Author: Bill Vallicella

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Underplayed/Forgotten Oldies

I'll reckon you haven't heard one of these in a righteous spell:

Betty Everett, You're No Good, 1963.  More soulful than the 1975 Linda Ronstadt version.
The Ikettes, I'm Blue, 1962.
Lee Dorsey, Ya Ya, 1961.  Simplicity itself. Three chords. I-IV-V progression. No bridge.
Paul Anka, A Steel Guitar and a Glass of Wine, 1962.
Carole King, Crying in the Rain, 1963.  The earnest girl-feeling of young Carole makes it better than the Everly Bros.' more polished and better executed version.   
Don Gibson, Sea of a Heartbreak.  A crossover hit from 1961.  It's a crime for the oldies stations to ignore this great song.
Ketty Lester, Love Letters, 1961.  Gets some play, but not enough.

Should You Trust Wikipedia?

Ed of Beyond Necessity asked me my opinion of the following passage from the Wikipedia article, Destiny.

In daily language destiny and fate are synonymous, but with regards to 20th century philosophy the words gained inherently different meanings.

For Arthur Schopenhauer destiny was just a manifestation of the Will to Live. Will to Live is for him the main aspect of the living. The animal cannot be aware of the Will, but men can at least see life through its perspective, though it is the primary and basic desire. But this fact is a pure irrationality and then, for Schopenhauer, human desire is equally futile, illogical, directionless, and, by extension, so is all human action. Therefore, the Will to Live can be at the same time living fate and choice of overrunning the fate same, by means of the Art, of the Morality and of the Ascesis.

For Nietzsche destiny keeps the form of Amor fati (Love of Fate) through the important element of Nietzsche's philosophy, the "will to power" (der Wille zur Macht), the basis of human behavior, influenced by the Will to Live of Schopenhauer. But this concept may have even other senses, although he, in various places, saw the will to power as a strong element for adaptation or survival in a better way.[3] In its later forms Nietzsche's concept of the will to power applies to all living things, suggesting that adaptation and the struggle to survive is a secondary drive in the evolution of animals, less important than the desire to expand one’s power. Nietzsche eventually took this concept further still, and transformed the idea of matter as centers of force into matter as centers of will to power as mankind’s destiny to face with amor fati.

The expression Amor fati is used repeatedly by Nietzsche as acceptation-choice of the fate, but in such way it becomes even another thing, precisely a “choice” destiny.

Ed tells me that the above strikes him as "gibberish."  Well, if not pure gibberish, then very, very  bad.  First of all, the writing is awkward and inept and in places incoherent. 

In the first sentence the author mentions 20th century philosophy and then immediately goes on to speak of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, both 19th century thinkers.  Could the author be so clueless as not to know when these gentlemen lived and wrote?

"Will to Live is the main aspect of the living."  Sentences like his are part of why I rejoice in no longer being a professor.  First of all, Will cannot be described as an aspect of anything: 'aspect'  suggests a view, an appearance, a representation (Vorstellung), a phenomenon.  Schopenhauer's Will, however, plays in his system the role that the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich)  plays in Kant's.  Will is noumenal, not phenomenal, and so cannot be coherently described as an aspect. One ought to have gathered this just from the title of Schopenhauer's magnum opus, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.  Second, Will is what everything is at bottom, not just living things.

I won't continue through the passage.  It is bad throughout.  What I hated about teaching was having to wade through garbage like this.  How does one explain to an incompetent writer what competent writing is?  It is like trying to explain to a nerd why his pocket protector is a sartorial outrage or why pulling your pants up too high is 'uncool' or why socks with sandals don't make it.  Or how do you explain to a socially lame person why she is socially lame?  What do you do? Give her rules to follow?  But such rules come too late.

I do not take as harsh a view of Wikipedia as Ed does.  There is much of value in its pages, and plenty of the material is arcana that cannot be found elsewhere.  But one cannot really trust anything one finds there since there is no way of knowing who wrote what and what his credentials are.

Let Caveat lector! be your watch-phrase, then, when you make use of this online resource.

Addendum:  Mark Anderson recommends The 'Undue Weight' of Truth on Wikipedia.

Kennedy, Clinton, and the Sex Business

George Orwell, Keep the Aspidistra Flying (Harvest 1956), p. 102:

This woman business! What a bore it is! What a pity we can't cut it right out, or at least be like the animals — minutes of ferocious lust and months of icy chastity. Take a cock pheasant, for example. He jumps up on the hens' backs without so much as a with your leave or by your leave. And no sooner is it over than the whole subject is out of his mind. He hardly even notices his hens any longer; he ignores them, or simply pecks them if they come near his food. He is not called upon to support his offpsring, either. Lucky pheasant! How different from the lord of creation, always on the hop between his memory and his conscience!

Being like the animals is of course no solution, even if it were possible. A strange fix we're in: it is our spiritual nature that enables both our sinking below, and our rising above, the level of the animal.

The delusive power of the sex drive is made all the more delusive and dangerous when aided  and abetted by personal magnetism and great political power. Kennedy and Clinton are two examples of how power corrupts.

On the Mormon Concept of God

I should thank (or perhaps blame) Spencer Case for sidetracking me into the thickets of Mormon metaphysics.  But I have no cause to complain seeing as how my motto is "Study everything, join  nothing."  Earlier I made a preliminary response to some of Spencer's concerns about the "facelessness" of the full Anselmian conception of deity.  Here I am not concerned to defend that conception in all its aspects.  Indeed, I will concede arguendo all of the following for the space of this post:  divine simplicity is incoherent; divine simplicity is inconsistent with the doctrine of the Trinity; the latter doctrine is incoherent; and so is the doctrine of the Incarnation. I make these concessions to focus the issue and to make clear that my interest as a philosopher is neither apologetic nor polemical.  I want to put Blake Ostler and other Mormons at ease: I am not here interested in attacking their faith or defending the sort of God conception found in Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.  Philosophy is first and foremost inquiry; its purpose is not to attack or defend any worldview.  It does not exist to shore up or legitimate antecedently accepted worldviews or ideologies. (So it is not ancilla theologiae, not the handmaiden of theology or of natural science or of anything else.)  Religions are worldviews; philosophy as inquiry is no more a worldview than is mathematics or physics.  It is also important to note that if the Augustine-Anselm-Aquinas conception is incoherent it doesn't follow that the Mormon conception is coherent: they could both be incoherent.

The issue I will discuss is precisely whether the following assertion by A. A. Howsepian is true:  ". . . nothing countenanced by Mormon metaphysicians could possibly count as God." ("Are Mormons Theists?" Religious Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, Sept. 1996, p. 367)  Since I am not familiar with the particulars of Mormon doctrine, I will simply assume that they are what Blake T. Ostler says they are in his response to Howsepian in  "Worshipworthiness and the Mormon Concept of God," Religious Studies, vol. 33, no. 3 (Sept. 1997), pp. 315-326.  So what I will be doing is examining Ostler's view of the the Mormon conception of God with an eye to deciding whether it is an adequate God conception.

1. The Anselmian Criterion  of Deity

Obviously, not just anything could count as God.  So we need a criterion of deity.  According to the Anselmian criterion, which both Howsepian and Ostler accept, at least in the main, it is a matter of broadly logical necessity that nothing could count as God that is not the greatest conceivable being (GCB).   The Anselmian provenience of this notion is clear: God is "that than which no greater can be conceived."  The greatness of the GCB consists in its unsurpassibility in respect of all perfections or great-making properties.  The GCB possesses all great-making properties and the highest degree of those that admit of degrees.  Among these properties are the traditional omni-attributes, e.g. omniscience.  Only the GCB is an adequate object of worship.

Let's note that if a being is unsurpassable by any being distinct from itself it does not follow that it is unsurpassable, period.  For it might be "self-surpassable in some respects." (Ostler 315) Obviously, a being that was unsurpassable by any other but self-surpassable could not be actus purus inasmuch as it would have to  harbor unrealized potentialities.  We ought therefore to distinguish an unmodified and a modified GCB criterion:

Unmodified:  If a being counts as God, then that being is unsurpassable in point of perfection by any being, including itself.

Modified:  If a being counts as God, then that being  is unsurpassable in point of perfection by any being distinct from itself.

2.  Does the Mormon God Satisfy the Modified Anselmian Criterion?

It is obvious that the Mormon God cannot satisfy the unmodified  criterion since that criterion leads to the ontologically simple God in whom there is no composition of any kind, whether of form and matter, act and potency, essence and existence, supposit and attributes.  Since Mormons can reasonably reject ontological simplicity, they needn't be fazed by the unmodified criterion.  Ostler maintains, however, that the Mormon concept of God can satisfy the modified criterion.  It may have a chance of doing so if 'God' is construed as 'Godhead.'  (319).  This Godhead, Ostler tells us, is the one supreme being. (319)  If henotheism is the view that there is at least one God, then the Mormon view as Ostler presents it is henotheistic.  If monotheism is the view that there is exactly one God, then the Mormon view is not monotheistic.  Ostler tells us that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three distinct Gods. (319) So there are at least three distinct Gods in the Mormon pantheon, which prevents the view from being strictly monotheistic.  They are nonetheless one Godhead in that the three "divine personages" are united "in love and unity." (320)

Each of the divine persons is "corporeal" and "located in a particular space-time." (320)  The Godhead, however, is not corporeal, at least if Godhead is the same as Godhood.  Ostler employs both of these terms without explaining whether or how they differ.  (320) My impression is that he is using them interchangeably.  If that is right, then Godhead/Godhood is not corporeal.  This is because ". . . Godhood refers to the immutable set of properties necessary to be divine. There is only one Godhood or divine essence in this sense." (320-321, emphasis in original)  Presumably, an immutable set of properties is not corporeal.  The same goes for a set of immutable properties, and a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are immutable properties.

How are God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost related?  They are related in a "relationship of divine love" which is "contingent and not necessary." (321) It is contingent because "Love is a voluntary attitude freely chosen." (321)  "The divine persons can kenotically empty themselves of the divine glory by separating themselves from the divine unity of the Godhead." (321)  Despite this ability of the persons to separate themselves from the unity of the Godhead,

. . . there always has been and always will be a God in the sense of divine persons united as one. The divine persons obviously can so plan that there will always be at least two joined as one to govern the universe. (321)

The individual divine persons are subject to "eternal progression," progression in knowledge, power and dominion.  (321) Does it follow that "Godhead as a whole" or "God-as-divine-persons-in-relationship" is subject to eternal progression?  No it doesn't, says Ostler, and to think otherwise would be to commit the fallacy of composition.  This is the fallacy with which Ostler taxes Howsepian. 

3. Preliminary Evaluation

My question is precisely this: Does the Mormon conception of God/Godhead, as explained by Ostler, satisfy the modifed Anselmian criterion?  The modified criterion requires that a candidate for GCB status  be necessarily unsurpassable by another, but allows the candidate to be self-surpassable in some respects.  Ostler tells us that

. . .there cannot be a greater being than God qua the divine persons united as one Godhead in Mormon thought.  God is necessarily unsurpassable by any other being. (323)

Here is one difficulty I am having.  Ostler claims that the divine persons are contingently related to each other.  It follows that the Godhead as the unity of the persons contingently exists. Please note that if x always existed and always will exist,it doesn't follow that x necessarily exists.  (If x exists at all times in the actual world, it does not follow that x exists in every possible world.)  If the divine persons "c an so plan that there will always be at least two joined as one" (321, emphasis added), it doesn't follow that they must so plan.  Now if the Godhead contingently exists, then there can be a greater being than "God qua the divine persons united as one Godhead," namely, a being having the same properties bu existing necessarily.

I conclude that the Mormon conception as explained by Ostler cannot satisfy the modified Anselmian criterion.  For whether God/Godhead is or is not self-surpassable, he must be a necessary being.  But he can't be a necessary being if the divine persons are merely contingently related. If they are contingently related, then they are possibly such as to be unrelated.  But if they are possibly such as to be unrelated, then their unity is possibly nonexistent, i.e. not necessary.  So it looks as if Howsepian is right in his claim that ". . . nothing countenanced by Mormon metaphysicians could possibly count as God."

Does Ostler have an escape via his talk of Godhood as opposed to Godhead?  (320-321) Godhood or "the divine essence" is "the immutable set of properties necessary to be divine."  This set counts as a necessary being unlike Godhead which we have seen is a contingent being.  But although metaphysically necessary, Godhood cannot be the one God who is "the governing power of the enture universe."  For no such abstract object as a set can play that role.  But, to be charitable, I won't hold Ostler to his talk of a 'set.'  Let us take him to mean a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are the divine attributes.  It too is a necessary being, but it too is causally impotent and cannot be the governing power of the entire universe. 

In sum, Godhead is powerful but contingent while Godhood is necessary but powerless.  To satisfy the modified Anselmian criterion, Ostler needs a being that is both necessary and powerful. 

The Latest Outrage from Obama’s Justice Department

Opening paragraph:

We don't often defend the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but Attorney General Eric Holder can inspire strange alliances. Recently, the Justice Department asked the full circuit to overturn the unanimous and enlightened decision of a three-judge panel allowing bone marrow donors to be compensated for their donations.

Why not allow compensation?

. . . allowing compensation would "undermine the efforts to encourage voluntary donations" and that Congress has established that bone marrow transplants "should not be subject to market forces."

This is a perfect example of how contemptibly and willfully stupid leftists are.  Allowing compensation would not undermine but enhance voluntary donations.  That's obvious.  They don't see it because they are blinded by their own lust for power, desire for total control, and hatred of liberty and free markets.

Read the whole piece to fully savor the illogic of the boneheads over at Justice.

Callicles Anticipates De Sade

At Gorgias 492, tr. Helmbold, the divine Plato puts the following words into the mouth of Callicles:
  
     A man who is going to live a full life must allow his desires to
     become as mighty as may be and never repress them. When his
     passions have come to full maturity, he must be able to serve them
     through his courage and intelligence and gratify every fleeting
     desire as it comes into his heart.

     [. . .]

     The truth, which you claim to pursue, Socrates, is really this:
     luxury, license, and liberty, when they have the upper hand, are
     really virtue, and happiness as well; everything else is a set of
     fine terms, man-made conventions, warped against nature, a pack of
     stuff and nonsense!

De sadeNow let us consider what the decidedly undivine Marquis de Sade has Mme. Delbene say in Julliette or Vice Amply Rewarded:

     . . . I am going to dismiss this equally absurd and childish obligation which enjoins us not to do unto others that which unto us we would not have done. It is the precise contrary Nature     recommends, since Nature's single precept is to enjoy oneself, at the expense of no matter whom. But at our leisure we shall return to these subjects; for the nonce, let's now put our theories into  practice and, after having demonstrated that you can do everything without committing a crime, let's commit a villainy or two to  convince outrselves that everything can be done. (p. 30, emphasis  in original, tr. Casavini)

From the cover: "abridged but unexpurgated from the original  five-volume work especially for the adult reader." In other other words, the good stuff, i.e., the philosophy, has been cut, but the 'adult matter' remains. I get a kick out of this use of 'adult' — but that's another post.

Obama’s Assault on Religious Liberty

Quotable:

Here is what is particularly worrisome: the state seems no longer satisfied with a slow but steady evolution toward secularity; it is aggressively forcing Catholic hospitals off the stage, for it is creating for them an impossible situation. If they cave in and provide insurance for these verboten procedures, they have effectively de-Catholicized themselves; and if they refuse to provide such insurance, they will be met with fines of millions of dollars, which they cannot possibly pay.

In either case, they are forced out of business as Catholic. And this seems, sadly, to be precisely what the Obama administration wants.

At the University of Notre Dame, on the occasion of his receiving (controversially enough) an honorary degree of laws, President Obama publicly and vociferously pledged that he would provide for a "conscience clause" for those who wanted, for religious reasons, to opt out of a policy they find objectionable. But with this recent mandate, he has utterly gone back on his word.

The secularist state recognizes that its principle [sic! read 'principal'] enemy is the Church Catholic. Accordingly, it wants Catholicism off the public stage and relegated to a private realm where it cannot interfere with secularism's totalitarian agenda. I realize that in using that particular term, I'm dropping a rhetorical bomb, but I am not doing so casually.

It's not a rhetorical bomb but the plain truth.  The Left is totalitarian by its very nature, a nature  manifested every day.  The author ought to ask himself whether it makes sense to be so polite and civil toward an administration that is not only the enemy of what he represents, but also mendacious in its hiding of that fact.