Bill Vallicella – Page 549 – Maverick Philosopher

Against Antony Flew on Progress in Philosophy

Antony Flew, There is a God, pp. 40-41 (quoted from Appeared-to-Blogly):

I came to see, as I would write in An Introduction to Western Philosophy, that there can be progress in philosophy despite the general absence of consensus. The lack of consensus in philosophy is not an independently sufficient demonstration that the subject does not make progress. The attempt to show that there is no philosophical knowledge by simply urging that there is always someone who can be relied on to remain unconvinced is a common fallacy made even by a distinguished philosopher like Bertrand Russell. I called it the But-there-is-always-some-one-who-will-never-agree Diversion. Then there is the charge that in philosophy it is never possible to prove to someone that you are right and he or she is wrong. But the missing piece in this argument is the distinction between producing a proof and persuading a person. A person can be persuaded by an abominable argument and remain unconvinced by one that ought to be accepted.

Progress in philosophy is different from progress in science, but that does not mean it is therefore impossible. In philosophy you spotlight the essential nature of deductive argument; you distinguish between questions about the validity or invalidity of arguments and questions about the truth or falsity of their premises or conclusion; you indicate the strict usage of the term fallacy; and you identify and elucidate such fallacies as the But-there-is-always-someone-who-will-never-agree Diversion. To the extent that these things are accomplished with better reasoning and greater effectiveness, progress will be seen—even as consensus and persuasion remain elusive and incomplete. (from Flew, There is a God, pp. 40-41).

Is Flew right? I don't think so.

That there is no consensus in philosophy among competent practitioners is a widely-accepted fact, one that cannot be reasonably disputed. I challenge anyone to give me a clear example of a philosophical problem that has been solved to the satisfaction of all competent practioners. Of course, I am not talking about intramural or school-immanent solutions, but extramural or school-transcendent ones. I trust you catch my meaning. The Thomists think they have solved the problem of universals. The competent practioners within that school agree on that solution and consider the problem solved. But that intramural consensus means little given the existence of competing schools of thought with different solutions. A solution that is school-relative or relative to a set of background assumptions is not a solution, period. (This requires further discussion in connection with the views of N. Rescher, but not here.)

For a second example, the logical positivists in their heyday thought they had definitively established that metaphysical assertions are cognitively meaningless. They had no trouble persuading their own ilk. But the rest of the philosophical world was flabbergasted at their philistinism, not to mention the self-refuting property of the positivist's verifiability criterion of cognitive significance. Examples are easily multiplied.

So I take it to be a fact beyond reasonable dispute that there has been and is now no consensus in philosophy among competent practitioners. What can be reasonably disputed is whether the fact in question gives us a good reason to think either that (i) there will be no progress in philosophy, or that (ii) there can be no progress in philosophy. Flew blurs these two claims. Let's consider the weaker one, (i).

But first we need to address a logically prior question: what is progress in philosophy? It is clear that we ought not identify progress in philosophy with the achieving of consensus, or with progress towards consensus. Suppose consensus is reached as to the solution of some problem. It might still be that the solution is incorrect. Suppose the Thomists take over the world and enforce consensus by liquidating all dissidents and persuading the rest. Their solution to the problem of universals, say, or the problem of change, might still be incorrect. On the other hand, dissensus does not entail that no solution has been arrived at. Maybe Karl Popper did solve the problem of induction despite his failure to convince all of his competent colleagues.

Consensus does not entail philosophical knowledge; dissensus does not entail the lack thereof. (Note that I am assuming, with Flew, that progress in philosophy is progress in knowledge. This is not obvious, but this too cannot now be discussed. There are several ways in which philosophy has progressed even if no philosophical knowledge has been achieved. If nothing else, there are more philosopy books in the world than ever before.)

Entailment, then, fails. Nevertheless, lack of agreement among competent practitioners is good, albeit defeasible, evidence that a solution has not been attained. Flew seems not to appreciate this point, and he seems to miss it because he erects a straw man:

The attempt to show that there is no philosophical knowledge by simply urging that there is always someone who can be relied on to remain unconvinced is a common fallacy made even by a distinguished philosopher like Bertrand Russell. I called it the But-there-is-always-some-one-who-will-never-agree Diversion.

The fact there will always be people who disagree is not to the point. For it may be that they disagree out of stupidity, or temporary confusion, or ignorance of the nature of the problem, or unfamiliarity with the terminology, or because they are sophists or quibblers or contrarians who have a perverse need to contradict. This is why I used the phrase 'competent practitioners.' These are people who have all of the intellectual and moral virtues, a high degree of intelligence, familiarity with the canons of logic, knowledge of relevant empirical facts, etc.

So if anyone is committing a fallacy here it is Flew: he is committing the straw man fallacy. No one "simply urges" that there is no philosophical knowledge because someone remains unconvinced. The point is rather that even after such pesky varmints as the stupid, the confused, the ignorant, the intellectually dishonest, and their uncles and cousins have been excluded, there will still be diagreement, and that this disagreement cannot simply be discounted or ignored. If you are a competent practitioner and you disagree with my solution to a problem, then that ought to give me pause: it is a good reason for me to doubt whether my solution really is one. Of course, I might still be right. But then how would I know this? And if I don't know that my solution is correct, is it a solution? (This needs further discussion. Compare: if I have a true belief about the way to Tucson, does it follow that I know the way? If Seldom Seen Slim, a local, says you go thataway, when I think I ought to go thisaway, should that not give me pause if I don't have justification for my true belief?)

It is telling that the only examples of philosophical knowledge that Flew provides, in the passage quoted leastways, are elementary points of logic. This is not quite to the point since logic is a tool of philosophy but not philosophy proper. I would like to see him give some examples from substantive branches of philosophy where he thinks we have philosophical knowledge.

Augustine Against the Stoics

Today, August 28th, is the Feast of St. Augustine on the Catholic calendar. In honor of the Bishop of Hippo I pull a quotation from his magisterial City of God, Book XIX, Chapter 4:

And I am at a loss to understand how the Stoic philosophers can presume to say that these are no ills, though at the same time they allow the wise man to commit suicide and pass out of this life if they become so grievous that he cannot or ought not to endure them. But such is the stupid pride of these men who fancy that the supreme good can be found in this life, and that they can become happy by their own resources, that their wise man, or at least the man whom they fancifully depict as such, is always happy, even though he become blind, deaf, dumb, mutilated, racked with pains, or suffer any conceivable calamity such as may compel him to make away with himself; and they are not ashamed to call the life that is beset with these evils happy. O happy life, which seeks the aid of death to end it? If it is happy, let the wise man remain in it; but if these ills drive him out of it, in what sense is it happy? Or how can they say that these are not evils which conquer the virtue of fortitude, and force it not only to yield, but so to rave that it in one breath calls life happy and recommends it to be given up? For who is so blind as not to see that if it were happy it would not be fled from? And if they say we should flee from it on account of the infirmities that beset it, why then do they not lower their pride and acknowledge that it is miserable?

Companion posts: The Stoic Ideal and Christian Stoicism.

Dubious Compensation

Memory compensates us for the passage of time, but it also ensures that we will never forget that we are subject to it. Yet better to be a man than an animal held hostage to the passing moment but oblivious of the fact.

A Moral Paradox

Moral success can lead to pride, a form of moral failure. Moral failure can lead to humility, a form of moral success.

Tolerance, Health, and Fascism

Required reading.

Zimmerman-Martin: The ‘Conversation’ about Race Continues

Charlotte Allen, A Tale of Two Trials. An excellent point-by-point rebuttal of (willful?) mistakes about the facts and the law made by the purveyors of the liberal-left 'narrative.'

'Narrative' is a POMO word favored by those who for whom power is the end. For a leftist, truth doesn't matter unless it can be used as a means to the end of power. What matters are those 'narratives' that help forward their agenda. A narrative needn't be true to be a narrative. It is quite in line with Karl Marx's 11th Thesis on Feuerbach, "The philosophers have variously interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it."

Now compare the sobriety of Allen's piece with the febrile lunacy of Patricia J. Williams', The Monsterization of Trayvon Martin: How George Zimmerman’s lawyers exploited racist stereotypes to justify the fear—and killing—of black men.

Michael Barone holds forth sensibly in

Forget the Old South: Trayvon Martin Was No Emmett Till

In this stupid piece, the author maintains that "No one talks about race." The author, a history professor at ASU, is further proof that the universities have become leftist seminaries. This idiot is being supported by taxpayers' dollars.

To recover from the foregoing farrago of Unsinn, enjoy this outstanding piece by John Lott, Obama's Racial Imbalance.

I am Reminded of Christopher McCandless

In the news this morning a story about a young man, 18, who lived not far from here in Apache Junction, whose body was found dead near his abandoned SUV in the woods of southern Oregon. According to his father, Johnathan [sic] Croom was "a young man who had a broken heart." He was grieving the end of a relationship with "someone back in Phoenix."

"He was a young man who had a broken heart and headed out to try to find himself," the elder Croom said. "We're looking forward to finding out exactly what happened."

[. . .]

Hutson said Croom also talked to his parents about Christopher McCandless, whose journey to Alaska was documented in the book "Into the Wild." McCandless gave up his worldly goods to live in the Alaska wilderness, only to die there, perhaps from eating wild potatoes.

A book can change your life. J. D. Salinger's Catcher in the Rye is an even better example. It changed countless lives, some in very bad ways.

Here are some of my McCandless posts:

A Note on Into the Wild, the Movie

Faith and Prayer: The Case of Ron Franz

The Strange Case of Gene Rosselini

The Seeker

The last-mentioned ends like this, with some good advice for the young and in search of themselves:

In McCandless' case, the scorn for security, his fleeing a living death, led to a dying death. In an excess of self-reliance he crossed the Teklanika, not realizing it was his Rubicon and that its crossing would deposit him on the Far Shore. Be bold, muchachos, be bold; be not too bold.

The Straws of Memory

We grasp at the straws of memory to keep from being swept away by time's flood.

School Vouchers: Another DOJ Assault on Federalism

Eric Holder's out-of-control Department of (Social) Justice is at it again, this time going after Bobby Jindal's school choice program in Louisiana.

Yet another attack on federalism. This is not a word that wears its meaning on its sleeve, and the average panem et circenses American would be hard-pressed to define it.

Federalism is (i) a form of political organization in which governmental power is divided among a central government and various constituent governing entities such as states, counties, and cities; (ii) subject to the proviso that both the central and the constituent governments retain their separate identities and assigned duties. A government that is not a federation would allow for the central government to create and reorganize constituent governments at will and meddle in their affairs. Federalism is implied by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

Federalism would make for less contention because people who support high taxes and liberal schemes could head for states like Massachusetts or California, while the conservatively inclined who support gun rights and capital punishment and border control could gravitate toward states like Texas.

The fact of the matter is that we do not agree on a large number of divisive, passion-inspiring issues (abortion, gun rights, capital punishment, affirmative action, school vouchers, photo ID at polling places, legal and illegal immigration, taxation, wealth redistribution, the purposes and limits, if any, on governmental power . . .) and we will never agree on them. These are not merely academic issues since they directly affect the lives and livelihoods and liberties of people. And they are not easily resolved because they are deeply rooted in fundamental worldview differences. When you violate a man's liberty, or mock his moral sense, or threaten to destroy his way of life, you are spoiling for a fight and you will get it.

I fear that we are coming apart as a nation. We are disagreeing about things we ought not be disagreeing about, such as the need to secure the borders. The rifts are deep and nasty. Polarization and demonization of the opponent are the order of the day. Do you want more of this? Then give government more say in your life. The bigger the government, the more to fight over. Do you want less? Then support limited government and federalism. A return to federalism may be a way to ease the tensions, not that I am sanguine about any solution.

Resolution and Dissolution

What we lack the power to resolve, time has the power to dissolve. A dispute, for example. A dispute forgotten is a dispute dissolved.

Made for Thinking

Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Krailsheimer #620:

Man is obviously made for thinking. Therein lies all his dignity and his merit; and his whole duty is to think as he ought. Now the order of thought is to begin with ourselves, and with our author, and our end.

Now what does the world think about? Never about that, but about dancing, playing the lute, singing, writing verse, tilting at the ring, etc., and fighting, becoming king, without thinking about what it means to be a king or to be a man.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Dylan’s Civil Rights Songs

The 1963 March on Washington now lies 50 years in the past. Those civil rights battles were fought and they were won. What could be achieved by legislation and government intervention was achieved. Unfortunately, the civil rights movement gradually transmogrified into a civil rights hustle and grievance industry as the original ideals of Martin Luther King, Jr. were betrayed by race hustlers like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton. And now look at the mess we are in. But it was a time of great and inspiring music. Here are some of Dylan's singular contributions.

Blowin' in the Wind

They Times They Are a' Changin'. A wonderful alternate version by the man himself.

Oxford Town

Only a Pawn in Their Game

The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll. What ever happened to William Zantzinger? See here. The Althouse take on the case.

The Death of Emmett Till. Once again: Trayvon Martin was no Emmett Till!

Chimes of Freedom. Duet with Baez. (Or is it Joan Osbourne?) The Byrd's folk rock version.

When the Ship Comes in. Duet with Baez at the 1963 March on Washington. Clancy Bros. version.

After Dylan did his bit to change the world, the quietist and poet in him won out over the activist and he bid farewell to his past, and, like a quintessential American, moved on down the line.

Restless Farewell. Mark Knopfler rendition.

My Back Pages. Byrds' version.

Memory and the Operations of Reason

"Memory is necessary for all the operations of reason." (Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Krailsheimer, #651)

This seems right. Consider this quick little argument against scientism, the philosophical, not scientific, view that all knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge:

1. I know by reason alone, a priori, and not by any natural-scientific means, that addition has the associative and the commutative properties and that these properties are distinct.

2. If scientism is true, then it is not the case that (1).

Therefore

3. Scientism is not true.

I grasp (understand) this argument and its validity by reason. To grasp any such argument, it is not sufficient that a succession of conscious states transpire in my mental life. For if the state represented by (1) falls into oblivion by the time I get to (2), and (2) by the time I get to (3), then all I would undergo would be a succession of consciousnesses but not the consciousness of succession. But the consciousness of succession is necessary to 'take in' the argument. And this consciousness of succession itself presupposes a kind of memory. To grasp the conclusion as a conclusion — and thus as following from the premises — I have to have retained the premises. There has to be a diachronic unity of consciousness in which there is a sort of synopsis of the premises together with the conclusion with the former entailing the latter.

But of course something similar holds for each proposition in the argument. The meaning of a compound proposition is built up out of the meanings of its propositional parts, and the meaning of a simple proposition is built up out of the meanings of its sub-propositional parts, and these meanings have to be retained as the discursive intellect runs through the propositions. ('Discursive' from the L. currere, to run.) This retention — a term Husserl uses — is a necessary condition of the possibility of understanding.

And so while I do not grasp an argument by memory (let alone by sense perception or introspection), memory is involved in rational knowledge.

The Pascalian aphorism bears up well under scrutiny.

Example of associativity of addition: (7 + 5) + 3 = 7 + (5 + 3). Example of commutativity: (7 + 5) + 3 = (5 + 7) + 3. The difference between the two properties springs to the eye (of the mind). Now what must mind be like if it is to be capable of a priori knowledge? Presumably it can't just be a hunk of meat.

But if the below companion post is right, not even sense knowledge is such that its subject could be a hunk of meat. We are of course meatheads. But squeezing meaning out of mere meat — there's the trick!

Companion post: Pascal on the Immateriality of the Subject of Experience

Kierkegaard: Some Extracts with an Anti-Natalist Flavor

My 1995-1996 Turkish Journal contains quotations from, and commentary on, some of S.K.'s journal entries. Unfortunately, I don't have complete bibliographical data, just the entry numbers. What sent me back to my Turkish Journal was London Karl's request that I dig up Kierkegaardian passages that smack of anti-natalism.

S. K. on Women, #4998. ". . . there is a moment in her life when she deceptively appears to be infinitude herself — and that is when man is captured. And as a wife she is quite simply — finitude."

S. K. seems to be alluding to the Platonic-Augustinian idea that woman (man too in Plato) can be either a deceptive appearance or a sort of reminder of Transcendence, a waker-upper from our Cave-like amnesia. (Anamnesis doctrine).

S. K. #5000. ". . . Christianity and all more profound views of life take a dim view of the relation to the opposite sex, for they assume that getting involved with the other sex is the demotion of man."

A problem for S. K. If the human race ought to come to an end, if procreation and propagation of the species is better not engaged in, then where will the souls come from to share in the divine life? Or does S. K. believe in the pre-existence of souls? Cf. #3970 where S. K. seems to endorse pre-existence.

Again the tension of Platonic-Gnostic and Jewish-Aristotelian elements in Christianity.

But, given problems like these, would it not be absurd to give up the quest for metaphysical truth and sink into a mundane existence?

S. K. #5003. To marry a woman is to be finitized and mediocratized by her. [A paraphrase, apparently, not a quotation.]

S. K. #5005. "Man was structured for eternity; woman leads him into a side remark."

S. K. 5006. "An eminently masculine intellectuality joined to a feminine submissiveness — that is the truly religious."

The Dignity of the King

Wherein resides the dignity of the king? At every time in every possible game, the king is on the board. He cannot be captured: he never leaves the board while the game is on. He alone is 'necessary,' all other pieces are 'contingent.'

But at game's end, he too goes into the box with the lowliest of the pawns, as if to demonstrate that the high and mighty in life are equalized in death.