Author: Bill Vallicella

Feser on Vallicella on Rand

I just discovered this post at Edward Feser's weblog.  Excerpt:

Bill also evaluates Rand’s argument to the effect that “to grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence.” He sees in this an inadvertent echo of modal Spinozism, and not implausibly. But to me it is even more reminiscent of the even more extreme metaphysics of Parmenides . . . .

The  Parmenides connection is very interesting.  When I asked Harry Binswanger why he thinks that the existence of nature is logically necessary, he replied,

Well, the first part is axiomatic: "existence exists." What makes that logically necessary? The fact that "existence doesn't exist" is a contradiction. "What is, is; what is not, is not" Parmenides wisely said.

Ernst Haeckel said that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, that the development of the individual recapitulates the development of the species.  Whether or not this is true in biology, it is often true  with amateur philosophers: these members of the Philo-phylum have a tendency to 'reinvent the wheel' while at the same time failing to appreciate the defects of their primitive reinvented 'wheel.'

Now you might want to dismiss what I just wrote as a cheapshot, but you will see that it is not if you study what I say here and here and here.  There is no 'Rand-bashing' here, contra what some opine; there is the careful and critical examination of ideas.  That is part of what philosophy is.

Back to Parmenides: Binswanger’s Defense of Rand’s Block Universe

In response to Harry Binswanger, I wrote:

My diagnosis of our disagreement is as follows. You think that what is causally necessitated (e.g. the lunar craters) is broadly-logically necessary (BL-necessary) whereas I think that what is causally necessitated is broadly-logically contingent. Because you think that what is causally necessitated is BL-necessary, you naturally think that my having my hat on is not causally necessitated. If I've understood you correctly, you do not deny that there are BL-contingent events, an example being my freely choosing to put on my hat. What you deny is that there are any BL-contingent events in nature (the realm of the non-man-made).

Your scheme makes sense if (i) time is [metrically] infinite in the past direction; (ii) nature always existed; (iii) nature exists of BL-necessity (also known in the trade as metaphysical necessity) and nothing about nature is BL-contingent. On these assumptions, every event is BL-necessary. Add to that the assumption that every event in nature is causally determined, and we get the extensional equivalence of the causally necessitated and the BL-necessary. Man-made facts, which you grant are BL-contingent, are not causally necessitated because, for you, X is causally necessitated if and only if X is BL-necessary.

If the foregoing expresses your view, then I think I have isolated the source of our disagreement: we disagree over (iii). I see no reason to accept it. Do you have an argument?

Binswanger responded:

Your "diagnosis" is correct in spirit. I have quarrels over formulation, but there's no need to discuss them here. So we disagree about (iii): the existence of nature is logically necessary and nothing about nature is logically contingent.

You ask for an argument for that. Well, the first part is axiomatic: "existence exists." What makes that logically necessary? The fact that "existence doesn't exist" is a contradiction. "What is, is; what is not, is not" Parmenides wisely said.

The second part is non-axiomatic, and derives from causality. Objectivism holds that causality is the application of the law of identity to action. Things do what they do because they are what they are. For the fragile to act as non-fragile would be the same kind of contradiction as for glass to be not glass. This view of causality rejects the Humean event-to-event idea of causation (which actually originated with Telesio, I believe). We go back to the pre-Renaissance (broadly Greek) view of causation as a relation between entities and their actions.


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Stupor Bowl Sunday Refused, Yet Again

Video Herewith, my annual Stupor Bowl Sunday post, supplemented with a properly curmudgeonly quotation from Edward 'Cactus Ed' Abbey for your reading enjoyment. Things were bad last year: the damn thing transpired in Phoenix. Luckily, it was far from where I dwell safe and snug in the foothills of the Superstition Mountains.  This year the game is far away, but the Arizona Cardinals are in contention.  Funny name, 'Cardinals.'  What does football have to do with little birdies?  Will I sneak a peek this year?  Maybe.  But I won't be able to take more than a few minutes of it.  In any case, here is last year's post.  I am tempted to add a rant about the misuse of taxpayer money for the construction of stadiums that are used only by some, but that can wait for next year.

I won't be watching the game. I don't even know which teams are playing. Undoubtedly there is more to football than I comprehend. But the games are nasty, brutish, but not short, and I know all I need to know about the implements of shaving.

Epistemic/Doxastic Possibility

Recent forays into the metaphysics and epistemology of modality require us to be quite clear about the senses  of 'possible,'  necessary,'  and the other modal words in play.  In the contexts mentioned, these words are not being used epistemically or doxastically. 

Is Joan in her office? If I ask you, you might reply, "It's possible." Or if I ask you, "Is Zorn's Lemma logically independent of the Axiom of Choice" you might reply, "It's possible." We need to clarify these uses of 'possible.'

This Site Will Not Harm Your Computer!

Using the Google search engine this morning, I noticed that every search I did brought up sites flagged with the 'This site may harm your computer' warning.  I even Googled 'Google' and got the same result!  Could Google be flagging every site brought up by its engine?  That would be such an obvious piece of fear-mongering and traffic-reducing stupidity that I hesitate to impute it to them.  Any thoughts from the computer cognoscenti?

Despite my catchy title, it is your responsibility take precautions whenever you connect with anything in any way.  I am responsible for the content of this site, including in some measure the content of the comments, which is why I delete stupid and otherwise offensive comments and block those who send them.  But I take no responsibility for what goes on at the server end.

UPDATE: 9:30 AM.  Alexander Pruss informs me that the problem has been fixed.

UPDATE: 1:30 PM. Google explains the origin of the error.

From Possibilities to Possible Worlds

1. One cannot do modal logic, let alone modal metaphysics, without both modal concepts and  'modal intuitions.' One has to start from a pre-thematic understanding of modal concepts such as possibility and necessity and how they are interrelated and also from certain prior convictions about what counts as possible and  necessary. (The same is true in other disciplines such as ethics: if you don't grasp the distinctions and interconnections among the permissible, the impermissible, the obligatory, and the supererogatory, and have some reasonably firm intuitions about what particular actions and ommissions fall under these categories, then there is no point in doing ethics.)

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Is the Existence of God Entailed by Alternative Ways Natural Things Might Have Been?

This post is a sequel to Ayn Rand on Necessity, Contingency, and Dispositions.  There we were examining this quotation:

What do you mean by "necessity"? By "necessity," we mean that things are a certain way and had to be.  I would maintain that the statement "Things are," when referring to non-man-made occurrences, is the synonym of "They had to be."  Because unless we start with the premise of an arbitrary God who creates nature, what is had to be. (IOE, 2nd ed., p. 299)

Rand's argument may be set forth as follows:

1. If there are alternative ways non-man-made things might have been, then an arbitrary (free) God exists.

2. It is not the case that an arbitrary (free) God exists. Ergo,

3. There are no alternative ways non-man-made things might have been.

I rigged the argument so that it is valid in point of logical form: the conclusion follows from the premises.  But are the premises true?  A more tractable question: Do we have good reason to accept them?

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Notes on Van Inwagen on Modal Epistemology

Herewith, some interpretive notes and critical comments on Peter van Inwagen's paper, "Modal Epistemology" (Philosopical Studies 92 (1998), pp. 67-84; reprinted in van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality, Cambridge UP, 2001, pp. 243-258.)

1. Van Inwagen describes his position as "modal scepticism" (245) but a better name for it would be 'mitigated modal scepticism' since he does admit that we have modal knowledge: "I think we do know a lot of modal propositions . . . ." (245)

Harry Binswanger Defends Rand

I thank Dr. Binswanger for commenting on the post, Modal Confusion in Rand/Peikoff.  His  stimulating comments deserve to be brought to the top of the page.  I have reproduced them verbatim below.  I have intercalated my responses  in blue.  The ComBox is open, but the usual rules apply: be civil, address what is actually said, argue your points, etc. 

…………………..

As an actual Objectivist philosopher, let me attempt to address Bill's critique of Peikoff's article.

First, there's a significant typo in the first line of his reproduction of Peikoff's last paragraph. Peikoff did *not* write: "Truth is the identification of a fact WITH reality." (As someone pointed out, that is nonsensical.) The actual sentence is: "Truth is identification of a fact OF reality." (emphasis added by me)

(For the merely connotative difference between "fact" and "fact of reality," see _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_, p. 243).

BV: Guilty as charged. I apologize for the unintentional typographical error.

Now on to the main point. The Objectivist position is twofold:

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Why God Cannot be the Creator of the Universe

Leonard Peikoff writes, "Is God the creator of the universe? There can be no creation of something out of nothing. There is no nothing."

Peikoff is arguing that God cannot be the creator of the universe because creation is creation of something out of nothing, and there is no nothing.  Is this a good argument or a bad argument?  Justify your answer.  Be clear and concise.

Rand Entry in the Philosophical Lexicon

Here we find:

rand, n. An angry tirade occasioned by mistaking philosophical disagreement for a personal attack and/or evidence of unspeakable moral corruption. "When I questioned his second premise, he flew into a rand." Also, to attack or stigmatise through a rand. "When I defended socialised medicine, I was randed as a communist."

Ayn Rand on Necessity, Contingency, and Dispositions

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd ed., p. 299, Rand speaking:

What do you mean by "necessity"? By "necessity," we mean that things are a certain way and had to be.  I would maintain that the statement "Things are," when referring to non-man-made occurrences, is the synonym of "They had to be."  Because unless we start with the premise of an arbitrary God who creates nature, what is had to be.  We have to drop any mystical premise and keep the full context in mind.  Then, aside from human action, what things are is what they had to be.

The alternative of what "had to be" versus "what didn't have to be" doesn't apply metaphysically.  It applies only to the realm of human action and human choice."

First of all, 'Things are' and 'Things had to be' cannot be synonyms since they obviously have different meanings as anyone who understands English knows.    But let's be charitable.  What Rand is trying to say is that every non-man-made occurrence is such that 'had to be' applies to it, and every man-made occurrence is such that 'did not have to be' applies to it.  Charitably construed, she is not making a false semantic point, but two modal points.  The first is that nothing non-man-made is contingent or, equivalently, that everything non-man-made is necessary.  The second modal point is that the man-made is contingent.  I will discuss only the first modal point.  It is not obvious and is denied by many philosophers both theists and atheists.  So it is legitimate to demand an argument for the thesis. 

Continue reading “Ayn Rand on Necessity, Contingency, and Dispositions”

Existence, God, and the Randians

This is a follow-up to yesterday's  Rand and Existence Again. The following is by Leonard Peikoff:

Every argument for God and every attribute ascribed to Him rests on a false metaphysical premise. None can survive for a moment on a correct metaphysics . . . .

Existence exists, and only existence exists. Existence is a primary: it is uncreated, indestructible, eternal. So if you are to postulate something beyond existence—some supernatural realm—you must do it by openly denying reason, dispensing with definitions, proofs, arguments, and saying flatly, “To Hell with argument, I have faith.” That, of course, is a willful rejection of reason.

Objectivism advocates reason as man’s sole means of knowledge, and therefore, for the reasons I have already given, it is atheist. It denies any supernatural dimension presented as a contradiction of nature, of existence. This applies not only to God, but also to every variant of the supernatural ever advocated or to be advocated. In other words, we accept reality, and that’s all.

In this passage we meet once again our old friend 'Existence exists.'  And we note the sort of linguistic mischief that Rand/Peikoff engage in.   It cannot be denied that existing things exist, and only existing things exist.  This is entirely trivial.  Anyone who denies it embraces a contradiction:  There are existing things that do not exist. We should all agree, then, with the first sentence of the second paragraph. So far, so good. 

But then Peikoff tells us that to postulate something supernatural such as God is "to postulate something beyond existence."  Now it may well be that there is no God or anything beyond nature.  It may well be that everything that exists is a thing of nature.   But the nonexistence of God does not follow from the triviality that everything that exists exists.  Does it take a genius to see that the following argument is invalid?

1. Existence exists, ergo

2. God does not exist.

One cannot derive a substantive metaphysical conclusion from a mere tautology. No doubt, whatever exists exists.  But one cannot exclude God from the company of what exists by asserting that whatever exists exists.  Now it is not nice to call people stupid, but anyone who cannot appreciate the simple point I have just made is, I am afraid, either stupid, or not paying attention, or willfully obtuse. Here is an example of a valid argument:

3. Nothing supernatural exists

4. God is supernatural, ergo

5. God does not exist.

For Peikoff to get the result he wants, the nonexistence of God, from the premise 'Existence exists,' he must engage in the linguistic mischief of using 'existence' to mean 'natural existence.'  Instead of saying "only existence exists," he should have said 'only natural existence exists.' But then he would lose the self-evidence of "Existence exists and only existence exists."

Conflating a trivial self-evident thesis with a nontrivial controversial thesis has all the advantages of theft over honest toil as Russell said in a different connection.  It would take a certain amount of honest philosophical toil to construct a really good argument for the nonexistence of any and all supernatural entities.  But terminological mischief is easy.  What Peikoff is doing above is smuggling the nonexistence of the supernatural into the term 'existence'  Now if you cannot see that that is an intellectually dispreputable move, then I must say you are hopeless.

It is like a bad ontological argument in reverse.  On one bad version of the ontological argument, one defines God into existence by smuggling the notion of existence into the concept of God and then announcing that since we have the concept of God, God must exist.  Peikoff is doing the opposite: he defines God and the supernatural out of existence by importing their nonexistence into the term 'existence.'  But you can no more define God into existence than you can define him out of existence.

There are other egregious blunders in the above passage.  But if I were to expose every mistake of the Randians, I might attain the age of a Methuselah and still not be done.  Or perhaps I should liken it unto a Sisyphean labor, one of endless and futile toil.  Futile, because the Randians I have so far encountered seem quite unteachable.

 

 

Rand and Existence Again

One of my Rand posts has inspired some vigorous discussion at Triablogue.  My nominalist sparring partner 'Ocham' over at Beyond Necessity comments here on part of the Triablogue discussion:

Tennant points out the 'Existence exists' is incoherent – existence is commonly regarded as a second-order property. Not by everyone, I should point out, but certainly Frege's view that existence is a second-order predicate is accepted by nearly all those in mainstream analytic philosophy. Nor is Donohue's restatement, "whatever exists exists" in any way useful, because it is either merely tautological and doesn't tell us anything, or it is equally incoherent (for it dubiously assumes that existence is a first-order predicate).

Let me try to sort this out.  Neither Tennant nor 'Ocham' understand what Rand is saying.  Donohue may understand it, but he doesn't see what is wrong with it.


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In All Fairness to Ayn Rand and the Randians . . .

. . . I should point out that there are professional philosophers who take Rand's work seriously.  See The Ayn Rand Society.  Some years ago I read something by Douglas Rasmussen, one of the members of the society, and I found it quite good. 

I suppose one could compare Rand with Nietzsche on the score of professional respectability.  There are philosophers who have utter contempt for Nietzsche and deny that he is a philosopher at all.   In the early '90s I had a conversation with the late Gregory Fitch, then chairman of the Arizona State University Philosophy Department.  I asked him if anyone in his department had an interest in Nietzsche.  He snorted that that no one there was interested in "that junk."   But not all analytic philosophers are narrow Fitch-style bigots.  There are other analytic philosophers who find Nietzsche's ideas worthy of study and reconstruction. 

Like Nietzsche, Rand is untrained in philosophy, rants and raves, argues in an abominably slovenly fashion when she argues at all, is supremely confident  of her own towering significance, is muddled and  idiosyncratic — Existence exists! — , expresses contempt for her opponents, all the while psychologizing them and making little attempt to understand their actual positions.  And like Nietzsche, she is immensely attractive to adolescents of all ages.  Still, there are ideas there worth discussing, if only to show how one can go wrong.  Same with Nietzsche: he goes wrong in very interesting ways.

Recall what got me started on this current Rand jag.  It was 'Ocham's' question whether Rand counts as a professional or an amateur.  I have been making a case that she and Peikoff are amateurs.  (This is consistent with their ideas being worth discussing.) But it is no surprise to me that amateurs fail to appreciate the merits of my case.  More to come.