Friday Cat Blogging! Proof that I am a Racist

I have two black cats and they are never allowed off my plantation. The following graphic proves the opposite of what it intends. It is obviously white supremacist in excelsis for a white man to own black cats!

Can a Black be a Racist?

More generally, can a non-white be a racist? It depends on what a racist is. The unfortunate tendency is to bandy the term about undefined. This serves the purposes of those who want an all-purpose verbal cudgel with which to attack their opponents. I will give you my definition, one that ought to appeal to sane and well-intentioned people.

A racist is a person who harbors an abiding irrational hatred of all or most of the members of one or more other races just because of their racial membership.

Racism is a standing disposition that manifests itself in hateful or contemptuous words and deeds. These words and deeds are not rational responses to particular provocations but express a blanket, irrational negative attitude to an entire group. This is why "all or most" figures in my definition. Obviously, hatred of a person of a different race needn't be racist: the hater may have good reason to hate the other person. Racism comes into it when the person is hated because of his membership in the other race.

On the above definition a black can be a racist, and indeed some are. And so can Hispanics and Asians, including Sarah Jeong.

For the record, I condemn racism as above defined, and you should too.

If you don't like my definition, do you have any reason not to like it? Do you have a better definition?

Notice that I didn't mention skin color in my definition. People who should know better regularly conflate skin color with race. Skin color, however, is at best a phenotypical indicator of race. Suppose you have two guys, one from India, the other from Africa. Suppose they are dark in color to the same degree. They are both 'blacks' — black in color to the same degree of blackness. But they are of different races. Therefore, race is not the same as skin color.

For the politically correct, however, blacks cannot be racists. The reason, apparently, is that whites oppress blacks but blacks don't oppress whites. If so, racism is really about power and oppression, and not about race.

If racism is not about race, then why speak of racism as opposed to oppressivism?

After all, some whites oppress other whites. White males oppress white females. White-collar whites oppress blue-collar whites. 'Coastal' whites oppress 'heartland' whites. You could say that the former 'look down' on the latter as they 'fly over' them. And let's not forget the Jews. Are Jews white? Assume they are. And yet white goyim oppress them.

White females oppress white females. The good-lookers oppress the plain Janes. There is a whole lotta oppressin' goin' on. Or at least the oppressed groups feel oppressed.

'Liberal' blacks oppress conservative blacks by calling them Uncle Toms, traitors to their race, etc. Are 'liberal' blacks therefore racists?

I am making two main points.

First, on a sane definition of 'racism,' proffered above, non-whites can be racists.

Second, if your beef is with the oppression or 'denigration' of one group by another, then 'racism' is not the word you want.

Blogging may not be good for me: I am writing like a damned journalist what with these one sentence paragraphs.

God help me. Journalists deserve about as much respect today as lawyers and Catholic priests. I make an exception for journalists who courageously enter war zones to get the story and sometimes don't come home.

Make Orwell Fiction Again

This from Nancy Pelosi's website (emphasis added):

The Affordable Care Act, signed into law by President Obama in 2010, ensures that all Americans have access to quality, affordable health care and significantly reduces long-term health care costs. This historic legislation, in the league of Social Security and Medicare, will lead to healthier lives, while providing the American people with more liberty to pursue their hopes and dreams.

This is another good example of an Orwellian use of language. Americans love liberty and so Pelosi, in an attempt to deceive, works 'liberty' into her statement, advancing a claim of Orwellian absurdity, namely, that limitations on the liberty of individuals and private entities are in reality enhancements of liberty.

War is peace. Slavery is freedom. Less liberty is more liberty. Dependence on government is self-reliance. Fascist thugs are anti-fascist. The Orwellian template: X, which is not Y, is Y.

1968

Nostalgia City for this aging Boomer.

The prevailing campus spirit at Berkeley in the mid-Sixties had been Camelot-style liberal, venerating the fallen hero JFK, Michael Row the Boat Ashore, fighting world communism and intending to put a man on the moon. Most students were content within the technocratic state and eager to join its ranks. Cal graduates enlisted in the Peace Corps, not Students for a Democratic Society.

Then, quite suddenly, cool moved from Kennedy-style white Oxford shirts and can-do pragmatism to longhaired forest creatures quoting Kahlil Gibran. Sorority girls wearing madras skirts donned Mexican peasant blouses one day and dangly silver earrings the next. Accessories included funky Volkswagen buses, Cost Plus exotica, and European grand tours on $5 or $10 dollars a day. Berkeley students often seemed to have quite a lot of disposable income, thanks to their uncertain, hopeful, dollar-humping parents.

My advice to the young: take care to get old. He who would understand the world needs the grist of memory for the mill of inquiry.

Publishing Slang: Graf

Paragraph. Example:

I know y’all are worn out by all my takes on the Catholic abuse scandal, but if you can stand it, Megan McArdle’s column on it is worth reading. This graf jumped out at me:

Footnote 190 in Vlastimil Vohánka, Modality, Logical Probability, and the Trinity: A Defence of Weak Skepticism

To put it oxymoronically, I am seriously toying with taking a mysterian line with respect to such Christian dogmas as Trinity and Incarnation. To this end, I need to come to grips with our Czech friend Vlastimil Vohánka's footnote 190 on pp. 79-80 of his 2011 dissertation. This subject-matter is difficult, so put on your thinking caps. I will first quote the entire footnote, and then report on what I make of it.

190 WMST [Weak Modal Skepticism about the Trinity Doctrine] is rather a (part of a) meta-theory of the Trinity than a (part of a) theory of the Trinity. It‘s a position in the epistemology of the belief in the Trinity. According to WMST, the Trinity doctrine is a mystery, in a sense. In which sense?

Dale Tuggy distinguishes the following senses: (i) a proposition not known before divine revelation of it, but which has now been revealed by God and is known to some; (ii) a proposition which cannot be known independently of divine revelation, but which has now been revealed by God and is known to some; (iii) a proposition we don‘t completely understand; (iv) a true proposition we can‘t explain; (v) a true proposition we can‘t fully or adequately explain; (vi) an unintelligible proposition, the meaning of which can‘t be grasped; (vii) a true proposition which one should believe even though it seems, even after careful reflection, to be logically and/or otherwise impossible and thus false. See D. Tuggy ―The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing,‖ Religious Studies 39, No. 2 (2003), pp. 175-176; and D. Tuggy, ―Trinity,‖ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/trinity (accessed October 14, 2011), # 4.

Tuggy does not specify the modality of his 'cannot.' Taking it as psychological impossibility, we may plausibly say that if the Trinity doctrine is logically possible, WMST implies the doctrine is a mystery in the sense (iii). WMST leaves the issue of other senses of 'mystery' open even under the assumption of logical possibility of the doctrine. Under the assumption that the Trinity doctrine is true, WMST implies the doctrine is a mystery in the senses (iii) and (v).

Further, WMST implies mysterianism about the Trinity, in Tuggy‘s sense of the word. Mysterianism about the Trinity says that the true theory of the Trinity must, given our present epistemic limitations, to some degree lack meaning which we can understand or lack meaning which seems to us logically possible. Cf. D. Tuggy, ―Trinity,‖ op. cit., # 4. The implication by WMST of what Tuggy (ibid.) calls as positive mysterianism is much less clear. By this sort of mysterianism, he means the claim that the true theory of the Trinity must seem to us logically impossible. But there‘s some distance between (psychologically) necessary absence of evident (logical) possibility and (psychologically) necessary appearance of (logical) impossibility. WMST also does not seem to imply the position labeled by Tuggy as negative mysterianism: the claim that the true theory of the Trinity cannot seem logically possible and cannot seem logically impossible. (Ibid.) If the Trinity doctrine, in my sense, exhausted the true theory of the Trinity, then negative mysterianism would imply WMST. But it still would be contentious to assert that the converse holds, too, because the appearance of logical impossibility might be (psychologically)possible under WMST. Finally, it‘s worth noting that although positive mysterianism and negative mysterianism are incompatible, there‘s still a middle ground between them. A mysterian could hold – against both of the two contraries – that the Trinity doctrine need not, but can seem logically impossible; or that the Trinity doctrine need not seem logically impossible, but can seem logically possible.

Let's see if I can clarify this in my own terms.

Positive mysterianism (PM): this is the epistemological meta-thesis that the Trinity doctrine, given our present cognitive limitations, must appear to us as logically impossible.

Negative mysterianism:(NM): this is the epistemological meta-thesis that the Trinity doctrine, given our present cognitive limitations, cannot seem to us logically possible and cannot seem to us logically impossible.

What is the force of the 'must' and the 'cannot' in (PM) and (NM)? Following Vohanka, we can take the modal terms as referring to psychological necessity and psychological impossibility, respectively. Thus on PM we can't help but find the doctrine to be logically impossible. In this sense it must appear to us as logically impossible. This is due to the actual constitution of our minds, a constitution which may be metaphysically contingent.

But who are we? You could say human animals, but I prefer to say discursive intellects or ectypal intellects whether biologically human or not. There may be some extraterrestrial non-human mysterians out there.

And what is meant by 'present' cognitive limitations'? I take 'present' wide open so as to cover our entire embodied existence or perhaps our entire embodied fallen existence. Our present cognitive limitations are our limitations 'here below' to use an old-fashioned religious phrase or our limitations 'here and now.' We should hold open the possibility that in our prelapsarian state we did not suffer from our present cognitive limitations.

Disjunctive Mysterianism (DM): "[Disjunctive] mysterianism about the Trinity says that the true theory of the Trinity must, given our present epistemic limitations, to some degree lack meaning which we can understand or lack meaning which seems to us logically possible.

Vlastimil tells us that according to WMST, the Trinity doctrine is a mystery, in a sense. In what sense? In a sense that implies (DM). It seems to me that Vlastimil's attitude toward the Trinity doctrine is not one of skepticism or doubt; what he is doing is making a non-skeptical claim about the intelligibility to us of the Trinity doctrine. (Needless to say, the doctrine and the Trinity itself, the reality behind the doctrine if there is one, must be distinguished.)

It may help to distinguish five possible attitudes towards a proposition:

1) Accept as true.
2) Reject as false.
3) Reject as meaningless.
4) Suspend judgment as to whether either true or false.
5) Suspend judgment as to whether either meaningful or meaningless. (The epoche of the Pyrrhonists.)

(5), when applied to the Trinitarian proposition, is the attitude according to which one suspends judgment on the question as to whether or not one even has a (Fregean) proposition before one's mind when one intones or hears the Trinitarian formula or verbalism, "There is one God in three divine persons."

The last two, (4) and (5), are forms of skepticism.

Let the proposition be: There is one God in three divine persons.

It seems to me that my and V's attitude to the Trinitarian proposition is none of the above five.

I am inclined to accept (PM) while V. is apparently accepting (DM). Both of us are making non-skeptical claims about the intelligibility to us (not in itself) of the Trinitarian proposition.

Does this seem right?

Capital Punishment is Indeed a Deterrent

Joseph M. Bessette in the Wall Street Journal:

Consider this example that the philosopher Edward Feser and I recount in our book, By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed: A Catholic Defense of Capital Punishment: At a professional conference, a criminologist reported that two burglars had broken into his mother’s apartment and tied her up as they searched for valuables. As they were about to leave, one said: “She has seen us and can identify us. Should we kill her?” “No,” answered the other, “we don’t want to risk the death penalty.” They let her live. One can hardly imagine a clearer example of deterrence.

Another example comes from Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California. In the 1960s she served on the California Women’s Parole Board. At one hearing, Mrs. Feinstein asked an armed robber seeking release from prison why she never used a loaded gun. “So I would not panic, kill somebody, and get the death penalty,” she answered. That convinced Mrs. Feinstein that (in her words) “the death penalty in place in California in the ’60s was in fact a deterrent.”

A third example is recounted by law professor Robert Blecker, who had spent years interviewing prisoners. A veteran criminal told Mr. Blecker that the reason he spared the life of a drug dealer in Virginia whom he had tied up and robbed was because the state had the electric chair. In a similar situation in the District of Columbia, which had abolished the death penalty, the criminal had killed his victim. “I just couldn’t tolerate what they had waiting for me in Virginia,” he said.

These examples are powerful illustrations that the death penalty can and does deter some would-be murderers. Like the rest of us, criminals want to live, and, as the these examples show, they will often adjust their behavior accordingly. Without the death penalty, what incentive would a “lifer” have not to kill while in prison or, if he escaped, while on the run?

There is also a deeper kind of deterrence, largely overlooked in discussions of the death penalty, which doesn’t require rational calculation. When society imposes the ultimate punishment for the most heinous murders, it powerfully teaches that murder is a great wrong. Children growing up in such a society internalize this message, with the result that most people wouldn’t even consider killing another human being.

I would add that eliminating the death penalty undermines the message that murder is a great wrong and contributes to leniency and a ratcheting down of penalties in respect of non-capital crimes such as rape.

Here the principle of justice, which demands that malefactors receive a punishment proportionate to their offense, and deterrence of this deeper sort meet. If we abolish the death penalty for even the most heinous and coldblooded murderers, we fatally undermine the idea of justice as the cornerstone of our criminal-justice system. Over time justice will be replaced by a therapeutic or technocratic model that treats human beings as cases to be managed and socially engineered rather than as morally responsible persons.

Bishops Without Chests

And the hits keep coming.

When Did Sex Begin?

In 1963. Or at least so we hear from Philip Larkin in his Annus Mirabilis. It was indeed a remarkable year. I was but a boy in grade school, but old enough so that I now remember all those wonderful songs and not so wonderful events such as the Profumo scandal in Britain. What ever happened to sex kitten Christine Keeler, by the way? Brace yourself.

Sexual intercourse began
In nineteen sixty-three
(which was rather late for me) -
Between the end of the Chatterley ban
And the Beatles' first LP.
Up to then there'd only been
A sort of bargaining,
A wrangle for the ring,
A shame that started at sixteen
And spread to everything.
Then all at once the quarrel sank:
Everyone felt the same,
And every life became
A brilliant breaking of the bank,
A quite unlosable game.
So life was never better than
In nineteen sixty-three
(Though just too late for me) -
Between the end of the Chatterley ban
And the Beatles' first LP.

Cesare Pavese, “Passion for Solitude”

Passion for Solitude

BY CESARE PAVESE

TRANSLATED BY GEOFFREY BROCK

I’m eating a little supper by the bright window.

The room’s already dark, the sky’s starting to turn.

Outside my door, the quiet roads lead,

after a short walk, to open fields.

I’m eating, watching the sky—who knows

how many women are eating now. My body is calm:

labor dulls all the senses, and dulls women too.

Outside, after supper, the stars will come out to touch

the wide plain of the earth. The stars are alive,

but not worth these cherries, which I’m eating alone.

I look at the sky, know that lights already are shining

among rust-red roofs, noises of people beneath them.

A gulp of my drink, and my body can taste the life

of plants and of rivers. It feels detached from things.

A small dose of silence suffices, and everything’s still,

in its true place, just like my body is still.

All things become islands before my senses,

which accept them as a matter of course: a murmur of silence.

All things in this darkness—I can know all of them,

just as I know that blood flows in my veins.

The plain is a great flowing of water through plants,

a supper of all things. Each plant, and each stone,

lives motionlessly. I hear my food feeding my veins

with each living thing that this plain provides.

The night doesn’t matter. The square patch of sky

whispers all the loud noises to me, and a small star

struggles in emptiness, far from all foods,

from all houses, alien. It isn’t enough for itself,

it needs too many companions. Here in the dark, alone,

my body is calm, it feels it’s in charge.

Cesare Pavese, "Passion for Solitude" from Disaffections: Complete Poems 1930-1950. Copyright © 2002 by Cesare Pavese. Reprinted with the permission of Copper Canyon Press, P.O. Box 271, Port Townshend, WA 98368-0271, coppercanyonpress.org. Source: Disaffections: Complete Poems 1930-1950 (Copper Canyon Press, 2002)

………………………

Who knows how many women are eating now, women dulled by labor, thought of by Cesare, alone at table, in a dark room, who, like the struggling star is alone, but unlike the star, is enough for himself, body calm and in charge feeling no need for a woman.

A Modest View of Oneself

A modest view of oneself may reflect self-knowledge or lack of self-confidence. But to know which requires self-knowledge.

And Still More Corruption

The PA Catholic Sex Abuse Horror

There ought to be a moratorium on the admission of homosexuals into the seminaries. Granted, the homosexual propensity is not sinful, only the exercise. But given the current level of corruption in the seminaries and in the Church in general, a moratorium on the admission of homosexuals would be a good first step in restoring the seminaries to their task of purely spiritual insemination.

For you liberals, moratoria are by definition temporary.

Maximilian Kolbe

Today is the feast of Maximilian Kolbe.

Although it is a deep and dangerous illusion of the Left to suppose that man is inherently good and that it is merely such contingent and remediable factors as environment, opportunity, upbringing and the like that prevent the good from manifesting itself, there are a few human beings who are nearly angelic in their goodness. One can only be astonished at the example of Maximilian Kolbe and wonder how such moral heroism is possible. And this even after adjusting for a certain amount of hagiographic embellishment.

Is there a good naturalistic explanation for Kolbe's self-sacrifice?

Wikipedia:

At the end of July 1941, ten prisoners disappeared from the camp, prompting SS–Hauptsturmführer Karl Fritzsch, the deputy camp commander, to pick 10 men to be starved to death in an underground bunker to deter further escape attempts. When one of the selected men, Franciszek Gajowniczek, cried out, "My wife! My children!", Kolbe volunteered to take his place.^[8]

Strange Unbalanced Creatures

One and the same person at one time unjustly mocks, belittles, ridicules, blasphemes, denigrates, scorns, and contemns. At another time he idolizes, unjustly places on a pedestal, engages in inordinate praise, and prostrates himself before a pseudo-god.