This Just Now In: There is no Now! More Bad Philosophy from a Physicist

One of the tasks of philosophy is to expose bad philosophy.  Scientists pump out quite a lot of it.   Physicists are among the worst.  I have given many examples.  Here is another one.  Let's get to work.  Dartmouth physicist Marcelo Gleiser writes in There is No Now

You say, “I’m reading this word now.” In reality, you aren’t. Since light travels at a finite speed, it takes time for it to bounce from the book to your eye. When you see a word, you are seeing it as it looked some time in the past. To be precise, if you are holding the book at one foot from your eye, the light travel time from the book to your eye is about one nanosecond, or one billionth of a second. The same with every object you see or person you talk to. Take a look around. You may think that you are seeing all these objects at once, or “now,” even if they are at different distances from you. But you really aren’t, as light bouncing from each one of them will take a different time to catch your eye. The brain integrates the different sources of visual information, and since the differences in arrival time are much smaller than what your eyes can discern and your brain process, you don’t see a difference. The “present”—the sum total of the sensorial input we say is happening “now”—is nothing but a convincing illusion.

Gleiser is confusing seeing with object seen.  True, light travels at a finite speed. So the word seen is the word as it was one nanosecond ago.  But it doesn't follow that I am not seeing the word now. The seeing occurs now at time t, the word seen, however, is not the word as it is at t, but the word as it was at t* (t*<t). 

When I glance at the sun, I see it as it was about eight minutes ago.  But it does not follow that the seeing (glancing) is not occurring now, or that there is no now.

Suppose that at time t I am visually aware of a word and of a cat.  I am focused on the word, but the cat is nearby in the periphery of my visual field.  So the seeing of the word and the seeing of the cat are simultaneous seeings.  But the word I see is the word as it was one nanosecond ago, whereas the cat I see is the cat as it was, say, 10 nanoseconds ago.  So I grant that there are a couple of illusions here.

The first illusion is that if a seeing occurs at time t, then the object seen is as it is at t. This cannot be given the well-known facts that Gleiser adduces.  The object seen is as it was at an earlier time t*.  But if you see through (forgive the pun) the first illusion, you may still succumb to the second.  The second illusion is that objects seen at the same time t are as they were at the same time t*, where t* is earlier than t.  In my example, the seeing of the word and the seeing of the cat occur at the same time, call it t.  But, given that word and cat are at different distances from the subject, there is no one time t*, earlier than t, such that word and cat were as they were when they were seen.

But again, that does not show that the present moment or the Now is an illusion.

Gleiser's thesis is that there is no Now, that it is a "cognitive illusion."  He sums up:

To summarize: given that the speed of light is fast but finite, information from any object takes time to hit us, even if the time is tiny. We never see something as it is “now.” However, the brain takes time to process information and can’t distinguish (or time-order) two events that happen sufficiently close to one another. The fact that we see many things happening now is an illusion, a blurring of time perception.

Gleiser is just confused.  There is an illusion, but it is the illusion that we see things as they are now.  But that is not to say that there is no Now, or that the Now is an illusion.  In fact, Gleiser presupposes that there is a Now when he says that we never see anything as it is now.  Right now the Sun is in some definite state, but the physics of visual perception make it impossible to see the Sun as it is now.  If it had gone supernova three minutes ago, it would appear to us now as it usually does.

Geiser confuses an epistemological claim — We never see anything distant from us as it is at the precise time of the seeing — with an ontological claim: there is no present moment.

There is other nonsense in Gleiser's piece.   Take this sentence: "The notion of time is related to change, and the passage of time is simply a tool to track change."  I'll leave it to the reader to sort this out.  I've had enough!

Related entries:

Do Physicists Bullshit?

Why Do Some Physicists Talk Nonsense about Nothing?

"We're Just a Bit of Pollution," Cosmologist Says

 

The Dirty and the Funny

The muse of philosophy must have visited my otherwise undistinguished classmate Dolores back in the fifth grade.  The topic was dirty jokes and that we should not tell them or listen to them.  "But sister," Dolores piped up, "what if you laugh not because the joke is dirty but because it is funny?"

It was a good distinction then and a good distinction now.

D. M. Armstrong on Religion

Jenny and david armstrong(Photo credit: David Chalmers via Andrew Chrucky)

I posted on Armstrong's naturalism yesterday, and that got me to thinking whether he ever said anything anywhere about religion.  A little searching  turned up the following 2002 interview of Armstrong by Andrew Chrucky. Here is an excerpt that touches upon Armstrong's view of religion:

Chrucky:  Let me move on to something else. What I would want to know from a philosopher if I were an ordinary person. Probably the first things I would want to know is: Are you religious in any way?
Armstrong: No. I'm not.

Chrucky: What is your take on religion?
Armstrong: I have the greatest respect for it. I think it may be the thing that many people need, and it enshrines many truths about life. But I do not think it is actually true.

Chrucky: So, it expresses truth in some metaphorical way?
Armstrong: In some metaphorical and symbolic way, I think it grasps at truth. And I think it gives hope and comfort to many.

Chrucky: I am not much into religion as a subject, but perhaps someone like Bultmann who was demythologizing religion is someone you would find favor with?
Armstrong: I am quite happy with religion going on the way it is. I don't want to alter the religions. That's not my interest. But I suppose that if you are considering what is the truth behind religion then it would have to be demythologized.

Chrucky: How do you view the state of the world? Right now there seems to be a rise in fundamentalism all over.
Armstrong: Yes.

Chrucky: You know Iran became a theocracy, and there seems to be a Christian-Islamic confrontation going on. How does one resolve this? Is there a philosophical way of looking at it?
Armstrong: No. I don't think so.

Chrucky: Is there a need for dialogue? . . . so that religions confront one another, or is this hopeless?
Armstrong: I don't really know. I really don't have any views on this point. I think of myself as in the Christian and Jewish tradition, and in the tradition of Greece. Matthew Arnold thought of Hebraism and Hellenism as the twin poles of Western culture. I see myself as a person in the stream within that culture, and I think it may perhaps be the best tradition of thought and life that has so far been evolved. Certainly I don't think we should be apologetic about it.

……….

This interview confirms what I suspected was Armstrong's attitude toward religion.  As a naturalist, he cannot consider any of the characteristic claims of religion to be literally true.  But as a conservative, he has "the greatest respect for it" and he appreciates the important and beneficial role it plays in the lives of many people.  While not true in its characteristic claims, religion "enshrines many truths about life."  Armstrong endorses the notion that Hebraism and Hellenism are the twin poles of Western culture, the tradition of which is the best that has so far been evolved.  Armstrong sees himself in that tradition.  One might wonder, however, whether his work in philosophy has had or will have the effect of undermining it.

He is clearly a traditionalist who takes the great problems of philosophy seriously and unabashedly uses phrases like 'great problems.'  He respects the tradition even while diverging from it.  I cannot imagine him writing a book like David Stove's The Plato Cult.  His approach in philosophy is direct, realistic, ontological, nonlinguistic.  He is also traditional in that he sees an important role for philosophy.  He is far from scientism as I tried to make clear in my earlier post.

A final observation.  Armstrong's is a disinterested search for truth.  He is like Aristotle in that regard.  One cannot imagine his naturalism becoming a substitute religion for him.

A Sketch of Armstrong’s Naturalism and Why I am not a Naturalist

David armstrongThe late David Malet Armstrong has a serious claim to being Australia's greatest philosopher.  His life work is summed up in his Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Oxford UP, 2010).  It is from the Introduction to this slim volume that I draw the following précis of his naturalism.

Armstrong on Naturalism

1. Naturalism for Armstrong is the thesis that "all that exists is the space-time world . . . ." The space-time world is the physical world.  The thesis, then, is that reality is exhausted by the physical world.

2. Naturalism is an assumption:  it is assumed to be true.

3. Armstrong admits that he has no argument for naturalism  except that it is a position that many would accept, both philosophers and non-philosophers.  There is no philosophical reasoning whereby one could prove that any metaphysical scheme, including naturalism, is correct.  To think otherwise is "folly."  I agree.  One cannot prove naturalism or any form of anti-naturalism. 

4. Armstrong also describes naturalism as an "hypothesis," one that many would accept as plausible.  "The space-time entity seems obviously to exist. Other suggested beings seem much more hypothetical." (1)

5. Though naturalism cannot be proven, one can attempt to develop it into a coherent vision of the fundamental structure of the world or of the general nature of things, a vision (his word) that can then be put into competition with other visions.  The development of a vision of things will involve argumentation but also bare assertion. "I argue where I can, but at times I simply assert."

6. The exclusion of so-called abstract entities or abstract objects such as mathematical sets, unexemplified universals, and numbers from the roster of the real is because of their lack  of causal power.  What causal role could they play?  "And if they play no causal role it is hard to see how we can have good reasons for thinking that they exist." (2) 

We ought to distinguish between

A. To exist is to be capable of entering into causal relations

and

B. We have no good reasons for postulating entities that are incapable of entering into causal relations.

Armstrong affirms (B), but he also seems committed to (A) since (A) is entailed by naturalism.  Naturalism is the view that reality is exhausted by the space-time world, the view that nothing exists except what exists in the space-time world.  Given that the space-time world is a world of causal interactions, it follows that all and only that which is causally active/passive exists.  If you are an Armstrongian naturalist, then you cannot posit such causally inert entities as mathematical sets even if there are some good reasons for postulating them.

7. The space-time world, the physical world, is Wilfrid Sellars' world of the scientific image, not that of the manifest image.  It is therefore the task of physics, or perhaps total natural science, to tell us what the physical world, and thus all of reality, is like. 

8. Now if naturalism is true and physics (or total science) informs us as to nature's laws and properties, why do we need metaphysics?  Why isn't physics all the metaphysics we need?  Why shouldn't we embrace both the ontological thesis of naturalism and the epistemological thesis of scientism?  After all, they seem to go together.  If all that exists is the system of space-time-matter, and physics tells us what there is to know about it, then what room is there for metaphysics?

There is room for metaphysics according to Armstrong because we need a systematic account of such topic-neutral notions as cause, class, property, relation, quality, kind, resemblance, quantity, number, substance, fact, truth, law of nature, power, and others.

For example, common experience and the sciences inform us as to what causes what, but not as to what causation is.  What is causation?  What distinguishes a causal from a noncausal event sequence?  Is causation 'in the objects' mere regular succession as Hume thought (or as Hume is often taken to have thought)?  Or is there more to it?  And what is that more?  Does the cause produce the effect?  Does the cause bring the effect into existence?  Can x cause y even if the x-y sequence does not instantiate any regularity?  What are the relata of the causal relation?  Can a substance be a causal relatum?  Is causation a relation at all?  And so on.  All of these are questions in metaphysics (ontology) for Armstrong.

So a thoroughgoing naturalist who restricts the real to the space-time system needn't embrace scientism; he can maintain that there is room for metaphysics in one sense of that ancient word:  not an inquiry into what is beyond the physical or natural, but an inquiry into the deepest and most pervasive structures of the natural.  (Armstrong does not mention scientism or make the point I just made, but it clearly follows from what he says.

Why I am Not a Naturalist (A Brief Sketch)

Armstrong is surely right that one cannot prove naturalism.  Equally, one cannot disprove it. But there  reasons that make its rejection reasonable.

There are questions that naturalism cannot satisfactorily answer.  Among them:  Why does anything at all exist? Or, more precisely, why does anything contingent at all exist?  The space-time system exists and it exists contingently — there is no logical or metaphysical necessity that there be a space-time system at all, or the precise one that we find ourselves in.   But the space-time entity, as Armstrong calls it,  lacks the resources to explain its own existence.  I won't argue this here, but I have in other places.  There are also good reasons to reject the suggestion that the space-time system exists as a matter of brute fact.

Deeper than the question, Why does anything at all exist? is the question, What is it for any contingent thing to exist?  Does Armstrong have an answer for this question?  Surely it is a central question of metaphysics.  We cannot decide what exists or why anything exists unless we know what it is for something to exist.  He doesn't deal with it as far as I know, but he does seem to have an implicit answer, (A) above which can also be formulated as follows:

A*. For any x, x exists iff x is possibly such as to be either a cause or an effect. 

A**. For any x, x exists iff x has the power to bring about a change in itself or in another or the liability to have a change brought about in it.

But even if these biconditionals are true, they presuppose existence rather than accounting for it.  A thing cannot have a causal power or a causal liability or stand in a relation unless it 'already' (logically speaking) exists.  What makes a thing exist, therefore, cannot be its having a power or liability or its standing in a relation.

Long story short, A's naturalism has no satisfactory answer to either of my existence questions.

And then there are questions about mind, questions about consciousness, qualia, intentionality, reason, and the like.  They notoriously resist naturalistic treatment.  Armstrong, who is famous for his intellectual honesty, readily admits this:

I do not know how to refute the claim that intentionality is an irreducible phenomenon, a phenomenon that is something different from the physical processes in the brain.  So in my philosophy of mind I face difficulties from the alleged qualia and from the phenomenon of intentionality that seem rather greater than anything I am aware of in the rest of my ontological scheme. (115)

That naturalism is not compelling is also evident from the fact that naturalists disagree bitterly among themselves as to what shape it should take.  Some naturalists want to countenance abstracta while others are eliminativists about the mind.

But I don't reject naturalism simply because it does not have satisfactory answers to all the questions that need answering; I also reject it on the basis of all the experiences (mystical, religious, paranormal) that point to, though they do not prove, what William James calls the "reality of the unseen."  Such experiences by themselves may not cut much ice, but in conjunction with an array of rigorous arguments against naturalism and an array of rigorous argments for some form or anti-naturalism, they play an important role in a cumulative case argument for the reasonableness of anti-naturalism.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: More Performers Who Ditched Their Italian Surnames

But before getting on to the greaseball crooners, a bit of R & R history.  London Ed reminds me that today, the 5th of July, 2014, is the 60th anniversary of the recording of Elvis Presley's That's Alright, Mama, his first commercial record.  It was written and first recorded by Arthur 'Big Boy' Crudup in 1946.  Some say that Presley's recording is the first rock and roll record.  Others give the palm to the 1951 Rocket 88 by Jackie Brenston and his Delta Kings.  The associated video features footage (and 'leggage') of Bettie Page, that innocent  and unwitting sex kitten of the '50s. She got religion big time later on, as did Dion Dimucci, but that's another and another Saturday Night at the Oldies . . . .

…………..

Before Bobby Darin became Bobby Darin he rejoiced under the name, Walden Robert Cassotto.  Dream Lover18 Yellow Roses. You're the Reason I'm Living.

Bobby Rydell started out Robert Ridarelli.  Forget himVolare. "Letsa fly . . . ." Wild One. We Got Love.

No, his name wasn't Dino Martino, it was Dino Paul Crocetti.  Schmaltzy as it is, That's Amore captures the Nagelian what-it's-like of being in love.  Houston.

Concetta Rosa Maria Franconero, better known as Connie Francis. My Darling Clementine. Never on Sunday.  I prefer the understated Melina Mercouri version.

Timoteo Aurro = Timi Yuro.  When I first heard her back in the day, I thought she was black.  What a voice!  What's the Matter, Baby?  Her signature number: Hurt.

Laura traded in 'Nigro' for 'Nyro.'  Wedding Bell Blues.   And When I Die.  These go out to Monterey Tom, big L.N. fan.  Nyro died young in 1997 of ovarian cancer, 49 years of age.

Laura Nyro

The Gender Academy

In his latest NRO column, Spencer Case argues that "The feminist left is politicizing philosophy."  I would add that this is but a special case of the general truth that the Left politicizes everything. 

Some related posts of mine:

The Politicization of the American Philosophical Association

The Recent Dennett-Plantinga A. P. A. Debate and the Question of Tone in Philosophy Excellent comment thread.  A. C. Grayling makes an appearance and is pummelled by Ed Feser and others.

Still More on the Colorado Situation

Lukas Novak on Reference to What is Not

Our Czech friend Lukas Novak sent me a paper in which, drawing upon John Duns Scotus, he rejects the following principle of reference:

(PR) It is impossible to refer to that which is not.

In this entry I will first pull some quotations from Novak's paper and then raise some questions about the view he seems to be endorsing.

I. Novak's Scotistic View

Novak writes,

Scotus’ position can be simply characterized as a consistent rejection of the PR . . . . According to Scotus, the objects of any intentional relations . . . simply are not required to have any ontological status whatsoever, or, as Scotus puts it, any esse verum. The “being” expressed by the predicates exploited by Francis, like “to be known” (esse cognitum), “to be intelligible” (esse intelligibile), “to be an image of a paradigm” (esse exemplatum), “to be represented” (esse repraesentatum) and the like, is not real or true in any way, irrespectively of whether the relation involved concerns God or man.

[. . .]

 

It is not necessary to assume any esse essentiae in objects of knowledge: instead, Scotus speaks of “esse deminutum” here, but he points out emphatically that this “diminished being” is being only “secundum quid”, i.e., in an improper, qualified sense – this is the point of Scotus’ famous criticism of Henry of Ghent laid out in the unique question of dist. 36 of the first book of his Ordinatio. If you look for some real being in the object of intellection that it should have precisely in virtue of being such an object, there is none to be found. The only real being to be found here is the real being of the intellection, to which the esse deminutum of the intellected object is reduced:

[. . .]

In other words: if we were to make something like an inventory of reality, we should not list any objects having mere esse deminutum. By speaking about objects in intelligible being we do not take on any ontological commitment (to use the Quinean language) over and above the commitment to the existence of the intellections directed to these objects.

[. . .]

And now the crucial point: it is precisely this intelligibility, imparted to the objects by the divine intellect, what [that] makes human conceiving of the same objects possible, irrespectively of whether they have any real being or not:

[. . .]

In other words: the most fundamental reason why the PR is false is, according to Scotus, the fact that a sufficient condition of the human capacity to refer to something is the intelligibility of that something. This intelligibility, however, is bestowed on things in virtue of their being conceived, prior to creation, by the absolute divine intellect. This divine conceiving, however, neither produces nor presupposes any genuine being in the objects; for it is a universal truth that cognition is an immanent operation, one whose effect remains wholly in its subject (and so does not really affect its object) – in this elementary point divine cognition is not different. Accordingly, objects need not have any being whatsoever in order to be capable of being referred to. (emphasis added)

II. Some Questions and Comments

As a matter of fact we do at least seem to refer to nonexistent objects and say things about them, true and false.   Alexius von Meinong's celebrated goldner Berg, golden mountain, may serve as an example.  The golden mountain is made of gold; it is a mountain; it does not exist; it is an object of my present thinking; it is indeterminate with respect to height; it is 'celebrated' as it were among connoisseurs of this arcana; it is Meinong's favorite example of a merely possible individual; it — the very same one I am talking about now — was discussed by Kasimir Twardowski, etc.

Now if this seeming to refer is an actual referring, if we do refer to the nonexistent in thought and overt speech, then it is possible that we do so.  Esse ad posse valet illatio.  But how the devil is it possible that we do so?  (PR) is extremely plausible: it is difficult to understand how there could be reference to that which has no being, no esse, whatsoever.

If I understand Novak, he wants a theory that satisfies the following desiderata or criteria of adequacy

D1. Possibilism is to be avoided.  We cannot maintain that the merely possible has any sort of being.

D2. Actualist ersatzism is to be avoided.  We cannot maintain that there are actual items such as Plantingian haecceities that stand in for mere possibilia.

D3. The phenomenological fact that intentionality is relational or at least quasi-relational is to be respected and somehow accommodated.  No adverbial theories!

D4. Eliminativism about intentionality/reference is to be avoided.  Intentionality is real!

D5. Nominalist reductionism according to which reference is a merely intralinguistic phenomenon is to be avoided.  When I refer to something, whether existent or nonexistent, I am getting outside of language!  

Novak does not list these desiderata; I am imputing them to him.  He can tell me if my imputation is unjust.  In any case, I accept (D1)-(D5): an adequate theory must satisfy these demands.  Now how does Novak's theory satisfy them?

Well, he brings God into the picture. Some will immediately cry deus ex machina! But I think Novak can plausibly rebut this charge.  If God is brought on the stage in an ad hoc manner to get us out of a jam, then a deus ex machina objection has bite.  But Novak and his master Scotus have independent reasons for positing God.  See my substantial post on DEM objections in philosophy, here.

Suppose we have already proven, or at least given good reasons for, the existence of God.  Then he can be put to work.  Or, as my esteemed teacher J. N. Findlay once said, "God has his uses."

So how does it work?  It is sufficient for x to be an object of thought or reference by us that it be intelligible. This intelligibility derives from the divine intellect who, prior to creation, conceives of such items as the golden mountain.  But this conceiving does not impart to them any real being.  Nor does it presuppose that they have any real being.  In themselves, they have no being at all.  God's conceiving of nonexistent objects is a wholly immanent operation the effect of which remains wholly within the subject of the operation, namely, the divine mind.    And yet the nonexistent objects acquire intelligibility.  It is this intelligibility that makes it possible for us finite minds to think the nonexistent without it being the case that nonexistent objects have any being at all.

That is the theory, assuming I have understood it.  And it does seem to satisfy the desiderata with the possible exception of (D3).  But here is one concern.  The theory implies that when I think about the golden mountain I am thinking about an operation wholly immanent to the divine intellect.  But that is not what I seem to be thinking about.  What I seem to be thinking about has  very few properties (being golden, being a mountain) and perhaps their analytic entailments, and no hidden properties such as the property of being identical to an operation wholly immanent to the divine intellect.  An intentional object has precisely, all and only, the properties it is intended as having.

Connected with this concern is the suspicion that on Novak's theory the act-object distinction is eliminated, a distinction that is otherwise essential to his approach.  He wants to deny that merely intentional objects have any being of their own.  So he identifies them with divine conceivings.  But this falls afoul of a point insisted on by Twardowski.  (See  article below.)

My merely imagined table does not exist in reality, 'outside' my mind.  But it also does not exist 'in' my mind as identical to the act of imagining it or as a proper part of the act of imagining it, or as any sort of mental content, as Twardowski clearly saw.  Otherwise, (i) the merely imagined table would have the nature of an experience, which it does not have, and (ii) it would exist in reality, when it doesn't, and (iii) it would have properties that cannot be properties of mental acts or contents such as the property of being spatially extended.

My point could be put like this.  The typical merely intentional, hence nonexistent, object such as the golden mountain does not have the nature of an experience or mental act; it is an object of such an act.  But if merely intentional objects are divine conceivings, then they have the nature of an experience. Ergo, etc.  Novak's theory appears to fall into psychologism.   

Arguments Don’t Have Testicles

The Supreme Court justices in the majority in the 5-4 Hobby Lobby decision are all male: Alito, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Kennedy.  If someone seeks to discredit their decision on that ground, say this:

Arguments don't have testicles!

If the person persists, then point out that females dominated the minority in that decision.

Semi-Annual Twilight Zone Marathon Starts Tomorrow!

Rod serlingSchedule here.

The hard-driving Serling lived a short but intense life. Born in 1924, he was dead at age 50 in 1975. His four pack a day cigarette habit destroyed his heart. Imagine smoking 80 Lucky Strikes a day! Assuming 16 hours of smoking time per day, that averages to one cigarette every twelve minutes.  He died on the operating table during an attempted bypass procedure.

But who is to say that a long, healthy life is better than a short, intense one fueled by the stimulants one enjoys? That is a question for the individual, not Hillary, to decide.

 

It is appropriate that on Independence Day one should celebrate with Serling, WWII paratrooper, anti-statist, defender of the individual.

Serling knew how to entertain while also stimulating thought and teaching moral lessons. Our contemporary dreckmeisters apparently think that the purpose of art is to degrade sensibility, impede critical thinking, glorify scumbags, and rub our noses ever deeper into sex and violence. It seems obvious that the liberal fetishization of freedom of expression without constraint or sense of responsibility is part of the problem. But I can't let a certain sort of libertarian or economic conservative off the hook. Their lust for profit is also involved.

What is is that characterizes contemporary media dreck? Among other things, the incessant presentation of defective human beings as if there are more of them than there are, and as if there is nothing at all wrong with their way of life. Deviant behavior is presented as if it is mainstream and acceptable, if not desirable. And then lame justifications are provided for the presentation: 'this is what life is like now; we are simply telling it like it is.' It doesn't occur to the dreckmeisters that art might have an ennobling function.

The tendency of liberals and leftists is to think that any presentation of choice-worthy goals or admirable styles of life could only be hypocritical preaching.  And to libs and lefties, nothing is worse than hypocrisy.  Indeed, a good indicator of whether someone belongs to this class of the terminally benighted is whether the person obsesses over hypocrisy and thinks it the very worst thing in the world.  See my category Hypocrisy for elaboration of this theme.

Robert Paul Wolff’s Misunderstanding of the Hobby Lobby Decision

Professor Wolff of The Philosopher's Stone writes,

When we got back to our apartment, I turned on my computer to check the news, and learned of the pair of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court.  That both decisions are disastrous goes without saying, but I think they have quite different significances.

The Hobby Lobby decision granting to certain businesses the legal right to claim protection of their "religious beliefs" against The Affordable Care Act is by any measure the more grotesque of the two, and Justice Ginsburg is clearly correct in warning that the majority has opened the door to an endless series of meretricious claims of conscience by those fictional persons we call corporations.  Only someone with Marx's mordant satirical bent could fully appreciate the decision to confer personhood on corporations while robbing actual persons of the elementary right to medical protection.

I beg to differ.  First of all, the SCOTUS decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby was not that personhood is to be conferred on corporations.  That had already been settled by the Dictionary Act enacted in 1871.  Here we read:

The Dictionary Act states that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”12

The question the court had to decide was whether closely held, for-profit corporations are persons under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act . "RFRA states that “[the] Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.”3 (Ibid.)

If Hobby Lobby is forced by the government to provide abortifacients to its employees, and Hobby Lobby is a person in the eyes of the law, then the government's Affordable Care Act mandate is in violation of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act.  For it would substantially burden Hobby Lobby's proprietors' exercise of religion if they were forced to violate their own consciences by providing the means of what they believe to be murder to their employees.  So the precise question that had to be decided was whether Hobby Lobby is a person in the eyes of the law.  The question was NOT whether corporations are persons in the eyes of the law.  Wolff is wrong if he thinks otherwise.

Note that the issue here is not constitutional but statutory: the issue has solely to do with the interpretation and application of a law, RFRA.  As Alan Dershowitz explains (starting at 7:52), it has to do merely with the "construction of a statute."

Not only was the SCOTUS decision not a decision to confer personhood on corporations, it also does not entail "robbing actual persons of the elementary right to medical protection."  And this, even if (i) there is a positive right to be given medical treatments, drugs, appliances, and whatnot, and (ii) abortion is a purely medical procedure that affects no person other than a pregnant woman.  See Dershowitz. 

The Case for Nicotine

Nicotine is the main psychoactive ingredient in tobacco, and a most delightful and useful ingredient it is, especially for us Luftmenschen.  I am thinking of the chess players who make Luft, not war, and of the philosophers whose thoughts are characteristically lofty and luftig even if at times nebelig.  Nicotine is good for cognitive functioning, increasing both memory and attention.  Studies on humans and lab animals show this to be the case.  But we connoisseurs of the noble weed know this to be so without the help of studies. Experientia docet

The drawback, of course, is that nicotine may be the most highly addictive substance on earth–more addictive than crack cocaine or heroin, and a more difficult addiction to shake, Rezvani said.

Why is that? First, it binds with the receptors in the brain for acetylcholine, one of our most important neurotransmitters and the first ever discovered. Second, because nicotine is usually inhaled, via cigarettes and now e-cigarettes, it hits the brain almost immediately.

“One reason for it being so addictive is that as soon as you smoke, you see the reward,” Rezvani said. The same is true of crack cocaine, he said.

KoopThe quotation 'smacks' of wild liberal exaggeration.  It reeks of the Big Lie.  People have been parroting that Everett Koop line for years.  Remember that bow-tied sawbones who occupied the most useless office in the land, that of Surgeon General, from 1981 to 1989?  Surely it is nonsense to say that nicotine is more addictive than heroin or crack cocaine.  In fact, I will go one better:  It is not addictive in any serious sense at all. But of course it all depends on what exactly is meant by 'addiction,' a word I have yet to see any anti-tobacco ideologue explain.  It is a word that is used and overused and abused in all sorts of promiscuous connections.

You say you're addicted to nicotine?  Well, if I paid you a million dollars to go one month without smoking, would you be able to do it? Of course you would.  But if you had been shooting heroin daily for years and were addicted, and I made the same offer, would you be able to collect?  No way!  This is of course an empirical question, but some empirical questions can be answered from the armchair.  This assumes that you have experience of life and some common sense, a commodity in short supply among liberals.  It would be very interesting to set up an experiment, but you would need some moneybags to bankroll it.  Anybody out there want to pony up 200 million USD?  Do the experiment using 100 two-pack per day cigarette smokers and 100 heroin addicts who shoot up daily.  You get a million bucks if you go a month without indulging.  You will of course be under close surveillance.  I predict the following outcome.  90 – 100% of the smokers but only 0-10% of the 'smackers' would collect.

And now for some anecdotal evidence, which is, after all, evidence: 'anecdotal' is not here functioning as an alienans adjective.

I have been smoking cigars and pipes for 45 years or so.  Time was when I smoked two loads of pipe tobacco per diem, all the way down, and it was strong stuff.  In Turkey where I lived for a year in the '90s I bought a Meerschaum pipe and I smoked an unconscionable quantity of the meanest shit there is, straight Turkish.  Stateside the stuff is used sparingly as a seasoning in blends.  I don't recommend it straight.  Might blow your head clean off.  Mine is still intact, thank you very much.

Now here's my point:  if nicotine is addictive, then surely I ought to be addicted.  But I'm not.  I smoke only when I decide to, nowadays, less than one cigar per week.  But I smoke the sucker down to the bitter end, reducing the whole of it to smoke and ashes.  "But doesn't it burn your fingertips?"  Not if I tamp it down into a smoking pipe.  The finale is mighty rasty and loaded with nicotine.  And I am still not addicted.

I am not an isolated exception.  There are all the two-pack-a day cigarette smokers who just up and quit of their free will without a federal program or a 'patch' or somebody holding their hand.  I'm thinking of my father, and aunts and uncles, and brother-in-law, and hundreds of others.  And they smoked unfiltered Camels and Lucky Strikes, not the pussy brands abroad in the land today. 

Now suppose I was smoking crack cocaine or mainlining heroin for the last 45 years.  I'd mostly like be dead, but if I weren't I would be addicted in a serious sense of that word. So there is just no comparison.  It's a bullshit comparison that only a willfully nescient liberal could love.

Can you call a substance 'addictive' if only some people become 'addicted' to it?  I say No.  In the case of nicotine, it is not the substance that is addictive but the user who allows himself of his own free will to become 'addicted.'  (Those are 'sneer' quotes by the way.)  You say you have an 'addictive personality'?  I'm going to question that too.  You are most likely just looking for an excuse.  Why not say you lack self-discipline and that you refuse to take yourself in hand; that instead of doing those things, you blame your problems on something outside of yourself, whether tobacco or tobacco companies, or 'society'?

The case for nicotine, then, is that it is a sovereign enhancer of cognitive functioning.  And you can get it without smoking cigarettes or using snuff.  I recommend that you stay away from cigarettes and snuff.

There is a lot to say on this topic and lot of liberal nonsense to dispose of.  But I'll end today with this aphorism:

The church of liberalism must have its demon and his name is 'tobacco.'

Peter Unger Introduces a Central Thesis of his New Book, Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy

Here, via Dave Lull.  The comments, as one ought to expect, are not very good.  Here as elsewhere, and to exaggerate a bit, the best arguments against an open combox are the contents of one.

I have read large chunks of Unger's new book and I hope to provide a critical response to some of it before too long.  For now I refer the interested reader to a couple of recent Unger-related entries.

Peter Unger on Betrand Russell on the Value of Philosophy

Can one Copulate one's Way to Chastity?  Notes on Wittgenstein and Unger