthy of being called classical. We will have to examine that critique one of these days. But today I want to draw your attention to some passages from Chapter 10, Section 4 of Louis Lavelle’s The Dilemma of Narcissus (Allen & Unwin, 1973, tr. Gairdner):

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Lust

Lust is both evil and paltry. The lecher makes himself contemptible in the manner of the glutton and the drunkard. The paltriness of lust may support the illusion that it does not matter if one falls into it. Thus the paltriness hides the evil. This makes it even more insidious.

Dust in the Wind

We are little more than organized dust in the wind. And yet we feel ourselves superior to the universe! In a sense, we are right: we know the universe; it is our object. We know it, but it doesn’t know us. It can crush us, but it cannot know us.

On Socializing

To socialize, one must accommodate oneself to the mentality of the group. One must conform, fit in, be a ‘regular guy,’ and above all avoid serious conversation! But no independent spirit, no true individual, can tolerate this sort of self-denial unless it is absolutely forced on him. Ganz man selbst sein, kann man nur wenn man allein ist! (Schopenhauer) “You can only be entirely yourself when you are alone.” “Whosoever would be a man must be a nonconformist.” (Ralph Waldo Emerson) In another place, Emerson tells that he does not visit the homes of his relatives because he does not like to be alone. I salute you, Waldo!

Perils of Praise

We do not like to be praised if: the praiser is beneath us; what is praised in us is something insignificant or common; the praise is felt to be insincere, perhaps by having an ulterior motive; the praise is mistaken in that we lack the excellence attributed to us. Particularly galling is to be praised for something insignificant while one’s actual virtues go unappreciated. So be careful in your bestowal of praise: take care that you do not offend the one you hope to flatter.