Author: Bill Vallicella

How Not to Define ‘Atheism’

Atheism as lack

Nonsense, say I.

Note first that atheism cannot be identified with the lack of theistic belief, i.e., the mere absence of the belief that God or a god exists, for that would imply that cabbages and tire irons are atheists.  Note second that it won't do to say that atheism is the lack of theistic belief in persons, for there are persons incapable of forming beliefs.  Charitably interpreted, then, the idea must be that atheism is the lack of theistic belief in persons capable of forming and maintaining beliefs.

But this cannot be right either, and for a very simple reason.  Atheism is something people discuss, debate, argue for, argue against, draw conclusions from, believe, disbelieve, entertain, and so on.  Atheism, in other words, is a PROPOSITION: it is something that can be either true or false, that can be the object of such propositional attitudes as belief and disbelief, that can stand in such logical relations to other propositions as entailment, consistency, and inconsistency.  But one cannot discuss, debate, argue for, . . . believe, etc. a lack of something.  Atheism redefined as the lack of theistic belief is a PROPERTY of certain persons. Now a proposition is not a property.  Atheism is a proposition and  for this reason cannot be redefined as a property.

Someone who understands this might nevertheless maintain that 'negative atheism' is a proposition, namely, the proposition that there are people capable of forming and maintaining beliefs who simply lack the belief that God exists.  Admittedly, one could use 'atheism' as the label for the proposition that there are such people.  But then atheism so defined would be trivially true.  After all, no one denies that there are people capable of beliefs who lack the belief that God exists.  Furthermore, if 'atheism' is so defined, then theism would be the view that there are persons capable of belief who have the belief that God exists.  But then theism, too, would be trivially true.  And if both are true, then they cannot be logical contradictories of each other as they must be if the terms are to mean anything useful.

Now what is the point of the terminological mischief perpetrated by these 'negative atheists'?  It is terminological mischief because we have just seen it ruin two perfectly good words, 'atheism' and 'theism.'  If atheism and theism are worth discussing, then atheism is the view that no gods exist and theism is the view that one or more gods exist.

The point of the cyberpunk definition is to avoid being pinned down, to avoid being committed to a positive thesis.  But of course the claim that there is no God is a positive claim about Reality, namely, the claim that Reality is godless.  And so our cyberpunk commits himself nolens volens.

‘Homophobia’ and ‘Carniphobia’

If you are a conservative, don't talk like a liberal!  I've made this point before but it bears repeating. We conservatives should never acquiesce in the Left's acts of linguistic vandalism. Battles in the culture war are often lost and won on linguistic   ground. So we ought to oppose resolutely the Left's attempts at linguistic corruption.

Take 'homophobia.'

A phobia is a fear, but not every fear is a phobia. A phobia is an  irrational fear. One who argues against the morality of homosexual practices, or gives reasons for opposing same-sex marriage is precisely — presenting arguments, and not expressing any phobia. The arguments  may or may not be cogent. But they are expressive of reason, and are intended to appeal to the reason of one's interlocutor. To dismiss them as an expression of a phobia show a lack of respect for reason and for the persons who proffer the arguments.

There are former meat-eaters who can make an impressive case against the eating of meat. Suppose that, instead of addressing their arguments, one denounces the former carnivores as 'carniphobes.' Can you see what is wrong with that? These people have a reasoned position. Their reasoning may be more or less cogent, their premises more or less disputable. But the one thing they are not doing is expressing an irrational fear of eating meat. Many of them like the stuff and dead meat inspires no fear in them whatsoever.

The point should be obvious: 'homophobia' is just as objectionable as 'carniphobia.' People who use words like these are attempting to close off debate, to bury a legitimate issue beneath a crapload of PeeCee jargon. So it is not just that 'homophobe' and 'homophobia' are question-begging epithets; they are question-burying epithets.

And of course 'Islamophobia'  and cognates are other prime examples.  Once again, a phobia is an irrational fear.  But fear of radical Islam is not at all irrational.  You are a dolt if you use these terms, and a double dolt if you are a conservative.

Language matters.

Why does language matter?  Because clear thinking matters, and language is the medium of thought.

Why does clear thinking matter?  Because clear thinking is truth-conducive.

Why does truth matter?  Because living according to the truth is conducive to human flourishing.

What It Takes to Be Happy

FlaubertAttributed to Gustave Flaubert:  "To be stupid, and selfish, and to have good health are the three requirements for happiness; though if stupidity is lacking, the others are useless."

Witty, but false.  Comparable and  less cynical is this saying which I found attributed to Albert Schweitzer on a greeting card: Happiness is nothing more than good health and a poor memory.  (Whether the good Schweitzer ever said any such thing is a further question; hence my omission of quotation marks.)

I am inclined to agree with both gentlemen that good health is a necessary condition of happiness, at least for most of us.  But happiness does not require a poor memory, it requires the ability to control one's memory, and the ability to control one's mind generally.  I am happy and I have an excellent memory; but I have learned how to distance myself from any unpleasant memories that may arise. 

An unhappy intellectual may think that stupidity is necessary for happiness, but then he is the stupid one.  A keen awareness of the undeniable ills of this world is consistent with being happy if one can control his response to those ills.  There is simply no necessity that one dwell on the negative if this dwelling destroys one's equanimity.  But this non-dwelling is not ignorance.  It is mind control. 

As for selfishness, it is probably true that its opposite is more likely to lead to happiness than it.

The temptation to wit among the literary often leads them astray.

‘Islamophobia’ and ‘Hoplophobia’

My argument against the use of these and related terms is simple and straighforward.  A phobia, by definition, is an irrational fear.  (Every phobia is a fear, but not every fear is a phobia, because not every fear is irrational.)  Therefore, one who calls a critic of the doctrines of Islam or of the practices of its adherents an Islamophobe is implying that the critic is in the grip of an irrational fear, and therefore irrational. This amounts to a refusal to confront and engage the content of his assertions and arguments.

This is not to say that there are no people with an irrational fear of Muslims or of Islam.  But by the same token there are people with an irrational fear of firearms.

Suppose a defender of gun rights were to label anyone and everyone a hoplophobe who in any way argues for more gun control.  Would you, dear liberal, object?  I am sure you would.  You would point out that a phobia is an irrational fear, and that your fear is quite rational.  You would say that you fear the consequences of more and more guns in the hands of more and more people, some of them mentally unstable, some of them criminally inclined, some of them just careless.

You, dear liberal, would insist that your claims and arguments deserve to be confronted and engaged and not dismissed.  You would be offended if a conservative or a libertarian were to dismiss you as a hoplophobe thereby implying that you are beneath the level of rational discourse.

So now, dear liberal, you perhaps understand why you ought to avoid 'Islamophobia' and its variants except in those few instances where they are legitimately applied.

Perhaps.

Why Forgive?

Because we ourselves need to be forgiven.

"But I have never done anything that requires forgiveness."  Really?  Then please forgive me for considering you either a liar, or deeply self-deceived, or an amnesiac, or insane, or a joker, or someone unfamiliar with the English language . . . .

Lawrence Krauss

His latest outburst sullies the pages of The New Yorker. When readers brought it to my attention, I thought I might write a response, but then thought better about wasting my time, once again, on a fool and his foolishness.  And now I see that my efforts are unnecessary: Edward Feser has done the job in the pages of Public Discourse.

Ed is uncommonly gifted at polemic.  He characterizes Krauss as a "professional amateur philosopher."   I wish I had come up with that brilliancy.  But now that I have the phrase you can expect me to use it.

Here are some anti-Krauss entries of mine.

Equality and Affirmative Action

"Equality, I spoke the word as if a wedding vow; ah, but I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."

Bob Dylan, My Back Pages

Reader Jacques spots an error of mine in a recent entry and goes on to make points with which I agree:

In your recent post on "sloppy liberal thinking about equality" you seem to be thinking a little sloppily yourself.  (No offense!  I admire your philosophical writing and I've learned a lot from your blog.)

You say that equality of opportunity is necessary but not sufficient for equality of outcomes, but in fact it's neither sufficient nor necessary.  It is clearly possible to have unequal opportunities, in pretty much any sense that we can give to that term, and equal outcomes.  In fact the denial of equal opportunity might often be necessary for equal outcomes.  If many As are criminals and very few Bs are, the only way to equalize the outcomes for As and Bs with respect to incarceration (for example) will be to deny them equal opportunities.  Maybe we give Bs many more opportunities to shape up than we give to As, for example.  Or maybe we sentence As more harshly than Bs for the same offences. 

Or imagine a more extreme scenario:  all As but no Bs are competent philosophers.  Universities might then arrange to have 'equal outcomes' for As and Bs with respect to admission to graduate studies in philosophy only by making their 'opportunities' grossly unequal in relevant respects.  For example, they might choose to set absurdly high standards for any A who seeks admission to a graduate program while setting absurdly low standards for any B, thus ensuring that exactly equal numbers of As and Bs are admitted.  Or they might choose to introduce new criteria for admission which have no systematic relationship to anyone's interest or ability in philosophy, but which can be expected to be met by most Bs and only a few As.  (Perhaps almost all Bs are left-handed or good at Scrabble, and these traits are very rare among As.  The universities declare that being a left-handed Scrabble player contributes something vital and deep and vibrant to the philosophical culture, and that, therefore, those who can enrich the culture in this respect, just by being who they are, and that, therefore, they should always be preferred to other candidates in relation to whom they are 'relatively equal' in other respects.)

Of course, this is pretty much how 'equal outcomes' are achieved, or approximated, in our actual society under the rule of Leftism.  Since people and groups are in fact radically unequal in their abilities and interests and in pretty much every way that matters, the desired equality of outcomes must always be achieved by denying opportunities to some people and creating special opportunities for others.  This is how 'affirmative action' works, for example.  If the relevant 'opportunities' were really equal, there would be far fewer women and racial minorities in philosophy than there are at present.  And usually it's quite obvious that women, for example, are being hired or promoted on the basis of qualifications or achievements that would not count for much if they were men.  (Not to suggest, of course, that no or few women are capable or competent philosophers; the point is that if they are their capabilities and competence are almost always rated far more highly than they would be if they were men.)  Women and minorities are routinely given a kind of 'opportunity' that is denied to others:  the opportunity to have their achievements and abilities assessed under less demanding standards.

BEATific October Again

Kerouac friendsAnd no better way to kick off Kerouac month than with 'sweet gone Jack'  reading from "October in Railroad Earth" from Lonesome Traveler, 1960.  Steve Allen provides the wonderful piano accompaniment.  I have the Grove Press Black Cat 1970 paperback edition. Bought it on Bourbon Street in New Orleans, 12 April 1973.  I was travelling East by thumb to check out East Coast graduate schools where I had been accepted, but mostly  I 'rode the dog' (Greyhound bus), a mode of transport I wouldn't put up with today: two guys behind me chain-smoked  and talked all the way from Los Angeles to Phoenix.  New Orleans proved to be memorable, including the flophouse on Carondelet I stayed in for $2.  It was there that Lonesome  Traveler joined On the Road in my rucksack.  I never before had seen Tabasco bottles so big as on the tables of the Bourbon Street bars and eateries.  Exulting in the beat quiddity of the scene, I couldn't help but share my enthusiasm for Nawlins with a lady of the evening, not sampling her wares, but just talking to her on the street, she thinking me naive, and I was. 

Here is a long  excerpt (7:10), which contains the whole of the first two sections of the piece, pp. 37-40, of the Black Cat edition.

Related articles
Jack Kerouac and Food

Could I Support a Muslim for President?

It would depend on the Muslim.

Consider first a parallel question: Could I support a Christian for president?  Yes, other things being equal, but not if he or she is a theocrat.  Why not?  Because theocracy is incompatible with the principles, values, and founding documents of the United States of America.

Similarly, I could easily support a Muslim such as Zuhdi Jasser for president (were he to run) because he is not a theocrat or a supporter of Sharia. To be precise: Jasser's being a Muslim would not count for me as a reason not to support him, even though I might have other reasons not to support him, for example, unelectability.  

When Dr. Ben Carson said he could not support a Muslim for president what he meant was that he could not support a Muslim who advocated Sharia.  That was clear to the charitable among us right from the outset.  But he later clarified his remarks so that even the uncharitable could not fail to understand him.

Some dismissed this clarification as 'backtracking.'  To 'backtrack,' however, is to say something different from what one originally said.  Carson did not 'backtrack'; he clarified his original meaning.

Nevertheless, CAIR has absurdly demanded that Carson withdraw from the presidential race.

Is there anything here for reasonable people to discuss?  No.  Then why is this story still in the news?  Because as a nation we are losing our collective mind.

It's like Ferguson.  What's to discuss?  Nothing.  We know the facts of the case.  Michael Brown was not gunned down by a racist cop seeking to commit murder under the cover of law.  Brown brought about his own demise.  On the night of his death he stole from a convenience store, assaulted the proprietor, refused to obey a legitimate command from police officer Darren Wilson, but instead tried to wrest the officer's weapon from him.  He acted immorally, illegally, and very imprudently.  He alone is responsible for his death.

So there is nothing here for reasonable and morally decent people to discuss.  But we are forced to discuss it because of the lies told about Ferguson by the Left.  The truth does not matter to leftists; what matters is the 'empowering' narrative.  A narrative is a story, and a story needn't be true to be a good story, an 'empowering' story, a  story useful for the promotion of the Left's destructive agenda.

Another pseudo-issue  that deserves no discussion except to combat the lies and distortions of the Left:  photo ID at polling places.

Exercise for the reader: find more examples.   

Sloppy Liberal Thinking About Equality

Equality of opportunity is one thing, equality of outcome quite another.  The former is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of the latter.  Yet many liberals think that any lack of equality of outcome for a given group argues an antecedent lack of equality of opportunity for that group.  This is a non sequitur of the following form:

P is necessary for Q

Ergo

~Q is sufficient for ~P.

This is an invalid argument form since it is easy to find substitutions for ‘P’ and ‘Q’ that make the premise true and the conclusion false.  For example, being a citizen is necessary to be eligible to vote; ergo, not being eligible to vote is sufficient to show that one is not a citizen.  The conclusion is false, since there might be some other factor that disqualifies one from voting such as being a felon, or being under age.  Similarly, an unequal outcome is not sufficient to show discrimination or unequal opportunity for the simple reason that there might be some other factor that explains the unequal outcome, such as a lack of competitiveness, an inability to defer gratification, or a lack of ability.

Russell, Sense Data, and Qualia

Reader K. G. writes,

I recently came across a passage in Russell's Mysticism and Logic which you may find interesting. In the essay "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter," Russell writes (p. 144), "… the existence of sense-data [qualia] is logically independent of the existence of mind, and is causally dependent upon the body of the percipient, rather than upon his mind.” [. . .] On the contrary, I propose that any tenable definition of qualia must construe them as mental items, i.e. items whose esse is their percipi. [. . .]
 
What are your thoughts on this argument?
 
I think you are confusing qualia with sense data.  I grant you that qualia are mental items, and that they cannot exist apart from minds.  But sense data are not qualia.  First of all, Russell does not use 'quale' (singular) or 'qualia' (plural) in the two essays you mention.  But he does tell us what he means by 'sense data':  ". . . I believe that the actual data in sensation, the immediate objects or sight or touch or hearing, are extra-mental, purely physical, and among the ultimate constituents of matter." (10th ed., 128)
 
Suppose I am staring at a blue coffee cup.  The particular blue that I visually sense, precisely as I sense it, is a sense datum: it is the direct or  immediate object of my visual sensing.  It is distinct from the sensing. The sensing is something I undergo or experience or live through; it is part of my mental life.  As such it is mental in nature.  The sense datum, however, is not mental.  It is not an episode of experiencing or part of an episode of experiencing; it is the direct object of  an experiencing.  For Russell, the blue sense datum is not only not mental; it is physical: it is a proper part of the coffee cup.  I read Russell in these essays as a bundle theorist: physical objects are bundles of sense data both synchronically and diachronically.
 
Note also that while a blue sense datum is blue, a sensing of a blue sense datum is not blue.  (An adverbialist who speaks of sensing-blue-ly gives up the act-object schema that Russell presupposes.) 
 
Sense data, then, are objects of sensings.  For Russell, they are extra-mental and indeed physical.  Qualia, however, are the phenomenal characters of experiencings.  For example, the felt quality, the what-it-is-like, of a twinge of pain, precisely as it is felt.  Or the smell of burnt garlic.  Or the taste of licorice. 
 
There are many tricky questions here.  Suppose I am given a piece of black, semi-soft candy and asked  what it is.  I put it in my mouth to find out.  I discover that it is a piece of licorice.  I seem to have discovered something objective about a physical object, namely, that this bit of candy is licorice.  This would suggest that the object of my gustatory sensing is extra-mental and indeed physical.  Or should we say merely that I had a gustatory experience with a certain phenomenal character and that the characteristic taste of the thing I put in my mouth is wholly mental in nature?