TypePad ComBox Quirk

I sometimes have trouble getting the TypePad ComBox to accept my comments.  Others have had this problem.  I get the error message: "Sorry, this data cannot be accepted.'  By fiddling around, I have discovered that doing one or more of the following will trigger the system to accept data. (1) Make a minor alteration in the text. (2) Resubmit your name and e-mail address. (3) Copy your comment, open the blog in a new window and input the data via the new window.  It seems that problems arise if you leave the ComBox open too long in a given window or take too long composing your comment.

What I have yet to figure out is how to make full HTML functionality available in the ComBox.

The Definition of ‘Atheist’ and the Burden of Proof

Some define atheism in terms of the absence of the belief that God exists.  This won't do, obviously, since then we would have to count cabbages and sparkplugs as atheists given the absence in these humble entities of the belief that God exists.  But the following could be proffered with some show of plausibility: An atheist is a person whose psychological makeup is such as to permit his standing in the propositional atttude of belief toward the proposition that God exists, but who as a matter of fact does not stand in this relation, nor is disposed to stand in this relation were he to be queried about the existence of God.  Note that it does not suffice to say that an atheist is a person in whom the belief that God exists is lacking for then the neonatal and the senile would count as atheists, which is  surely  a bit of a stretch.

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In Praise of Blogosophy

Philosophy is primarily an activity, not a body of doctrine. If you were to think of it as a body of doctrine, then you would have to say there is no philosophy, but only philosophies. For there is no one universally recognized body of doctrine called philosophy. The truth of course is one not many. And that is what the philosopher aims at: the one ultimate truth about the ultimate matters, including the ultimate truth about how we ought to live. But aiming at a target and hitting it are two different things. The target is one, but our many arrows have fallen short and in different places. And if you think that your favorite philosopher has hit the target of truth, why can't you convince the rest of us of that?

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Religion and the Inculcation of Morality

Many of us internalized the ethical norms that guide our lives via our childhood religious training. We were taught the Ten Commandments, for example. We were not just taught about them, we were taught them.  We learned them by heart, and we took them to heart. This early training, far from being the child abuse that A. C. Grayling and other militant atheists think it is, had a very positive effect on us in forming our consciences and making of us the basically decent human beings we are. I am not saying that moral formation is possible only within a religion; I am saying that some religions do an excellent job of transmitting and inculcating life-guiding and life-enhancing ethical standards. (By the way, I use 'ethical' and 'moral' interchangeably, as I explain here.)

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The Politicization of the American Philosophical Association

Several people have asked me my opinion on the recent petition to the American Philosophical Association regarding alleged discrimination by certain colleges and universities against homosexuals.  At the moment I have nothing to say about either the petition or the counterpetition.  I want to point out that the politicization of the A. P. A. is nothing new and, more importantly, that it is inconsistent with the charter of the A. P. A as a professional organization that it take groups stands on debatable social and political questions.  My reasons are given in the letter to the A. P. A. reproduced below.

Neven Sesardic e-mailed a while back:

I wonder whether there has ever been any reaction to your wonderful letter to the APA about their stand on the war in Iraq. I let my subscription lapse after that.

I did receive a very nice supportive letter from Panayot Butchvarov, although it may have been in reference to an earlier letter in which I protested the APA's taking of a group stand against capital punishment. Having lived under Communism, Butchvarov is familiar with the perils of groupthink.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Memorable Instrumentals from the ’60s.

Jorma Kaukonen's Embryonic Journey from The Jefferson Airplane's Surrealistic Pillow LP, 1967.

Bent Fabric, Alley Cat, 1962.

The Village Stompers, Washington Square, 1963.

Kenny Ball, Midnight in Moscow, 1962.

David Rose, The Stripper, 1962.

Acker Bilk, Stranger on the Shore, 1962.

Dick Dale and the Deltones, Misirlou, 1963.  If surf music had a father, Dick Dale was the man.

The Chantays, Pipeline, 1963.  A nice college boy effort, but the definitive version is the Dick Dale and Stevie Ray Vaughan cover.

Floyd Cramer, Last Date, 1960.

Michael Bloomfield, Albert's Shuffle, 1968.  Definitive proof that a white boy can play the blues.

The Lottery Player

The lottery player, unable to think clearly about money, both overvalues and undervalues it.

He overvalues it inasmuch as he thinks that a big win would be a wonderful thing even though it would probably not be, and won't occur in any case for the vast majority of players. There are plenty of examples, some reported here, of people who have been destroyed by a sudden huge windfall. For instance,

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The Two-Fold Sense of ‘The Actual World’

A correspondent poses the following difficulty:

. . . compare two possible worlds W1 and W2. What makes them different worlds? Their constituent substances and events – that’s how we identify a world. Let’s say that W1 and W2 are distinct possible worlds, and add that A, the actual world, is in fact W1. [. . .] And then we seem to have a problem: It turns out that W1 = A, but W1 ≠ W2. But if we say that A could have been W2, then it seems that W1 could have been W2 – but that’s impossible, given the necessity of identity. What to do, what to do . . . .

Think about how you would respond to this before proceeding.

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Are There Any Rationally Compelling Arguments for Substantive Theses?

From the mailbag:

Greetings! First, you have a terrific blog, keep up the good work! I'm just an undergrad who is minoring in philosophy, so a lot of your posts are a little over my head, but I try to follow along when I can.

I was just having a quick glance at your post on Russell's Teapot, and one paragraph stuck out to me:
 
"Now it seems to me that both (S) and (W) are plainly false: we have all sorts of reasons for believing that God exists. Here Alvin Plantinga sketches about two dozen theistic arguments. Atheists will not find them compelling, of course, but that is irrelevant. The issue is whether a reasoned case can be made for theism, and the answer is in the affirmative. Belief in God and in Russell's teapot are therefore not on a par since there are no empirical or theoretical reasons for believing in his teapot."
 
I think I have an issue with your statement about atheists not finding theistic arguments compelling to be irrelevant, and all that is important is that, according to you, a reasoned case can be made for theism. So, it sounds to me like you are distinguishing between 2 statements:
 
"Atheists don't find theistic arguments compelling."
 
and
 
"A reasoned case can be made for theism."
 
You accept the former statement, but you say it's irrelevant, because you accept the latter statement. But to me, I find both statements to be essentially synonymous.
 

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Thomas Mann on Blogging

Thomas Mann: Diaries 1918-1939 (Abrams, 1982, tr. R & C Winston), p. 194:

I love this process by which each passing day is captured, not only in its impressions, but also, at least by suggestion, its intellectual direction and content as well, less for the purpose of rereading and remembering than for taking stock, reviewing, maintaining awareness, achieving perspective . . . .

Thomas Mann on Politics

From Thomas Mann's journal entry of August 5, 1934:

A cynical egotism, a selfish limitation of concern to one's personal welfare and one's reasonable survival in the face of the headstrong and voluptuous madness of 'history' is amply justified. One is a fool to take politics seriously, to care about it, to sacrifice one's moral and intellectual strength to it. All one can do is survive, and preserve one's personal freedom and dignity.

Onesided, but forgiveably so.  Pertinent to the present.

They Post Infrequently but Well

Jim Ryan and Franklin Mason, the proprietors of Philosoblog and The Philosophical Midwife respectively, are both analytically trained philosophers outside of academe.  Their weblogs are well worth reading.  Explore their archives: the things they write rise above the ephemeral.  I have my differences with both, and they with each other.  But the commonalities run deeper.  On the off-chance they are not acquainted, I'll hazard a cyber-introduction:  Jim, this is Franklin; Franklin, this is Jim.

Modal Sentences and Truncated Counterfactual Conditionals

Let's think about the following modal sentence:

1. My expository skills could be better than they are.

(1)  is a modal sentence because of the presence in it of the modal word 'could.'  Whether or not you agree with me that (1) is true, you must concede that (1) has a definite meaning understandable by any competent speaker of the English language.  (1) is a bit of ordinary, grammatically correct English: there is nothing extraordinary or 'philosophical' about it.  Not only does (1) have a definite meaning, it has exactly one definite meaning: no question of ambiguity arises.  One cannot say that (1) is meaningless or incoherent or ambiguous.  Compare (1) with the nonmodal

2. My expository skills are better than they are.

(2) is plainly incoherent for reasons that need no belaboring.  And anyone who understands English will instantly discern the difference between (2) and (1).

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