Reason proves weak in the search for truth, but strong in the rationalizing of behavior.
Month: January 2020
Word of the Day: Zaftig
Said of a woman. Having a full, shapely figure. Voluptuous. Plump and vigorous. Rubenesque. A Yiddish word. Supposedly from the German saftig, juicy. More here. Trigger Warning! Snowflakes of the distaff persuasion will be offended.
Time was when 'female persuasion' and the like were used figuratively as a kind of joke; after all, one cannot be persuaded to be female or male. Or recruited. One does not join the female club. Nor can one be assigned one's sex at birth. Being female is something biological, not political or social like a party affiliation. But the times they have a'changed. Nowadays everything is a social construction and a matter of arbitrary identification. So, being female is like being a Democrat!
Nowadays there is no sex, only gender. How then can anything be sexist? And if, in reality, there are no races — race being a mere social construct — how can there be racism? Inquiring minds want to know.
CTRL-F
Use this command to locate a bit of text in a document.
TL;DR
The hyperkineticism of present-day communication forces one to be pithy, which is good in many contexts. The downside you already know about.
Is Speech Violence? Culture War 1.0 and Culture War 2.0
The rules of engagement relate to how we deal with our disagreements. In Culture War 1.0, if an evolutionary biologist gave a public lecture about the age of the Earth based on geological dating techniques, creationist detractors would issue a response, insist that such dating techniques are biased, challenge him to a debate, and ask pointed—if unfairly loaded—questions during the Q&A session.
In Culture War 2.0, disagreements with a speaker are sometimes met with attempts at de-platforming: rowdy campaigns for the invitation to be rescinded before the speech can be delivered. If this is unsuccessful, critics may resort to disrupting the speaker by screaming and shouting, engaging noise makers, pulling the fire alarm, or ripping out the speaker wires. The goal is not to counter the speaker with better arguments or even to insist on an alternative view, but to prevent the speaker from airing her views at all.
Today’s left-wing culture warriors are not roused to action only by speakers whose views run afoul of the new moral orthodoxy. They combat “problematic” ideas anywhere they’re found, including peer-reviewed academic journals. In 2017, Portland State University Political Science Professor Bruce Gilley published a peer-reviewed article titled “The Case for Colonialism” in Third World Quarterly. Many academicians were enraged, but rather than write a rebuttal or challenge Gilley to a public debate (as they might have done in the era of Culture War 1.0), they circulated a popular petition demanding that Portland State rescind his tenure, fire him, and even take away his Ph.D. “The Case for Colonialism” was eventually withdrawn after the journal editor “received serious and credible threats of personal violence.”
Christian organizations have a long history of censorship, and this has continued to some extent even in recent decades. All the same, such an attempt to suppress an academic article would have been almost unthinkable during Culture War 1.0. There were some analogous attempts on the part of Christians during precursors of this culture war, as for example in the incidents surrounding Tennessee’s Butler Act of 1925 and the subsequent “Scopes Monkey Trial.” And religious would-be censors during Culture War 1.0 did occasionally make attempts on novels and movies interpreted as blasphemous or obscene, such as The Last Temptation of Christ (1988). But for the most part, Creationists in the first Culture War didn’t want evolutionary biologists to lose their tenure and their doctorates. They wanted to debate and prove them wrong.
One common theme running throughout Culture War 2.0 is the idea, endorsed by many well-meaning activists, that speech is violence. And if speech is violence, the thinking goes, then we must combat speech with the same vigor we use to combat physical violence. This entails that we cannot engage supposedly violent speech, sometimes referred to indiscriminately as “hate speech,” merely with words. If someone is being punched in the face, it’s futile to say, “Would you kindly stop?” or “This is not an ethical way to behave.” You need to take action. The rules of engagement change if speech cannot be met with speech—with written rebuttals, debates, and Q&A sessions. If speech is violence, it must either be prevented or stopped with something beyond speech, such as punching Nazis, throwing milkshakes, or using institutional mechanisms to smother unwanted discourse.
Is Speech Violence?
As the nursery rhyme goes,
Sticks and stones may break my bones
But words can never hurt me.
No speech is physically violent, and so the first thing that ought to be said is that unwanted speech, offensive speech, dissenting speech, contrarian speech, polemical speech, and the like including so-called 'hate speech,' ought not be met by physical violence. There are exceptions, but in general, speech is to be countered, if it is countered and not ignored, by speech, not physical assaults on persons or property private or public. The speech may be sweet and reasonable or ugly and combative.
Here is an exception. Some speech is of course psychologically violent and psychologically damaging to some of those who are its recipients. The young, the impressionable, and the sensitive can be harmed, and in instances terribly, by psychologically violent speech. Suppose one parent is verbally abusing a sensitive child in a psychological damaging way. ("You worthless piece of shit, can't you do anything right? I wish you were never born!") The other parent would be justified in using physical violence to stop the verbal abuse.
A second exception. Blasphemers invade a church service. It would be morally permissible to force them to leave by physical means. A third exception. Protestors block a major traffic artery. The police would be justified in using physical force to remove the law breakers. In this case it is not the speech that is being countered by physical violence but the protestors' illegal action of blocking the artery.
But in general, no speech may be legitimately countered with physical violence to the person or property of the speaker. Speech is not a form of physical violence and may not be countered by physical violence.
That's one point. A second is that we of the Coalition of the Sane are justified is using physical violence against those who try to shut down our dissent by physical means if the authorities abdicate. This is why Second Amendment rights are so very important.
Finally, as I have said many times, dissent is not hate to those who can think straight and are morally sane.
Could it be Reasonable to Affirm the Infirmity of Reason?
Any reasons one adduces in support of the thesis of the infirmity of reason will share in the weakness of the faculty whose weakness is being affirmed. Is this a problem for the proponent of the thesis? Does he contradict himself? Not obviously: he might simply accept the conclusion that the reasoning in support of the thesis is inconclusive.
Suppose I argue that, with respect to all substantive philosophical theses, there there are good arguments pro and good arguments contra, and that these arguments 'cancel out.' Now my thesis is substantive, and so my thesis applies to itself, whence it follows that my meta-thesis has both good arguments for it and good arguments against it, and that they cancel out.
Where is the problem? I am simply applying my meta-philosophical skepticism to itself, as I must if I am to be logically consistent. Now I could make an exception for my meta-thesis, but that, I think, would be intolerably ad hoc.
I am not dogmatically affirming the infirmity of reason; I am merely stating that there are reasons to accept it, reasons that are not conclusive.
Deeper into this topic:
Seriously Philosophical Theses and Argument Cancellation
Thought, Action, Dogma, and De Maistre: The Infirmity of Reason
The Deep Thinker
Elias Canetti, The Agony of Flies: Notes and Notations (Die Fliegenpein: Aufzeichnungen), Noonday 1994, tr. H. F. Broch de Rothermann, bilingual ed., p. 25:
His thoughts have fins instead of wings.
It flows better in German:
Sein Denken hat Flossen statt Flügel.
The title is my creation.
Many of Canetti's notations express insights; others, however striking, are exercises in literary self-indulgence, not that there is anything wrong with that.
Here are some good ones:
No code is secret enough to allow for the expression of complete candor. (5)
He will never be a thinker: he doesn't repeat himself enough. (13)
He desires the existence of the people he loves, but not their presence and their preoccupations. (15)
He wishes for moments that burn as long as match. (15)
I read that as a protest against time's fugacity.
He is as smart as a newspaper; he knows everything and what he knows changes from day to day. (19)
Even the great philosopher benefits from exaggeration, but with him she must wear a tightly woven garment of reason. The poet, on the other hand, exposes her in all her shimmering nudity. (19)
It's easy to be reasonable when you don't love anyone, including yourself. (21)
On fair days he feels too sure of his own life. (23)
That resonates with me. But it is not an aphorism if an aphorism must present a universal truth. This is an aphorism: On fair days one feels too sure of one's own life. But this is the philosopher talking with his zeal to transcend the particular toward the universal. The poet is more at home, or entirely at home, with the particular. There is an advantage to Canetti's formulation: it cannot be contradicted. He is reporting the feeling of a particular man, presumably himself. The corresponding aphorism invites counterexamples.
God does not like us to draw lessons from recent history. (23)
I surmise that the thought driving the aphorism is that the horrors of the 20th century make theistic belief psychologically impossible. Who can believe in God after Auschwitz?
Related: Susan Sontag on the Art of the Aphorism
Addendum. Contrast
On fair days he feels too sure of his own life
with
He whose days are fair feels too sure of his own life.
'He' in the second sentence functions as a universal quantifier, not as a pronoun. Pronouns have antecedents: the 'he' in the second sentence has no antecedent. Nor does it need one. The 'he' in the first sentence, however, could be called a dangling pronoun: its antecedent is tacit, and is presumably 'Canetti.' If this is right, the two sentences express different thoughts and are not intersubstitutable salva veritate.
I rather doubt that Canetti would approve of this analysis. Too philosophical.
Saturday Night at the Oldies: Varia
Bob Dylan, Cold Irons Bound. When your name is 'Bob Dylan' you have your pick of sidemen. A great band. "The walls of pride, they're high and they're wide. You can't see over, to the other side."
Joe Brown, Sea of Heartbreak. Nothing touches Don Gibson's original effort, but this is very satisfying version.
Elvis Presley, Little Sister
Carole King, You've Got a Friend
Buddy Guy, et al., Sweet Home Chicago. Looks like everyone is playing a Strat except for Johnny Winter.
Ry Cooder, He'll Have to Go. A fine, if quirky, cover of the old George Reeves hit from 1959.
Marty Robbins, El Paso. Great guitar work.
A Relativist Cannot Rationally Object to the Imposition of One’s Values on Others
Here, at MavPhil Strictly Philosophical
Why the Right-Left Divide is Unbridgeable: Three Reasons
One reason is that we differ over values. That's bad. Worse still is that we differ over what is true and what is false. Disagreements about values and norms are troubling but not surprising, but nowadays we can't even agree on what the facts are. Worst of all is that we differ over what truth is and whether there are any truths. The point about values is obvious. I won't say more about it on this occasion. Here are some examples of how we differ over what is true and what is false:
The left believes the president colluded with Russia to win the 2016 election. The reality is that there was no collusion. This is the conclusion of the Mueller report, but still, the left doesn’t accept it.
The left is certain President Trump said the neo-Nazis are “very fine people” when referring to the protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia. The right is certain the president didn’t say there are good neo-Nazis any more than he said there are good “antifa” members. When he said there were “very fine people on both sides,” he was referring to those demonstrating on behalf of keeping Confederate statues and those opposed. See “The Charlottesville Lie” by CNN analyst Steve Cortes.
The left believes socialism is economically superior to capitalism. But the reality is that only capitalism has lifted billions of people out of poverty.
These examples are from Dennis Prager. I will now go Prager one better: we don't just disagree about what is true and false; we disagree about whether there is truth is the first place.
The Left is culturally Marxist, and part of that line is that there is no objective truth. What there are are perspectives and power relations. 'True' is whatever perspective enhances the power of some tribe. Thus the abominations 'our truth' and 'my truth.'
We are obviously in deep trouble and it is not clear how to avoid disaster. Hot civil war would be a disaster. But we conservatives are not about to accept dhimmitude. Secession is unworkable. We need to find the political equivalent of divorce. But how to work this out in detail is above my pay grade. And yours too.
The consolations of philosophy, and of old age, are many.
‘For’ and ‘Because’: A Linguistic Bagatelle
My sense of the English language tells me that (1) below, but not (2), is good English.
1) On presentism, what no longer exists, does not exist at all. For on presentism, only the present exists.
2) On presentism, what no longer exists, does not exist at all. Because on presentism, only the present exists.
As I see it, (1) is good English because 'for' in a context like this means 'it is because.'
The Augustinian Meta-Predicament
The Augustinian predicament is that, if you don't ask me what time is; I know. But if you ask me, I don't know.
The meta-predicament is that, if you don't press me too hard, I know what the main issues in dispute are, and what the main theories of time state; but if you press me and demand clear explanations, then I find that I don't know.
Custody of the Eyes
You look at unworthy objects, objects that debase. Or you view worthy things through the distorting lenses of concupiscence and greed.
A Paltry Nobility
A paltry nobility it is that extends only to a recognition of one's baseness. Such is a nobility of thought that cannot implement itself in action.