Another round with David Brightly. My responses are in blue.
Bill says,
We don't want to say that a dead man becomes nothing after death since he remains a particular, completely determinate, dead man distinct from others. If the dead become nothing after death then all the dead would be the same. If your dead father and your dead mother are both nothing, then there is nothing to distinguish them.
It's difficult to know what to make of this. My guess is that Bill is conflating a thing with the idea of a thing.
BV: I plead innocent. I hope David doesn't think that when a person dies, that person becomes an idea. My veridical memories of my dead mother are memories of a woman not an idea.
First, 'particular' and 'completely determinate' do not denote properties of concrete objects like men. One can contrast 'I have in mind a particular man' with 'I have in mind a man' but 'particular' here qualifies not 'man' but rather the way of having in mind. 'Completely determinate' functions in a similar way. What would 'partially determinate man' denote? A partially determinate idea of a man makes sense, however; we know some of his properties but not others.
BV: I beg to differ. Granted, my idea of David is incomplete: I know some of his properties but not others. But David is not the same as my idea of him, and that's a good thing for both of us. I say that David himself is complete (completely determinate), just like everything else that exists mind-independently. It makes sense to say both that my idea of David is incomplete, and that David himself is complete. The fact that there cannot be an incomplete man cannot be used to show that 'complete' cannot be a predicate of concrete items. So why does David think that?
David may be relying on a Contrast Argument one form of which is as follows:
1) If a term T is meaningful, then there are items to which T does not apply.
2) There are no items to which T does not apply.
Ergo
3) T is not meaningful.
In the present case:
4) If 'complete' is a meaningful term, then there are concrete items to which 'complete' does not apply.
5) There are no concrete items to which 'complete' does not apply.
Ergo
6) 'Complete' is not a meaningful term.
Well, I reject Contrast Arguments. Bang on the link. Similarly with 'particular.' David appears to believe, pace Meinong, that there are no incomplete items in reality, and that all incompleteness is epistemic. I think so too. But that is not the issue. The issue is whether 'particular' and 'complete' can be predicated meaningfully of items like David and his dogs, or whether they qualify merely the way one has these things in mind. He hasn't given me a good reason to change my view.
Second, 'dead' is an alienating adjective. If a man is a living thing and 'dead' means non-living, then a 'dead man' is a somewhat contradictory conception. Better to think of 'is dead' as 'has died'. A dead man is one who has passed through that final event that all living things inevitably come to, and has ceased to be.
BV: Very tricky! No doubt there are alienans adjectives (bang on the link), but is 'dead' (juxtaposed with 'man') one of them? Clearly, a decoy duck is not a duck. But it is not clear that a dead duck is not a duck. Now the corpse of a duck is not a duck. But if your pet duck Donald dies you can still utter truths about him and have veridical memories of him. Those truths and memories are about a duck that has died, a particular duck, not a rabbit. And not about nothing. Try this triad on for size:
a) Tom Petty is a man.
b) Tom Petty is dead. (Tom Petty has died.)
c) Nothing dead is a man. (Nothing that has died is a man.)
Clearly, the singer is a man, not a duck or a valve-lifter in a '57 Chevy. And clearly, Petty is dead. It seems to follow that Petty is a dead man. So it seems we ought to reject (c) above. Is (c) not more reasonably rejected than the other two limbs of the triad? I would say so.
Granted, Petty is not the man he used to be. He no longer breathes, for example. He has lost much of the typical functionality of a man. So there is rational pressure to deny (a). There does not appear to be a clean solution to the (a)-(c) puzzle. The propositions cannot all be true. But it is not obvious which of them to reject.
David tells us that a dead man has ceased to be. (I will assume that to be = to exist.) But it is not at all clear that a dead man such as Tom Petty has ceased to exist. On one way of looking at it, Petty exists just as robustly (or as anemically) as I do. We both tenselessly exist. It is just that every moment of his existence is earlier than the present moment, whereas this is not the case for me. Petty is wholly past whereas I exist at present, and presumably also in future. But we both exist (tenselessly)! This is a possible view, and distinguished thinkers have subscribed to it, Albert Einstein to mention one. So it is not obvious, pace David, that when a man or a dog or any living thing dies, it ceases to exist. David may be assuming that only what exists (present tense), exists. But this is a miserable tautology unless David can supply a non-presentist reading of the second occurrence of 'exists.'
Third, to speak of 'becoming nothing' on death is misleading. Death is the end of all becoming. One has finally begone, as it were. [?] It's not that the dead lack something to distinguish them. Rather, they are not there to be distinguished one from another. But this is not to say that my parents were indistinguishable as objects. Nor is it to say that my thoughts about my parents are now indistinguishable. Surely I can say, My mother was short and my father was tall.
BV: David can say these things, but these past-tensed truths are (i) logically contingent and (ii) true at present. So they need truthmakers that exist at present. What might these be if only what exists at present exists? This, in nuce, is the grounding objection to presentism. I don't see that David has a good answer to it. If, however, existence is tenseless, then the truthmakers are easily supplied.
DB quoting BV: Nor do we want to say that a person who dies goes from being actual to being merely possible. There is clearly a distinction between an actual past individual and a merely possible past individual. Schopenhauer is an actual past individual; his only son Willy is a merely possible past individual
Once again I'm afraid I can't regard 'being actual' and 'being merely possible' as denoting properties of individuals. How these predications are to be understood is not an easy question. Suffice it to say that there is clearly a problem with 'Schopenhauer's only son Willy' when the philosopher's only child was a daughter.
BV: I don't get the daughter bit. But surely David is an actual individual, not a merely possible individual. I have no idea why he balks at this. He is actual, not merely possible, or necessary, or impossible. What's more, he is contingent: although he actually exists, he is possibly such that he does not exist. There is no necessity that he exist at any time at which he exists. And note that if 'actual' is true of everything, it does not follow that 'actual' is not a meaningful term.
DB quoting BV: On the 'growing block' theory, dead Petty exists. (This is obviously not a present-tensed use of 'exists.') He does not exist at present, but he exists in the sense that he belongs to the actual world. Once actual, always actual. Is this wholly clear? No, but it is tolerably clear and plausible. After all, we are making singular reference to Petty, a concrete actual individual, as we speak, and this is a good reason to hold that he exists, not at present of course, but simpliciter.
The 'growing block' theory sounds like a kind of four-dimensionalism deriving from the physicist's notion of spacetime as a four-dimensional manifold. We trace the world-lines of the particles that were ever part of Petty and we find that they form a densely packed blob within a certain spacetime region. We are tempted to identify the contents of this region with Petty himself. If we think of the ensemble of worldlines of all material particles as the actual world itself, then yes, the Petty blob seems indeed to belong to the actual world. But this is a mistake. The worldline of a particle represents not so much the particle itself but rather its history. Likewise the blob we take to be Petty represents his biography, in mind-numbing detail. We are confusing a thing with the life it lived. Of course Petty belonged to the world—I don't see quite what 'actual' adds here—it's just that he does not belong to it any more. Perhaps Bill is emphasising that Petty was a real man, not, say, a character in a fiction like Spinal Tap. There is more than a hint here that Bill is appealing to a theory of direct reference. Petty has to exist in order that we may refer to him.
BV: There are several gnarly issues that need disentangling. I'll leave that for later. David tells us that Petty was actual but is not now actual. That is true, but trivial. It may be that what David is advocating is that we simply use tensed language and not make any trouble for ourselves by asking such as questions as: what makes it true that Petty was a musician? It may be that he is a tautological presentist who maintains that whatever exists, exists, where 'exists' in both occurrences is present-tensed. It may be that he is refusing to stray from ordinary English and credit such high-flying metaphysical questions as: Is the whole of reality restricted to the present moment or not?
