Month: April 2012

April 30th, 1945, Berlin

Why did Hitler commit suicide on this day in his bunker in Berlin in 1945?  One reason was that he didn't want to end up like Mussolini and his girlfriend.

I was in Hitler's suicide bunker.

Despite the attempts on Hitler's life, in particular Claus von Stauffenberg's of July 1944, the Leader of the 1000 Year Reich died by his own hand. 

Addendum.  I woke up in the middle of the night and asked myself how Hitler could have known how Mussolini and his girlfriend ended up.  After all, the execution of the two Italians occurred on 29 April, 1945, the day before Hitler's murder of Eva Braun and his suicide.  Could Hitler in his Berlin bunker have gotten word that quickly?  Apparently yes, as I discovered when I pulled Antony Beevor's The Fall of Berlin 1945 (Penguin, 2002) from the shelf of my well-stocked library:

Apart from Himmler's betrayal, Hitler's other great preoccupation remained his fear of being taken alive by the Russians.  News had come through of Mussolini's execution by partisans and how the bodies of the Duce and his mistress, Clara Petacci, had been hoisted upside down in Milan.  A transcript of the radio report had been prepared in the special outsized 'Fuehrer typeface' which saved Hitler from wearing spectacles.  It was presumably Hitler who underlined in pencil the words 'hanged upside down.'  (p. 357)

For another excerpt from Beevor's book, one  which recounts the savage rape inflicted upon German women by the Soviet army as it approached Berlin from the east, see  They raped every German female from eight to 80.

It is important  to rub one's nose in the horrors of history as prophylaxis against the dangerous utopianism of progressives with their Rousseauean fantasies about  man as inherently good. Man is capable of some good, but he is not inherently good.  The study of the history of just the 20th century should disabuse one of that notion once and for all.

PC Conservative Andrew McCarthy’s Lame Response to John Derbyshire

It is well known by now that NRO has cut its ties with John Derbyshire ('Derb') over the latter's publication in another venue of The Talk: Nonblack Version.  Both Rich Lowry and Andrew McCarthy have commented on this severing of ties and both sets of comments are unbelievably lame.  Here is the substance (or rather 'substance') of McCarthy's response (numerals added):

[1] We believe in the equal dignity and presumption of equal decency toward every person — no matter what race, no matter what science tells us about comparative intelligence, and no matter what is to be gleaned from crime statistics. [2] It is important that research be done, that conclusions not be rigged, and that we are at liberty to speak frankly about what it tells us. [3] But that is not an argument for a priori conclusions about how individual persons ought to be treated in various situations — or for calculating fear or friendship based on race alone. [4] To hold or teach otherwise is to prescribe the disintegration of a pluralistic society, to undermine the aspiration of e pluribus unum.

Ad [1].  Well, don't we all (including Derb) believe in the equal dignity of human persons regardless of race, creed, national origin, sex, age?  Is McCarthy suggesting that Derb rejects this principle?   But of course equality of rights is not the same as empirical equality.  That people are not empirically equal is a factual claim in two senses of 'factual': it is a non-normative claim, and it is a true claim.  That people have equal rights is a normative claim. The non-normative and normative claims are logically independent.  One cannot infer empirical equality from normative equality.  More importantly, one cannot infer normative inequality from empirical inequality.  For example, human infants are pretty much helpless, but this fact does not detract from their equal right to life.  Women are on average shorter than men, and less muscular, but these facts do not detract from their status as persons, as rights-possessors.  90 year-olds tend to be more frail than 60 year-olds, but this fact does not entail that a 90 year-old is less of a person, has a lesser normative status, than a 60 year-old. 

Ad [2].  Who could disagree with this bromide?

Ad [3].  It is in his third sentence where McCarthy ascends into Cloud Cuckoo Land.  Suppose it is a fact that "Blacks are seven times more likely than people of other races to commit murder, and eight times more likely to commit robbery."  A fact is a fact.  There are no false facts, and there are no racist facts.  There are racial facts (facts about race), but a racial fact is not a racist fact.  Now suppose I encounter at night, in a bad part of town, an "individual person" in McCarthy's phrase whom I do not know, a person who is young, male, black, and dressed gangsta-style.  His dark glasses prevent me from seeing his eyes and judging his sobriety.  His deep pockets might conceal a pistol.  Would I be justified in using statistical common sense and avoiding said individual?  Of course.  The guy might be harmless, but I do not know that.  I do know that he fits the profile of an individual who could cause me some serious trouble.  Common sense dictates that I give him a wide berth just as I would with a drunken Hells (no apostrophe) Angel exiting a strip joint.  There are no black Hells Angels, by the way.

Does that mean that I don't consider the black man or the biker to have rights equal to mine?  No. It means that  I understand that we are not mere rights-possessors or Kantian noumenal agents, but also possessors of animal bodies and socially formed (and mal-formed) psyches and that these latter facts induce empirical inequalities of various sorts.

Am I drawing an a priori  conclusion when I avoid the black guy?  Of course not.  My reasoning is a posteriori and inductive.  I am reasoning from certain perceived facts: race (not skin color!), behavior, dress, location, time of day, etc. to a conclusion that is rendered  probable (not certain) by these facts.  And note that in a situation like this one does not consider "race alone" in McCarthy's phrase.  If I considered "race alone" then there would be no difference between the dude I have just described and Condoleeza Rice.

Is my inductive reasoning and consequent avoidance behavior morally censurable?  Of course not.  After all, I have a moral duty to attend to my own welfare.  (See Kant on duties to oneself.)  If anything, my reasoning and behavior are morally obligatory.  And I am quite sure that Andrew McCarthy would reason and behave in the same way in the same circumstances.

Ad [4].  What McCarthy is saying here is nonsense and beneath commentary.  But I will point out the tension between calling for a "pluralistic society" while invoking the phrase e pluribus unum, "out of many, one."  One wonders how long before McCarthy cries for more "diversity." 

The Pee Cee conservative is an interesting breed of cat.  We shall have to study him more carefully.

A Pithy Summary of the Trayvon Martin Case

Here:

The liberal narrative about the [Trayvon Martin] case is now destroyed; it had nothing to do with finding out the truth, whether a trigger-happy vigilante murdered Trayvon Martin, or a desperate neighborhood watchman saved his head from being pounded to smithereens by pulling out a gun and shooting his assailant, or something in between. The narrative instead was solely concerned with taking a tragic shooting case and turning it into more fuel for a fossilized civil rights industry (since the case broke, dozens of violent crime cases of blacks against whites and Asians are splashed over the news, enraging readers and escaping liberal commentary). All we know now is that the “narrative”—a preteen shot “like a dog” while eating candy by a white “assassin” who uttered racial epithets and was never even touched by the victim, only to be let go by a wink-and-nod police force—is false.

I think it will be very hard to get a second-degree murder conviction, given the absence of racial malice on the tape (the narrative’s “coons” and NBC’s version of Zimmerman on his own volunteering “he’s black” are now inoperative), eyewitness accounts of the fray, and the clear injuries to Zimmerman. Instead, the authorities will hope that by inflating the indictment, by airing the facts, and by making Zimmerman testify, tensions will ease–and so when he is acquitted or a judge throws out the case, or a lesser count is pressed, riots will fizzle.

[. . .]

Perhaps before the second-degree-murder charge is thrown out, the prosecution can so entangle Zimmerman in testimony that they can recharge him with perjury or conspiracy and then plea bargain him down to a year or two. The case is now not concerned with justice, but with politics, defusing threats of violence, and salvaging the careers of so many who so foolishly rushed to judgment.

Something and Nothing Again: Krauss Takes Another Stab at Defending His ‘Bait and Switch’

In the pages of Scientific American, Lawrence M. Krauss writes:

As a scientist, the fascination normally associated with the classically phrased question “why is there something rather than nothing?”, is really contained in a specific operational question. That question can be phrased as follows: How can a universe full of galaxies and stars, and planets and people, including philosophers, arise naturally from an initial condition in which none of these objects—no particles, no space, and perhaps no time—may have existed? Put more succinctly perhaps: Why is there ‘stuff’, instead of empty space? Why is there space at all? There may be other ontological questions one can imagine but I think these are the ‘miracles’ of creation that are so non-intuitive and remarkable, and they are also the ‘miracles’ that physics has provided new insights about, and spurred by amazing discoveries, has changed the playing field of our knowledge. That we can even have plausible answers to these questions is worth celebrating and sharing more broadly.

This paragraph is a perfect example of why I find Krauss exasperating.  They guy seems incapable of thinking and writing clearly.

First of all, no one can have any objection to a replacement of the old Leibniz question — Why is there something rather than nothing? See On the Ultimate Origin of Things, 1697 — with a physically tractable question, a question of interest to cosmologists and one amenable to a  physics solution. Unfortunately, in the paragraph above, Krauss provides two different replacement questions while stating, absurdly, that the second is a more succint version of the first:

K1. How can a physical universe arise from an initial condition in which there are no particles, no space and perhaps no time?

K2. Why is there 'stuff' instead of empty space?

These are obviously distinct questions.  To answer the first one would have to provide an account of how the universe originated from nothing physical: no particles, no space, and "perhaps" no time.  The second question would be easier to answer because it presupposes the existence of space and does not demand that empty space be itself explained.

Clearly, the questions are distinct.  But Krauss conflates them. Indeed, he waffles between them, reverting to something like the first question after raising the second.  To ask why there is something physical as opposed to nothing physical is quite different from asking why there is physical "stuff" as opposed to empty space.

One would think that a scientist, trained in exact modes of thought and research, would not fall into such a blatant confusion.  Or if he is not confused 'in his own mind' why is he writing like a sloppy sophomore?  Scientific American is not a technical journal, but it is certainly a cut or two above National Enquirer.

To make matters worse, Krauss then starts talking about the 'miracles' of creation.  Talk of miracles, or even of 'miracles,' has no place in science.  The point of science is to demystify the world, to give, as far as possible, a wholly naturalistic account of nature.  It is a noble enterprise and ought to be pursued to the limit.  But what is the point of bringing in a theological term with or without 'scare' quotes?  The same goes for 'creation.'   In his book he refers to the physical universe as creation.  But creation implies a creator.   Why the theological language? Is he trying to co-opt it?  What game is he playing here?  Whatever it is, it doesn't  inspire confidence in anything he says.

Go back to my opening point.  There can be no objection to a replacement of the Leibniz question with one or more physically tractable questions.  Unfortunately, Krauss is not clearly doing this.  He thinks he is answering the Leibniz question.  But he waffles, and he shifts his ground, and he backtracks when caught out and criticized.

Whatever merit his book has in popularizing recent cosmology, it is otherwise worthless.  The book is a miserable exercise in 'bait and switch.'    From the very title (A Universe From Nothing: Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing), Krauss purports to be  answering the old philosophical question using nothing but naturalistic means.  But having baited us, he then switches and waffles and backtracks and plays semantic games.

Related post:  "We're Just a Bit of Pollution," Cosmologist Says

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Politically Incorrect Tunes

Ray Stevens, Ahab the Arab.  Here is the original from 1962.  In the lyrics there are references to two hits from the same era, Chubby Checker's The Twist (1960) and Lonnie Donegan's British skiffle number   Does Your Chewing Gum Lose its Flavor?  On second thought, the reference is to Checker's Le't's Twist Again Like We Did Last Summer (1960).

Larry Verne, Mr. Custer (1960). "What am I doin' here?"

And now a trio of feminist anthems. Marcie Blaine, Bobby's Girl.  "And if I was Bobby's girl, what a faithful, thankful girl I'd be."  Carol Deene, Johnny Get Angry.  Can't find the Joanie Sommers original, but this is an adequate cover.  "I want a cave man!"  k. d. Laing's parody.  Little Peggy March, I Will Follow Him.  "From now until forever."

Meanwhile the guys were bragging of having a girl in every port of call.  Dion, The Wanderer (1961). Ricky Nelson, Travelin' Man. (1961)

Addendum:  I forgot to link to two Ray Stevens numbers that are sure to rankle the sorry sensibilities of  our liberal pals: Come to the USA, God Save Arizona.

The Need for Logico-Philosophical Umpires

Tammy-bruce-snubnose-vertical

The following is from the Powerblogs archive.  Originally posted 5 November 2005.

Can't get a job teaching philosophy? Perhaps you can market yourself as a talk show umpire. There is a dire need for argumentative quality control on the shout circuit.

Last night I was pleased to see my favorite gun-totin' lesbian on Hannity and Colmes, the irrepressible Tammy Bruce. (That's her above with her pal 'Snubby.'  The gal needs a lesson in trigger discipline: 'Get yer booger-hooker off the bang switch!') At one point, Bruce came out against governmental wealth redistribution via the tax code. Colmes the liberal replied in effect: So you're opposed to taxation!

At this point, a competent umpire would have called a timeout and thrown Colmes into the penalty box. For he committed a truly grotesque conceptual mistake by gratuitously assuming that it is somehow built into the very concept of taxation that it should involve redistribution of wealth. Taxation is the process whereby monies are extracted from the populace to offset the costs of government. There is nothing in the nature of taxation as such to require a 'progressive' scheme of taxation. Otherwise, a flat tax would be a contradiction in terms.

Here is an analogy. Suppose I warn you not to confuse insurance with investment and advise you to buy a term life insurance policy. An insurance agent, eager to line his own pockets, objects: So you're
opposed to insurance! The counterresponse is that there is nothing in the concept of life insurance to require that it have any investment  features. An umpire on the scene would slap a penalty on the greedy agent.

Of course, my umpire proposal is utopian. Average viewers apparently like shouting and mindless contention. They wouldn't put up with any close analysis or careful argument assessment. Ratings would plummet.   Hannity and his sidekick would be out of a job.

This  begs raises the question: Are the masses inherently stupid, or have they been stupefied by the media? The answer, I suspect, is both: thinking is hard work and even people with an aptitude for it are not inclined to engage in it. But it is also the case that the media do not encourage thoughtfulness and are quite willing to pander to their audiences to turn a buck.

It is the ugly side of capitalism; but socialism and government control of the media would obviously be a disaster.

The solution? C-Span and cyberspace. (By the way, I apologize for my uses of 'masses'; I thereby violated my own rule that a conservative  should not talk like a leftist. So maybe I shouldn't have used   'capitalism' either.)

Logical Versus Metaphysical Modality

A Pakistani reader inquires:

This is a query which I hope you can answer. Is there such a distinction as 'logical contingency' vs 'metaphysical contingency', and 'logical necessity' vs 'metaphysical necessity'? And if there is, can you explain it? Thank you.

A short answer first.  Yes, there are these distinctions.  They amount to a distinction between logical modality and metaphysical modality.  The first is also  called called narrowly logical modality while the second is also called broadly logical modality.   Both contrast with nomological modality. 

Now a long answer.  The following nine paragraphs unpack the notion of broadly logical or metaphysical modality and contrast it with narrowly logical modality.

1. There are objects and states of affairs and propositions that can be known a priori to be impossible because they violate the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). Thus a plane figure that is both round and not round at the same time, in the same respect, and in the same sense of 'round,' is impossible, absolutely impossible, simply in virtue of its violation of LNC. I will say that such an object is narrowly logically (NL) impossible. Hereafter, to save keystrokes, I will not mention the 'same time, same respect, same sense' qualification which will be understood to be in force.

2. But what about a plane figure that is both round and square? Is it NL-impossible? No. For by logic alone one cannot know it to be impossible. One needs a supplementary premise, the necessary truth grounded in the meanings of 'round' and 'square' that nothing that is round is square. We say, therefore, that the round square is broadly logically (BL) impossible. It is not excluded from the realm of the possible by logic alone, which is purely formal, but by logic plus a 'material' truth, namely the necessary truth just mentioned.

3. If there are BL-impossible states of affairs such as There being a round square, then there are BL-necessary states of affairs such as There being no round square. Impossibility and necessity are interdefinable: a state of affairs is necessary iff  its negation is impossible. It doesn't matter whether the modality is NL, BL, or nomological (physical). It is clear, then, that there are BL-impossible and BL-necessary states of affairs.

4. We can now introduce the term 'BL-noncontingent' to cover the BL-impossible and the BL-necessary.

5. What is not noncontingent is contingent. (Surprise!) The contingent is that which is possible but not necessary. Thus a contingent proposition is one that is possibly true but not necessarily true, and a contingent state of affairs is one that possibly obtains but does not necessarily obtain. We can also say that a contingent proposition is one that is possibly true and such that its negation is possibly true. The BL-contingent is therefore that which is BL-possible and such that its negation is BL-possible.

6. Whatever is NL or BL or nomologically impossible, is impossible period. If an object, state of affairs, or proposition is excluded from the realm of possible being, possible obtaining, or possible truth by logic alone, logic plus necessary semantic truths, or the (BL-contingent) laws of nature, then that object, state of affairs or proposition is impossible, period, or impossible simpliciter.

7. Now comes something interesting and important. The NL or BL or nomologically possible may or may not be possible, period. For example, it is NL-possible that there be a round square, but not possible, period. It is BL-possible that some man run a 2-minute mile but not possible, period. And it is nomologically possible that I run a 4-minute mile, but not possible period. (I.e., the (BL-contingent) laws of anatomy and physiology do not bar me from running a 4-minute mile; it is peculiarities not referred to by these laws that bar me. Alas, alack, there is no law of nature that names BV.)

8. What #7 implies is that NL, BL, and nomological possibility are not species or kinds of possibility. If they were kinds of possibility then every item that came under one of these heads would be possible simpliciter, which we have just seen is not the case. A linguistic way of putting the point is by saying that 'NL,' 'BL,' and 'nomological' are alienans as opposed to specifying adjectives: they shift or 'alienate' ('other') the sense of the noun they modify. From the fact that x is NL or BL or nomologically possible, it does not follow that x is possible. This contrasts with impossibility. From the fact that x is NL or BL or nomologically impossible, it does follow that x is impossible. Accordingly, 'NL,' 'BL,' and 'nomological' do not shift or alienate the sense of 'impossible.'

9. To appreciate the foregoing, you must not confuse senses and kinds. 'Sense' is a semantic term; 'kind' is ontological. From the fact that 'possible' has several senses, it does not follow that there are several species or kinds of possibility. For x to be possible it must satisfy NL, BL, and nomological constraints; but this is not to say that these terms refer to species or kinds of possibility.

Insurance Profiling

A reader who wishes to remain anonymous writes:
I was reading your recent post on profiling and it moved me to share with you a point I've shared with others many times.  I worked a long time ago in insurance, and profiling in insurance is not only commonplace it is necessary and accepted by the public. Most adults know, for instance, that females receive better rates than males. It is no moral commentary on being a guy that males receive higher rates than women. It is simply a statistical fact that males cost more money to insure than females, and so insurance companies rate accordingly.

Further, insurance rates are based on credit score in part. It is not some moral judgment on companies' part. Insurance companies do not think that if you have bad credit you are inherently 'worse' than someone with good credit. It is simply a statistical fact that bad credit correlates  with higher accident ratios. And insurance companies set their rates accordingly.

Of course no one complains about men receiving higher rates than women. But I have little doubt that if women were the ones to receive the higher rates, it would be a big deal. It is the same reason race cannot be included in insurance calculations. Surely it is no more inherently 'sexist' to rate men differently than would be 'racist' to rate different races differently. It is simply facing statistical facts.

The truth is that profiling is fine for people on the left; it just matters who is being profiled. If a car full of white men in white hoods with a rebel flag on their vehicle entered a middle class black neighborhood, and they were pulled over for fear of hurting someone, nobody would complain about this (and rightly so). But if a group of black kids blasting gangster rap enters a middle class white neighborhood is pulled over for the same fear, it is the end of the world. The hypocrisy is apparent to anyone with a brain.

That's right, the hypocrisy of liberals is evident to anyone who can think clearly and objectively. Imagine the quandry they would be in if we didn't let them get away with their double standards. 
 
It also speaks volumes about what liberals and their political correctness have done to this country that my reader  must fear for his livelihood simply because he has spoken the plain truth above.  He states without malice what we all know to be true, and yet must request that I not reveal his name.  The political environment is becoming McCarthyite.  Time was, when a certain sort of right-wing crazy saw a commie under ever bed. Today's liberal crazies see a 'racist' under every bed.  I'm still waiting for these bums to define 'racist.'

The Ultimate Explanation-Seeking Why-Question and Contrastive Explanations

I argued yesterday that the following questions are distinct:

   Q1. Why does anything at all exist, rather than nothing?
  
   Q2. Why does anything at all exist?

Today I explore a little further  the difference between non-contrastive and contrastive explanations. Consider the difference between:

   1. Why is Mary walking rather than swimming?

   2. Why is Mary walking?

An answer to (2) might be: She exercises daily and her preferred form of exercise is walking. But this answer is no answer to (1). For here it is not the phenomenon of her walking that needs explaining, but the contrastive phenomenon of her walking instead of swimming. An answer to (1) might run: Mary is walking rather than swimming because she had an operation on her arm and she doesn't want to get the bandage wet.

So answering (2) does not answer (1). But it is also true that answering (1) does not answer (2). For if she is walking rather than swimming so as not to get her bandage wet, this does not explain why she is walking in the first place. It leaves open whether she walks to exercise, or to meet her neighbors, or for some other reason.

I conclude that (1) and (2) are distinct. They are distinct because their answers need not be the same.

Now let us consider the presuppositions of (1). It is obvious — isn't it? — that only what is the case can be explained. That there are leprechauns cavorting in my yard cannot be explained since it is not the case. I will allow you to say that there is a possible world in which leprechauns cavort in my yard; but since that world is merely possible, nothing in it needs to be explained. So (1) presupposes that Mary is walking. (1) also presupposes that Mary is not swimming. No one can both walk and swim at the same time; so a person who is  walking is not swimming.

A third presupposition of (1) is that it is possible that Mary be swimming. If I aim to explain why she is walking rather than swimming, then I presuppose that she is not swimming. But her not swimming is consistent with the possibility of her swimming. Her not swimming is also consistent with the impossibility of her swimming. Nevertheless, if I ask why walking rather than swimming, I presuppose that she might have been swimming. 'Rather than' means 'instead of' (in place of). So if she is walking instead of swimming, and walking is possible because actual, then swimming must also be possible if it is to be something that can be done instead of walking. It might help to consider

   3. Why is Mary walking rather than levitating?

   or

   4. Why is Mary walking rather than levitating and not levitating at
   the same time?

These two questions have presuppositions that are false. (3) presupposes that it is possible that Mary be doing something nomologically impossible, while (4) presupposes that it is possible that Mary being doing something that is narrowly-logically impossible.  Questions (3) and (4) are therefore not to be answered but to be rejected — by rejecting the false presuppositions upon which they rest.

The same holds for the rather more interesting (Q1) and (Q2). (Q1) presupposes that it is possible that nothing exist. For again it is a contrastive phenomenon that wants explaining: something rather than nothing. Either (Q1)'s presupposition is false, or it is such that, if it were true, then every being would be contingent, in which case there could be no ultimate regress-stopping explanation of why something rather than nothing exists.  That is the point I made yesterday.

So the correct response to (Q1) is either to reject it by rejecting the false presupposition upon which it is based, or to reject it by pointing out that, if said presupposition were true, no ultimate regress-stopping explantion would be possible. (Q2), however, does not presuppose that it is possible that nothing exist. It does not suffer from the internal defect that bedevils (Q1).
 

“Tookie” Williams Executed

From the Powerblogs archive.  Originally posted 13 December 2005.  

As you all know by now, Stanley "Tookie" Williams was executed at San Quentin, California at 12:35 AM PT. I take no pleasure in this man's or any man's death; but I do take satisfaction from justice's being served. I simply do not understand how anyone who is not morally obtuse can fail to see that justice demands capital punishment in cases like this.

 Not only did this fellow brutally murder four people, three of them members of a Chinese family, "Buddha-heads" in the miscreant's lingo, but he also helped found the Crips gang. So he is indirectly and partially responsible for hundreds and perhaps thousands of other crimes including rapes, carjackings, murders, you name it. Not only that, he failed to show any remorse, failed to take responsibility for his deeds, and played the predator right to the end, attempting to stare down the press there to witness his last moments.

But no fact and no argument I or anyone adduces will make any impression on liberal gush-heads like Bill Press, Ed Asner, Mike Farrell and their ilk. Bill Press the other day opined that capital punishment is "cruel and unusual." To say something so stupid, and so typical of a liberal, is to empty that phrase of all meaning. Williams died by lethal injection, painlessly. He wasn't broken on the wheel, drawn and quartered — or cut in half by a blast from a 12-gauge  shotgun, which is how he murdered one of his victims. 

So there is cause to celebrate: not the death of a man, nor the awesome power of the state, but that justice was done and the Left was  handed a stinging rebuke.

On Praise

We do not like to be praised if (a) the praiser is beneath us; (b) what is praised is something insignificant or common; (c) the praise is insincere, perhaps by having an ulterior motive; (d) the praise is mistaken in that we lack the excellence attributed to us.

Particularly annoying is to be praised for something insignificant while one's actual virtues go unappreciated. So be careful in your bestowal of praise: take care that you do not offend the one you hope to flatter.

Two Forms of the Ultimate Explanation-Seeking Why-Question

Why does anything at all exist? Someone could utter this interrogative form of words merely to express astonishment that anything should exist at all. But it is more natural to take the question as a request for an explanation: Why, for what reason or cause, does anything at all exist? What explains the sheer existence of things? Suppose we call this the ultimate explanation-seeking why-question.

Before attempting to answer this question, one ought to examine it carefully. One ought to question the question. If we do so, we soon realize that the question why anything at all exists can be formulated in two ways. One formulation is contrastive, the other non-contrastive:

Q1. Why does anything at all exist, rather than nothing?

Q2. Why does anything at all exist?

What this post argues is that Q1 suffers from a defect that makes it unanswerable, but that Q2 does not suffer from this defect. Failure to distinguish Q1 and Q2 may lead one to reject both questions as unanswerable. It appears that Paul Edwards makes this mistake in his entry "Why?" in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Anthony Flood may be repeating it here.

That these are distinct questions becomes apparent when we note that the questions rest on different presuppositions. Both questions presuppose that something exists. If that were not the case, there would be nothing to explain. But Q1 also presupposes that it is possible that nothing at all exist. Call this further presupposition P. P is no part of Q2, as I will explain in a moment.

Let us first think about P and what it entails. P may be expressed in several logically equivalent ways:

There might have been nothing at all
It is possible that nothing exist
Possibly, nothing exists
There is a possible world in which nothing exists

where ‘possible’ and cognates pick out broadly logical possibility.

No matter how P is formulated, it entails that everything that exists is contingent, equivalently, that nothing that exists is a necessary being. For if there might have been nothing at all, then any thing X that exists is such that it might not have existed. That is just to say that X is a contingent being. So given that Q1 presupposes P, and that P entails that there are no necessary beings, it follows that Q1 presupposes that there are no necessary beings. But this seems to imply that the question Q1 cannot be answered.

For if Q1 – or the asking of Q1 – presupposes that no being  is a necessary being, then the asking of Q1 presupposes that there is nothing in terms of which an ultimate explanation could be couched. This is because an ultimate explanation of why anything at all exists cannot be in terms of a contingent entity. A contingent explainer would need explanation just as much as any other entity. An ultimate explanation, if one is to be had, must invoke a noncontingent, but possible, entity: one that either explains itself or at least is not in need of an explanation by another. (I am assuming that there cannot be an actually infinite regress of contingent explainers. This assumption is quite easy to defend, but I won’t address that task here.)

The upshot is that Q1 entails its own unanswerability. This is not because we are unable to know the answer, but because the question itself by its very structure rules out an answer. In other words, Q1 is self-defeating in that it rests on a presupposition that rules out an answer. The proper procedure with respect to Q1, then, is to reject it, not try to answer it.

But the situation is different with Q2. Q2 does not presuppose that every being is contingent. It does not presuppose the opposite (some being is noncontingent) either. Q2 is neutral on the question whether every being is contingent. This is why Q2 is not just a truncated form of Q1. It is not as if ‘rather than nothing’ is implied but not stated in Q2. Q2, resting as it does on different presuppositions than Q1, is a different question. Q2 does not presuppose the possibility of there being nothing at all, hence, does not presuppose that only what is contingent can exist.

Thus Q2 allows the possibility of a necessary being. Nothing about Q2 entails its own unanswerability. Q2 allows the following answer: things exist because one of the things that exist is a necessary being whose existence is self-explanatory, while everything else is explained in terms of this necessary being.

Whether this answer is correct is a further question.  The present point is merely that Q2, unlike Q1, is answerable.