Month: March 2011

Does God Exist Because He Ought to Exist?

Steven, Peter, et al.:  This paper has been languishing  on my hard drive for some time.  Comments appreciated. 

Abstract.  Modal ontological arguments for the existence of God require a possibility premise to the effect that a maximally perfect being is possible. Admitting the possibility of such a being may appear to be a minimal concession, but it is not given that the admission, together with the uncontroversial premise that a necessary being is one whose possibility entails its actuality, straightaway entails the actual existence of a maximally perfect being. The suspicion thus arises that the modal ontological argument begs the question at its possibility premise. So various philosophers, including J. N. Findlay, A.C. Ewing, John Leslie and Carl Kordig have attempted to support the possibility premise by broadly deontic considerations concerning what ought-to-be, where this ought-to-be subsists independently of the powers of any agent. The basic idea is that God, conceived as a maximally perfect being, is possible because (i) he ought to exist, and (ii) whatever ought to exist is possible. The basic idea is that the non-agential oughtness or axiological requiredness of the divine existence certifies the possibility and in turn the actuality of the divine existence. The overall argument could be described as a broadly deontic God proof along modal ontological lines. This article sets forth and defends the argument before explaining why it is not ultimately compelling.

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Is the Difference Between a Fact and Its Constituents a Brute Difference?

Note to Steven Nemes:  Tell me if you find this totally clear, and if not, point out what is unclear.  Tell me whether you accept my overall argument.

The day before yesterday in conversation Steven Nemes presented a challenge  I am not sure I can meet.  I have maintained (in my book, in published articles, and in these pages) that the difference between a fact and its constituents cannot be a brute difference and must therefore have a ground or explanation.  But what exactly is my reasoning?

Consider a simple atomic fact of the form, a's being F.  This fact has two primary constituents, the individual a, and the monadic property F-ness, which a possesses contingently.  But surely there is more to the fact than these two primary constituents, and for at least two reasons.  I'll  mention just one, which I consider decisive:  the constituents can exist without the fact  existing.  The individual and the property could each exist without the former exemplifying the second.  This is so even if we assume that there are no propertyless individuals and no unexemplified properties.  Consider a world W which includes the facts Ga and Fb.  In W, a is propertied and F-ness is exemplified; hence there is no bar to saying that both exist in W.  But Fa does not exist in W.  So a fact is more than its primary constituents because they can exist without it existing.

A fact is not its constituents, but those constituents unified in a particular way.  Now if you try to secure fact-unity by introducing  one or more secondary constituents such  an exemplification relation, then you will ignite Bradley's regress.  For if the constituents include a, F-ness, and EX, then you still have the problem of their unity since the three can exist without constituting a fact.

So I take it as established that a fact is more than its constituents and therefore different from its constituents.  A fact is different from any one of its constituents, and also from all of them taken collectively, as a mereological sum, say.    The question is:  What is the ontological ground of the difference?  What is it that makes them different?  That they are different is plain.  I want to know what makes them different.  It won't do to say that one is a fact while the other is not since that simply underscores that they are different.  I'm on the hunt for a difference-maker.

To feel the force of the question consider what makes two different sets different.  If S1 and S2 are different sets, then it is reasonable to ask what makes them different, and one would presumably not accept the answer that they are just different, that the difference is a brute difference.  Let S1 be my singleton and S2 the set consisting of me and Nemes.  It would not do to say that they are just different.  We need a difference-maker.  In this case it is easy to specify: Nemes.  He is what makes S1 different from S2.  Both sets contain me, but only one contains him.  Generalizing, we can say that for sets at least,

DM. No difference without a difference-maker.

So I could argue that the difference between a fact and (the sum of) its constituents cannot be a brute difference because (i) there is no difference without a difference-maker and (ii) facts, sets, and sums, being complexes, are relevantly similar.  (I needn't hold that the numerical difference of two simples needs a difference-maker.) But why accept (DM) in full generality as applying to all types of wholes and parts?  Perhaps the principle, while applying to sets, does not apply to facts and their constituents.  How do I answer the person who argues that the difference is brute, a factum brutum, and that therefore (DM), taken in full generality, is false?  As we say in the trade, one man's modus ponens is another's modus tollens.

Can I show that there is a logical contradiction in maintaining that facts and their constituents just differ?  That was my strategy in the book on existence.  The strategy is to argue that without an external ground of unity — an external unifer — one lands in a contradiction, or rather cannot avoid a contradiction.  That the unifier, if there is one, must be external as opposed to internal is established by showing that otherwise a vicious infinite regress ensues of the Bradley-type.  I cover this ground in my book and in articles in mind-numbing detail; I cannot go over it again here.  But I will refer the reader to my 2010 Dialectica article  which discusses a fascinating proposal according to which unity is constituted by an internal infinite, but nonvicious, regress.  But for now I assume that the unifier, if there is one, must be external.  If there is one, then the difference between a fact and its constituents cannot be brute.  But why must there be a unifier?

Consider this aporetic triad:

1. Facts exist.
2. A fact is its constituents taken collectively.
3. A fact is not its constituents taken collectively.

What I want to argue is that facts exist, but that they are contradictory structures in the absence of an external unifier that removes the contradiction.  Since Nemes agrees with me about (1), I assume it for present purposes.  (The justification is via the truth-maker argument).

Note that (2) and (3) are logical contradictories, and yet each exerts a strong claim on our acceptance.  I have already argued for (3).  But (2) is also exceedingly plausible.  For if you  analyze a fact, what will you uncover?  Its constituents and nothing besides.  The unity of the constituents whereby it is a fact as opposed to a nonfact like a mereological sum eludes analysis.  The unity cannot be isolated or located within the fact.  For to locate it within the fact you would have to find it as one of the constituents.  And that you cannot do.

Note also that unity is not perceivable or in any way empirically detectable.  Consider a simple Bergmann-style or 'Iowa' example, a red round spot.  The redness and the roundness are perceivable, and the spot is perceivable.  But the spot's being red and round is not perceivable.  The existence of a fact is the unity of its constituents.  So what I am claiming is equivalent to claiming that existence is not perceivable, which seems right: existence is not an empirical feature like redness and roundness.

So when we consider a fact by itself, there seems to be nothing more to it than its constituents.

Each limb of the triad has  a strong claim on our acceptance, but they cannot all be true as formulated.  The contradiction can be removed if we ascend to a higher point of view and posit an external unifier.  What does that mean? 

Well, suppose there is a unifier U external to the fact and thus not identifiable with one or more of its primary or secondary constituents.  Suppose U brings together the constituents in the fact-making way.  U would then be the sought-for ground of the fact's unity.  The difference between a fact and its constituents could then be explained by saying that  the difference is due to U's 'activity':  U operates on the constituents to produce the fact.  Our original triad can then be replaced by the following all of whose limbs can be true:

1. Facts exist
2*. A fact, considered analytically, is its constituents taken collectively.
3.  A fact is not its constituents taken collectively.

This triad is consistent.  The limbs can all be true.  And I think we have excellent reason to say that each IS true.  The truthmaker argument vouches for (1).  (2*) looks to be true by definition.  The argumentation I gave for (3) above strikes me as well-night irresistible.

But if you accept the limbs of the modified triad, then you must accept that there is something external to facts which functions as their unifier.  Difficult questions about what U is and about whether U is unique and the same for all facts remain; but that U exists is 'fallout' from the modified triad.  For if each limb is true, then a fact's being more than its constituents can be accounted for only by appeal to an external unifier.

But how exactly does this show that the difference between a fact and its constituents is not a brute difference?   The move from the original to the modified triad is motivated by the laudable desire to avoid contradiction.  So my argument boils down to this:  If the difference is brute, then we get a logical contradiction. So the difference is not brute. 

But it all depends on whether or not there are facts.  If facts can be reasonably denied, then my reasoning to a unifer can be reasonably rejected.  But that's a whole other can of worms: the truthmaker argument.

Analytically considered, a fact is just its constituents.  But holistically considered it is not.  Unity eludes analysis, and yet without unities there would be nothing to analyze!  Analytic understanding operates under the aegis of two distinctions: whole/part, and complex/simple.  Analysis generates insight by reducing wholes to their parts, and complex parts to simpler and simpler parts, and possibly right down to ultimate simples (assuming that complexity does not extend 'all the way down.')  But analysis is a onesided epistemic procedure.  For again, without unities there would be nothing to analyze. To understand the being-unified of a unity therefore requires that we ascend to a  point of view external to the unity under analysis. 

‘Practical’ and Religious Attitudes Toward Philosophy

Philosophy is unserious to the onesidedly worldly and 'practical' because it bakes no bread. To which the best response is: "Man does not live by bread alone." 

To the onesidedly religious, philosophy is unserious because it begets pride and does not lead unto salvation. "Not worth an hour's trouble," said Pascal with Descartes in his sights. Both types, the worldly and the religious, dismiss philosophy as 'mere theory' and 'empty speculation' but for opposite reasons. 

Strangely enough, both types make use of it when it suits their purposes. Each justifies his own position philosophically. How else could he justify it? Assertions and arguments about philosophy are philosophical assertions and arguments — and it cannot be otherwise. Such assertions and arguments cannot come from below philosophy, nor can they come from above it: metaphilosophy is a branch of philosophy.

Blaise Pascal wrote a big fat book of Pensées — and a magnificent book it was. But why did he bother if philosophy is not worth an hour's trouble? Because he made an exception in his own case: his philosophy, he felt, was different! Well, all philosophers feel that way. All feel themselves to be questing for the truth as for something precious, even when they, like Nietzsche, say things that imply that there is no truth. None feel themselves to be engaged in 'empty speculation' or 'mental masturbation' or 'meaningless abstraction.'

One of the curious things about fair Philosophia is that you cannot outflank her, and you cannot shake her off. She outflanks all would-be outflankers. Ultimate dominatrix that she is, she always ends up on top. So you'd better learn to live with her and her acolytes.

Not Brute Enough

There is the fear that one is not brute enough, not animal enough for this brutal world, a world in which nobility, refinement, kindness, objectivity, reasonableness, impersonal pursuit of truth and justice are perceived as weakness, and brute force, tribalism, onesidedness, and blind loyalty to one's own are admired.

Muslim Groups Fomenting Hysteria over Rep. Pete King Hearings

Brace yourself for the crapload of liberal-left blather sure to inundate us  over the 'McCarthyism' of the Pete King investigation.  Hats off to Pete King, a true profile in courage, who stands up to militant Islam and its liberal-left enablers.  Here is Steven Emerson, an expert commentator on these matters (emphasis added):

The line of attack is now familiar: If King (R-L.I.) were truly interested in violent extremism, his hearings would focus on a wide range of groups that wreak havoc on America, including neo-Nazis and others; by focusing solely on Muslim extremism, the argument goes, he is betraying his bias.

This is utterly ridiculous. Our organization, the Investigative Project on Terrorism, recently did an analysis of all terrorism convictions based on statistics released by the Justice Department. These stats show that more than 80% of all convictions tied to international terrorist groups and homegrown terrorism since 9/11 involve defendants driven by a radical Islamist agenda. Though Muslims represent less than 1% of the American population, they constitute defendants in 186 of the 228 cases the Justice Department lists.

The figures confirm that there is a disproportionate problem of Islamic militancy and terrorism among the American Muslim population.

Read it all!  And political correctness be damned. 

Univocity, Equivocity, and the MOB Doctrine

Here is another argument that may be banging around in the back of the heads of those who are hostile to the doctrine that there are modes of being, the MOB doctrine to give it a name:

1. If there are modes of existence, then 'exist(s)' is not univocal.
2. If 'exist(s)' is not univocal, then it is equivocal.
3. If 'exists(s)' is equivocal, then existents are partitioned into separate and unrelatable domains.
4. It is not the case that existents are partitioned into separate and unrelatable domains.
Ergo
5. There are no modes of existence.

I believe that this argument can be fairly imputed to Quentin Gibson. (See The Existence Principle, Kluwer 1998, p. 26 et passim) Of course, the above is my reconstruction; he is nowhere near as clear as I am being. 

The argument is seductive but unsound.  (2) is false: if a term is not univocal it does not follow that it is equivocal in the sense of 'equivocal' needed to make (3) true.   I believe I have already demonstrated this.  'Exists(s)' is not univocal as between

6. Jewish philosophers exist
and
7. Kripke exists.

But it doesn't follow from this lack of univocity that we have sheer equivocity of the river bank /financial bank sort.  (6) makes an instantiation claim while (7) doesn't.  'Exist' in (6) is a second-level predicate while in (7) 'exists' is a first-level predicate.  So the predicate is used to say different things of different things.  In (6) being-instantiated, but not singular existence,  is being predicated of the concept Jewish philosopher.  In (7) singular exsistence, but not being-instantiated, is being predicated of Kripke.

And yet there is a systematic connection between the two sentences and the two senses of 'exist(s).'  If a first-level concept 'exists,' i.e., is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists.  And if an individual exists, then there is some concept it instantiates.

Call this equivocity if you like, but it is not the sort of equivocity that has the unacceptable consequence that is recorded in the consequent of (3).  It doesn't lead to a partitioning of existents into separate and unrelatable domains.

Or take the substance/accident case.  Substances exist and accidents exist.  If so, they exist in different ways.  Or so say I.  Accidents exist-in substances while substances do not.  Does 'exist(s)' have two different senses as applied to substances and accidents?  Yes, but they are connected senses.  So it doesn't follow from this lack of univocity that substances and accidents belong in separate and unrelatable domains.  Quite the contrary!  It is precisely because they exist in different ways that we can render intelligible how they are related.

We are drifting in the direction of the old analogia entis.  I can feel it.

National Public Radio Needs Your Support!

If you like NPR programming, as I like some of  it, write them a check!  Just don't demand that they receive taxpayer support.  At least not now.  We are in fiscal crisis, and budgetary cuts must be made.  If such inessentials as NPR, PBS, NEH and NEA cannot be defunded, where will the cuts be made?  Think about it.  If these small allocations cannot be zeroed out or placed on moratorium, how are we going to tackle entitlement reform?

So one good reason to defund NPR is that we cannot afford it.

Some think that a refusal of sponsorship amounts to censorship.  But that is stupidity pure and simple and duly refuted here.

But even if we could afford it, NPR in its present configuration should not receive Federal support.  And this for the simple reason that it is plainly a propaganda arm of the Left.  Now that should be obvious to anyone who has been following current events, including the firing of Juan Williams, the exposure and sacking of the two Schillers, etc.  If you deny the Leftward tilt of NPR in its present incarnation, then you are delusional and not worth talking to.  So let's assume that you are sane and admit the bias.  The next question is whether you think it is morally right that tax dollars be used to push points of view that most of us in this conservative land find objectionable.  I say that it it is not morally right that you take my money by force and then use it for a purpose that is not only inessential and unconnected to the necessary functions of government, but also violates my beliefs.

Perhaps, if NPR were balanced like C-SPAN, it could be tolerated in times of plenty.  But we are not in times of plenty and it is not balanced.

So that is my second reason for defunding NPR. 

Note that a reasonable liberal could accept my two reasons.  I am not arguing that government must not engage in any projects other than those that are strictly essential such as those connected to the protection of life, liberty, and property (the Lockean triad).  I leave that question open for the space of this post.  I am arguing that present facts dictate that defunding NPR is something we ought to do. 

I love Garrison Keillor and his "Prarie Home Companion" and tune in whenever I can.  "Guy Noir" is one of my favorite bits.  So I hope NPR stays on the air — on its own fiscal steam.  Hell, if they wean themselves from the  mammaries of massive Mama Obama Government I may even send them a check myself!  And the same goes for PBS. 

Sponsorship and Censorship

Lefties often conflate lack of sponsorship with censorship when it suits them. It is not that they are too dense to grasp the distinction, but that they willfully ignore it for their ideological purposes. If a government agency refuses to sponsor your art project, it does not follow that you are being censored. To censor is to suppress. But there is nothing suppressive about a refusal to fund.

If you are a serious artist, you will find a way to satisfy your muse. On the other hand, if you expect to dip into the public trough, be prepared to find some strings attached to your grant. Don't expect the tax dollars of truck drivers and waitresses to subsidize your violation of their beliefs.

More on Social Security as Welfare

In an earlier post I pointed out against Robert Samuelson that Social Security (SS), though in ways  like a welfare scheme, is not a welfare scheme.  Others are chiming in with Samuelson:

Social Security is a welfare program masquerading as an insurance program. People may think of it as forced savings, but that isn't how the program really works.

The trust fund and individual account aspects of Social Security are accounting gimmicks. The payroll taxes we pay in are not really saved for our retirements. They are already paying for the benefits of the current retirees. When we retire, if we are very lucky, we will live off the payroll taxes of the poor working stiffs who remain. The trust fund is stuffed with IOUs; the government has already spent the surpluses. Al Gore's lock box has been picked. Millions continue to draw benefits after they've already gotten back everything they paid in plus interest.

The second paragraph is wholly unexceptionable.  But consider the fact that to be eligible for SS benefits, a worker must have completed 40 quarters of employment.  That fact alone suffices to make it literally false that SS is a welfare program.  Add to it the fact that the amount paid out also reflects how long one has been employed and what one's level of compensation has been.  So although it is true that SS is like a welfare program in the ways Samuelson mentions, it is not, strictly  speaking, a welfare scheme.

Language matters.  Precision matters.  And if not here, where?  If you say what you know to be false for rhetorical effect then you undermine your credibility among those who you need to persuade.  Conservatives don't need to persuade conservatives, and they will not be able to persuade leftists.  They must pitch their message to the undecided who, if rational, will be put off by sloppy rhetoric and exaggeration.

I note that W. James Antle, III, the author of the linked article, refers to the SS system as "the liberals' Ponzi scheme."  But of course it is not a Ponzi scheme.  A Ponzi scheme, by definition, is a scheme set up with the intention of defrauding people for the benefit of those running the scheme.  But there is nothing fraudulent about the SS sytem: the intentions behind it are good ones!  The SS system is no doubt in dire need of reform if not outright elimination.  But no good purpose is achieved by calling it a Ponzi scheme.  That's either a lie or an exaggeration.  Not good, either way.  The most you can say is that it is like a Ponzi scheme in being fiscally unsustainable as currently structured.

Conservative exaggeration is politically foolish.  Is it not folly to give ammo to the enemy?  Is it not folly to choose a means (exaggeration and distortion) that is not conducive  to the end (garnering support among the presently uncommitted)?

Liberal-Left Bias Among the Social Psychologists

Here.  Excerpts, with emphases and a couple of comments by MavPhil.

Let's look at the 3 very liberal social sciences: anthropology, sociology, and psychology. These 3 fields have always leaned left, but things really changed in the 1960s. The civil rights struggle, the brutality inflicted upon peaceful marchers, the Viet Nam war, the assassinations of black leaders… Racial injustice in America was overwhelming, highly visible, and for many people, revolting. The generation that came of age in the 1960s and 1970s was profoundly shaped by these experiences. 

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Ashes to Ashes, Dust to Dust

"Remember, man, thou art dust and unto dust thou shalt return." Memento, homo, quia pulvis es et in pulverem reverteris. This warning, from the Catholic liturgy for Ash Wednesday, is based on Genesis 3, 19: In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es: quia pulvis es et in pulverem reverteris.

How real can we and this world be if in a little while we all will be nothing but dust and ashes?

     Our plesance here is all vain glory,
     This fals world is but transitory,
     The flesche is brukle, the Feynd is slee;
     Timor mortis conturbat me.

     No stait in Erd here standis sicker;
     As with the wynd wavis the wicker,
     Wavis this wardlis vanitie;
     Timor mortis conturbat me.

     (William Dunbar c. 1460 — c. 1520, from "Lament for the Makers.")

     Here lie I by the chancel door;
     They put me here because I was poor.
     The further in, the more you pay,
     But here lie I as snug as they.

     (Devon tombstone.)

     Here lies Piron, a complete nullibiety,
     Not even a Fellow of a Learned Society.

     Alexis Piron, 1689-1773, "My Epitaph"

     Why hoard your maidenhead? There'll not be found
     A lad to love you, girl, under the ground.
     Love's joys are for the quick; but when we're dead
     It's dust and ashes, girl, will go to bed.

     (Asclepiades, fl. 290 B.C., tr. R. A. Furness)

     The world, perhaps, does not see that those who rightly engage in
     philosophy study only death and dying. And, if this be true, it
     would surely be strange for a man all through his life to desire
     only death, and then, when death comes to him, to be vexed at it,
     when it has been his study and his desire for so long.

     Plato, Phaedo, St. 64, tr. F. J. Church