What follows is a comment by David Brightly which just came in but is buried in the comments to an old entry. I have added my responses in blue.
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I have just spotted that you quote EJL as saying,
This, of course, raises the question of how we can so much as talk about Caesar now that he no longer exists simpliciter — how we can speak about 'that which is not.'
My understanding is that 'no longer' is a marker of a tensed verb. So Lowe appears to be using 'to exist simpliciter' as if it were tensed. This leaves me somewhat confused. I'm not at all sure that 'simpliciter' adds (or subtracts) anything here. Lowe's paragraph, minus the 'simpliciter', makes sense as ordinary tensed English.
BV: As you see it, David, 'Caesar no longer exists' and 'Caesar no longer exists simpliciter' express exactly the same thought. That same thought is expressed by 'Caesar existed but Caesar does not exist (present tense). 'Simpliciter' adds nothing to 'exists.'
I suppose that you will say that the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing — how can we speak about 'that which is not' when that which is not is not 'there' to be spoken of — is a pseudo-problem, at least when raised with respect to wholly past items. I suppose that you will say that we can now refer to Caesar because he existed, and that nothing more need be said. Your view, I take it, is that Caesar can, at the present time, be an object of successful reference and a logical subject of true predications without existing simpliciter or tense-neutrally. It suffices for successful reference to Caesar who is now nothing that he was something, i.e., that he existed. You might take it a step further and argue that the Platonic pseudo-problem arises from a failure to stick to ordinary tensed English, and that the 'problem' is dissolved (as opposed to solved) by simply using the tenses of our beloved mother tongue in their ordinary work-a-day ways and not allowing language to "go on holiday" (Wittgenstein).
To put words in your mouth: you are saying that there is no genuine problem about the reality of the past; said reality consists solely in the fact that we can use the past tense to make true statements, e. g., 'Churchill smoked cigars.'
Have I understood your position? If I have, then what we are really discussing is whether the debate that divides presentists and 'eternalists' is a genuine debate or instead a pseudo-debate sired by a misuse of language.
Also, further down you say,
However things stand with respect to the future, the past surely seems to have a share in reality.
Could you not have said '…the past seems to have had a share…'? Again,
The question is whether what WAS has a share in reality as opposed to being annihilated, reduced to nothing, by the passage of time. [my emphasis]
BV: I don't say it your way because I believe that 'existence simpliciter' has a specific, non-redundant use. I believe that one can sensibly ask whether what exists (present tense) exhausts what exists simpliciter. I believe that both of the following are substantive claims:
a) Only what exists (present tense) exists!
b) It is not the case that only what exists (present tense) exists!
For me, (a) is not a tautology, and (b) is not a contradiction. Why not? Because, for me, if x exists simpliciter, it does not follow that x exists (present tense). So if (a) is true, it is true as a matter of metaphysics, not as a matter of formal logic. And if (a) is false, it is not false as a matter of formal logic but as a matter of metaphysics.
You, David, do not admit the distinction between what exists (present tense) and what exists simpliciter. For you, 'exists simpliciter' collapses into 'exists' (present tense).
You then return to the truthmaker objection. It seems to me quite natural and unproblematic to say that the past both had a share in reality and has been reduced to nothing. Problems only appear when we say the past both has a share in reality and has been reduced to nothing.
BV: But of course I don't say that. It is contradictory to say that the past has a share in reality and has been reduced to nothing. I say that there are very good reasons to hold that the past is not nothing, that is is real (actual, not merely possible; factual not fictional) but merely lacks temporal presentness.
Suppose that a certain building B has been completely demolished. On your view B has been reduced to nothing. All will agree that B is now nothing. But you want to say more. You want to say that what is now nothing is nothing sans phrase (without qualification). You want to say that what is nothing now is nothing without any temporal qualification. Can you prove that? Can you refute the view that wholly past items, which by definition are nothing now, have (tenselessly) a share in reality? Can you prove that the past — past times, past events, processes, continuants, etc. — are simply nothing as opposed to nothing now?
The past is arguably actual, not merely possible, and factual, not fictional. If so it is (tenselessly) real, and therefore not nothing. The passage of time does not consign what has become wholly past to nothingness. Can you refute this view? I grant that it has its own problems. The main problem, as it seems to me, is to specify what it means to say that a temporal item — an item in time — exists tenselessly.
My view is that these problems about the relation of time and existence are genuine but insoluble. Your view, I take it, is that the problems are pseudo-problems susceptible of easy dissolutions if we just adhere to ordinary ways of talking.
Have I located the bone of contention? Or have I 'dislocated' it? (A pun I couldn't resist.)
