A Formula for Happiness

Excerpt:

For many years, researchers found that women were happier than men, although recent studies contend that the gap has narrowed or may even have been reversed. Political junkies might be interested to learn that conservative women are particularly blissful: about 40 percent say they are very happy. That makes them slightly happier than conservative men and significantly happier than liberal women. The unhappiest of all are liberal men; only about a fifth consider themselves very happy. (emphasis added)

Well, it's tough being a liberal.  We conservatives have our bibles and guns to cling to, but what do you have except your grievances and your utopian dreams that reality has a way of quashing?  Conservatives have the capacity to appreciate what they have while you liberals are too busy being pissed off at this sexist, intolerant, xenophobic, homophobic, racist, and bigoted country to have time to enjoy and appreciate anything.   

Camille Paglia Defends Men . . .

. . . and in the process kicks the candy ass of Maureen Dowd for whom "men have played so recklessly with the globe 'they nearly broke it.' "   You can break your finger nail, sweetie, but not the globe.  Girly-girl talk!  While C. P. is a good antidote to P. C., she cannot be awarded a plenary MavPhil endorsement because of the silly things she has said  about philosophy and women in philosophy.

Paglia-debate-600x399
 

But Camille, the one on the right,  well deserves a partial endorsement.  Here is a delightful Pagliaism: ”Leaving sex to feminists is like letting your dog vacation at the taxidermist.”

The image above suggests that the the ideal woman might well be a trinity:  Maureen in bed; the mannish Camille in the parlor for serious dialectic of the non-physical sort; the Virgin Mary (not depicted)  on a pedestal.

Note the dialectic  (in the Continental sense this time) of revelation and concealment displayed by the coquettish Maureen: one eye invisible, the low-cut top inviting the eye downward, while the gals to her left are bundled up like Muslims.

The Incoherence of ObamaCare ‘Insurance’

One cannot insure against an event the probability of which is 1. It violates the very concept of insurance.

I have a homeowner's policy for which I pay about $400 a year.  It insures against various adverse events such as fire.  Suppose I didn't have the policy and my house catches fire.  Do you think I could call up an insurer and buy a policy to cover that preexisting condition?  Not for $400.  He might, however, sell me a policy on the spot for the replacement value of the house.

Or suppose I am on my deathbed enjoying (if that's the word) my last sunset.  Do you think I could buy a $500,000 term life policy for, say, $2 K per annum? 

Do you understand the concept of insurance?  Do you see how this relevant to ObamaCare?  If not, read this.

ObamaCare Schadenfreude

Foolish liberals are paying the price in coin they understand for their thoughtless support of Obama and his 'signature' contribution to the unraveling of the republic.  With Affordable Care Act, Canceled Policies for New York Professionals. The NYT piece concludes:

It is not lost on many of the professionals that they are exactly the sort of people — liberal, concerned with social justice — who supported the Obama health plan in the first place. Ms. Meinwald, the lawyer, said she was a lifelong Democrat who still supported better health care for all, but had she known what was in store for her, she would have voted for Mitt Romney.

It is an uncomfortable position for many members of the creative classes to be in.

“We are the Obama people,” said Camille Sweeney, a New York writer and member of the Authors Guild. Her insurance is being canceled, and she is dismayed that neither her pediatrician nor her general practitioner appears to be on the exchange plans. What to do has become a hot topic on Facebook and at dinner parties frequented by her fellow writers and artists.

“I’m for it,” she said. “But what is the reality of it?”

Meinwald and Sweeney are learning the hard way that rhetoric and reality are not the same; that central planning doesn't work; that hope and change and impossible dreams are no substitute for careful thought; that cautious, piecemeal reforms are better than "the fundamental transformation of America"; that being well-spoken is not the same as being intelligent; that being black does not qualify one for high office any more than it disqualifies one for it; that 'social justice' is code for collectivist redistribution by redistributors who are immune to the restrictions and hardships they impose on those they rule.

Meinwald, the lawyer, seems not to have exercised the 'due diligence' that such types speak of; how could she not know what to expect when she and her ilk had been warned again and again?  And how could a lawyer  think that the only way to achieve "better health care for all" is by an inefficient liberty-destroying socialist scheme?

We all want better health care for all.  The question is how best to achieve it, and in such a way that it is not just affordable, but high quality and available and does not violate people's liberties or their consciences.

When liberals show that they have understood these simple points, then we can proceed. 

 

Keith Burgess-Jackson on Thomas Nagel

This is worth reproducing; I came to  essentially  the same conclusion (emphasis added):

The viciousness with which this book [Mind and Cosmos] was received is, quite frankly, astonishing. I can understand why scientists don't like it; they're wary of philosophers trespassing on their terrain. But philosophers? What is philosophy except (1) the careful analysis of alternatives (i.e., logical possibilities), (2) the questioning of dogma, and (3) the patient distinguishing between what is known and what is not known (or known not to be) in a given area of human inquiry? Nagel's book is smack dab in the Socratic tradition. Socrates himself would admire it. That Nagel, a distinguished philosopher who has made important contributions to many branches of the discipline,  is vilified by his fellow philosophers (I use the term loosely for what are little more than academic thugs) shows how thoroughly politicized philosophy has become. I find it difficult to read any philosophy after, say, 1980, when political correctness, scientism, and dogmatic atheism took hold in academia. Philosophy has become a handmaiden to political progressivism, science, and atheism. Nagel's "mistake" is to think that philosophy is an autonomous discipline. I fully expect that, 100 years from now, philosophers will look back on this era as the era of hacks, charlatans, and thugs. Philosophy is too important to be given over to such creeps.

One such creepy thug is this corpulent apparatchik of political correctness:

Brian leiterFor more on this theme, see my Should Nagel's Book be on the Philosophical Index Librorum Prohibitorum?

My Nagel posts are collected here.

 

 

 

Can a Sane and Morally Decent Person be a Liberal?

My title is intentionally hyperbolic and provocative, but not without justification given the outrageously vile (e.g., Martin Bashir) and breathtakingly mindless (e.g., Melissa Harris Perry) commentary encountered at liberal media outlets such as MSNBC.  Here is a measured formulation of my question:  To what extent does liberal ideology  militate against sanity and moral decency in those who imbibe it, people who otherwise are basically sane and decent?

A philosophy doctoral student at an Ivy League institution e-mails,

In a recent post, you wrote:

Can one be both a liberal and a decent and sane human being? Or is scumbaggery as it were inscribed into the very marrow of the contemporary liberal?  Or perhaps it is more like this:  once liberalism infects a person's mind, the decency that was there is flushed out.

Actually, I have struggled with relatives of these questions for some time, and honestly don't know what to think. Many of the people I rub shoulders with are liberal to the bone. But I know well enough to say they're genuinely nice people–and smart people (some, for instance, are brilliant philosophers). At the same time, I find most of the liberal claptrap so intellectually inane and morally repugnant that I have a genuinely hard time seeing how anyone–much less these seemingly smart and decent people–can believe it. I don't know how to reconcile the two observations. Surely you know at least one intelligent, morally decent liberal. How do you fit their existence into your ontology? Or do we have an argument from queerness motivating us to become liberal error theorists? Would such a creature–assuming they can exist–present a peer-disagreement scenario, or cause you to lower your credence in your own beliefs?

 
My correspondent poses the puzzle of reconciling
 
1. Some liberals are genuinely nice and highly intelligent people
 
with
 
2. These same liberals subscribe to intellectually inane and morally repugnant beliefs.
 
What makes this aporetic dyad truly puzzling is that the limbs are individually plausible but appear collectively inconsistent. Let's consider an example.
 
I don't know Robert Paul Wolff personally, but I was favorably impressed by a couple of his books and I read his blog, The Philosopher's Stone, despite the fact that he often comes across as a stoned philosopher.  He is no doubt very intelligent, and he seems like a nice guy.  But he says things so preternaturally moronic that I am left scratching my head.  Here is just one of  several examples:

Why Do Conservatives Oppose ObamaCare?

Robert Paul Wolff has an answer for us.  Ready?  The bolding is Wolff's own and is twice-repeated:

Because Obama is Black.

Is Professor Wolff serious? I'm afraid he is.  But given that the man is neither stupid nor the usual sort of left-wing moral scumbag, how could he be serious?  What explains a view so plainly delusional?  How account for an emotion-driven mere dismissal of the conservative position the arguments for which he will not examine? How is it that a professional philosopher, indeed a very good one, can engage in such puerile ad hominem psychologizing?  Wolff himself provides an answer in a later post:

My knowledge of the beliefs and sentiments of those on the right is based entirely on things I have read or have seen on television.  I have never had a conversation with a committed right-wing opponent of the Affordable Care Act, nor have I even, to the best of my knowledge, met one.  You would be quite correct in inferring that I live in a left-wing bubble [called Chapel Hill — before that, I lived in a left-wing bubble called Amherst, MA, and before that I lived in the right wing bubbles called Morningside Heights, Hyde Park, and Cambridge.]   If this strikes you as disqualifying me from having an opinion, you are free to ignore the rest of this post.

Need I say more?

…………
 
This is a perfect illustration of my correspondent's puzzle. In Robert Paul Wolff we have a man who is intelligent and (I will give him the benefit of the doubt) morally decent, but who maintains a thesis that is both delusional and morally repugnant in that it constitutes a slander on conservatives.  What explains this?  Wolff himself provides what may be the best explanation:  he lives in a bubble.  He doesn't know conservative positions, nor interact with conservatives.  But isn't it a moral failure in one who is supposedly a truth-seeker simply to ignore whole swaths of opinion that run counter to one's own?  Is that not a mark of intellectual dishonesty?
 
But the best explanation, in terms of his 'bubbly' isolation, is still not very good.  How could anyone of his maturity and experience with the world of ideas, even one  unfamiliar with conservatism, imagine for even a second that the cheap psychologizing he engages in could be on target?
 
It is Christmas time, and so, to be charitable I won't accuse Wolff of a moral failing; I'll just say that he and so many of his ilk are topically insane:  their leftism has rendered them incapable of rational thought with respect to certain issues, race being a chief one among them.
 
For further discussion of Robert Paul 'Howlin'' Wolff, see below.
 

What’s in a Name? ‘Schwarzenegger’ and ‘Heidegger’

Here is an old Powerblogs post.  It is reposted in my conviction that we must catalog and never forget the absurdities of the race-baiting Left.

………..

A while back, some fool from the Left coast — a Democrat party hack if memory serves — suggested that the name ‘Schwarzenegger’ was racist because of the ‘negger’ part. There was also the sly implication that the ‘racism of the name’ transferred onto its bearer. This slovenly pseudo-thinking is aided and abetted by the fact that schwarz is German for black. Hence, ‘black-nigger.’  Arnold Black-nigger.

To dispel this nonsense, note first that the German for ‘negro’ is not Negger, but Neger. Second, when ‘Schwarzenegger’ is compared with such similar names as ‘Heidegger,’ it becomes clear that ‘Schwarzenegger’ is to be parsed as Schwarzen-egger and not as Schwarze-negger.’ When I pointed this out to Horace Jeffery Hodges, he remarked that Egger is an early form of Acker, field. I suggested in turn that this is probably the origin of the English ‘acre.’ So if we must assign a meaning to Arnold’s name, it would be that of ‘black acre,’ or perhaps, ‘swarthy field.’

Now what about Heidegger? If we must assign a meaning to his name, I suggest that it is that of ‘heather field,’ or ‘heath acre,’ or perhaps, ‘pagan soil.’ Die Heide (feminine) means heather, heath, moor. . . while der Heide (masculine) means pagan. Given Heidegger’s association with the Blut und Boden ideology of the National Socialists — an association he never properly renounced — and the dark trends of his later thinking, ‘pagan soil’ may well be fitting.

Friday the 13th Cat Blogging!

Cat black Cat in tie

Friday the 13th of the 12th month of the 13th year of the third millennium.  I ain't superstitious, leastways no more than Willie Dixon, but two twin black  tuxedo cats just crossed my path.  All dressed up with nowhere to go.  Nine lives and dressed to the nines.  Stevie Ray Vaughan, Superstition.  Guitar solo starts at 3:03.  And of course you've heard the story about Niels Bohr and the horseshoe over the door:

A friend was visiting in the home of Nobel Prize winner Niels Bohr, the famous atom scientist.

As they were talking, the friend kept glancing at a horseshoe hanging over the door. Finally, unable to contain his curiosity any longer, he demanded:

“Niels, it can’t possibly be that you, a brilliant scientist, believe that foolish horseshoe superstition! ? !”

“Of course not,” replied the scientist. “But I understand it’s lucky whether you believe in it or not.”

Bill O’Reilly, Mungo Jerry, and Immanuel Kant

Mr. Bill made a mistake the other night on The O'Reilly Factor when he said that the British skiffle group Mungo Jerry's sole Stateside hit, In the Summertime, is from '67.  Not so, as I instantly recalled: it is from the summer of 1970.  I remember because that was the summer I first read Kant, ploughing through The Critique of Pure Reason.  I sat myself down under a tree in Garfield Park in  South Pasadena with the Norman Kemp Smith translation and dove in.  I couldn't make head nor tail of it.  But I persisted and eventually wrote my dissertation on Kant.

Now why is Mr. Bill's mistake worth mentioning?  Because, to paraphrase Santayana, those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it.  And we wouldn't want to repeat the '60s. 

Machiavelli, Arendt, and Virtues Private and Public

An important but troubling thought is conveyed in a recent NYT op-ed (emphasis added):

Machiavelli teaches that in a world where so many are not good, you must learn to be able to not be good. The virtues taught in our secular and religious schools are incompatible with the virtues one must practice to safeguard those same institutions. The power of the lion and the cleverness of the fox: These are the qualities a leader must harness to preserve the republic.

The problem as I see it is that (i) the pacific virtues the practice of which makes life worth living within families, between friends, and in such institutions of civil society as churches and fraternal organizations  are essentially private and cannot be extended outward as if we are all brothers and sisters belonging to a global community.  Talk of  global community is blather.  The institutions of civil society can survive and flourish only if protected by warriors and statesmen whose virtues are of the manly and martial, not of the womanish and pacific,  sort. And yet (ii) if no  extension of the pacific virtues is possible then humanity would seem to be doomed  in an age of terrorism and WMDs.  Besides, it is unsatisfactory that there be two moralities, one private, the other public.

Consider the Christian virtues preached by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount.  They include humility, meekness, love of righteousness, mercy, purity of heart, love of peace and of reconciliation.  Everyone who must live uncloistered in the world understands that these pacific and essentially womanish virtues have but limited application there.  (I am not using 'womanish' as a derogatory qualifier.) You may love peace, but unless you are prepared to make war upon your enemies and show them no mercy, you may not be long for this world.  Turning the other cheek makes sense within a loving family, but no sense in the wider world.  (Would the Pope turn the other cheek if the Vatican came under attack by Muslim terrorists or would he call upon the armed might of the Italian state?)  This is perfectly obvious in the case of states: they are in the state (condition) of nature with respect to each other. Each state secures by blood and iron a civilized space within which art and music and science and scholarship can flourish and wherein, ideally, blood does not flow; but these states and their civilizations battle each other in the state (condition) of nature red in tooth and claw.

The Allies would not have been long for this world had they not been merciless in their treatment of the Axis Powers. 

This is also true of individuals once they move beyond their families and friends and genuine communities and sally forth into the wider world. 

The problem is well understood by Hannah Arendt ("Truth and Politics" in Between Past and Future, Penguin 1968, p. 245):

     The disastrous consequences for any community that began in all
     earnest to follow ethical precepts derived from man in the singular
     — be they Socratic or Platonic or Christian — have been
     frequently pointed out. Long before Machiavelli recommended
     protecting the political realm against the undiluted principles of
     the Christian faith (those who refuse to resist evil permit the
     wicked "to do as much evil as they please"), Aristotle warned
     against giving philosophers any say in political matters. (Men who
     for professional reasons must be so unconcerned with "what is good
     for themselves" cannot very well be trusted with what is good for
     others, and least of all with the "common good," the down-to-earth
     interests of the community.) [Arendt cites the Nicomachean Ethics,
     Book VI, and in particular 1140b9 and 1141b4.]

There is a tension  between man qua philosopher/Christian and man qua citizen.  As a philosopher raised in Christianity, I am concerned with my soul, with its integrity, purity, salvation. I take very seriously indeed the Socratic "Better to suffer wrong than to do it" and the Christian  "Resist not the evildoer." But as a citizen I must be concerned not only with my own well-being but also with the public welfare. This is true a fortiori of public officials and people in a position to  influence public opinion, people like Catholic bishops many of whom are woefully ignorant of the simple points Arendt makes in the passage quoted. So, as Arendt points out, the Socratic and Christian admonitions are not applicable in the public sphere.

What is applicable to me in the singular, as this existing individual concerned with the welfare of his immortal soul over that of his  perishable body, is not applicable to me as citizen. As a citizen, I   cannot "welcome the stranger" who violates the laws of my country, a stranger who may be a terrorist or a drug smuggler or a human trafficker or a carrier of a deadly disease or a person who has no respect for the traditions of the country he invades; I cannot aid and abet his law breaking. I must be concerned with public order.  This order is among  the very conditions that make the philosophical and Christian life possible in the first place. If I were to aid and abet the stranger's law breaking, I would not be "rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" as the New Testament enjoins us to do.

Indeed, the Caesar verse provides a scriptural basis for Church-State separation and indirectly exposes the fallacy of the Catholic bishops  and others who confuse private and public morality.

NYT op-ed

Feminism

Phil Sheridan e-mails:

Thanks for your blog; it's been many years since I studied Philosophy as an undergrad, but I've enjoyed your writing.

You cover many topics, but I'm curious why you haven't touched on feminism. You would seem to be well suited to offer a solid critique, and I get the sense that philosophers still in academia mostly don't want to touch it. David Benatar is one exception, and Roy Baumeister is another, although he is a psychologist.  Of course being independent you get to think and write only about those topics that interest you. Maybe feminism isn't interesting, but I thought I'd ask.

Thank you for reading! Actually, feminism is touched upon (exactly the right word) in the following posts:

The Absurdity of Gender Feminism

Feminism as Masculinism

Puellafication

Promiscuous Post-Modern PC Prudes

Although I am a conservative, I am not a 'throne and altar' conservative. Nor am I the sort of conservative who thinks that everything traditional trumps everything newfangled.  (The conservative's presumption in favor of the traditional is defeasible.) And of course it is silly to think that conservatives oppose change; it is just that we don't confuse change with change for the better.

Traditionally, women were wives and mothers whose place was said to be the home.  (Either that, or they lived with their parents or entered a nunnery.)  Now the traditional wife and mother role is a noble one, and difficult to fill properly, and I have nothing but contempt for the feminazis who denigrate it and those who instantiate it.  May a crapload of obloquy be dumped upon their shrill and febrile pates.   But surely women have a right  to actualize and employ their talents to the full in whichever fields they are suited to enter, however male-dominated those fields  have been hitherto.  They must, however, be suited to enter those fields: no differential standards, no gender-norming,  no reverse discrimination.

Simone Weil, Edith Stein, and Elizabeth Anscombe are wonderfully good philosophers, and much better than most male philosophers.  I know their works well and consider them to be my superiors both intellectually and morally.  (And I don't think anyone would accuse me of a lack of self-esteem.)  It would have been a loss to all of us had these admirable lights been prevented from developing their talents and publishing their thoughts.

This makes me something of a liberal in an old and defensible sense.  But I don't use 'liberal' to describe my views because this word has suffered linguistic hijacking and now is, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable in sense from 'leftist.'  Anyone who reads this site soon learns that one of my self-appointed tasks is to debunk the pernicious buncombe of the Left.  As someone who maintains a balanced and reasonable position — does that sound a tad self-serving? — I am open to attack from the PC-whipped leftists and from the reactionary, ueber-traditionalist, 'throne and altar' conservatives.  To my amusement, I have been attacked from the latter side as a 'raving liberal.'  (I respond in the  appropriately appellated Am I a Raving Liberal?)

So much for a brief indication of where I stand wth respect to feminism.

Addendum (12/13).  Phil Sheridan responds:

David Benatar in The Second Sexism: Discrimination Against Men and Boys makes a distinction between egalitarian feminism and partisan feminism that I believe is similar, if not identical, to Sommers's distinction between equity and gender feminism.  He goes a step further than Sommers, however, and observes that, while egalitarian feminism exists as an idea, it is difficult to actually find it in the real world.  He doesn't quite say it explicitly, but he implies that all feminism is partisan, meaning that it is always advocating for women without regard for the ideal of equality, and without regard for the impact on men, children or society at large.
 
I think he is correct, and there are countless examples of this.  One is feminist opposition to equal child custody for fathers in the event of divorce.  NOW has been steadfast on this since the late 70's for primarily because it provides a better divorce outcome for women.  Feminists typically claim that the best interests of the child trumps equality in custody cases. They sometimes also make the absurd claim that fathers are often dangerous and might harm their children. In other cases, feminists cite historic injustice against women as a valid reason for sidestepping the ideal of equality in the here and now.  And women outnumber men at American universities now, but instead of a call for re-balancing, we hear the argument that perhaps women have qualities that make them better candidates for jobs in the current economy.  
 
You mention that women should not be prohibited from pursuing education/work that they are suited for, that we would have been denied the talents of Weil et al if we had not overturned the old sex restrictions.  You're right, of course; no reasonable person could disagree with that.
 
BV comments:  I would count The Thinking Housewife as a reasonable person, but she would seem to disagree with your agreement with me.   See, for example, her Why We Must Discriminate.   Here as elsewhere in the kingdom of ideas we find an astonishingly broad spectrum of opinion, from the gender feminist loons on the one end, to ultratraditionalists like our housewife on the other.
 
Feminism today goes far, far beyond that, however.  I think Sommers's distinction is not enough — it's making a cautious point when a thorough and aggressive assessment of the deep flaws in feminist theory and the advocacy it has spawned are required.  At this point in our history it's like spitting into a hurricane, but it must be done.