Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

  • Presupposition and Excluded Middle

    If Socrates dies at time t, then Socrates was alive prior to t. If Socrates does not die at t, then Socrates was alive prior to t.  Since both 'Socrates dies at t' and 'Socrates does not die at t' entail 'Socrates was alive prior t,' we say that the latter is a semantic presupposition of 'Socrates dies at t.'

    But wait a minute! Doesn't what I have written generate an inconsistent tetrad?

    1) p entails q

    2) Not-p entails q

    3) Necessarily, for any p, either p or not-p (Law of Excluded Middle)

    4) q is contingent.

    The conjunction of the first three limbs entails the negation of the fourth. So something has to give.

    It is a datum that q — 'Socrates was alive prior to t' — is contingent: true in some but not all possible worlds. So we either reject semantic presupposition (which requires the truth of both (1) and (2) ) or we reject Excluded Middle.

    Why not reject Excluded Middle? Socrates dies at t and Socrates does not die at t are contradictories: each is the negation of the other.  There is no possible world in which both are true.  And yet there are possible worlds in which neither is true. Those are the worlds in which Socrates does not exist.

    Bill Vallicella

    6 responses to “Presupposition and Excluded Middle”

  • Contingency and Composition

    Joe, who describes himself as "a high school student with a passion for philosophy of religion and metaphysics," asked me a long series of  difficult questions. Here is one of them:

    After reading [Edward] Feser's Five Proofs, I have had difficulties with the concept of sustaining causes. First, Feser argues  that composites require a sustaining cause in order to "hold them together" or keep them conjoined. But this seems to presuppose that all composite things (be it physical composites or metaphysical composites) are contingent.

     

    But why suppose that, necessarily, all composites are contingent? What is incoherent about this:

     

    X is a necessary being (i.e. X cannot fail to exist). X has metaphysical parts A, B, and C. Each of A, B, and C are also necessarily instantiated in reality, and the relations between A, B, and C are all necessarily instantiated in reality.

     

    Why ought we to rule out this epistemic possibility? This seems to be a necessary being which is composite. It would be a counter-example to the assumption that composition entails contingency (where contingency means can fail to exist).

     

    If we take composition broadly enough, composition does not entail contingency.  Consider the set, {1, 3, 5}. Assume that numbers are necessary beings. Then of course the set will also be a necessary being.  Furthermore, the relations that hold between the members of this set hold necessarily. For example, necessarily, 3 < 5, and necessarily, 3 > 1.  So if we think of sets as composite entities, then it is not the case that all composites are contingent.

     

    But what Feser is concerned with are material particulars, or material substances, to use the Aristotelian-scholastic jargon, e..g., a horse, a statue, a man.  And of course these cannot be taken to be sets of their metaphysical parts.  If I understand Feser, what he is asking is: what makes a contingent being such as Socrates contingent?  The question is not whether he is contingent, but what makes him contingent. What is the ground of his contingency?  The answer is that Socrates is contingent because he is composite.  Composition or rather compositeness is the ground of contingency. His contingency is explained by his compositeness, in particular, his being a composite of essence and existence. So at the root of contingency is the real distinction (distinctio realis) of essence and existence in finite substances.

     

    The claim is not that every composite entity is contingent, but that every contingent substance is contingent in virtue of its being composite. 

     

    Now if a contingent substance is contingent in virtue of its being composed of essence and existence, then a necessary being, or rather, a necessary being that has its necessity from itself and not from another, is necessary in virtue of its being simple, i.e., absolutely non-partite.  This is how Thomists feel driven to the admittedly strange and seemingly incoherent doctrine of divine simplicity. 

     

    If there is to be an ultimate explanation of the existence of contingent beings, this explanation must invoke an entity that is not itself contingent.  The ultimate entity must exist of metaphysical  necessity and have its necessity from itself.  Thomism as I understand it plausibly maintains that the ground of the divine necessity is the divine simplicity. God is necessary because in God essence and existence are one and the same.

    Bill Vallicella

  • A Little Unsolicited Advice for the Mature Members of the Distaff Contingent

    Warning: 'Sexist' content up ahead! Snowflakes to your safe spaces!

    ………………………

    Your sag and bag
    Won't hurt your charm
    But no man wants
    A hag or nag
    Upon his arm.

     

    Bill Vallicella

  • Implication and Presupposition

    Dave Bagwill asks:

    To be more clear: Do all propositions imply an ontology? Is 'imply' strong enough to bear the weight of 'assertion'? Or is 'imply' basically an equivalent of 'presuppose'?

    Still not clear enough. Dave. Not even the third question is clear since you didn't specify the  sense of 'imply.'  But the third question is clear enough to warrant a brief answer, which is: No. Consider the following which is an intuitively clear example of a proposition resting on a presupposition:

    Tom regrets lying to his wife.

    Necessarily, if Tom regrets lying to his wife, then Tom has lied to his wife. The antecedent implies (in the sense of 'entails') the consequent. (I have defined 'entails' on many occasions.) But note that it is also true that, necessarily, if Tom does not regret lying to his wife, then Tom has lied to his wife.

    This yields a criterion of one type of presupposition. A proposition p presupposes a proposition q just in case both p and its negation ~p entail q. One could also say that an entailment of a proposition p is a presupposition of p if and only if p's presupposition survives the negation of p.  (If the preceding sentence does not make sense to you, forget it, and focus on the one preceding it.) Consider now:

    Tom is drunk.

    Necessarily, if Tom is drunk, then someone is drunk. But it is not the case that, necessarily, if Tom is not drunk, then someone is drunk.

    So by the criterion lately enunciated, the 'survival of negation' criterion to give it a name, 'Tom is drunk,' while it implies (entails) that someone is drunk, does not presuppose that someone is drunk.

    Therefore, to answer Dave's question, 'imply' (in the sense of 'entails') is not equivalent to 'presuppose.'

    Alles klar?  Vielleicht nicht!

    One could conceivably balk, or baulk in the case of the Bad Ostrich, as follows: It is not clear, or it is false, that if Tom does not regret lying to his wife, then Tom has lied to his wife.  The Ostrich could say, "Tom does not regret lying because he didn't lie in the first place."

    As you can see, the topic of presupposition is a murky one, and part of the murkiness is due to the fact that presupposition is at the interface of the semantic and pragmatic, and it is not clear how they gear into each other, if you will excuse the mixed metaphors.

    Bill Vallicella

    5 responses to “Implication and Presupposition”

  • The Political Malpractice of the Democrats

    (Cross-posted at my FB page where comments are allowed.)

    Leading Democrats have reversed themselves on the need for a border wall to help secure the U. S. Mexico border. Notice, I said 'help secure.' No one thinks that a physical barrier suffices to insure border security.

    It should be noted, though, that many of those voices loudly condemning a border wall as cruel or ineffective have previously gone on record about our need for thorough border security.

    In 2005, Barack Obama declared, “We simply cannot allow people to pour into the U.S. undocumented, undetected, unchecked, circumventing the people who are waiting patiently, diligently, lawfully to become immigrants in this country.”

    Sen. Chuck Schumer knew the dangers of illegal immigration back in 2009. “People who enter the United States without our permission are illegal aliens and illegal aliens should not be treated the same as people who enter the U.S. legally,” he said.

    Even Hillary Clinton said in 2014: “I voted numerous times when I was a senator to spend money to build a barrier to try to prevent illegal immigrants from coming in and I do think you have to control your borders.”

    Our leading Democrats were for it before they were against it. How should we interpret the reversal? Two possibilities.

    A. Clinton, Schumer, and the rest did not mean what they said when they said they were for border security. They felt safe saying it because they knew no decisive action would be taken, and that the stream of Hispanic illegals would continue unabated to their political advantage. Saying what they did not really mean, or only half-meant, allowed them to posture as patriots concerned with the security of the homeland while reaping the benefits of illegal immigration.

    B. They meant what they said, but reversed themselves to oppose the hated Trump.

    I incline toward (A). What say you?

     
    A wall divides lawmakers over securing the country
    It is obvious that for many, cynical politics are prioritized over the…
    Bill Vallicella

  • Ideology at Odds with Open Inquiry

    (Cross-posted at my FB page where comments are allowed.)

    You will recall how Galileo got in trouble with the Inquisition. But now the Roman Catholic Church is a spent force culturally speaking and, under the 'leadership' of Bergoglio, is busy accommodating itself to the Left, which is now the arbiter of what is 'correct' and 'permissible.'

    This philosopher asks: Could it be racist if it is true?

    The Left responds: It cannot be true, because it is racist, and it is racist since it implies that we are not all equal as a matter of empirical fact.

    Note what has happened. Christianity taught the equality of persons as sons and daughters of the Supreme Person. The Left jettisons the metaphysical foundation and misunderstands the normative claim about equality as a factual claim.

    The Left goes only half way with the death of God. They reject God, but not the equality that makes sense only if God exists. This incoherence fuels their opposition to scientific research that contradicts the leftist equality axiom. And so Dr. Watson, despite his accomplishments, must be banned to scientific Siberia.

    Science must play the handmaiden to leftist ideology just as philosophy and science had to play the handmaiden to theology in the Middle Ages and a long time thereafter.

    And you STILL support the Left?

     
    DNA pioneer loses honours over race claims
    Nobel Prize-winning scientist James Watson has repeated remarks about…

    Bill Vallicella

  • Saturday Night at the Oldies: Phil Ochs and Tim Hardin

    Joan Baez, There but for Fortune. Ochs' best song in its best rendition.

    Phil Ochs, Changes

    YouTuber comment, good except for the exaggeration in the last sentence:

    Somewhere, in a parallel universe, in another dimension, where there's musical justice, Phil Ochs wasn't just Bob Dylan's sidekick in the early 60's, who released a bunch of albums that are long out of print, failed to gain international recognition, got choked by muggers and lost his ability to sing, disappeared into alcoholism and severe depression, and hanged himself on his birthday, and is remembered only thanks to documentaries about Greenwich Village and the Folk Revival. No, in some other reality he's remembered as one of the absolutely greatest songwriters, guitarist, and singers in the history of popular music . . . .

    Phil Ochs, Pleasures of the Harbor. Brings back memories of '67 and shows that Ochs could break out of the protest/topical rut. 

    Christopher Hitchens on Phil Ochs and those days.

    Phil OchsOchs' protest songs were too obvious and bound to the events of the day. Dylan's best protest songs avoided these defects to float free of the specific and enter the ethereal.  This is part of the reason why Ochs is tied to his time and place and remembered only by the aficionados but Dylan has a permanent place in the pantheon of Americana. For example, these great Dylan anthems lay it between the lines and have stood the test of time:

    Clancy Bros., When the Ship Comes In

    Alanis Morissette, Blowin' in the Wind

    Joan Baez, A Hard Rain's Gonna Fall

    And now some great tunes from the ill-starred Tim Hardin. I discovered him in '67 when I bought his Tim Hardin 2 LP.  Still have it in mint condition. Do I hear $10,000?  At the time, I thought that Hardin might displace Dylan in my adolescent affections or else become a sort of second Dylan.  But of course that did not happen since Dylan is on 'a whole other level'  despite Hardin's being a very fine songwriter and performer.

    Tim Hardin, Lady Came from Baltimore

    Tim Hardin, Reason to Believe

    Small Faces, Red Balloon. Great version! I prefer it to Hardin's original. But then, I don't know. Both good.  Hardin died of a heroin overdose in 1980.  'Red Balloon' is a heroin reference. See here:

    "Red Balloon" is a confessional song about Tim's mixed feelings toward heroin and its effects upon him. Heroin is often sold in balloons, so the "bought myself a red balloon" line refers to buying and taking heroin. The "blue surprise" is the adverse effects of heroin. One such effect is the loss of libido or sexual desire – "took the lovelight from my eyes." (or possibly mistreating your loved ones) "The pinning of my eyes" is probably some adverse physical effect. In the song he is addressing heroin (according to the magazine's interpretation) when he states "you were so easy to get to know, but will we see one another again…I hope so." The Troubadour version seems to confirm this, talking about running around on the lower East Side, much like in the old Cocaine song talking about going down to Beale and Main looking for the man who sells Cocaine. So though on the surface it appears to be a childlike song about balloons and children, it's actually quite the opposite.

    Tim Hardin 1Don't mess with the stuff, muchachos. I speak from experience. It can very easily kill you. This is part of the reason why I have such utter contempt for those obstructionist crapweasels, Nancy the Knucklehead Pelosi, the Botox-ed-up face of the Democrat (Demon Rat?) party, and her sidekick Chucky the Scumbag Schumer who in effect promote open borders and the flow of  drugs into the country.

    Tim Hardin, Black Sheep Boy

    If you love, let me live in peace/Please understand/ That the black sheep can wear the golden fleece and hold a winning hand.

    Tim Hardin, If I Were a Carpenter

    Bill Vallicella

  • Battling the Bad Ostrich over Assertion

    BV said:

    I will now pose a problem for the view that assertion = proposition.  Suppose I give the following valid argument, an instance of modus ponens.  By 'give an argument,' I mean that I assert its premises, and I assert  its conclusion as following from the premises, and this  in the presence of one or more interlocutors.  Thus the argument is to be taken in concreto, not in abstracto.

    If Tom is drunk, then Tom ought not drive
    Tom is drunk
    —–
    Tom ought not drive.

    If the argument is valid, as it plainly is, then, in both of its occurrences,  the sentence 'Tom is drunk' must express the same proposition.  But this cannot be the case if  a proposition is identical to an assertion. For the proposition Tom is drunk occurs unasserted in the major, but asserted in the minor.  (To assert a conditional is not thereby to assert either its antecedent or its consequent.) Since one and the same proposition can occur unasserted in one context and asserted in another, we must distinguish between a proposition and an assertion.

    The Ostrich responds:

    I deny that the sentence ‘Tom is drunk’ in the major expresses a proposition at all. It expresses a proposition in the minor, I agree. I also claim that both sentences must have the same content in major and minor. But having the same content is not the same as expressing the same proposition. Perhaps we should rewrite the major as follows:

    That Tom is drunk implies that Tom ought not drive.

    We connect a name for contents, using a that-clause, with the connector ‘entails’. Thus we express the whole argument as follows

    It is the case (that Tom is drunk implies that Tom ought not drive)
    It is the case that Tom is drunk
    It is the case that Tom ought not drive.

    BV counter-responds:

    The Ostrich carelessly leaves out the parentheses in the minor and in the conclusion of his re-write of the original argument.  His re-write should look like this:

    It is the case (that Tom is drunk implies that Tom ought not drive)
    It is the case (that Tom is drunk)
    It is the case (that Tom ought not drive).

    'That Tom is drunk' is not a sentence but a nominal phrase.  In the major, it names a proposition, the proposition expressed in English by a tokening of 'Tom is drunk.'  It has to name a proposition because the implication relation connects propositions to propositions. In the minor 'that Tom is drunk' also expresses a proposition. It has to if the argument is to be valid.

    So one and the same proposition — the one named by 'that Tom is drunk' — occurs in both the major and the minor.  It is just that in the major it is not asserted, whereas in the minor it is.  Therefore, a proposition is not the same as an assertion — which was my claim all along.  (Not original with me, of course.  From Frege via Peter Geach.)

    So the Ostrich re-write is useless rigmarole.  Consider the following re-write:

    That Tom is drunk implies that Tom ought not drive
    Tom is drunk
    Tom ought not drive.

    This is valid. In the major, 'That Tom is drunk' names but does not assert a proposition. In the minor 'Tom is drunk' asserts the very same proposition.  So one and the same proposition can be both asserted and left unasserted. Therefore, a proposition is not the same as an assertion.

    The Ostrich tells us, "But having the same content is not the same as expressing the same proposition." I don't understand that.  A content in this context just is a proposition.

    Bill Vallicella

    7 responses to “Battling the Bad Ostrich over Assertion”

  • Misgivings About Deflationary Theories of Truth

    1. From my survey of the literature, there are four main types of truth theory being discussed: substantive theories, nihilist (for want of a better label) theories, deflationary theories, and identity theories.  Let me say just a little about the first two main types and then move on to deflationism.

    2. Substantive theories maintain that truth is (i) a metaphysically substantive item, presumably a property or relation, (ii) susceptible of non-trivial analysis or explication. Correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories count as substantive theories.  Such theories purport to analyze truth in terms of other, presumably more basic, terms such as a relation of correspondence or adequation to reality or to facts or mind-independent things as in Veritas est adequatio intellectus ad rem.  Or in terms of coherence of truth-bearers (beliefs, propositions, etc.) among themselves.  Or in terms of conduciveness to human flourishing as in William James' "the true is the good by way of belief."    Or in terms of broadly epistemic notions such as rational acceptability or warranted asseribility as in the Putnamian-Peircean 'Truth is rational acceptability at the ideal limit of inquiry.'

    The latter is not a good proposal for reasons I won't go into now, but it illustrates the project of giving a substantive theory of truth.  One tries to analyze truth in more basic terms.  One tries to give an informative, non-circular answer to the  question, What is truth?  The substantive approach is in the Grand Tradition deriving from Plato wherein one asks What is X?  (What is justice? (Republic) What is piety? (Euthyphro) What is knowledge? (Theaetetus) What is courage? (Laches)

    The substantive approach to truth can be summed up in three propositions:

    A. The facts about truth are not exhausted by the substitution-instances of the equivalence schemata 'p' is true iff p and *p* is true iff p.

    B.  There is a substantive property of truth common to all and only truths.

    C.  This substantive property is susceptible of analysis or explication.

    3. The 'nihilist' as he is known in the truth literature rejects substantive theories, not because they are substantive, but because they are theories.  He may grant that truth is a deep, substantial, metaphysically loaded, ontologically thick, topic.  But he denies that one can have a theory about it, that one can account for it in more basic terms: truth is just too basic to be explained in more fundamental terms.  The nihilist accepts (A) and (B) above but denies (C).

    4.  The deflationist, like the nihilist, rejects substantive theories of truth.  The difference is that the deflationist holds that an account of truth is possible albeit in very 'thin' terms, while the nihilist denies that any account is possible thick or thin:  truth is too basic to be accountable.  Nihilism allows truth to be a thick (metaphysical) topic.  Deflationism disallows this.  Deflationists deny (A), (B), and (C).

    5.  The deflationist makes a big deal out of certain seemingly obvious equivalences and he tries to squeeze a lot of anti-metaphysical mileage out of them.  Here are two examples, one involving a declarative sentence, the other involving a proposition.  Note that asterisks around a sentence, or around a placeholder for a sentence, form a name of the proposition expressed by the sentence. 

    E1. 'Grass is green' is true iff grass is green.

    E2. *Grass is green* is true iff grass is green.

    Now let us assume something which, though false, will simplify our discussion.  Let us assume that there is no other type of use of the truth predicate other than the uses illustrated in logical equivalences like the foregoing.  (Thus I am proposing that we ignore such uses as the one illustrated by 'Everything Percy says is true.') 

    The deflationist thesis can now be formulated as follows:  There is nothing more to truth  than what is expressed by such truisms as the foregoing equivalences.  Thus there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth that the LHS predicates of 'Grass is green' or of *Grass is green.*  The content on both sides is exactly the same: 'is true' adds no new content.  'Is true' plays a merely syntactic role.  In terms of Quine's disquotationalism (which is a version of the deflationary approach), 'is true' is merely a device of disquotation.  'Is true' has no semantic dimension: it neither expresses a substantive property, nor does it refer to anything.  Truth drops out as a topic of philosophical inquiry.  There is no such property susceptible of informative explication in terms of correspondence, coherence, rational acceptability, or whatnot.  The question What is truth? gets answered by saying that there is no such 'thing' as truth: there are truths, and every such truth reduces via the equivalence schema to a sentence or proposition in which the truth predicate does not appear.  Accordingly, there is nothing all truths have in common in virtue of which they are truths.  There is only a multiplicity of disparate truths.  But even this says too much since each 'truth' reduces to a sentence or proposition in which 'true' does not appear.

    6. Now for my misgivings about deflationism.  But first three preliminary points.

    a. Equivalence is symmetrical (commutative); if p is equivalent to q, then q is equivalent to p.  But explanation is asymmetrical: if p explains q, then q does not explain p.  From ' p iff q' one cannot infer 'p because q' or 'q because p.' 'p iff q' is consistent with both.   Connected with the asymmetry of explanation is that equivalences do not sanction reductions.  Triangularity and trilaterality are logically equivalent properties, but it doesn't follow that either reduces to the other.

    b. If two items are equivalent, then both are propositions or sentences.  There cannot be equivalence between a sentence or proposition and something that is neither. 

    c. To define equivalence we need to recur to truth.  To say that p, q are logically equivalent is to say that there is no possible situation in which p is true and q false, or q true, and p false.

    Now what is the deflationist saying? His thesis is negative: there is nothing to truth except what is captured in the the equivalence schemata and their substitution-instances. Consider

    E2. *p* is true iff p.

    First Misgiving: The truth of the biconditional is not in question.  But equivalences don't sanction reductions. See point (a) above. From (E2) one cannot infer that the LHS reduces to the RHS, or vice versa.  But the deflationist is saying that the LHS reduces to, and is explained by, the RHS.  But what is his justification for saying this?  Why not the other way around?  Why not say that p because *p* is true?

    Second Misgiving:  For an equivalence to hold, both sides must be true (or false).  Suppose both sides are true.  Then, although the predicate 'true' does not appear on the RHS, the RHS must be true.  So, far from dispensing with truth, the equivalence schemata and their instances presuppose it!

    You don't get it, do you?  Let me try an analogy with existence.  He who is deflationary about truth can be expected to be deflationary about existence as well.  A deflationist about existence might offer this equivalence schema:

    F. Fs exist iff something is an F.   (E.g., 'Cats exist iff something is a cat.')

    I grant that every instance of the schema is true.  So our deflationist about existence announces that 'exist' on the LHS of (F) plays a merely logico-syntactic role and that there is no substantive property of existence.  He could put his point paradoxically by saying that there is nothing existential about general existentials. But is it not obvious that if something is an F, then that thing must exist?  Are we quantifying over a domain of nonexistents?  If yes, then the equivalence fails.  But if we are quantifying over a domain of existents, then the existence of those existents is being presupposed.  So, even though 'exist' does not occur on the RHS of (F), existence is along for the ride.  Same with (E2).  Even though 'true' does not occur on the RHS of (E2), truth is along for the ride.  In both cases, existence and truth in meaty substantive senses are being presupposed.

    Third Misgiving.  'Grass is green' and 'It is true that grass is green' have exactly the same content. That is perfectly obvious and denied by no one.  'Is true' adds no new content.  But how is it supposed to follow that truth is not a substantive property?  What follows is that truth is not a content property.  How do our deflationist pals get from 'Truth is not a content property' to 'Truth is not a substantive property'?  Isn't it obvious that truth refers us outside the content of the proposition or sentence?

    Compare existence.  A thing and the same thing existing have exactly the same quidditative content.  The fastest runner and the existing fastest runner are numerically the same individual. Does it follow that existence is not a property?  No, what follows it that existence is not a quidditative property.  Existing Amby Burfoot and Amby Burfoot are quidditatively the same.  But if Burfoot lacked existence he wouldn't be able to do any running, or anything else: he would be nothing at all. Same with truth.  There is no difference in content between p and true p.  But it makes a world of difference whether p is true or false just as it makes a world of difference whether an individual exists or not.

    Fourth Misgiving.  If p and q are equivalent, then both are propositions.  The instances of (E) therefore do not get us outside the 'circle of  propositions.'  But isn't it obvious that whether or not a sentence or a proposition or a belief (or any truthbearer) is true or false depends on matters external to the truthbearer?

    Fifth Misgiving.  Is (E1) even true? If grass is green, it doesn't follow that 'grass is green' is true.  For grass is green whether or not the English language exists.

    Bill Vallicella

    2 responses to “Misgivings About Deflationary Theories of Truth”

  • Contention Got You Down?

    Two observations to buck you up:

    No abrasion, no pearl.

    No pressure, no diamonds.

    Bill Vallicella

  • Free Speech and Open Inquiry Under Attack at Major Universities

    In September 2016, one of the living giants of Christian scholarship, the Oxford emeritus philosopher Richard Swinburne, gave an address to the Midwest Society of Christian Philosophers, in the US. He spoke about Christian sexual ethics. In an aside — meaning this wasn’t the main topic of his talk — he affirmed the orthodox Christian view that homosexuality is morally wrong. For this, he was denounced by some Christian philosophers in the audience, and the head of the group quickly apologized for the keynote speaker, Swinburne, affirming Christian orthodoxy in an address to Christian philosophers. I wrote about it here. 

    It is scandalous that a leading Christian philosopher cannot state an orthodox Christian position — something that all Christians affirmed until the day before yesterday — at a gathering of Christian philosophers.

    Here is something equally scandalous, but far more dangerous. John Finnis is equally a giant in the world of Christian scholarship. He is a philosopher of law who specializes in natural law theory. Though he’s now based at Notre Dame, he is an emeritus professor at Oxford. Among his past students: Supreme Court justice Neil Gorsuch, and Princeton constitutional law professor Robert George.

    Finnis is now the object of a petition at Oxford asking that he be removed from teaching postgraduate students because of his views on homosexuality.

    Read it all: The John Finnis Line in the Sand

    Bill Vallicella

  • Two Senses of ‘Assertion’

    Ed e-mails:

    The crux is what is meant by ‘assertion’. Aristotle’s system is quite clear. We have two terms on the left and right, and the copula in the middle, plus a negation sign which (in Latin) can either appear on the left of the copula (a parte ante) or the right (a parte post). Assertion = enunciation = proposition. Assertion divides into affirmation (no negation sign) and denial or negation (includes negation sign).

    The two terms specify precisely what is affirmed or denied in the assertion/proposition.

    Then suppose some of John’s children are sleeping. We can express this using the two term plus copula in any of the following ways.

    ·Some children fathered by John are sleeping things

    ·Some things fathered by John are sleeping children

    ·Some sleeping children are things fathered by John

    ·Some sleeping things fathered by John are children

    All of these assert the existence of some children such that they sleep, and they are fathered by John.

    I have no objection to the above as a setting forth of one sense of 'assertion.'  In this sense, an assertion is the content or proposition asserted.  But I  must quibble with the last sentence: "All of these [sentences/propositions] assert  that the existence of some . . . ."  That is a loose way of talking, allowable in some contexts, but not in the present one in which we are discussing assertion, presupposition, Excluded Middle, and  cognate topics. A proposition doesn't assert anything, and neither does a sentence. People assert, and when they do, what they assert is a proposition. 

    The second sense of 'assertion,' then , comes into play when we use the word to refer to a speech act.  We do various things with words: make assertions, ask questions, issue commands, express wishes,  etc. These two senses of 'assertion' must be kept separate if we are to make any headway with the really interesting questions about presupposition, excluded Middle, and the rest. 

    So far I have said nothing the least bit tendentious or controversial. I have merely pointed out two senses of 'assertion.'

    I will now pose a problem for the view that assertion = proposition.  Suppose I give the following valid argument, an instance of modus ponens.  By 'give an argument,' I mean that I assert its premises and its conclusion as following from the premises in the presence of one or more interlocutors.

    If Tom is drunk, then Tom ought not drive
    Tom is drunk
    —–
    Tom ought not drive.

    If the argument is valid, as it plainly is, then, in both of its occurrences,  the sentence 'Tom is drunk' must express the same proposition.  But this cannot be the case if  a proposition is identical to an assertion. For the proposition Tom is drunk occurs unasserted in the major, but asserted in the minor.  (To assert a conditional is not thereby to assert either its antecedent or its consequent.) Since one and the same proposition can occur unasserted in one context and asserted in another,  we must distinguish between a proposition and an assertion.

    What we ought to say is that a proposition is the content of an assertion as a speech act.  A proposition cannot be the same as an assertion because there are unasserted proposition. And when a proposition is asserted, what gives it the 'assertoric quality' to coin a phrase is something external to the proposition itself, namely, a person's speech act of asserting it.

    Ed won't accept this. But I don't understand why. Perhaps he can explain it.

    Bill Vallicella

    7 responses to “Two Senses of ‘Assertion’”

  • Apologia Pro Vita Mea: A Reply to a Friendly Critic

    Vito Caiati responds to yesterday's Could it be like this?

    In yesterday's post, you write, “So I say: if you have the aptitude and the stamina, you live best by seeking the ultimate truth about the ultimate matters with your whole heart and mind and soul, with everything else you do subordinate to that quest and in service of it, and you keep up that quest until the hour of death, always a little out of breath, with no comfortable lounging in any dogmatic edifice, whether atheist, theist, or agnostic.”

    The "always a little out of breath" bit gives my statement of a personal credo a perhaps excessively romantic and needlessly literary accent.  But the questing life is the highest life for me, and not just for me. That I sincerely believe. I will add, however, that integral to an examined life is a critical examination of whether the highest life is indeed the examined life. So I am aware of the danger of erecting a dogmatic edifice of my own.

    While I appreciate the intellectual and spiritual sentiment that underlies this assertion, I am troubled by two things: First, the fact, which you have acknowledged in the past, that only a minute portion of humanity possesses either the “aptitude” or “stamina” to engage in [the search for] “the ultimate truth about the ultimate matters.”  That this is the case is beyond dispute, but why should it be so?  

    It is indeed beyond dispute and is further evidence that the human condition is a predicament, and a nasty one, a predicament to which there may be no good solution.

    I find the question very troubling. Historical demographers estimate that between 80 and 100 billion human beings have lived and died since the origin of our species.  The figure is staggering, but as staggering is the fact that all have met their ends in complete ignorance of ultimate truth. 

    But we don't know that, Vito. It is after all possible that when Thomas Aquinas had the mystical experience that put an end to his writing, he veridically experienced the ultimate truth and enjoyed an earthly foretaste of the Beatific Vision.  And if the angelic doctor's amanuensis, Reginald, never had any such experience but believed what the master taught, and if what he taught was true, then Reginald too was in contact with the ultimate truth, not in propria persona, but "through a glass darkly," that glass being faith. And the same holds for all the millions of Christians, not to mention adherents of other religions, throughout the ages who have believed without verifying glimpses into the Unseen and also without being able to give good reasons for their belief.  It may have been that all these folks were in contact with ultimate truth even if they can't be said to have known such truth in a manner to satisfy exacting modern requirements on knowledge.

    Disease, hunger, violence, physical or mental infirmity, and indigence have precluded even the notion of such a search for most.  The lack of a philosophical or religious inclination has precluded it for almost all of the rest. Thus, a gross and general ignorance of final matters has been and remains the lot of mankind.  Something is profoundly wrong here, and the conviction that a few might have the means and inclination to diverge from the norm is, at best disquieting, and at word [worst?], questionable.

    So even if an ultimate, saving truth could be discovered by a proper search, circumstances and personal inadequacy have prevented and will prevent the vast majority from ever finding it on their own.  Something is indeed "profoundly wrong here."  But of course this is just one more goad to the seeker's seeking. 

    Second, the search, whether it has taken a religious or philosophic form, has endured for thousands of years and produced no definite or even probable answers, so why continue to engage in it? The assumption appears to be that if pursued with the right attitude, sufficient dedication, and intellectual honesty, it will yield something of this “ultimate truth.” But is it not the case that all the evidence weighs against this belief?

    The problem is not that no definite answers have been produced, but that there are too many of them, they contradict one another on key points, and that this is good reason to be skeptical of any particular answer.  To add to the trouble, what I just said will be denied by many intelligent and sincere philosophers.  They will insist that their worldview is either true or more likely to be true than any other, and that the plethora of mutually incompatible worldviews is no decent argument to the contrary. But this too is just part of the predicament we are in, a predicament that the spiritually sensitive find intolerable and seek a way out of.

    I am not saying that one is not entitled to devote oneself to this search, but I do not understand the conviction that it a worthwhile pursuit. All sorts of scientific questions remain unresolved, some for hundreds of years, but in approaching them, we are encouraged by the signs of small progress that have been made.  We have no such intellectual incentives in the matters of which you speak. Now, I understand that we have not been able to reach any sort of agreement on a host of other matters, from politics to morals, but in such cases, we at least understand the rough givens with which we are dealing. Of “the ultimate truth about the ultimate matters,” we lack such an understanding. This is hardly encouraging.

    This is the nub of the matter. I said in effect that the best life for a human being is a life whose dominant purpose is the search for the ultimate truth about the ultimate matters. (By the way, this search does not exclude politics and morality which rest on controversial philosophical assumptions.) And of course I mean a truth that one existentially appropriates (makes one's own) and lives. There are several ways of objecting to my thesis. Some will claim to have the truth already, and see no point is seeking what one possesses.  There are the dogmatic atheists for whom God and the soul are no longer issues. There are the dogmatic theists who have an answer for everything.  There are the dogmatic agnostics who are quite convinced that nothing can be known or even reasonably believed about ultimates (God, the soul, the meaning of human existence) and who think bothering one's head over these questions is simply foolish and might even drive one crazy such that the best way to live is to focus on the easily accessible foreground objects in the Cave and to make friends with finitude, accepting whatever mundane satisfactions come along until death puts an end to it all.

    Vito may be flirting with the agnostic camp. He wonders how what we may as well call The Quest could be "a worthwhile pursuit." One of his arguments is that very few are in a position to pursue the Quest. The other is that the Quest, although pursued by the best and the brightest since time immemorial, has arrived at no solid result acceptable to all thinking people.

    To the first point, I would say that the value of the Quest does not depend on how many are in a position to pursue it.  To the second point, I would say that no serious quester give up the Quest for the reason Vito cites.  The Quest is his vocation; he is called to it even if he cannot explain who or what is calling him. He finds deep satisfaction in the searching and the momentary glimpses of insight, and his satisfaction is reinforced by his conviction that the paltry objects pursued by the many are relatively worthless. He sees the vanity, the emptiness, of the world that most find most solidly real. Name and fame, property and pelf, are to him bagatelles.  The Quest is his spiritual practice and it is satisfying to the quester even when there is no tangible outcome. He likes to pray, meditate, study, reason, think, write.  This is all underpinned by a faith that there will be a favorable outcome, if not here, then Elsewhere.

    Bill Vallicella

  • Another Round on (Semantic) Presupposition: An Inconsistent Pentad

    Ed writes,

    p = *Socrates has just stopped talking*

    q  = *Socrates was talking just now*

    1. p presupposes q

    2. If p presupposes q, then (p or not-p) entails q

    3. It is necessary that p or not-p

    4. It is necessary that q

    5. It is not necessary that Socrates was talking just now

    We agree with (1) in some sense. In (2), we try to sharpen that sense, i.e. of ‘presupposition’. (3) is a logical truth. So is (4): if the antecedent is necessary, so is the consequent. (5) is obviously true (unless we hold the necessity of the past, but the example could be changed with the same problematic result).  

    My feeling is that we are not being sharp enough about ‘presupposition’. What exactly is it?

    ……………………………………………..

    The above propositions are collectively inconsistent: they cannot all be true.  But there is a philosophical problem only if all of the propositions are plausible. (2), however, is not at all plausible and seems to reflect a blunder on Ed' s part.  The idea behind semantic presupposition is that if p presupposes q, then both p and its negation entail q. What Ed should have written is

           2* If p presupposes q, and p is true, then p entails q, and if p is false, then not-p entails q.

    For example, if I stop talking at time t, then my stopping entails my talking immediately before t; if I keep talking at t, then that also entails my talking immediately before t.  The proposition presupposed is the same whether I stop talking or keep talking.

    Clearly (2) and (2*) are different propositions. So I solve the pentad by rejecting (2) and its consequences.

    Bill Vallicella

    5 responses to “Another Round on (Semantic) Presupposition: An Inconsistent Pentad”

  • If Nothing Exists, is it True that Nothing Exists? Well Yes, but Then . . .

    Here is a puzzle for London Ed and anyone else who finds it interesting. It is very simple, an aporetic dyad.

    To warm up, note that if snow is white, then it is true that snow is white.  This seems quite unexceptionable, a nice, solid, datanic starting point. It generalizes, of course: for any proposition p, if p, then it is true that p.  Now the connection between antecedent and consequent is so tight that we are loathe to say that it just happens to hold.  It holds of necessity.  So here is the first limb of our aporetic dyad:

    a) Necessarily, for any p, if p, then it is true that p.

    Equivalently: there is no possible world in which both p and it is not true that p.  For example, there is no possible world in which both 7 + 5 = 12 and it is not true that 7 + 5 = 12.

    Intuitively, though, there might have been nothing at all.  Is it not possible that nothing exists? Things exist, of course. But might it not be that everything that exists exists contingently? If so, then there might never have existed anything. Our second limb, then, is this:

    b) Possibly, nothing exists.

    Equivalently: There is at least one possible world in which nothing exists.

    Both limbs of the dyad are plausible, but they can't both be true.  To see this, substitute 'nothing exists' for 'p' in (a) and drop the universal quantifier and the modal operator. This yields:

    c) If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists.

    But (c) can't be true in every world given (b).  For if (c) is true, then something does exist, namely, the truth (true proposition) that nothing exists. But (c) is true in every world given (a).

    Therefore (a) and (b) cannot both be true: the dyad is logically inconsistent.

    So something has to give, assuming we are not willing to accept that the dyad is an aporia in the strict sense, a conceptual impasse that stops the discursive intellect dead in its tracks.  A-poria: no way.  Do we reject (a) or do we reject (b)? If a solution is possible, then I am inclined to reject (b).

    But then I must affirm its negation:

    d) Necessarily, something (or other) exists.

    (Note that if it is necessary that something exist, it does not follow that some one thing necessarily exists. If there is no possible world in which nothing exists, it does not follow that there is some one thing that exists in every world.)

    Yikes! Have I just proven by a priori reasoning the necessary existence of something or other outside the mind?  Of course, I have not proven the necessary existence of God; I may have proven only the necessary existence of those abstract objects called propositions.

    (Father Parmenides, with open arms, welcomes home his prodigal son?)

    Bill Vallicella

    7 responses to “If Nothing Exists, is it True that Nothing Exists? Well Yes, but Then . . .”

Latest Comments

  3. And then there is the Sermon on the Mount. Here is a list of 12 different interpretations: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sermon_on_the_Mount

  10. Bill, One final complicating observation: The pacifist interpretation of Matt 5:38-42 has been contested in light of Lk 22: 36-38…

Categories

Philosophy Weblogs

Other Websites