Month: September 2010

On ‘Spirituality’

Is Atheism a Religion?

From the mail:

Just read your On Religious Pluralism and Religious Tolerance entry, and I have one concern. Is it really right to view the New Atheists, and atheists in general, as "not religious"? I imagine this really depends on how you yourself define religion, and I admit to not knowing that. [. . .]

I don't know it either [grin].

The question as to what religion is is not at all easy to answer.  It is not even clear that the question makes sense.  For when you ask What is religion? you presuppose that it has an essence which can be captured in a definition that specifies necessary and sufficient conditions.  But it might be that the concept religion is a family resemblance concept like the concept game (to invoke Wittgenstein's famous example).  Think of all the different sorts of games there are. Is there any property or set of properties that all games have and that only games have?  Presumably not.  The concept game is a family resemblance concept to which no essence corresponds.  Noted philosophers of religion such as John Hick maintain the same with respect to the concept religion.

If you take this tack, then you can plausibly argue that Marxism and secular humanism and militant atheism are religions.

But it strikes me as decidedly odd to characterize  a militant anti-religionist as having a religion.  Indeed, it smacks of a cheap debating trick:  "How can you criticize religion when you yourself have a religion?" I prefer to think along the following lines. Start with belief-system as your genus and then distinguish two species: belief-systems that are theoretical, though they may have practical applications,  and belief-systems that are by their very nature oriented toward action.  Call the latter ideologies. Then distinguish between religious and non-religious ideologies.  Marxism and militant atheism are non-religious ideologies while the Abrahamic religions and some of the Eastern religions are religious ideologies.

But this leaves me with the problem of specifying what it is that distinguishes religious from non-religious ideologies.  Perhaps this: all and only religions make reference to a transcendent reality, whether of a personal or impersonal nature, contact or community or identification with which is the summum bonum and the ultimate purpose of human existence.  For the Abrahamic faiths, Yahweh, God, Allah  is the transcendent reality.  For Taoism, the Tao.  For Hinduism, Brahman.  For Buddhism, the transcendent state of nirvana.  But I expect the Theravadins to object that nibbana is nothing positive and transcendent, only the extinguishing or dissolution of the (ultimately illusory) self.  I could of course simply deny that Theravada Buddhism is a religion, strictly speaking.  I could lump it together with Stoicism as a sort of psychotherapy, a set of techniques for achieiving equanimity.

There are a number of tricky and unresolved issues here, but I see little point in calling militant atheism a religion, though I concede it is like a religion in some ways.

 

Definitions and Axioms of Classical Mereology

Is a wall or a brick house a whole of its parts?  Obviously — that's a pre-analytic datum.  But is it a sum of its parts?  I have been arguing, with no particular originality, in the negative.  I have been arguing that it is a big mistake to assume  that, just because y is a whole of the xs, that y is a sum of the xs. But it depends on what exactly is meant by 'sum.'  My point is well-taken if 'sum' is elliptical for 'classical mereological sum.'  But what does that mean?  Since 'classical mereological sum' is a technical term, it has all and only the meaning conferred upon it by the definitions and axioms of classical mereology.  I will now present what I take to be the essentials of classical mereology.  I will use 'sum' as short for 'classical mereological sum.'  Later we will look at neoclassical variants that result from tampering with the classical definitions and axioms.

If anything in what follows is original, it is probably a mistake on my part.  Feel free to correct me — but only if you know the subject matter.

I will take proper parthood and identity as primitives.  To simplify the exposition I will drop universal quantifiers.  They are there in spirit if not in letter.

D1. x is a PART of y =df x is a proper part of y or x = y.

D2. x OVERLAPS y =df there is a z such that z is part of x and z is part of y.

D3. x is DISJOINT from y =df it is not the case that x overlaps y.

D4. y is a SUM of the xs =df z overlaps y iff z overlaps one of the xs.

A1. Asymmetry of Proper Parthood.  If x is a proper part of y, then y is not a proper part of x.

A2. Transitivity of Proper Parthood.  If x is a proper part of y, and y is a proper part of z, then x is a proper part of z.

A3. Supplementation of Proper Parthood.  If x is a proper part of y, then there is a z such that z is a proper part of y and z is disjoint from x.

A4. Uniqueness of Summation.  If u is a sum of the xs and v is a sum of the xs, then u = v.

A5. Unrestricted Summation.  For any xs, there is a y such that y is a sum of the xs.

When I used the word 'sum' in previous posts, I intended that its meaning be not merely the meaning assigned to it by (D4), but the meaning assigned to it by (D4) in conjunction with the rest of the definitions and the axioms (not to mention the theorems that follow as logical consequences of the definitions and axioms). 

Extensionality is a feature of classical mereology.  I leave it as an exercise for the reader to derive Extensionality of Parthood  — if x and y are sums with the same proper parts, then x = y — as a theorem from the above.

 

Religions: Problems, Solutions, Techniques

Simplifying a four-part  schema employed by Stephen Prothero in his God Is Not One (Harper, 2010, p. 14), I propose, in agreement with Prothero, that each religion can be usefully seen as addressing itself to a problem; offering a solution to the problem, a solution that also constitutes the religion's goal; and proposing a technique for solving the problem and achieving the goal.

This post will consider five religions and how the simplified Prothero schema applies to them. 

For Christianity, the problem is sin, the solution or goal is salvation, and the technique is some combination of faith and good works. (14)  For Buddhism, the problem is suffering, the solution or goal is nirvana, and the technique for achieving nirvana is the Noble Eightfold Path. (14)  Prothero's main purpose in his book is to stress the differences between religions.  That is the point of the silly title, "God is Not One."  Obviously, God is one by definition; it is the conceptions of God that are various.  It is also a bad title because Prothero's topic is religion, not theism.  Buddhism, after all, is not a theistic religion.  But let that pass.  I can't fault the man for wanting to attract buyers with a catchy title, one reminiscent of Hitchens' God Is Not Great.  The schema makes clear the differences between these two great religions:

Are Buddhists trying to achieve salvation?  Of course not, since they do not even believe in sin.  Are Christians trying to achieve nirvana?  No, since for them suffering isn't something that must be overcome. (15)

If salvation is salvation from sin, then of course Prothero is right.  Sin is an offence against God, and in a religion with no God there can be no sin.  Nevertheless, I am a bit uneasy with the starkness of Prothero's contrast.  The Buddhist too aims at a sort of salvation, salvation from all-pervasive suffering.  To use 'salvation' so narrowly that it applies only to the Christian's religious goal obscures the commonality between the two great religions.  I should think that some soteriology or other is essential to every religion.   A religion must show a way out of our unsatisfactory predicament, and one is not religious unless one perceives our life in this world as indeed a predicament, and one that is deeply and fundamentally unsatisfactory, whatever the exact nature of the satisfactoriness.

For Islam, the problem is neither sin nor suffering but self-sufficiency,"the hubris of acting as if you can get along without God, who alone is self-sufficient." (32)  The solution or goal is "a soul at peace" (Koran 89: 27) in submission to Allah.  The technique that takes the believer from self-sufficiency to Paradise is to 'perform the religion." (42: 13)  Orthopraxy counts for more than orthodoxy.  The profession of faith is relatively simple, to the effect that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the messenger of God.  That is the First Pillar of Islam.  The other four concern practice: prayer (salat), charity (zakat), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj).

For Hinduism, the problem is samsara, "the vicious cycle of life, death, and rebirth." (136)  The solution (goal) is moksha, liberation from samsara.  The aim is not to escape into an afterlife, but to escape once and for all from the wheel of becoming whether here or beyond.  Moksha is not salvation because the goal is to escape samsara, not sin.  The various yogas are the techniques, whether karma yoga, jnana yoga, or bhakti yoga, whether work yoga, wisdom yoga, or the yoga of devotion.

For Judaism, the problem is exile, "distance from God and where we ought to be."  The solution is return, "to go back to God and our true home." (253)  The techniques are to keep the narrative alive and to obey the law, to remember and obey.  

So much for a quick little sketch of Prothero's new book.  A popular treatment but well worth reading.    

 

The Muslim Cab Driver and the Fundamentalist Christian Pharmacist

Mark Whitten inquires by e-mail re: Alcohol, Dogs, and Muslim Cab Drivers:

What is the difference between a Muslim cab driver who does not wish to transport a person with a dog or [an unopened container of]  alcohol, and a fundamentalist Christian pharmacist who does not want to dispense birth control?

Is there not a similar issue of social (dis)harmony / ‘‘assimilation’’ here?

I will assume arguendo that the arguments  against the moral permissibility of birth control (i.e., techniques that prevent conception as opposed to terminating a conceptus) are no better than the arguments against the moral permissibility of imbibing alcoholic beverages in moderation and keeping (well-behaved) dogs as pets  and transporting them in public.  On this assumption what the Christian pharmacist and the Muslim cab driver are doing is very similar.

If I were the owner of the pharmacy, I would fire the fundamentalist and give him this little speech:  "We live in a tolerant pluralistic society in which people disagree about many things including the morality of contraception.  I grant you that, objectively, the practice is either morally acceptable or it is not.  But we don't know which it is. While I respect your deep conviction, it is cuts no ice.  So we tolerate those who differ.  If in good conscience you cannot dispense birth control pills and devices, then you should resign.  But if you refuse to do your job, then you are fired."

If I were the owner of the cab company, I would fire the Muslim and give him this little speech:  "We live in a tolerant pluralistic society in which people disagree about many things including the morality of drinking.  I grant you that, objectively, the practice is either morally acceptable or it is not.  But we don't know which it is. While I respect your deep conviction, it  cuts no ice.  So we tolerate those who differ.  If in good conscience you cannot pick up uninebriated and otherwise well-behaved fares who are transporting unopened containers of hooch, then you should resign.  But if you refuse to do your job, you are fired.

And similarly for the Muslim supermarket checkout girl who refuses to touch a package of bacon.  She ought to be fired.  Ditto for the Muslim Disneyland hostess who insisted on wearing a hijab.  She should be fired and told to look for a job at ShariaLand.

Suppose a flat-chested lass tries to get a waitress  job at Hooters.  Hooters  is an establishment wherein adolescent males of all ages assemble to gawk at the front-end endowments — the 'hooters' — of nubile young ladies. (Some eating and drinking takes place as well.)  Suppose the applicant  is refused on the ground of cup size.  I would say that that is a legitimate form of discrimination  given the puerile purposes of that private enterprise.  It is similar to the Disneyland case.  The average American goes to Disneyland for a dose of pure Americana.  That's what  Disneyland sells.  The rubes from fly-over country don't want to see no Muslims.  Disneyland, as a private enterprise, has the right to demand that its employees project the right image. 

And political correctness be damned.

 

Alcohol, Dogs, and Muslim Cab Drivers

Apparently, significant numbers of Muslim taxi drivers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area are refusing to transport people carrying  dogs or unopened containers of alcoholic beverages. There is a lesson here, but I am quite sure that liberals won't learn it, until they learn it the hard way.  It is a simple lesson really: social harmony is difficult in any event and is made especially difficult when large numbers of people are let into a society who (i) have wildly different values than the rest of us, and (ii) have no intention of assimilating.

On Praying for Christopher Hitchens

There is something strange, and perhaps even incoherent, about praying for Christopher Hitchens if the prayers are not for his recovery or for his courageous acceptance of death, but for conversion or a change of heart.  Let's think about it.

I do not play the lottery; I have good reasons for not playing it; I have no desire to win it, and I believe that I would be worse off if I were to win it.  Suppose you know these facts about me, but say to me nonetheless, "I am praying that you win the lottery," or "I hope you win the lottery."  Surely there is something strange about praying or hoping that I get something that I don't want and that I believe would make me worse off were I to get it. But beyond strange, it may even be incoherent.  Given that I do not play the lottery, there is no way I can win it; so if you hope or pray that I win it, then you are hoping or praying for the impossible.  Of course, you could hope or pray that I start playing.

Hitch does not want salvation of his soul via divine agency, and he has reasons that seem good to him for denying that there is such a thing.  And he presumably believes (though I am speculating here) that survival of bodily death and entry into the divine milieu would not be desirable.    For one thing, his brilliance would be outshone by a greater Brilliance which would be unbearable for someone with the pride of Lucifer, the pride of the light bearer.  It may also be that he believes, as many atheists and mortalists do, that the meaning of life here below, far from requiring a protraction into an afterlife, is positively inconsistent with such an extension.  "How boring and meaningless eternity would be, especially without booze and cigarettes and (sexual intercourse with) women!"

Hitch has lived his life as if God and the soul are childish fictions.  As a result, he has done none of the things that might earn him him immortality and fellowship with God, even assuming he wanted them.  This suggests that it is not just strange, but incoherent to pray for Hitch's metanoia.  For that would be like praying that he win the lottery without playing, without doing the things necessary to win it.

If a merciful God exists, then he should do the merciful thing and simply give Hitch what he wants and expects, namely annihilation.  Either that, or assign him another go-round, or series of go-rounds, on the wheel of samsara until such time as he is ready to accept the divine offer of everlasting life.

As for the prayer day in his honor, Hitch won't be attending.

 

Word of the Day: ‘Nychthemeron’

You may have noticed that 'day' is ambiguous: it can refer to a 24  hour period or to the non-nocturnal portion of a 24 hour period. The ambiguity spreads to the Latin injunction, Carpe diem! Does it include Carpe noctem! or exclude it? Or perhaps neither: to seize the day is to make good use of the present, whatever its duration, whether it be an hour, a day, a week.

A nychthemeron, from the Greek nyktos (night) and hemera (day) is a  period of 24 hours, a night and a day. Sleep researchers distinguish the nychthemeral from the circadian. According to Michael Quinion, "Circadian refers to daily cycles that are driven by an internal body clock, while nychthemeral rhythms are imposed by the external environment."

The use of the word is illustrated in this magnificent sentence from  "The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" by the great American philosopher, C. S. Peirce:

The dawn and the gloaming most invite one to Musement; but I have
found no watch of the nychthemeron that has not its own advantages
for the pursuit.

'Gloaming' is another one of those beautiful old poetic words that we conservatives must not allow to fall into desuetude. Use it or lose   it. It means twilight.

On Religious Pluralism and Religious Tolerance

If you are an adherent of a given religion, why ought you tolerate other religions?  We must tolerate other religions because we do not know which religion is true, if any is, and this would be something very important to know if it could be known.  So we must inquire, and our inquiry will be aided by the availability of a a number of competing religions and nonreligious belief systems. 

But toleration has limits.  No religion or nonreligious ideology may be tolerated if it doesn't respect the principle of toleration.  And so we ought not tolerate a religion whose aim is to suppress and supplant other religions and force their adherents to either convert or accept dhimmi status.  Proselytization is tolerable but only if it is non-coercive.  The minute it becomes the least bit coercive we have every right to push back vigorously.  But equally, we ought not tolerate the ideology of the New Atheists  if and to the extent that they aim to suppress religion.  But is there any such tendency among the New Atheists?  Here is Stephen Prothero (God Is Not One, Harper 2010, p. 321) on Sam Harris, one of the 'Four Horsemen' of the New Atheism:

Harris then attacked the ideal of religious tolerance as "one of the principal forces driving us toward the abyss."  "Some propositions are so dangerous," he wrote in a chilling passage, "that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them."  For Harris, religious tolerance is almost as dangerous as religion itself.  Belief in God is not an opinion that must be respected; it is an evil that must be confronted.

Like me, Harris believes that toleration has limits.  Of course it does.  But Harris and Co. draw the line in the wrong place, and they do so because they are not merely opposed to fanatical religion, jihadist religion, religion that violates freedom of inquiry and autonomy of thought, but to religion as such.  For them, religion itself is the problem.  But this is a shockingly puerile view that ignores the vast differences among religions, differences that Prothero's book does a good job of setting before us in all their richness.

On an approach more nuanced than that of the New Atheist ideologues, one grasps that some religions are tolerable, some are intolerable, some antireligious ideologies are tolerable, and some are not.  If the fulminations of Harris and friends spill over into actions that involve the suppression of religion, then he and his ilk are intolerable and ought to be opposed with vigor.

My view is not merely that most religions and anti-religious ideologies ought to be tolerated, but that the existence of these competing worldviews is a good and enriching  thing in that it helps us clarify and refine and test our own views and practices and helps us progress toward truer and more life-enhancing systems of thought and practice. 

Louis Lavelle on Our Dual Nature

 Louis Lavelle, The Dilemma of Narcissus, tr. Gairdner, Allen and  Unwin, 1973, p. 165:

The centaur, the sphinx, and the siren express the idea that man emerges out of an animal, and that he never sheds his hoofs, his claws, his scales. Man is a mixture; his dual nature is what makes him man; it is the essence of his vocation and destiny. It is folly to imagine him a god or reduce him to an animal; he is more like a satyr with two natures, and it would be hard to say whether his deepest desire is to raise the animal within him to the contemplation of the divine light, or to bring the god down into his animal body, and make him feel every impulse coursing through his flesh.

I would only add that it is man's spiritual nature that allows him to make such errors as to think that he is — nothing but an animal.