Author: Bill Vallicella

Should a Philosopher Care about the Political Situation?

It would seem that a "spectator of all time and existence" (Plato, Republic 486a) ought to care inasmuch as his 'telescope' is located in the world, well within range of the agents of the State, the power of which has rarely been limited, and the malevolence of which has too often swamped the good things some states have done.  (The State is a necessary evil.) In the 20th century alone, communists murdered some 100 million, destroyed countless churches and other religious edifices, and replaced philosophy with communist ideology.

You say you could still do philosophy in the gulag? Who are you, Boethius?  I am no Boethius.

The philosopher here below must needs be  a man of action, a fighter with words and weapons, to some extent at least, to defend the precincts within which alone the free life of the mind and spirit can flourish.

Companion post: The Consolations of Philosophy

 

Butchvarov: Knowledge as Requiring Objective Certainty

Butch and booksWe begin with an example from Panayot Butchvarov's The Concept of Knowledge, Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 47.

[CK is the red volume on the topmost visible shelf.  Immediately to its right is Butch's Being Qua Being.  Is Butch showing without saying that epistemology is prior to metaphysics?]

But now to work.

There is a bag containing 99 white marbles and one black marble. I put my hand in the bag and without looking select a marble. Of course, I believe sight unseen that the marble I have selected is white. Suppose it is. Then I have a justified true belief that a white marble has been selected. My belief is justified because of the fact that only one of the 100 marbles is black.  My belief is true because I happened to pick a white marble.  But surely I don't know that I have selected a white marble.  The justification, though very good, is not good enough for knowledge. I have justified true belief but not knowledge.

Knowledge, says Butchvarov, entails the impossibility of mistake. This seems right. The mere fact that people will use the word 'know' in a case like the one described cuts no ice.  Ordinary usage proves nothing.  People say the damndest things.  They are exaggerating, as a subsequent post may show.  'Know' can be used in non-epistemic ways — think of carnal knowledge for example — but used epistemically it can be used correctly in only one way: to mean absolute impossibility of mistake.  Or as least that is Butchvarov's view, a view I find attractive.

Admittedly, knowledge as impossibility of mistake is a very stringent concept of knowledge. Why should we care to set the bar so high? Why is knowledge in the strict sense important? It is important because there are life and death situations in which one needs to know in order to decide on a course of action.

Like Islamists, Leftists Hate Apostates

David Horowitz, Left Illusions: An Intellectual Odyssey (Spence Publishing, 2003), pp. 274-276:

The radical commitment is less a political than a moral choice. Leaving the faith is a traumatic experience because it involves an involuntary severing of communal ties. That is why "political correctness" is a habit of the progressive mind – it is the line of fear that holds the flock in check.

No greater caution exists for those tempted to leave the faith than the charge of "selling out." Prior to the temptation, leaving the faith is inconceivable, a sign that one is no longer a good person. Only pathological behavior – a lust for money or some other benefit – could explain to a leftist the decision to join the opposition. To the progressive mind, no decent person could ever freely make such a choice. Even in the post-communist world, the most untheoretical progressive remains in this way a vulgar marxist despite all that has historically transpired. The fact that Peter [Collier] and I actually lost opportunities for personal gain as a result of our change of heart made no impression on out former comrades, who labeled us "renegades" and accused us of selling out just the same.

Five Grades of Agnosticism

In David Horowitz's Dark Agenda: The War to Destroy Christian America (Humanix, 2018), we read:

My own theological views are those of an agnostic — one who doesn't know. I do not know whether there is a Divine designer or not. (p. 24)

Well, I don't know either. I agree with Horowitz when he tells us, on the preceding page, that

. . . the question of whether God exists cannot be resolved. Both sides must rely on faith. (p. 23)

So what is the difference between me and Horowitz? We are both agnostics by his definition. But I am a theist whereas he is not. It appears that we need to distinguish different types or grades of agnosticism. It will develop that one can be both a theist and an agnostic.

AG-1: "I don't know, and I don't care. The existence of God is not a (live) issue for me."  This sort of agnostic is a practical atheist. He lives as if there is no God, but without denying or doubting his existence.  

AG-2:  "I don't know, but I care, and I appreciate the importance of the question.  But I see no good reason either to affirm or to deny, and so I suspend judgment. Rather than trouble my head over such a question, I content myself with the ordinary life of a mortal man. I do not dream of immortality or hanker after transcendence. While I grant that the question is of some importance, I do not consider the question of enough importance to trouble myself over it." This sort of agnosticism is close to Pyrrhonism.

AG-3:  "I don't know, but I care, and I appreciate the importance of the question.  And while I see no good reason to affirm or deny,  I don't suspend judgment; I continue to inquire. I sense that my ultimate happiness is at stake, and that it would be imprudent simply to dismiss the question as unanswerable and sink back into everydayness."

AG-4:  "I don't know, but I care, and I appreciate the great importance of the question. What's more, I find nothing epistemically disreputable about believing beyond the evidence, seeing as how we do this regularly in other areas of life; I cannot, however, bring myself to believe."

AG-5: "I don't know, but I care, and I appreciate the great importance of the question. I am inclined to believe, and I do believe, for reasons that are not rationally compelling, but also not epistemically disreputable. My faith is a living faith, not merely intellectual assent to a proposition; it is something I live, and my living as I do attests to the psychological reality of my believing."

The fifth grade of agnosticism is a type of theism. It is not the theism of the one who claims to know that God exists, or who claims to be able to prove that God exists.  But it is theism nonetheless, for it is an affirmation of the existence of God.  It follows that one can be both an agnostic and a theist.  In fact, I would argue further that an agnostic is the only sort of theist one ought to be.  

To conclude, what is the difference between me and Horowitz?  We are both agnostics by his definition.  But whereas I am an AG-5 agnostic, he, as far as I can tell, is an AG-3 agnostic.

Addendum (12/12). Vito Caiati responds:

I found your most recent post “Five Grades of Agnosticism” most valuable in that it succinctly sets out the quite diverse tenors of this philosophic position on the existence of God. Over the years, I have fallen into all of these “five grades,” with the exception of AG-1. As you know, I now, as for much of my life, affirm a much more specific version of AG-5, one that centers my life on Christian dogmas and practices, as taught by the Roman Catholic Church. My most recent return to Catholicism was, if you recall from our correspondence over the last few years, fraught with intellectual conflict, since my faith exists alongside of a powerful skeptical inclination, which is only further reinforced once the already daunting difficulties involved in an assertion of God’s existence are compounded by those involved in matters of dogma and doctrine. I have often thought that it would be best to remain with the embrace of philosophic theism, which is, I assume, what you are affirming in AG-5, that is, the affirmation of the existence of a theistic God and an adherence to those moral precepts that are evident to reason and conscience. Am I right about this?

Not quite.  I am thinking of AG-5 as a type of theism that could be filled out and made more specific in different ways. One could add some or all of the following beliefs: immortality of the soul, resurrection of the body, triune nature of the one God, divine simplicity, divine incarnation, and so on through a range of even more specific beliefs concerning, e.g., the nature of post-mortem rewards and punishments, the impossibility of gaining merit after death, etc.   None of these are precluded by the AG-5 schema. What the schema excludes is any claim to knowledge with regard to these matters.   I am assuming that knowledge entails objective certainty.  And so AG-5 runs counter to the traditional Roman Catholic claim that its magisterium teaches infallibly with absolute, divinely sanctioned and grounded authority, with respect to faith and morals.  AG-5 rules out that sort of dogmatism.

If so, where does religion fit in, since a commitment to theism, even one that guides one’s mode of life is not a religion but a private philosophic and moral stance? Is it your position that a life-shaping belief, in a theistic God renders the choice of, say, a particular religious tradition not of first importance? So, for example, one might simply be advised to follow the theistic tradition into which one was born, as long as it possesses doctrinal, ethical, and liturgical features that are not inimical to the existence of a deity as classically construed?

AG-5 is not a merely philosophical schema that excludes religion. I am thinking of it as allowing for religious deployment and development.  And if religion is communal, then the schema would permit a development that was not merely private.

I would say that a life-shaping belief in God (which goes beyond the mere belief that God exists) does not require adherence to any extant religious tradition. But that would be a hard row to hoe for most.  They would be well-advised to stick to the tradition in which they were raised — except perhaps for Islam which is more of a destructive political ideology than a religion, although for peaceful Muslims it is better than no religion. 

So you, Vito, would be well-advised to remain within the Roman Catholic ambit, provided you can find a parish with a Latin mass that is not manned by pedophiles or mere social workers or theological know-nothings and that adheres to and attempts to transmit traditional teachings.

Your post raises many other questions and concerns, such as those touching on revelation, but I will stop here.

Yes it does, and I am willing continue the conversation "until death do us part."  It is my firm belief that there is no better and more noble way to spend the lion's share of one's brief time here below than by addressing, reverentially but critically, the Great Questions.  And that includes the question of the possibility and actuality of divine revelation and all the rest of the theological and philosophical conundra, including Trinity, Incarnation, Transubstantiation, Ascension, Assumption, and so on, until death which, we hope, will lift the curtain and bring us light.

And if it doesn't? Well then, we have spent our lives in a most excellent way and have lost nothing of value.  

Military Service and ‘Skin in the Game’

There is something to be said in favor of an all-voluntary military, but on the debit side there is this: only those with 'skin in the game' — either their own or that of their loved ones — properly appreciate the costs of foreign military interventions.  I say that as a conservative, not a libertarian.

There is also this to consider:  In the bad old days of the draft, people of different stations – to use a good old word that will not be allowed to fall into desuetude, leastways not on my watch — were forced to associate with one another — with some good effects.  It is 'broadening' to mingle  and have to get along with different sorts of people.  And when the veteran of foreign wars returns and takes up a profession in, say, academe, he brings with him precious hard-won experience of all sorts of people in different  lands in trying circumstances.  He is then more likely to exhibit the sense of a Winston Churchill as opposed to the nonsense of a Ward Churchill.

Nancy Pelosi and the Divine Spark

Donald Trump famously referred to MS-13 gangsters as "animals." That's not the way I would put it inasmuch as it is an insult to animals who, unlike the gangbangers, are beneath good and evil. But Trump talks like a working stiff and we all know what he meant. Pelosi, however, took umbrage, protesting that the murderous bunch possesses "the divine spark" (her phrase) along with the rest of us. I don't disagree, but I do have a couple of questions for Madame Speaker.

First, Nancy dear, do you think the pre-natal also have the divine spark? If not, why not? Isn't that what your Catholic religion, bits of which you regularly inject into your speeches, teaches? And if the horrific rapes, murders, beheadings, etc. of the MS-13 do not cause them to forfeit the "divine spark," then how it it that a human fetus' lack of development prevents it from having said spark?

Second, as a leftist committed to driving every vestige of religion, or rather Christianity, from the public square, can't you see that it is inconsistent of you to use themes from your Catholic girlhood when it suits you and your obstructionist purposes?

You come across as a silly goose of a dingbat. Or is that just an act to mask your mendacity and subversiveness and Alinskyite disregard of double standards?

The Spirit of Philosophy

By my lights, the spirit of genuine philosophy is anti-dogmatic.  A real philosopher does not bluster. He does not claim to know what he does not know, and in some cases, cannot know. A real philosopher does not confuse subjective conviction with objective certainty. He has time and he takes time. He can tolerate suspense and open questions. But his suspension is not a Pyrrhonian abandonment of inquiry, but is in the service of it. His happiness is not a porcine ataraxia, but the happiness of the hunt. Unlike the dogmatist, however, he has high standards with the result that is hunt is long and perhaps endless as long as he remains in statu viae wandering among the charms and horrors of the sublunary.

And yet we are participants in life's parade and not mere spectators of it. Curiously, we are both part of the passing scene and observers of it.  To us as participants in the flux and shove of the real order a certain amount of bluster has proven to be life-enhancing and practically necessary. To live is to maneuver, to position oneself, to take a position, to adopt a stance, to grab one's piece of the action and defend it, and in the clinch to shoot first and philosophize later.

As so we are torn. It is a broken world and we are broken on its samsaric wheel. To put it grandly,  the human condition is a tragic predicament. We must act in conditions of poor lighting, maintaining ourselves in the Cave's chiaroscuro, with little more than faith and hope to keep us going. At the same time we seek light, light, more light and the transformation of faith into knowledge and hope into having. 

Defending Barry Miller against Herman Philipse: Existence as a First-Level Property, Part III

This is the third in a series.  First installment, second, Philipse's review.

Herman Philipse's strongest argument against Barry Miller's claim that existence is a a first-level property, a property of individuals, is the absurdity objection.

According to this objection, if existence is an accidental real first-order property of individual entities, so must non-existence be, but this would imply an absurdity. For in order to attribute truly a real property to a specific individual, we must be able to refer successfully to that individual by using a proper name, a pronoun, or by pointing to it, etc. However, we can refer successfully to an individual only if that individual exists or at least has existed, so that non-existence cannot be a real property. Hence existence cannot be an accidental real first-level property of individuals either.

The absurdity objection can be put like this:

a) Existence is a (real, non-Cambridge) property of individuals if and only if nonexistence is also a (real, non-Cambridge) property of individuals.

b) Non-existence cannot be a property of individuals: if an individual exists, then it cannot have the property of nonexistence. 

Therefore

c) Existence is not a property of individuals.

Miller must accept (b) since he does not countenance nonexistent items in the manner of Meinong. He agrees with Frege, Russell, and Quine that everything exists. If so, then non-existence cannot be a real property of individuals. Otherwise, there could be an individual x such that x both exists and does not exist. That would be absurd, i.e., logically contradictory.

Miller must therefore reject (a).  Now let's hear what Philipse has to say.

Miller replies to this argument [the absurdity objection] by claiming that whereas existence is a real property of individuals, non-existence is merely a Cambridge property. He proposes the following criterion for deciding whether the lack of a real property implies the presence of a real complementary property: "Lack of a real property F would bespeak the presence of a correlative real property non-F only if F and non-F were determinates of . . . one determinable property" (p. 23, quote from Miller). Since there is no determinable of which both existence and non-existence are determinates (like red and not-red may both be determinates of the determinable colour), non-existence is not a real property, but rather a Cambridge property. Hence, Miller rejects the [major] premise of the absurdity objection.

I do not think that this refutation is convincing. Why endorse Miller's criterion? A person could just as well propose a similar criterion for deciding whether we are talking about real properties: all real properties are either determinates of determinables, or determinables of determinates. Since this is not the case for existence, existence cannot be a real property. Furthermore, non-existence cannot be a Cambridge property, contrary to what Miller claims. He defined a Cambridge property as a property the presence or absence of which does not make a real difference to the individual that has it. Is it true, or is it even meaningful to say, that it makes no real difference to the goddess Athena whether she has the property of non-existence or not? Moreover, whereas all Cambridge properties are relational (p. 29), non-existence is not relational.

Philipse makes three counter-arguments in the second of the quoted paragraphs.   

The second is question-begging and is easily dismissed. Miller rejects such Meinongian objects as the goddess Athena. So no question can arise with respect to it as to whether or not it has the property of non-existence.  

The third counter-argument is this: All Cambridge properties are relational; non-existence is not relational; ergo, non-existence is not a Cambridge property.  This begs the question at the major premise. If Miller is right, not all Cambridge properties are relational: non-existence is a Cambridge property that is not relational.

The first-counter-argument is also question-begging. The argument is:  "all real [non-Cambridge] properties are either determinates of determinables, or determinables of determinates"; existence is not  a determinate of a determinable, etc; ergo, existence is not a real property.  Miller will simply run this argument in reverse: because existence is a real property, the major premise is false.

What we have here is (at least) a standoff.  Philipse has failed to refute Miller. Can Miller refute Philipse?  Perhaps not. If so, then we have a standoff. Miller's view is a contender. It is at least as good as the Fregean and Meinongian views. But all three views are open to objections. 

Some Questions about White Privilege

There is a lot of talk these days about white privilege.  The notion cries out for some squinty-eyed scrutiny.

1. White privilege is presumably a type of privilege.  What is a privilege?  This is the logically prior question. To know what white privilege is we must first know what privilege is.  Let's consider some definitions.

D1.  A privilege is a special  entitlement or immunity granted to a particular person or group of persons by the government or some other corporate entity such as a university or a church on a conditional basis.

Driving on public roads is a privilege by this definition.  It is not a right one has  just in virtue of being a human being or a citizen.  It is a privilege the state grants on condition that one satisfy and continue to satisfy certain requirements pertaining to age, eyesight, driving skill, etc.  Being a privilege, the license to drive can be revoked.  By contrast, the right to life and the right to free speech are neither conditional nor granted by the government.  They can't be revoked.  Please don't confuse a constitutionally protected right such as the right to free speech with a right granted by the government. 

Faculty members have various privileges, a franking privilege, a library privilege, along with such perquisites as an office, a carrel, secretarial help, access to an an exclusive dining facility, etc.  Immunities are also privileges, e.g., the immunity to prosecution granted  to a miscreant who agrees to inform on his cohorts.

Now if (D1) captures what we mean by 'privilege,' then it it is hard to see how there could be white privilege.    Are there certain special entitlements and immunities that all and only whites have in virtue of being white, entitlements and immunities granted on a conditional basis by the government and revocable by said government?  No.  But there is black privilege by (D1).  It is called affirmative action. 

So if we adopt (D1) we get the curious result that there is no white privilege, but there is black privilege!  Those who speak of white privilege as of something real and something to be aware of and opposed must therefore have a different definition of privilege in mind, perhaps the following:

D2. A privilege is any unearned benefit or advantage that only some people have in virtue of their identity.  It needn't be granted by any corporate entity, nor need it be conditional.  Aspects of identity that can afford privilege in this sense include race, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, class, wealth, ability, or citizenship status.

White privilege cardPeople who speak of white privilege probably have something like (D2) in mind.  The idea is that there are certain unearned advantages that accrue to whites just in virtue of their race, advantages that do not accrue to members of other races.

One question arises right here.  What justifies the broadening of the term 'privilege' to cover any unearned benefit?  If the term is used strictly, there is no white privilege.  To speak of white privilege one has to engage in a semantic stretch.  What justifies this stretch?  Is it a legitimate stretch or a example of linguistic distortion?  And what is the agenda behind it? 

One thing to note about (D2) is that it leads to a proliferation of privileges. There will be as many privileges as there are unearned benefits possessed by some but not all.  For example, there will be the 'privilege' of being right-handed since this is a minor  advantage — better to be right-handed than either left-handed or ambisinistrous — and it is unearned and not possessed by everyone.  And the same goes for being ambidexterous.  I lack the  'privilege' of ambidexterity, being right-handed only,  and so I am disadvantaged relative to the ambidexterous.  But I am not as disadvantaged relative to the ambidexterous as the ambisinistrous.  They are the worst off when it comes to handedness.  Should they receive something like reparations for nature's niggardliness?

Now clearly all of us enjoy all sorts of unearned benefits. Tall men, of whatever race, have an unearned advantage over short men, as long as they are not too tall.  In the USA at least it is better to be 6'1" rather than 4'11".  (D2) therefore implies that there is a tallness privilege in some cultures.  Is this a problem?  Does justice demand that heights be equalized?  And who will appoint and equalize the Procrustean equalizers?  Or are the equalizers exempt from equalization?  If so, this would be an immunity, hence a  'privilege,' a leftist privilege.

Blacks born in the post-war USA have an unearned advantage over both whites and blacks born in some other parts of the world.  Blacks born into two-parent homes in the USA have an unearned advantage over blacks born into single-parent homes in the USA.  Blacks born without birth defects have an unearned advantage over blacks born with birth defects.  Many blacks born without birth defects have an unearned advantage over some whites born with birth defects.  And so on.

If there is an advantage to being white, is this an advantage enjoyed by all whites?  And if it is not shared by all whites, why should this advantage be called white privilege?  Do 'poor white trash' share in white privilege?  Wouldn't it be better to be born into a solid, middle-class two-parent black or Hispanic family than to be born into a 'poor white trash' family?  Do rednecks and Southerners generally share in white privilege?  It didn't seem to help Paula Deen very much.

What is the relation between white privilege and majority privilege?  I grant that, ceteris paribus, it is better to be white than black in the USA at the present time.  But how much of this advantage is due to whites' being a majority?  When Hispanics become a majority in California, say, will there be talk of Hispanic privilege?  Should Hispanics then start feeling guilty about their unearned advantage?

Here is an important question.  Am I not entitled to my unearned benefits despite the fact that I have done nothing to earn them?  My being tall is not my own doing, and I don't do much of anything besides staying alive to keep myself tall.  I don't work at it in the way I work at improving my mind and work at maintaining my physical and fiscal fitness. 

Suppose you are a black male born in the post-war USA into a middle-class, two-parent, loving home.  You have all sorts of unearned benefits.  Do you feel guilty because you have  unearned benefits that a lot of 'poor white trash' lack?  Should you feel guilty?  Change the example slightly: you were born in London and have the unearned benefit of a British accent.  You come to the States and are hired by CNN or FOX News, beating out white competitors, in large part because of that beautiful and charming accent.  Do you 'check' your privilege or feel guilty about it?  Does it bother you that a Southern accent is a definite disadvantage?

So those are some questions that come to mind when I think about white privilege.  I'll end with a bit of analysis of an interesting quotation from this article:

Those of us who are white and male in the U.S. were born with significantly more chips [with which] to play the poker game of life than were people of color or women. Although our white, male status is a biological reality, the unearned benefits that our race and gender identity provides us are a social construction, that is—they are special perks granted by a white patriarchal society.

The second sentence is gibberish.  Males are on average taller than females.  Being tall is an unearned benefit, but surely it is no social construction.  The very notion of social construction is dubious by itself.  What does the phrase mean? Care to define it?  It smacks of the fallacy of hypostatization.  There is this entity called 'society' that constructs things?  I am not saying the phrase 'social construction' cannot be given a coherent meaning; I'm just saying that I would like to know what that meaning is.  Define it or drop it. 

Perk? Isn't that what the coffee does — or used to do back in the day?  The word our 'professor' wants is 'perquisite.'  As I suggested above, perquisites are privileges.  So what the 'professor' is doing is conflating privileges with unearned benefits.  That conflation needs to be either justified or dropped. We are told that these 'perks' are granted by a white patriarchal society?  Smells like the fallacy of hypostatization again.  Where can I find the group of people who collectively decide to grant these special 'perks' to white people? 

I could go on, but this is enough 'shoveling' for one day.

Harley-Davidson: Stickin’ it to the Man

Check out this H-D promotional video.  A celebration of individuality by people who dress the same, ride the same make of motorcycle, and chant in unison.

"Some of us believe in the Man Upstairs, but all of us believe in stickin' it to the Man Down Here." 

But without the Man Down Here there would be no roads, no gasoline, no science, no technology, no motorcycles, no law and order, no orderly context in which aging lawyers and dentists could play at stickin' it to the Man on the weekends. 

The Man is discipline, self-denial, repression, deferral of gratification, control of the instinctual.   The Man is civilization, discontents and all. Without the Man there would be no one to stick it to, and nothing to stick it to him with.  Adolescents of all ages need the Man to have someone to rebel against.

Still and all, after watching this video, what red-blooded American boomer doesn't want to rush out and buy himself a hog? Get your motor runnin', head out on the highway . . . .

Personal anecdote: A few years back I took a three-day motorcycle course, passed it, and got my license.  I was about to rush out and buy myself a hog when Good Sense kicked in.  So I rushed out and bought myself a Jeep Wrangler instead.  

Cops: A Necessary Evil

I don't much like law enforcement agents (qua law enforcement agents) and I try to avoid contact with them, not because I violate laws or have something to hide, but because I understand human nature, and I understand how power corrupts people, not inevitably, but predictably. Cops and sheriffs are too often arrogant, disrespectful, and willing to overstep their lawful authority.

But there is a species of varmint that I like even less than law enforcement agents: criminals and scofflaws. They are the scum of the earth. To clean up scum you need people who are willing to get dirty and who share some of the attributes of those they must apprehend and incarcerate. I mean such attributes as courage, cunning, some recklessness, with a dash of ruthlessness thrown in for good measure. Government and its law enforcement agencies are a necessary evil. That is not pessimism, but realism.

There are anarchists and others who dream of a world in which good order arises spontaneously and coercive structures are unnecessary. I want these anarchists and others to be able to dream on in peace. For that very reason, I reject their dangerous utopianism.

Grateful to Live in Arizona

I've lived in Hawaii, Santa Barbara, Boston, and the Midwest, not to mention other places in the USA and abroad: Salzburg, Austria, Freiburg, Germany, and Ankara, Turkey.   No place beats Arizona, all things considered. That is a mighty subjective judgment, to be sure, but if a blogger cannot vent his subjectivity, who can?

For one thing, Arizona is in the West and we all know that the West is the best, far, far away from the effete and epicene East, lousy with liberals, and the high taxes they love; but not so far West as to be on the Left Coast where there was once and is no more a great and golden state, California. Geographical chauvinism aside, there is beauty everywhere, even in California, when you abstract from the political and economic and social malaise wrought by destructive leftists, the majestic Sierra Nevada, for example, the Range of Light (John Muir). Herewith, an amateur  shot of the the Sedona red rock country:

IMG_0337

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Defending Barry Miller against Herman Philipse: Existence as a First-Level Property, Part II

This is the second in a series. Here is the first installment. Read it for context and references. We are still examining only the first premise of Barry Miller's cosmological argument, as sketched by Philipse:

1) Existence is a real first-level accidental property of contingent individuals.

Philipse gave two arguments contra. In my first entry I refuted the weaker of the two. Philipse argued that Kant in 1781 had already put paid to the proposition that existence is a "real predicate," i.e., a real property of individuals.  I showed that Philipse confuses two different senses of 'real.'  When the Sage of Koenigsberg tells us that Offenbar, Sein ist kein reales Praedikat, he is telling us that it is obvious that being or existence is not a first-level quidditative determination.  This is true, whether or not it is obvious.  But when Miller tells us that existence is a real property of individuals, he is telling us that it is a non-Cambridge property of individuals.  Philipse confuses 'real' in the sense of 'quidditative' with 'real' in the sense of 'non-Cambridge,' and on the basis of this confusion takes Kant to have refuted Miller.  The ineptitude of Philipse's 'argument' takes the breath away.

The other argument Philipse gives is not so easily blown out of the water, if it can be so blown at all. He writes:

It is not necessary to discuss here all the attempted refutations Miller puts forward, for the simple reason that if he fails to refute convincingly only one plausible argument to the effect that existence is not a real predicate, his negative strategy is shipwrecked.

Let me take the so-called absurdity objection as an example (pp. 21-23). According to this objection, if existence is an accidental real first-order property of individual entities, so must non-existence be, but this would imply an absurdity. For in order to attribute truly a real property to a specific individual, we must be able to refer successfully to that individual by using a proper name, a pronoun, or by pointing to it, etc. However, we can refer successfully to an individual only if that individual exists or at least has existed, so that non-existence cannot be a real property. Hence existence cannot be an accidental real first-level property of individuals either.

The absurdity objection can be put like this:

a) Existence is a (real, non-Cambridge) property of individuals if and only if nonexistence is also a (real, non-Cambridge) property of individuals.

b) Non-existence cannot be a property of individuals: if an individual exists, then it cannot have the property of nonexistence. 

Therefore

c) Existence is not a property of individuals.

This is an argument that cannot be dismissed as resting on an elementary confusion. But let's take a step back and formulate the problem as an aporetic triad or antilogism the better to reconnoiter the conceptual terrain.

a) Existence is a (real, non-Cambridge) property of individuals if and only if nonexistence is also a (real, non-Cambridge) property of individuals.

b) Non-existence cannot be a property of individuals: if an individual exists, then it cannot have the property of nonexistence. 

c*) Existence is a property of individuals.

Each of these three propositions is individually plausible. And yet they cannot all be true on pain of logical contradiction. Individually plausible, but collectively inconsistent. So, if we adhere to the law of non-contradiction,  one of the propositions must be rejected.  Which will it be?

A. The Fregean will reject (c*).  A Fregean or Fressellian for present purposes is someone who, first, holds that 'exist(s)' is univocal in sense and second, has only one admissible sense: as a second-level predicate.  Thus the general existential 'Cats exist' is logically kosher because it can be read as predicating of the first-level property of being a cat the second-level property of being instantiated.  But the singular existential 'Max exists' is not logically kosher and is indeed meaningless in roughly the way 'Max is numerous' is meaningless.  For if 'exists' is univocal and means 'is instantiated,' then one cannot meaningfully say of Max that he exists for the simple reason that it is meaningless to say of an individual that it is instantiated.  Max could conceivably have an indiscernible twin, but that would not be an instance of him. By definition, the only instantiable items are properties, concepts, and the like.  Some will say that the Fregean analysis can be made to work for singular existentials if there are such haecceity properties as identity-with-Max, 'Maxity' to give it a name.   Suppose that there are.  Then 'Max exists' is analyzable as 'Maxity is instantiated.'  But this does not alter the fact that 'exist(s)' is a second-level predicate, and existence a second-level property.

B. The Meinongian will reject (b).  A Meinongian for present purposes is someone who denies that everything exists, and holds instead that some items exist and some do not.  For the Meinongian, existence is a classificatory principle: it partitions a logically prior domain of items into those that exist and those that do not.  For the Meinongian, both existence and non-existence are first-level properties. Existence cannot be classificatory for the Fregean because, for the Fregean, everything exists.  And so for the Fregean, there cannot be a property of non-existence.

C. The Millerian — to give him a name — rejects (a).  A Millerian for present purposes is one who holds, against the Meinongian, that there are no nonexistent items, and against the Fregean that existence is a genuine, non-relational  property predicable of individuals.  Holding that everything exists, the Millerian cannot admit that non-existence is a real (i.e., non-Cambridge) property of individuals.  

In Part III of this series, I will examine Philipse's atempted rebuttal of Miller's rejection of (a).  For now I will merely point out that the Meinongian and Fregean positions are open to powerful objections and therefore cannot be used to refute the Millerian view.  They merely oppose it. To oppose a theory T with a questionable theory T* is not to refute T.  'Refute' is a verb of success. To refute a theory is to prove that it is untenable. Note also that the Fregean and the Meinongian are at profound loggerheads, which fact undermines both positions. After all, deep thinkers have supported each.  

My point, then, is that Philipse hasn't refuted Miller; he has merely opposed him from the point of view of the Fregean theory which is fraught with difficulties.  One cannot refute a theory with a theory that is itself open to powerful objections as the Fregean theory is.