January 2019 – Page 2 – Maverick Philosopher

Word of the Day: Eloignment

Removal to a distance, withdrawal.

Eloignment has fallen into desuetude, as has 'desuetude.' Archaic. Quite useless for communication with deplorables, or with anyone except me and Dave Bagwill who hipped me to the word.

I tip my hat to David Bagwill for recommending that I read Cornelius Van Til. So I sprang for the fourth edition of The Defense of the Faith, with Oliphint's annotations, P & R Publishing, 2008. Van Til's presuppositionalism is intriguing even if in places preposterous. Having discussed Romans 1:18 a couple of time before in these pages, I looked to see what Van Til had to say about it. But first my take, one that Van Til & Co. might dismiss as 'Romanist' or worse.

Rather than quote the whole of the Pauline passage at Romans 1: 18-20, I'll summarize it. Men are godless and wicked and suppress the truth. What may be known about God is plain to them because God has made it plain to them. Human beings have no excuse for their unbelief. "For since the creation of the world, God's invisible qualities — his eternal power and divine nature — have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made . . . ."

Paul's claim here is that the existence and nature of God are evident from creation and that unbelief is a result of a willful turning away from the truth. There is no excuse for unbelief because it is a plain fact that the natural world is divine handiwork. Now I am a theist and I am sympathetic to Christianity. But although I have one foot in Jerusalem, the other is planted firmly in Athens. It therefore strikes me that to characterize the natural world as 'made' or 'created' begs the question in favor of theism. As begging the question, the Pauline claim about the evidentness of the world's being created offers no support for theism. It is an analytic proposition that there is no creation without a creator. So if the heavens and the earth are a creation, then it follows straightaway that a creator exists.

But is the world a divine creation? This is the question, and the answer is not obvious. That the natural world is a divine artifact is not evident to the senses, or to the heart, or to reason. Of course, one can argue for the existence of God from the existence and order of the natural world. I have done it myself. But those who reject theistic arguments, and construct anti-theistic arguments, have their reasons too, and it cannot fairly be said that what animates the best of them is a stubborn and prideful refusal to submit to a truth that is evident. It is simply not objectively evident to the senses or the intellect or the heart that the natural world is a divine artifact. If it were objectively evident, then there would be no explanation of the existence of so many intellectually penetrating, morally upright, and sincere atheists. Even if the atheisms of Nietzsche, Russell, Sartre, and Hitchens could be dismissed as originating in pride, stubborness, and a willful refusal to recognize any power or authority beyond oneself, or beyond the human, as may well be the case with the foregoing luminaries, it does not follow that the atheism of all has this origin.

I am moved to marvel at "the starry skies above me." This was one of two things that filled Kant with wonder, the other being "the moral law within me." But seeing as is not seeing. If you see the starry skies as divine handiwork, then this is an interpretation from within a theistic framework. But the datum seen can just as easily be given a non-theistic interpretation.

It is all-too-human to suspect in our opponents moral depravity when we cannot convince them. The Pauline passage smacks of that all-too-humanity. There are sincere and decent atheists, and they have plenty of excuse for their unbelief. The fact of evil being perhaps the best excuse. The best of them, if wrong in the end, are excusably wrong.

Or so I tend to think. But I am open to a change of view and a change of heart (metanoia).

I suppose I will be told that I am falsely assuming that there are some neutral data that we can access via reason unaided by revelation, data that will supply premises for arguments to the existence of God, arguments that would constitute a philosophically neutral, theologically uncommitted preambulum fidei in Thomas's sense, when such a neutral method can only in the end issue in the conclusion that Christian theism is not true. The correct method, I will be told, is to start with and adhere to the presupposition that Christianity is true, lock, stock, and barrel, and to see everything in its light:

Roman Catholics and Arminians, appealing to the 'reason' of the natural man as the natural man himself interprets his reason, namely as autonomous, are bound to use the direct method of approach to the natural man, the method that assumes the essential correctness of a non-Christian and nontheistic conception of reality. The Reformed apologist, on the other hand, appealing to that knowledge of the true God in the natural man which the natural man suppresses by means of his assumption of ultimacy, will also appeal to the knowledge of the true method which the natural man knows but suppresses. The natural man at bottom knows that he is the creature of God. He knows also that he is responsible to God. He knows that he should live to the glory of God. He knows that in all that he does he should stress that the field of reality which he investigates has the stamp of God's ownership upon it. But he suppresses his knowledge of himself as he truly is. (123-124)

At this point in the text comes a footnote referencing Romans 1: 18 ff.

Above I suggested that Paul begs the question. Now to beg a question is to assume what one needs to prove. But there is no need to prove what one presupposes. So one who presupposes the truth of Christian theism cannot be accused of begging the question. There just is no question that can be neutrally engaged by the reason of the natural man if the truth of Christian theism is presupposed.

The ultimate principle of all proof is the Law of Non-Contradiction. It therefore cannot be proved, but only presupposed. One who affirms it cannot therefore be reasonably accused of begging the question: there simply is no question here that can reasonably be disputed.

But this leaves unanswered the question why we ought to presuppose the truth of Christian theism. For the latter, with all of its very specific claims about Trinity, Incarnation, etc. is rather unlike the logical law just mentioned — to put it in the form of an understatement. Why not presuppose atheism as many today do? They too can and do make claims about what we 'know' and what we 'suppress.' We all know deep down that we are nothing but clever land mammals slated for extinction, with no higher origin or higher destiny, but we suppress this ugly truth because we are unwilling to face the dreadful facts.

If a gratuitous assertion can be met with a gratuitous counter assertion, the same goes for a gratuitous presupposition.

More later.

Atomic Sentences and Syncategorematic Elements

The Ostrich tells me that Frege has no copula. That's not wrong, but there is a nuance that muddies the waters. Suppose Al is fat. The symbolization as Fa suggests the absence of a copula and thus the absence of a syncategorematic element. There appears to be only two categorematic elements, a and F. Well, let's see.

………………………………..

According to Fred Sommers (The Logic of Natural Language, Oxford UP, 1982, 166), ". . . one way of saying what an atomic sentence is is to say that it is the kind of sentence that contains only categorematic expressions." Earlier in the same book, Sommers says this:

In Frege, the distinction between subjects and predicates is not due to any difference of syncategorematic elements since the basic subject-predicate propositions are devoid of such elements. In Frege, the difference between subject and predicate is a primitive difference between two kinds of categorematic expressions. (p. 17)

Examples of categorematic (non-logical) expressions are 'Socrates' and 'mammal.' Examples of syncategorematic (logical) expressions are 'not,' 'every,' and 'and.' As 'syn' suggests, the latter expressions are not semantic stand-alones, but have their meaning only together with categorematic expressions. Sommers puts it this way: "Categorematic expressions apply to things and states of affairs; syncategorematic expressions do not." (164)

At first I found it perfectly obvious that atomic sentences have only categorematic elements, but now I have doubts. Consider the atomic sentence 'Al is fat.' It is symbolized thusly: Fa. 'F' is a predicate expression the reference (Bedeutung) of which is a Fregean concept (Begriff) while 'a' is a subject-expression or name the reference of which is a Fregean object (Gegenstand). Both expressions are categorematic or 'non-logical.' Neither is syncategorematic. And there are supposed to be no syncategorematic elements in the sentence: there is just 'F' and 'a.'

But wait a minute! What about the immediate juxtaposition of 'F' and 'a' in that order? That juxtaposition is not nothing. It conveys something. It conveys that the referent of 'a' falls under the referent of 'F'. It conveys that the object a instantiates the concept F. I suggest that the juxtaposition of the two signs is a syncategorematic element. If this is right, then it is false that atomic sentences lack all syncategorematic elements.

Of course, there is no special sign for the immediate juxtaposition of 'F' and 'a' in 'Fa.' So I grant that there is no syncategorematic element if such an element must have its own separate and isolable sign. But there is no need for a separate sign; the immediate juxtaposition does the trick. The syncategorematic element is precisely the juxtaposition.

Please note that if there were no syncategorematic element in 'Fa' there would not be any sentence at all. A sentence is not a list. The sentence 'Fa' is not the list 'F, a.' A (declarative) sentence expresses a thought (Gedanke) which is its sense (Sinn). And it has a reference (Bedeutung), namely a truth value (Wahrheitswert). No list of words (or of anything else) expresses a thought or has a truth value. So a sentence is not a list of its constituent words. A sentence depends on its constituent words, but it is more than them. It is their unity.

We here touch upon the ancient problem of the unity of the proposition first descried by the immortal Plato.

So I say there must be a syncategorematic element in 'Fa' if it is to be a sentence. There is need of a copulative element to tie together subject and predicate. It follows that, pace Sommers, it is false that atomic sentences are devoid of syntagorematic elements.

Note what I am NOT saying. I am not saying that the copulative element in a sentence must be a separate sign such as 'is.' There is no need for the copulative 'is.' In standard English we say 'The sea is blue' not 'The sea blue.' But in Turkish one can say Deniz mavi and it is correct and intelligible. My point is not that we need the copulative 'is' as a separate sign but that we need a copulative element which, though it does not refer to anything, yet ties together subject and predicate. There must be some feature of the atomic sentence that functions as the copulative element, if not immediate juxtaposition then something else such as a font difference or color difference.

At his point I will be reminded that Frege's concepts (Begriffe) are unsaturated (ungesaettigt). They are 'gappy' or incomplete unlike objects. The incompleteness of concepts is reflected in the incompleteness of predicate expressions. Thus '. . . is fat' has a gap in it, a gap fit to accept a name such as 'Al' which has no gap. We can thus say that for Frege the copula is imported into the predicate. It might be thought that the gappiness of concepts and predicate expressions obviates the need for a copulative element in the sentence and in the corresponding Thought (Gedanke) or proposition.

But this would be a mistake. For even if predicate expressions and concepts are unsaturated, there is still a difference between a list and a sentence. The unsaturatedness of a concept merely means that it combines with an object without the need of a tertium quid. (If there were a third thing, then Bradley's regress would be up and running.) But to express that a concept is in fact instantiated by an object requires more than a listing of a concept-word (Begriffswort) and a name. There is need of a syncategorematical element in the sentence.

So I conclude that if there are any atomic sentences, then they cannot contain only categorematic expressions.

Presupposition and Excluded Middle

If Socrates dies at time t, then Socrates was alive prior to t. If Socrates does not die at t, then Socrates was alive prior to t. Since both 'Socrates dies at t' and 'Socrates does not die at t' entail 'Socrates was alive prior t,' we say that the latter is a semantic presupposition of 'Socrates dies at t.'

But wait a minute! Doesn't what I have written generate an inconsistent tetrad?

1) p entails q

2) Not-p entails q

3) Necessarily, for any p, either p or not-p (Law of Excluded Middle)

4) q is contingent.

The conjunction of the first three limbs entails the negation of the fourth. So something has to give.

It is a datum that q — 'Socrates was alive prior to t' — is contingent: true in some but not all possible worlds. So we either reject semantic presupposition (which requires the truth of both (1) and (2) ) or we reject Excluded Middle.

Why not reject Excluded Middle? Socrates dies at t and Socrates does not die at t are contradictories: each is the negation of the other. There is no possible world in which both are true. And yet there are possible worlds in which neither is true. Those are the worlds in which Socrates does not exist.

Contingency and Composition

Joe, who describes himself as "a high school student with a passion for philosophy of religion and metaphysics," asked me a long series of difficult questions. Here is one of them:

After reading [Edward] Feser's Five Proofs, I have had difficulties with the concept of sustaining causes. First, Feser argues that composites require a sustaining cause in order to "hold them together" or keep them conjoined. But this seems to presuppose that all composite things (be it physical composites or metaphysical composites) are contingent.

But why suppose that, necessarily, all composites are contingent? What is incoherent about this:

X is a necessary being (i.e. X cannot fail to exist). X has metaphysical parts A, B, and C. Each of A, B, and C are also necessarily instantiated in reality, and the relations between A, B, and C are all necessarily instantiated in reality.

Why ought we to rule out this epistemic possibility? This seems to be a necessary being which is composite. It would be a counter-example to the assumption that composition entails contingency (where contingency means can fail to exist).

If we take composition broadly enough, composition does not entail contingency. Consider the set, {1, 3, 5}. Assume that numbers are necessary beings. Then of course the set will also be a necessary being. Furthermore, the relations that hold between the members of this set hold necessarily. For example, necessarily, 3 < 5, and necessarily, 3 > 1. So if we think of sets as composite entities, then it is not the case that all composites are contingent.

But what Feser is concerned with are material particulars, or material substances, to use the Aristotelian-scholastic jargon, e..g., a horse, a statue, a man. And of course these cannot be taken to be sets of their metaphysical parts. If I understand Feser, what he is asking is: what makes a contingent being such as Socrates contingent? The question is not whether he is contingent, but what makes him contingent. What is the ground of his contingency? The answer is that Socrates is contingent because he is composite. Composition or rather compositeness is the ground of contingency. His contingency is explained by his compositeness, in particular, his being a composite of essence and existence. So at the root of contingency is the real distinction (distinctio realis) of essence and existence in finite substances.

The claim is not that every composite entity is contingent, but that every contingent substance is contingent in virtue of its being composite.

Now if a contingent substance is contingent in virtue of its being composed of essence and existence, then a necessary being, or rather, a necessary being that has its necessity from itself and not from another, is necessary in virtue of its being simple, i.e., absolutely non-partite. This is how Thomists feel driven to the admittedly strange and seemingly incoherent doctrine of divine simplicity.

If there is to be an ultimate explanation of the existence of contingent beings, this explanation must invoke an entity that is not itself contingent. The ultimate entity must exist of metaphysical necessity and have its necessity from itself. Thomism as I understand it plausibly maintains that the ground of the divine necessity is the divine simplicity. God is necessary because in God essence and existence are one and the same.

A Little Unsolicited Advice for the Mature Members of the Distaff Contingent

Warning: 'Sexist' content up ahead! Snowflakes to your safe spaces!

………………………

Your sag and bag
Won't hurt your charm
But no man wants
A hag or nag
Upon his arm.

Implication and Presupposition

Dave Bagwill asks:

To be more clear: Do all propositions imply an ontology? Is 'imply' strong enough to bear the weight of 'assertion'? Or is 'imply' basically an equivalent of 'presuppose'?

Still not clear enough. Dave. Not even the third question is clear since you didn't specify the sense of 'imply.' But the third question is clear enough to warrant a brief answer, which is: No. Consider the following which is an intuitively clear example of a proposition resting on a presupposition:

Tom regrets lying to his wife.

Necessarily, if Tom regrets lying to his wife, then Tom has lied to his wife. The antecedent implies (in the sense of 'entails') the consequent. (I have defined 'entails' on many occasions.) But note that it is also true that, necessarily, if Tom does not regret lying to his wife, then Tom has lied to his wife.

This yields a criterion of one type of presupposition. A proposition p presupposes a proposition q just in case both p and its negation ~p entail q. One could also say that an entailment of a proposition p is a presupposition of p if and only if p's presupposition survives the negation of p. (If the preceding sentence does not make sense to you, forget it, and focus on the one preceding it.) Consider now:

Tom is drunk.

Necessarily, if Tom is drunk, then someone is drunk. But it is not the case that, necessarily, if Tom is not drunk, then someone is drunk.

So by the criterion lately enunciated, the 'survival of negation' criterion to give it a name, 'Tom is drunk,' while it implies (entails) that someone is drunk, does not presuppose that someone is drunk.

Therefore, to answer Dave's question, 'imply' (in the sense of 'entails') is not equivalent to 'presuppose.'

Alles klar? Vielleicht nicht!

One could conceivably balk, or baulk in the case of the Bad Ostrich, as follows: It is not clear, or it is false, that if Tom does not regret lying to his wife, then Tom has lied to his wife. The Ostrich could say, "Tom does not regret lying because he didn't lie in the first place."

As you can see, the topic of presupposition is a murky one, and part of the murkiness is due to the fact that presupposition is at the interface of the semantic and pragmatic, and it is not clear how they gear into each other, if you will excuse the mixed metaphors.

The Political Malpractice of the Democrats

(Cross-posted at my FB page where comments are allowed.)

Leading Democrats have reversed themselves on the need for a border wall to help secure the U. S. Mexico border. Notice, I said 'help secure.' No one thinks that a physical barrier suffices to insure border security.

It should be noted, though, that many of those voices loudly condemning a border wall as cruel or ineffective have previously gone on record about our need for thorough border security.

In 2005, Barack Obama declared, “We simply cannot allow people to pour into the U.S. undocumented, undetected, unchecked, circumventing the people who are waiting patiently, diligently, lawfully to become immigrants in this country.”

Sen. Chuck Schumer knew the dangers of illegal immigration back in 2009. “People who enter the United States without our permission are illegal aliens and illegal aliens should not be treated the same as people who enter the U.S. legally,” he said.

Even Hillary Clinton said in 2014: “I voted numerous times when I was a senator to spend money to build a barrier to try to prevent illegal immigrants from coming in and I do think you have to control your borders.”

Our leading Democrats were for it before they were against it. How should we interpret the reversal? Two possibilities.

A. Clinton, Schumer, and the rest did not mean what they said when they said they were for border security. They felt safe saying it because they knew no decisive action would be taken, and that the stream of Hispanic illegals would continue unabated to their political advantage. Saying what they did not really mean, or only half-meant, allowed them to posture as patriots concerned with the security of the homeland while reaping the benefits of illegal immigration.

B. They meant what they said, but reversed themselves to oppose the hated Trump.

I incline toward (A). What say you?

A wall divides lawmakers over securing the country

It is obvious that for many, cynical politics are prioritized over the…

Ideology at Odds with Open Inquiry

(Cross-posted at my FB page where comments are allowed.)

You will recall how Galileo got in trouble with the Inquisition. But now the Roman Catholic Church is a spent force culturally speaking and, under the 'leadership' of Bergoglio, is busy accommodating itself to the Left, which is now the arbiter of what is 'correct' and 'permissible.'

This philosopher asks: Could it be racist if it is true?

The Left responds: It cannot be true, because it is racist, and it is racist since it implies that we are not all equal as a matter of empirical fact.

Note what has happened. Christianity taught the equality of persons as sons and daughters of the Supreme Person. The Left jettisons the metaphysical foundation and misunderstands the normative claim about equality as a factual claim.

The Left goes only half way with the death of God. They reject God, but not the equality that makes sense only if God exists. This incoherence fuels their opposition to scientific research that contradicts the leftist equality axiom. And so Dr. Watson, despite his accomplishments, must be banned to scientific Siberia.

Science must play the handmaiden to leftist ideology just as philosophy and science had to play the handmaiden to theology in the Middle Ages and a long time thereafter.

And you STILL support the Left?

DNA pioneer loses honours over race claims

Nobel Prize-winning scientist James Watson has repeated remarks about…

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Phil Ochs and Tim Hardin

Joan Baez, There but for Fortune. Ochs' best song in its best rendition.

Phil Ochs, Changes

YouTuber comment, good except for the exaggeration in the last sentence:

Somewhere, in a parallel universe, in another dimension, where there's musical justice, Phil Ochs wasn't just Bob Dylan's sidekick in the early 60's, who released a bunch of albums that are long out of print, failed to gain international recognition, got choked by muggers and lost his ability to sing, disappeared into alcoholism and severe depression, and hanged himself on his birthday, and is remembered only thanks to documentaries about Greenwich Village and the Folk Revival. No, in some other reality he's remembered as one of the absolutely greatest songwriters, guitarist, and singers in the history of popular music . . . .

Phil Ochs, Pleasures of the Harbor. Brings back memories of '67 and shows that Ochs could break out of the protest/topical rut.

Christopher Hitchens on Phil Ochs and those days.

Ochs' protest songs were too obvious and bound to the events of the day. Dylan's best protest songs avoided these defects to float free of the specific and enter the ethereal. This is part of the reason why Ochs is tied to his time and place and remembered only by the aficionados but Dylan has a permanent place in the pantheon of Americana. For example, these great Dylan anthems lay it between the lines and have stood the test of time:

Clancy Bros., When the Ship Comes In

Alanis Morissette, Blowin' in the Wind

Joan Baez, A Hard Rain's Gonna Fall

And now some great tunes from the ill-starred Tim Hardin. I discovered him in '67 when I bought his Tim Hardin 2 LP. Still have it in mint condition. Do I hear $10,000? At the time, I thought that Hardin might displace Dylan in my adolescent affections or else become a sort of second Dylan. But of course that did not happen since Dylan is on 'a whole other level' despite Hardin's being a very fine songwriter and performer.

Tim Hardin, Lady Came from Baltimore

Tim Hardin, Reason to Believe

Small Faces, Red Balloon. Great version! I prefer it to Hardin's original. But then, I don't know. Both good. Hardin died of a heroin overdose in 1980. 'Red Balloon' is a heroin reference. See here:

"Red Balloon" is a confessional song about Tim's mixed feelings toward heroin and its effects upon him. Heroin is often sold in balloons, so the "bought myself a red balloon" line refers to buying and taking heroin. The "blue surprise" is the adverse effects of heroin. One such effect is the loss of libido or sexual desire – "took the lovelight from my eyes." (or possibly mistreating your loved ones) "The pinning of my eyes" is probably some adverse physical effect. In the song he is addressing heroin (according to the magazine's interpretation) when he states "you were so easy to get to know, but will we see one another again…I hope so." The Troubadour version seems to confirm this, talking about running around on the lower East Side, much like in the old Cocaine song talking about going down to Beale and Main looking for the man who sells Cocaine. So though on the surface it appears to be a childlike song about balloons and children, it's actually quite the opposite.

Don't mess with the stuff, muchachos. I speak from experience. It can very easily kill you. This is part of the reason why I have such utter contempt for those obstructionist crapweasels, Nancy the Knucklehead Pelosi, the Botox-ed-up face of the Democrat (Demon Rat?) party, and her sidekick Chucky the Scumbag Schumer who in effect promote open borders and the flow of drugs into the country.

Tim Hardin, Black Sheep Boy

If you love, let me live in peace/Please understand/ That the black sheep can wear the golden fleece and hold a winning hand.

Tim Hardin, If I Were a Carpenter

Battling the Bad Ostrich over Assertion

BV said:

I will now pose a problem for the view that assertion = proposition. Suppose I give the following valid argument, an instance of modus ponens. By 'give an argument,' I mean that I assert its premises, and I assert its conclusion as following from the premises, and this in the presence of one or more interlocutors. Thus the argument is to be taken in concreto, not in abstracto.

If Tom is drunk, then Tom ought not drive
Tom is drunk
—–
Tom ought not drive.

If the argument is valid, as it plainly is, then, in both of its occurrences, the sentence 'Tom is drunk' must express the same proposition. But this cannot be the case if a proposition is identical to an assertion. For the proposition Tom is drunk occurs unasserted in the major, but asserted in the minor. (To assert a conditional is not thereby to assert either its antecedent or its consequent.) Since one and the same proposition can occur unasserted in one context and asserted in another, we must distinguish between a proposition and an assertion.

The Ostrich responds:

I deny that the sentence ‘Tom is drunk’ in the major expresses a proposition at all. It expresses a proposition in the minor, I agree. I also claim that both sentences must have the same content in major and minor. But having the same content is not the same as expressing the same proposition. Perhaps we should rewrite the major as follows:

That Tom is drunk implies that Tom ought not drive.

We connect a name for contents, using a that-clause, with the connector ‘entails’. Thus we express the whole argument as follows

It is the case (that Tom is drunk implies that Tom ought not drive)
It is the case that Tom is drunk
It is the case that Tom ought not drive.

BV counter-responds:

The Ostrich carelessly leaves out the parentheses in the minor and in the conclusion of his re-write of the original argument. His re-write should look like this:

It is the case (that Tom is drunk implies that Tom ought not drive)
It is the case (that Tom is drunk)
It is the case (that Tom ought not drive).

'That Tom is drunk' is not a sentence but a nominal phrase. In the major, it names a proposition, the proposition expressed in English by a tokening of 'Tom is drunk.' It has to name a proposition because the implication relation connects propositions to propositions. In the minor 'that Tom is drunk' also expresses a proposition. It has to if the argument is to be valid.

So one and the same proposition — the one named by 'that Tom is drunk' — occurs in both the major and the minor. It is just that in the major it is not asserted, whereas in the minor it is. Therefore, a proposition is not the same as an assertion — which was my claim all along. (Not original with me, of course. From Frege via Peter Geach.)

So the Ostrich re-write is useless rigmarole. Consider the following re-write:

That Tom is drunk implies that Tom ought not drive
Tom is drunk
Tom ought not drive.

This is valid. In the major, 'That Tom is drunk' names but does not assert a proposition. In the minor 'Tom is drunk' asserts the very same proposition. So one and the same proposition can be both asserted and left unasserted. Therefore, a proposition is not the same as an assertion.

The Ostrich tells us, "But having the same content is not the same as expressing the same proposition." I don't understand that. A content in this context just is a proposition.

Misgivings About Deflationary Theories of Truth

1. From my survey of the literature, there are four main types of truth theory being discussed: substantive theories, nihilist (for want of a better label) theories, deflationary theories, and identity theories. Let me say just a little about the first two main types and then move on to deflationism.

2. Substantive theories maintain that truth is (i) a metaphysically substantive item, presumably a property or relation, (ii) susceptible of non-trivial analysis or explication. Correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories count as substantive theories. Such theories purport to analyze truth in terms of other, presumably more basic, terms such as a relation of correspondence or adequation to reality or to facts or mind-independent things as in Veritas est adequatio intellectus ad rem. Or in terms of coherence of truth-bearers (beliefs, propositions, etc.) among themselves. Or in terms of conduciveness to human flourishing as in William James' "the true is the good by way of belief." Or in terms of broadly epistemic notions such as rational acceptability or warranted asseribility as in the Putnamian-Peircean 'Truth is rational acceptability at the ideal limit of inquiry.'

The latter is not a good proposal for reasons I won't go into now, but it illustrates the project of giving a substantive theory of truth. One tries to analyze truth in more basic terms. One tries to give an informative, non-circular answer to the question, What is truth? The substantive approach is in the Grand Tradition deriving from Plato wherein one asks What is X? (What is justice? (Republic) What is piety? (Euthyphro) What is knowledge? (Theaetetus) What is courage? (Laches)

The substantive approach to truth can be summed up in three propositions:

A. The facts about truth are not exhausted by the substitution-instances of the equivalence schemata 'p' is true iff p and *p* is true iff p.

B. There is a substantive property of truth common to all and only truths.

C. This substantive property is susceptible of analysis or explication.

3. The 'nihilist' as he is known in the truth literature rejects substantive theories, not because they are substantive, but because they are theories. He may grant that truth is a deep, substantial, metaphysically loaded, ontologically thick, topic. But he denies that one can have a theory about it, that one can account for it in more basic terms: truth is just too basic to be explained in more fundamental terms. The nihilist accepts (A) and (B) above but denies (C).

4. The deflationist, like the nihilist, rejects substantive theories of truth. The difference is that the deflationist holds that an account of truth is possible albeit in very 'thin' terms, while the nihilist denies that any account is possible thick or thin: truth is too basic to be accountable. Nihilism allows truth to be a thick (metaphysical) topic. Deflationism disallows this. Deflationists deny (A), (B), and (C).

5. The deflationist makes a big deal out of certain seemingly obvious equivalences and he tries to squeeze a lot of anti-metaphysical mileage out of them. Here are two examples, one involving a declarative sentence, the other involving a proposition. Note that asterisks around a sentence, or around a placeholder for a sentence, form a name of the proposition expressed by the sentence.

E1. 'Grass is green' is true iff grass is green.

E2. *Grass is green* is true iff grass is green.

Now let us assume something which, though false, will simplify our discussion. Let us assume that there is no other type of use of the truth predicate other than the uses illustrated in logical equivalences like the foregoing. (Thus I am proposing that we ignore such uses as the one illustrated by 'Everything Percy says is true.')

The deflationist thesis can now be formulated as follows: There is nothing more to truth than what is expressed by such truisms as the foregoing equivalences. Thus there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth that the LHS predicates of 'Grass is green' or of *Grass is green.* The content on both sides is exactly the same: 'is true' adds no new content. 'Is true' plays a merely syntactic role. In terms of Quine's disquotationalism (which is a version of the deflationary approach), 'is true' is merely a device of disquotation. 'Is true' has no semantic dimension: it neither expresses a substantive property, nor does it refer to anything. Truth drops out as a topic of philosophical inquiry. There is no such property susceptible of informative explication in terms of correspondence, coherence, rational acceptability, or whatnot. The question What is truth? gets answered by saying that there is no such 'thing' as truth: there are truths, and every such truth reduces via the equivalence schema to a sentence or proposition in which the truth predicate does not appear. Accordingly, there is nothing all truths have in common in virtue of which they are truths. There is only a multiplicity of disparate truths. But even this says too much since each 'truth' reduces to a sentence or proposition in which 'true' does not appear.

6. Now for my misgivings about deflationism. But first three preliminary points.

a. Equivalence is symmetrical (commutative); if p is equivalent to q, then q is equivalent to p. But explanation is asymmetrical: if p explains q, then q does not explain p. From ' p iff q' one cannot infer 'p because q' or 'q because p.' 'p iff q' is consistent with both. Connected with the asymmetry of explanation is that equivalences do not sanction reductions. Triangularity and trilaterality are logically equivalent properties, but it doesn't follow that either reduces to the other.

b. If two items are equivalent, then both are propositions or sentences. There cannot be equivalence between a sentence or proposition and something that is neither.

c. To define equivalence we need to recur to truth. To say that p, q are logically equivalent is to say that there is no possible situation in which p is true and q false, or q true, and p false.

Now what is the deflationist saying? His thesis is negative: there is nothing to truth except what is captured in the the equivalence schemata and their substitution-instances. Consider

E2. *p* is true iff p.

First Misgiving: The truth of the biconditional is not in question. But equivalences don't sanction reductions. See point (a) above. From (E2) one cannot infer that the LHS reduces to the RHS, or vice versa. But the deflationist is saying that the LHS reduces to, and is explained by, the RHS. But what is his justification for saying this? Why not the other way around? Why not say that p because *p* is true?

Second Misgiving: For an equivalence to hold, both sides must be true (or false). Suppose both sides are true. Then, although the predicate 'true' does not appear on the RHS, the RHS must be true. So, far from dispensing with truth, the equivalence schemata and their instances presuppose it!

You don't get it, do you? Let me try an analogy with existence. He who is deflationary about truth can be expected to be deflationary about existence as well. A deflationist about existence might offer this equivalence schema:

F. Fs exist iff something is an F. (E.g., 'Cats exist iff something is a cat.')

I grant that every instance of the schema is true. So our deflationist about existence announces that 'exist' on the LHS of (F) plays a merely logico-syntactic role and that there is no substantive property of existence. He could put his point paradoxically by saying that there is nothing existential about general existentials. But is it not obvious that if something is an F, then that thing must exist? Are we quantifying over a domain of nonexistents? If yes, then the equivalence fails. But if we are quantifying over a domain of existents, then the existence of those existents is being presupposed. So, even though 'exist' does not occur on the RHS of (F), existence is along for the ride. Same with (E2). Even though 'true' does not occur on the RHS of (E2), truth is along for the ride. In both cases, existence and truth in meaty substantive senses are being presupposed.

Third Misgiving. 'Grass is green' and 'It is true that grass is green' have exactly the same content. That is perfectly obvious and denied by no one. 'Is true' adds no new content. But how is it supposed to follow that truth is not a substantive property? What follows is that truth is not a content property. How do our deflationist pals get from 'Truth is not a content property' to 'Truth is not a substantive property'? Isn't it obvious that truth refers us outside the content of the proposition or sentence?

Compare existence. A thing and the same thing existing have exactly the same quidditative content. The fastest runner and the existing fastest runner are numerically the same individual. Does it follow that existence is not a property? No, what follows it that existence is not a quidditative property. Existing Amby Burfoot and Amby Burfoot are quidditatively the same. But if Burfoot lacked existence he wouldn't be able to do any running, or anything else: he would be nothing at all. Same with truth. There is no difference in content between p and true p. But it makes a world of difference whether p is true or false just as it makes a world of difference whether an individual exists or not.

Fourth Misgiving. If p and q are equivalent, then both are propositions. The instances of (E) therefore do not get us outside the 'circle of propositions.' But isn't it obvious that whether or not a sentence or a proposition or a belief (or any truthbearer) is true or false depends on matters external to the truthbearer?

Fifth Misgiving. Is (E1) even true? If grass is green, it doesn't follow that 'grass is green' is true. For grass is green whether or not the English language exists.

Contention Got You Down?

Two observations to buck you up:

No abrasion, no pearl.

No pressure, no diamonds.

Free Speech and Open Inquiry Under Attack at Major Universities

In September 2016, one of the living giants of Christian scholarship, the Oxford emeritus philosopher Richard Swinburne, gave an address to the Midwest Society of Christian Philosophers, in the US. He spoke about Christian sexual ethics. In an aside — meaning this wasn’t the main topic of his talk — he affirmed the orthodox Christian view that homosexuality is morally wrong. For this, he was denounced by some Christian philosophers in the audience, and the head of the group quickly apologized for the keynote speaker, Swinburne, affirming Christian orthodoxy in an address to Christian philosophers. I wrote about it here.

It is scandalous that a leading Christian philosopher cannot state an orthodox Christian position — something that all Christians affirmed until the day before yesterday — at a gathering of Christian philosophers.

Here is something equally scandalous, but far more dangerous. John Finnis is equally a giant in the world of Christian scholarship. He is a philosopher of law who specializes in natural law theory. Though he’s now based at Notre Dame, he is an emeritus professor at Oxford. Among his past students: Supreme Court justice Neil Gorsuch, and Princeton constitutional law professor Robert George.

Finnis is now the object of a petition at Oxford asking that he be removed from teaching postgraduate students because of his views on homosexuality.

Read it all: The John Finnis Line in the Sand

Two Senses of ‘Assertion’

Ed e-mails:

The crux is what is meant by ‘assertion’. Aristotle’s system is quite clear. We have two terms on the left and right, and the copula in the middle, plus a negation sign which (in Latin) can either appear on the left of the copula (a parte ante) or the right (a parte post). Assertion = enunciation = proposition. Assertion divides into affirmation (no negation sign) and denial or negation (includes negation sign).

The two terms specify precisely what is affirmed or denied in the assertion/proposition.

Then suppose some of John’s children are sleeping. We can express this using the two term plus copula in any of the following ways.

·Some children fathered by John are sleeping things

·Some things fathered by John are sleeping children

·Some sleeping children are things fathered by John

·Some sleeping things fathered by John are children

All of these assert the existence of some children such that they sleep, and they are fathered by John.

I have no objection to the above as a setting forth of one sense of 'assertion.' In this sense, an assertion is the content or proposition asserted. But I must quibble with the last sentence: "All of these [sentences/propositions] assert that the existence of some . . . ." That is a loose way of talking, allowable in some contexts, but not in the present one in which we are discussing assertion, presupposition, Excluded Middle, and cognate topics. A proposition doesn't assert anything, and neither does a sentence. People assert, and when they do, what they assert is a proposition.

The second sense of 'assertion,' then , comes into play when we use the word to refer to a speech act. We do various things with words: make assertions, ask questions, issue commands, express wishes, etc. These two senses of 'assertion' must be kept separate if we are to make any headway with the really interesting questions about presupposition, excluded Middle, and the rest.

So far I have said nothing the least bit tendentious or controversial. I have merely pointed out two senses of 'assertion.'

I will now pose a problem for the view that assertion = proposition. Suppose I give the following valid argument, an instance of modus ponens. By 'give an argument,' I mean that I assert its premises and its conclusion as following from the premises in the presence of one or more interlocutors.