If you are a pacifist, why aren't you also pro-life? If you oppose the killing of human beings, how can you not oppose the killing of defenceless human beings, innocent human beings?
You call yourself a liberal. You pride yourself on 'speaking truth to power' and for defending the weak and disadvantaged. Well, how much power do the unborn wield?
Yesterday I made an objection to Richard Hennessey's neo-Aristotelian theory of accidental predication. But this morning I realized that he has one or more plausible responses. By the way, this post has, besides its philosophical purpose, a metaphilosophical one. I will be adding support to my claim lately bruited that philosophy — the genuine article — is not a matter of debate, as I define both 'philosophy' and 'debate.' For have you ever been to a debate in which debater A, having made an objection to something debater B has said, says, "Wait a minute! I just realized that you have one or more plausible ways of turning aside my objection. The first is . . . ."?
1. 'Socrates is seated' is an example of an accidental predication. For surely it is no part of Socrates' essence or nature that he be seated. There is no broadly logical necessity that he be seated at any time at which he is seated, and there are plenty of times at which he is not seated. 'Socrates is seated' contrasts with the essential predication 'Socrates is human.' Socrates is human at every time at which he exists and at every world at which he exists.
2. Hennessey's theory is that ". . . only if the referent of the 'Socrates' and that of the 'sitting' of 'Socrates is sitting' are identical can it be true that Socrates is actually the one sitting." The idea seems to be that accidental predications can be understood as identity statements. Thus 'Socrates is seated' goes over into (what is claimed to be) the logically equivalent 'Socrates is (identical to) seated-Socrates.' Accordingly, our sample sentence is construed, not as predicating a property of Socrates, a property he instantiates, but as affiming the identity of Socrates with the referent of 'seated-Socrates.'
3. But what is the referent of 'seated-Socrates'? If the referent is identical to the referent of 'Socrates,' namely Socrates, then my objection kicks in: how can the predication be contingently true, as it obviously is, given that it affirms the identity of Socrates with himself? Socrates is essentially Socrates but only accidentally seated.
4. Perhaps Hennessey could respond to this objection by saying that 'Socrates' and 'Socrates-seated' do not refer to the same item: they refer to different items which are, nonetheless, contingently identical. This would involve distinguishing between necessary identity and contingent identity where both are equivalence relations (reflexive, symmetrical, transitive) but only the former satisfies in addition the Indiscernibility of Identicals (InId) and the Necessity of Identity (NI). It is obvious that if a and b are contingently identical, but distinct, then these items must be discernible in which case InId fails. It is also obvious that NI must fail for contingent identity.
5. Closer to Aristotle is a view described by Michael C. Rea in "Sameness Without Identity: An Aristotelian Solution to the Problem of Material Constitution" in Form and Matter, ed. Oderberg, Blackwell 1999, pp. 103-115. I will now paraphrase and interpret from Rea's text, pp. 105-107. And I won't worry about how the view I am about to sketch differs — if it does differ — from the view sketched in #4.
When Socrates sits down, seated-Socrates comes into existence. When he stands up or adopts some other nonseated posture, seated-Socrates passes out of existence. This 'kooky' or 'queer' object is presumably a particular, not a universal, though it is not a substance. It is an accidental unity whose existence is parasitic upon the existence of its parent substance, Socrates. It cannot exist without the parent substance, but the latter can exist without it. The relation is like that of a fist to a hand made into a fist. The fist cannot exist without the hand, but the hand can exist without being made into a fist.Though seated-Socrates is not a substance it is like a substance in that it is a hylomorphic compound: it has Socrates as its matter and seatedness as its form. As long as Socrates and seated-Socrates exist, the relation between them is accidental sameness, a relation weaker than strict identity.
Accidental sameness is not strict identity presumably because the former is not governed by the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Clearly, Socrates and seated-Socrates do not share all properties despite their sameness. They differ temporally and modally. Socrates exists at times at which seated-Socrates does not exist (though not conversely). And it is possible that Socrates exist without seated-Socrates existing (though not conversely).
Are Socrates and seated-Socrates numerically the same? They count as one and so they are one in number though not one in being. So says Aristotle according to Rea. After all, if Socrates and Alcibiades are seated at table we count two philosophers not four. We don't count: Socrates, seated-Socrates, Alcibiades, seated-Alcibiades.
But I will leave it to Hennessey to develop this further. It looks as if this is the direction in which he must move if his theory is to meet my objection.
What about essential predication? Is there a distinction between Socrates and human-Socrates? These two cannot be accidentally the same. They must be strictly identical. If 'Socrates is human' is parsed as 'Socrates is identical to human-Socrates' then how does the latter differ from 'Socrates is Socrates'? The sense of 'Socrates is human' differs from the sense of 'Socrates is Socrates.' How account for that? 'Socrates is Socrates' is a formal-logical truth, trivial and uninformative. 'Socrates is human' is not a formal-logical truth; it is informative.
This infamous phrase of Hillaire Belloc is here explained by James V. Schall. Excerpt:
Modern science itself has medieval Christian origins. Without the notion of a real world, itself not God, worth investigating together with the notion of real secondary causes, no science would be possible. Those societies that embraced a voluntarist origin of things never developed science because one cannot investigate what can constantly be otherwise.
Schall goes on to mention the Pope's Regensburg speech. My comments thereon are in Pope Benedict's Regensburg Speech and Muslim Oversensitivity.
Richard Hennessey of Gnosis and Noesis sketches a neo-Aristotelian theory of predication in Another Aristotelian Basis for a Neo-Aristotelian Anti-Realism in the Theory of Universals. Drawing as he does upon my discussion in Scholastic Realism and Predication, he has asked me to comment on his post. I will do so with pleasure.
I first want to agree partially with something he says at the close of his post:
. . . we have in the so-called problem of universals not a genuine problem, but merely a pseudo-problem. That is, we have a problem of universals only if we posit their existence. If we do not posit them, there is no genuine problem.
I would put the point somewhat differently. The phrase 'problem of universals' is a misnomer. For what is in dispute in the so-called problem of universals is the nature of properties. Not their existence, but their nature. That there are properties is a given, a datum. What alone can be reasonably questioned is their nature. If you deny that sugar is sweet, then I show you the door. But if you deny that sweetness is a universal, then I listen to your arguments. For it is not at all obvious that the sweetness of a sugar cube is a universal. (Nor is it obvious that it isn't) That it is a universal is a theoretical claim that goes beyond the data. It is consistent with the data that the sweetness be a particular, an unrepeatable item, such as a trope (as in the theories of D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell, et al.) or some other sort of particular.
The correct phrase, then, is 'problem of properties,' not 'problem of universals.' But that is not to say that there is no legitimate use for 'problem of universals.' If one posits universals, then one will face various problems such as the problem of how they connect to particulars. Those problems are genuine, not pseudo, given that there are universals.
In any case, Richard sees no need to posit universals, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, to explain either essential or accidental predication. Here is the gist of Richard's theory:
Let us take the proposition “Socrates is sitting” or the strictly equivalent “Socrates is a sitting being.” The referent of the subject term here is the sitting Socrates and that of the predicate term is one and the same sitting Socrates. Similarly, the referent of the subject term of “Plato is sitting” is the sitting Plato and that of its predicate term is one and the same sitting Plato. Here, once again, only if the referent of the “Socrates” and that of the “sitting” of “Socrates is sitting” are identical can it be true that Socrates is actually the one sitting. And, only if the referent of the “Plato” and that of the “sitting” of “Plato is sitting” are identical can it be true that Plato is actually the one sitting.
What we have here could be called an identity theory of predication: if 'Socrates is a sitting being' is true, then the referent of the subject term 'Socrates' and the referent of the predicate term 'sitting being' are numerically identical. Accordingly, the 'is' is the 'is' of identity. ONLY on this analysis, says Richard, can the sentence be true. I rather doubt that, but first we need to consider whether Richard's theory is not open to serious objection.
If x and y are identical, then this is necessarily so. Call this the Necessity of Identity. More precisely: for any x, y, if x = y, then necessarily, x = y. Equivalent contrapositive: if possibly ~(x = y), then ~(x = y). It follows that if Socrates is identical to some sitting being, then necessarily he is identical to that sitting being. But in that case it would not be possible for Socrates not to be a sitting being. This, however, is possible. Sometimes he is on his feet walking around, other times he is flat on his back, and he has even been observed standing on his head. And please note that even if, contrary to fact, Socrates was always seated, it would still be possible for him not to be seated. The mere possibility of his not being seated shows that he cannot be identical to some sitting being.
This is an objection that Richard needs to address if his theory is to be tenable. Note that my objection can be met without invoking universals. One could say that 'Socrates' in our sample sentence refers to Socrates, that 'sitting' refers to a particularized property (a trope), and that the 'is' is the 'is' of predication, not identity. Accordingly, there is not an identity between Socrates and a sitting being; the particularized property being-seated inheres in Socrates, where inherence, unlike identity, is asymmetrical.
The other claim that Richard makes is that ONLY on his theory can the truth of 'Socrates is sitting' be accommodated. That strikes me as false. I just gave an analysis on which the truth of the predication is preserved. And of course there are others.
Here. Via the indefatigable Dave Lull. Here is my little tribute to Lull from earlier this year:
If you are a blogger, then perhaps you too have been the recipient of his terse emails informing one of this or that blogworthy tidbit. Who is this Dave Lull guy anyway? Patrick Kurp of Anecdotal Evidence provides an answer:
As Pascal said of God (no blasphemy intended) Dave is the circle whose center is everywhere in the blogosphere and whose circumference is nowhere. He is a blogless unmoved mover. He is the lubricant that greases the machinery of half the online universe worth reading. He is copy editor, auxiliary conscience and friend. He is, in short, the OWL – Omnipresent Wisconsin Librarian.
For other tributes to the ever-helpful Lull see here. Live long, Dave, and grease on!
Addendum (20 October, 5:20 AM): I just corrected a typo. I had 'indefagitable' instead of indefatigable.' Perhaps I was subsconsciously thinking that that one who is indefatigable cannot be fagged out. Hence: indeFAGitable.
PhilPapers is a nifty little utility. They have recently added PhilJobs for those of you in quixotic quest of an academic appointment. Here is my PhilPapers page. It captures only some of my publications even with 'online only' turned off.
In California, death row's the place to be — for all the amen-i-ties. And little chance of being executed. So if you're thinking of messin' with Texas, better head west. Just don't stop in Arizona. We carry open and concealed in these parts, and we don't need no stinkin' permit either way.
A correspondent writes:
Here's how I think science will eventually put religion out of business. Soon medical science is going to be able to offer serious life extension, not pie-in-the-sky soul survival or re-incarnation, but real life extension with possible rejuvenation. When science can offer and DELIVER what religion can only promise, religion is done.
1. Religion is in the transcendence business. The type of transcendence offered depends on the particular religion. The highly sophisticated form of Christianity expounded by Thomas Aquinas offers the visio beata, the Beatific Vision. In the BV — you will forgive the abbreviation — the soul does not lose its identity. It maintains its identity, though in a transformed mode, while participating in the divine life. Hinduism and Buddhism offer even more rarefied forms of transcendence in which the individual self is either absorbed into the eternal Atman, thereby losing its individual identity, or extinguished altogether by entry into Nirvana. And there are cruder forms of transcendence, in popular forms of Christianity, in Islam, and in other faiths, in which the individual continues to exist after death but with little or no transformation to enjoy delights that are commensurable with the ones enjoyed here below. The crudest form, no doubt, is the popular Islamic notion of paradise as an endless sporting with 72 black-eyed virgins. So on the one end of the spectrum: transcendence as something difficult to distinguish from utter extinction; on the other end, immortality mit Haut und Haar (to borrow a delightful phrase from Schopenhauer), "with skin and hair" in a realm of sensuous delights but without the usual negatives such as heart burn and erectile dysfunction.
I think we can safely say that a religion that offers no form of transcendence, whether Here or Hereafter, is no religion at all. Religion, then, is in the business of offering transcendence.
2. I agree with my correspondent that if science can provide what religion promises, then science will put religion out of business. But as my crude little sketch above shows, different religions promise different things. Now the crudest form of transcendence is physical immortality, immortality "with skin and hair." Is it reasonable to hope that future science will give rise to a technology that will make us, or some of us, physically immortal? I don't think so. That would violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics according to which the entropy of an irreversible process in an isolated system increases leading in the case of the universe (which is both isolated and irreversible) to the heat death of the universe and the end of all life. Granted, that is way off in the future. But that is irrelevant if the claim is that physical immortality is possible by purely physical means. And if that is not the claim, then the use of the phrase 'physical immortality' is out of place. In a serious discussion like this word games are strictly verboten.
3. Physical immortality is nomologically impossible, impossible given the laws of nature. Of course, a certain amount of life extension has been achieved and it is reasonable to expect that more will be achieved. So suppose the average life expectancy of people like us gets cranked up to 130 years. To underscore the obvious, to live to 130 is not to live forever. Suppose you have made it to 130 and are now on your death bed. If you have any spiritual depth at all, your lament is likely to be similar to that of Jacob's: "The length of my pilgrimage has been one hundred and thirty years; short and wretched has been my life, nor does it compare with the years my fathers lived during their pilgrimage." (Genesis 47:9)
The important point here is that once a period of time is over, it makes no difference how long it has lasted. It is over and done with and accessible only in the flickering and dim light of intermittent and fallible memory. The past 'telescopes' and 'scrunches up,' the years melt into one another; the past cannot be relived. What was distinctly lived is now all a blur. And now death looms before you. What does it matter that you lived 130 or 260 years? You are going to die all the same, and be forgotten, and all your works with you. After a while it will be as if you never existed.
The problem is not that our lives are short; the problem is that we are in time at all. No matter how long a life extends it is still a life in time, a life in which the past is no longer, the future not yet, and the present a passing away. This problem, the problem of the transitoriness of life, cannot be solved by life extension even if, per impossibile, physical immortality were possible. This problem of the transitoriness and vanity of life is one that religion addresses.
So my first conclusion is this. Even if we take religion in its crudest form, as promising physical immortality, "with skin and hair," science cannot put such a crude religion out of business. For, first of all, physical immortality is physically impossible, and second, mere life extension, even unto the age of a Methuselah, does not solve the problem of the transitoriness of life.
4. But I have just begun to scratch the surface of the absurdities of transhumanism. No higher religion is about providing natural goodies by supernatural means, goodies that cannot be had by natural means. Talk of pie-in-the-sky is but a cartoonish misrepresentation by those materialists who can only think in material terms and only believe in what they can hold in their hands. A religion such as Christianity promises a way out of the unsatisfactory predicament we find ourselves in in this life. What makes our situation unsatisfactory is not merely our physical and mental weakness and the shortness of our lives. It is primarily our moral defects that make our lives in this world miserable. We lie and slander, steal and cheat, rape and murder. We are ungrateful for what we have and filled with inordinate desire for what we don't have and wouldn't satisfy us even if we had it. We are avaricious, gluttonous, proud, boastful and self-deceived. It is not just that our wills are weak; our wills are perverse. It is not just that are hearts are cold; our hearts are foul. You say none of this applies to you? Very well, you will end up the victim of those to whom these predicates do apply. And then your misery will be, not the misery of the evil-doer, but the misery of the victim and the slave. You may find yourself forlorn and forsaken in a concentration camp. Suffering you can bear, but not meaningless suffering, not injustice and absurdity.
Whether or not the higher religions can deliver what they promise, what they promise first and foremost is deliverance from ignorance and delusion, salvation from meaninglessness and moral evil. So my correspondent couldn't be more wrong. No physical technology can do what religion tries to do. Suppose a technology is developed that actually reverses the processes of aging and keeps us all alive indefinitely. This is pure fantasy, of course, given the manifold contingencies of the world (nuclear and biological warfare, terrorism, natural disasters, etc.); but just suppose. Our spiritual and moral predicament would remain as deeply fouled-up as it has always been and religion would remain in business.
5. If, like my correspondent, you accept naturalism and scientism, then you ought to face what you take to be reality, namely, that we are all just clever animals slated to perish utterly in a few years, and not seek transcendence where it cannot be found. Accept no substitutes! Transhumanism is an ersatz religion.
It could be like this. All religions are false; none can deliver what they promise. Naturalism is true: reality is exhausted by the space-time system. You are not unreasonable if you believe this. But I say you are unreasonable if you think that technologies derived from the sciences of nature can deliver what religions have promised.
As long as there are human beings there will be religion. The only way I can imagine religion withering away is if humanity allows itself to be gradually replaced by soulless robots. But in that case it will not be that the promises of religion are fulfilled by science; it would be that no one would be around having religious needs.
Yesterday's hike was almost over. The light was failing as we gingerly negotiated the last steps of the treacherous downgrade of Heart Attack Hill. Suddenly my hiking partner let out a yell and jumped back at the unmistakable sound of a diamond back rattlesnake (crotalus atrox). It was a perfect hike: physically demanding in excellent company with a dash of danger at the end.
Why should the USA become like Europe? There is already Europe, and look at what it has become.
Despite my 'due diligence,' typographical errors, though I strive to ferret them out, often go undetected on the day of publication. All of yesterday's posts contain them. So I will correct them now. No, I don't use any SpellCheck utility. That's like having a jackass of an editor looking over my shoulder, a miserable Besserwisser who thinks he knows what I am 'trying' to say and how I want to say it. I'll say it my own way, damn you, and without your political correctness and school-marmish rules.
Calling something 'inappropriate' is the ne plus ultra of liberal disapprobation. They just can't bring themselves to use such words as 'wrong' or 'immoral' or evil.'
In human relationships it is often the absence of a past that makes possible the having of a future.
The proprietor of Beyond Necessity tells us that he is thinking of attending the London debate between William Lane Craig and atheist philosopher Stephen Law on 17 October. I hope he attends and files his report.
But can philosophy be debated? In a loose sense, yes, but not in a strict sense. I say that if debate is occurring in a certain place, then no philosophy is occurring in that place. Philosophy is not a matter of debate. That is a nonnegotiable point with me. So I won't debate it, nor can I consistently with what I have just said. It is after all a (meta)philosophical point: if philosophy cannot be debated then the same goes for this particular philosopheme. But though I won't debate the point, I must in my capacity as philosopher give some reasons for my view. My view is a logical consequence of my view of debate in conjunction with my view of philosophy.
Debate is a game in which the interlocutors attempt to defeat each other, typically before an audience whose approbation they strive to secure. Hence the query 'Who won the debate?' which implies that the transaction is about attacking and defending, winning and losing. I don't deny that debates can be worthwhile in politics and in other areas. And even in philosophy they may have some use. Someone who attends the Craig-Law debate will come away with some idea of what sorts of issues philosophers of religion discuss. What he won't come away with is any understanding of the essence of philosophy.
Why is philosophy — the genuine article — not something that can be debated?
Philosophy is inquiry. It is inquiry by those who don't know (and know that they don't know) with the sincere intention of increasing their insight and understanding. Philosophy is motivated by the love of truth, not the love of verbal battle or the need to defeat an opponent or shore up and promote a preconceived opinion about which one has no real doubt. When philosophy is done with others it takes the form of dialog, not debate. It is conversation between friends, not opponents, who are friends of the truth before they are friends of each other. Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.
There is nothing adversarial in a genuine philosophical conversation. The person I am addressing and responding to is not my adversary but a co-inquirer. In the ideal case there is between us a bond of friendship, a philiatic bond. But this philia subserves the eros of inquiry. The philosopher's love of truth is erotic, the love of one who lacks for that which he lacks. It is not the agapic love of one who knows and bestows his pearls of wisdom.
There is nothing like this in a debate. The aim in a debate is not to work with the other towards a truth that neither claims to possess. On the contrary, each already 'knows' what the truth is and is merely trying to attack the other's counter-position while defending his own. Thus the whole transation is ideological the two sides of which are polemics and apologetics. Debate is verbal warfare. This is why debaters never show doubt or admit they are wrong. To show doubt is to show weakness. To prevail against an enemy you must not appear weak but intimidating.
There is no place for polemics in philosophy. To the extent that polemics creeps in, philosophy becomes ideology. This is not to say that there is no place for polemics or apologetics. It is to say that that place is not philosophy.
Discussions with ideologues, whether religious or anti-religious, tend to be unpleasant and unproductive. They see everything in terms of attack and defense. If you merely question their views they are liable to become angry or flustered. I once questioned a Buddhist on his 'no self' doctrine. He became hostile. His hostility at my questioning of one of the beliefs with which he identifies proved that his 'self' was alive and kicking despite doctrinal asseverations to the contrary.
I stand astride both cities, with a foot in each. But I favor one leg . . . .
Or to change the metaphor: I do not look down upon the cities from above as from an Olympian standpoint but sight from the perspective of one of the cities, Athens, towards the other, Jerusalem.
So while I attempt a syn-optic view, my syn-optics cannot quite shake off the perspectivism of all finite optics. My intellectual honesty demands recognition of this fact.
In the last paragraph of the preface to the book that bears the slightly inaccurate English title Philosophical Faith and Revelation, Karl Jaspers explains why he entitled his book Der Philosophische Glaube Angesichts der Offenbarung and not Der Philosophische Glaube und Offenbarung. Jaspers remarks that und (and) would be inappropriate because it would suggest that he was laying claim to a superior standpoint outside both philosophy and revelation, a standpoint that Jaspers does not claim to occupy. He speaks from the side of philosophy while being touched, struck, affected (betroffen) by the claims of revelation. Thus his philosophical faith is in the face of (angesichts) revelation, elaborated in confrontation with it. And so his philosophical optics are situated and perspectival, not synoptic or panoptic.
It seems we have only four options assuming that an Hegelian panoptical God's eye view is unavailable to us, a view which would somehow synthesize philosophy and religion:
1. Deny the tension by eliminating Athens in favor of Jersualem in the manner of an irrationalist like Lev Shestov.
2. Deny the tension by eliminating Jerusalem in favor Athens.
3. Live the tension as a philosopher who takes seriously the claims and demands of revelation.
4. Live the tension as a religionist who take seriously the claims and demands of philosophy.
(1) and (2) are nonstarters. So we are left with the difficult choice between (3) and (4).
