Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

  • Good Friday: At the Mercy of a Little Piece of Iron

    Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, tr. Craufurd, Routledge 1995, p. 75:

    The infinite which is in man is at the mercy of a little piece of  iron; such is the hum an condition; space and time are the cause of it. It is impossible to handle this piece of iron without suddenly reducing the infinite which is in man to a point on the pointed  part, a point on the handle, at the cost of a harrowing pain. The  whole being is stricken in the instant; there is no place left for God, even in the case of Christ, where the thought of God is then that of privation. This stage has to  be reached if there is to be incarnation. The whole being becomes privation of God: how can we go beyond? After that there is only the resurrection. To reach this stage the cold touch of naked iron  is necessary.

    'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' There we have the real   proof that Christianity is something divine. (p. 79)

    We are spiritual beings, participants in the infinite and the absolute.  But we are also, undeniably, animals.  Our human condition is thus a  predicament, that of a spiritual animal.  As spirits we enjoy freedom of the will and the ability to encompass the whole universe in our thought.  As spirits we participate in the infinity and absoluteness of truth.  As animals, however, we are but indigent bits of the world's fauna exposed to and compromised by its vicissitudes.  As animals we are susceptible to pains and torments that swamp the spirit and obliterate the infinite in us reducing us in an instant to mere screaming animals. In the extremity of suffering, the body that served us as vehicle becomes a burden and a cross, and our way through the vale becomes a via dolorosa.

    Now if God were to become one of us, fully one of us, would he not have to accept the full measure of the spirit's hostage to the flesh?  Would he not have to empty himself fully into our misery?  That is Weil's point.  The fullness of Incarnation requires that the one incarnated experience the worst of embodiment and be tortured to death.  For if Christ is to be fully human, in addition to fully divine, he must experience the highest exaltation and the lowest degradation possible to a human. These extreme possibilities, though not actual in all,  define being human. 

    The Crucifixion is the Incarnation in extremis.  His spirit, 'nailed' to the flesh, is the spirit of flesh now nailed to the wood of the cross. At this extreme point of the Incarnation, doubly nailed  to matter, Christ experiences utter abandonment and the full horror of the human predicament.  He experiences and accepts utter failure and the terrifying thought that his whole life and ministry were utterly delusional. 

    The darkest hour.  And then dawn. 


  • From Way Back in 2006: A Question for 9/11 Revisionists

    Thanks to Vlastimil Vohanka for digging this up and linking to it. Excellent ComBox discussion.


  • Trump Against the Multiculturalists

    Excerpts (bolding and some subtitles added) from an outstanding essay by Thomas D. Klingenstein, Our House Divided: Multiculturalism vs. America:

    What is Multiculturalism?

    Multiculturalism conceives of society as a collection of cultural identity groups, each with its own worldview, all oppressed by white males, collectively existing within permeable national boundaries. Multiculturalism replaces American citizens with so-called “global citizens.” It carves “tribes” out of a society whose most extraordinary success has been their assimilation into one people. It makes education a political exercise in the liberation of an increasing number of “others,” and makes American history a collection of stories of white oppression, thereby dismantling our unifying, self-affirming narrative—without which no nation can long survive.

    Trump Exposes Multi-Culti as Existential Threat

    During the 2016 campaign, Trump exposed multiculturalism as the revolutionary movement it is. He showed us that multiculturalism, like slavery in the 1850’s, is an existential threat. Trump exposed this threat by standing up to it and its enforcement arm, political correctness. Indeed, he made it his business to kick political correctness in the groin on a regular basis. In countless variations of crassness, he said over and over exactly what political correctness prohibits one from saying: “America does not want cultural diversity; we have our culture, it’s exceptional, and we want to keep it that way.” He also said, implicitly but distinctly: the plight of various “oppressed groups” is not the fault of white males. This too violates a sacred tenet of multiculturalism. Trump said these things at a time when they were the most needful things to say, and he said them as only he could, with enough New York “attitude” to jolt the entire country. Then, to add spicy mustard to the pretzel, he identified the media as not just anti-truth, but anti-American.

    Some Countries are indeed Shitholes

    His pungent assertion that there are “shithole” countries was an example of Trump asserting that there is truth. He was saying that some countries are better than others and America is one of the better ones, perhaps even the best. Multiculturalism says it is wrong to say this (as it was “wrong” for Reagan to call the Soviet Union “evil”). Trump is the only national political figure who does not care what multiculturalism thinks is wrong. He, and he alone, categorically and brazenly rejects the morality of multiculturalism. He is virtually the only one on our national political stage defending America’s understanding of right and wrong, and thus nearly alone in truly defending America. This why he is so valuable—so much depends on him.

    Why did Trump Win?

    I think the explanation for Trump’s victory is actually quite straightforward and literal: Americans, plenty of whom still have common sense and are patriotic, voted for Trump for the very reason he said they should vote for him, to put America first or, as his campaign slogan had it, “to make America great again”—where “America” was not, as many conservatives imagine, code for “white people.” In other words, the impulse for electing Trump was patriotic, the defense of one’s own culture, rather than racist.

    A Defense of America and her Meaning

    Trump’s entire campaign was a defense of America. The election was fought not so much over policies, character, email servers, or James Comey, as it was over the meaning of America. Trump’s wall was not so much about keeping foreigners out as it was a commitment to a distinctive country; immigration, free trade, and foreign policy were about protecting our own. In all these policies, Trump was raising the question, “Who are we as a nation?” He answered by being Trump, a man made in America, unmistakably and unapologetically American, and like most of his fellow citizens, one who does not give a hoot what Europeans or intellectuals think.

    Hillary Clinton the Cosmopolitan, Elitist Disdainer

    Clinton, in the other corner, was the great disdainer, a citizen not of America but of the world: a postmodern, entitled elitist who was just more of Obama, the man who contemptuously dismissed America’s claim to being exceptional. What she called the “deplorables” were the “anti-multiculturalists.” She was saying, in effect, that she did not recognize the “deplorables” as fellow citizens, and they were, as far as she was concerned, not part of the regime she proposed to lead.

    Perhaps Trump’s most effective answer to Clinton’s and the Democrats’ multiculturalism was his attacks on political correctness, both before and after the election. Trump scolded Jeb Bush for speaking Spanish on the campaign trail. He pointed out that on 9/11 some Muslims cheered the collapse of the twin towers. He said Mexico was sending us its dregs, suggested a boycott of Starbucks after employees were told to stop saying “Merry Xmas,” told NFL owners they should fire players who did not respect the flag, expressed the view that people from what he called “shitholes” (Haiti and African countries being his examples) should not be allowed to immigrate, exposed the danger of selecting judges based on ethnicity, and said Black Lives Matter should stop blaming others.

    The core idea of each of these anti-P.C. blasts, when taken in aggregate, represent a commitment to America’s bourgeois culture, which is culturally “Judeo-Christian,” insists on having but one language and one set of laws, and values: among other things, loyalty, practical experience, self-reliance, and hard work. Trump was affirming the goodness of our culture. Odd as it may sound, he was telling us how to live a worthy life. Trump is hardly the ideal preacher, but in a society where people are thirsting for public confirmation of the values they hold dear, they do not require pure spring water. Even Trump’s crass statements objectifying women did not seem to rattle Trump women voters, perhaps because it did not come as news to them that men objectify women. In other words, Trump was being a man, albeit not the model man, but what mattered was that he was not the multicultural sexless man. A similar rejection of androgyny may have been at work in the Kavanaugh hearings.

    The Importance of Assimilation

    It was only a generation or so ago that our elite, liberals as well as conservatives, were willing to defend America’s bourgeois culture, American exceptionalism, and full assimilation for immigrants. Arthur Schlesinger expressed his view of assimilation this way: the “Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition … provides the standard to which other immigrant nationalities are expected to conform, the matrix into which they are to be assimilated.” That meant giving up one’s home culture, not necessarily every feature and not right away, but ultimately giving up its essential features in favor of American culture. In other words, there are no hyphenated Americans.

    'Diversity is our Strength' is Orwellian Bullshit

    Trump understands that “diversity is our greatest strength,” which is multiculturalism boiled down to an aphorism, is exactly backwards. America’s greatest strength is having transcended race, and the one major exception was very nearly our undoing. In light of this history, the history of the world (one “tribal” war after another), and the multicultural car wreck that is Europe today, to manufacture cultural diversity is nothing less than self-immolating idiocy. Trump might not put it in these words, but he gets it. The average American gets it too, because it is not very difficult to get: it is common sense.

    Conservatives and Republicans are Complicit

    Trump’s strengths are his courage, his common sense, and his rhetoric. He gets to the essential thing, the thing that no one else will say for fear of being called a “racist” or “fascist” or one of the other slurs that incite the virtue-signaling lynch mob.

    His “shithole” remark was one example. Another occurred in 2015 when Trump, after a terrorist attack, proposed a ban on all Muslims until “we figure out what the hell is going on.” Virtually everyone, the Right included, screamed “racism” and “Islamophobia.” Of course, to have defended Trump would have violated the multicultural diktat that Islam be spoken of as a religion of peace. But like Trump, the average American does not care whether Islam is or is not a religion of peace; he can see with his own eyes that it is being used as an instrument of war. When Muslim terrorists say they are doing the will of Allah, Americans take them at their word. This is nothing but common sense.

    Trump’s attempt to remove District Judge Gonzalo Curiel from a lawsuit in which Trump University was the defendant, in part because of the judge’s Mexican ancestry, was another instance where cries of “racism,” from the Right every bit as loud as from the Left, substituted for common sense. It was thought absurd for Trump to claim the judge was biased because of his ethnicity, yet it was the elite’s very insistence in making ethnicity a factor in the appointment of judges that invited Trump to respond in kind. We make ethnicity an essential consideration and then claim ethnicity should not matter. That is not common sense.

    Getting to the essential, commonsensical heart of the matter is the most important element of Trump’s rhetoric, but even his often cringeworthy choice of words sometimes advances the conservative cause. This is a sad reflection of the times, but these are the times we live in, and we must judge political things accordingly. When, for example, Trump mocked Judge Kavanaugh’s accuser, he was doing something else that only he can: taking multiculturalism, and its “believe all women” narrative, head on. We should continue to cringe at Trump’s puerility, but we should appreciate when it has value.

    In each of these instances, when conservatives joined liberals in excoriating Trump, conservatives were beating up our most important truth teller. Conservatives and Republicans should be using these instances to explain America and what is required for its perpetuation. In the examples listed above, they should have explained the importance of having one set of laws, full assimilation, and color blindness; the incompatibility of theocracy with the American way of life; that under certain circumstances we might rightly exclude some foreign immigrants, not because of their skin color but because they come from countries unfamiliar with republican government. Instead conservatives are doing the work of the multiculturalists for them: insinuating multiculturalism further into the public mind. Conservatives have, without quite realizing it, agreed to play by the multiculturalist’s rules and in so doing they have disarmed themselves; they have laid down on the ground their most powerful weapon: arguments that defend America.

    The Kavanaugh Hearings: Multiculturalism at Work

    In exposing the dangers of multiculturalism, Trump exposed its source: radical liberal intellectuals, most of whom hang about the humanities departments (and their modern day equivalents) at our best colleges and universities, where they teach the multicultural arts and set multicultural rules. And from the academy these ideas and rules are drained into the mostly liberal, mostly unthinking opinion-forming elite who then push for open borders, diversity requirements, racism (which somehow they get us to call its opposite), and other aspects of multiculturalism.

    Multicultural rules were in full force in the Kavanaugh hearings. Armed with the chapter of the multicultural creed that covers “male oppression of women,” Democrats could attack Kavanaugh with accusations conjured out of nothing. At the same time, multicultural rules required Republicans to fight with one hand behind their backs: they were forced to allow a case with no basis to go forward, could not attack the accuser, and had to use a woman to question her. Republicans reflexively accepted their assigned role as misogynists (and would have been accepting the role of racists had the accuser been black). True, Republicans had no choice; still when one is being played one needs to notice.

    Had Trump tweeted, “I don’t give a rat’s ass about the sex or color of the questioner,” I suspect the majority of Americans would have applauded. After all, that is the American view of the matter. It’s not the average American who requires a woman questioner or a black one. We know that because Trumpsters have told us. It’s not typically the parents in our inner-city schools who demand teachers and administrators with skin color that matches that of their children. It’s not ordinary Mexican immigrants who are agitating to preserve their native culture. It’s the multiculturalists.

    The Multi-Culti Understanding of Justice

    Multicultural rules flow from multiculturalism’s understanding of justice, which is based not on the equality of individuals (the American understanding) but on the equality of identity groups oppressed by white males. In the Kavanaugh hearings, the multiculturalists did not see a contest between two individuals but rather between all women who are all oppressed and all white men who are all oppressors. Americans claimed the multiculturalists violated due process and conventional rules of evidence, but from the multiculturalists’ perspective what Americans saw as violations were actually multiculturalism’s understanding of due process and rules of evidence. Americans were seeing a revolution in action.

    We now find ourselves in a situation not unlike that which existed before the Civil War, where one side had an understanding of justice that rested on the principle of human equality, while the other side rested on the principle that all men are equal except black men. One side implied a contraction and ultimate extinction of slavery; the other, its expansion. It was a case of a ship being asked to go in two directions at once. Or to use Lincoln’s Biblical metaphor, “a house divided against itself cannot stand.” Lincoln did not mean that the country could not stand part free and part slave. It could, as long as there was agreement that slavery was bad and on the road to extinction. But once half the country thought slavery a good thing and the other thought it a bad thing the country could no longer stand. It was the different understandings of justice that were decisive because when there are two understandings of justice, as in the Civil War and now, law-abidingness breaks down. In the Civil War, this resulted in secession. Today, this results in sanctuary cities and the “resistance.” To get a sense of how close we are to a complete breakdown, imagine that the 2016 election, like the Bush-Gore election, had been decided by the Supreme Court. One shudders to think.

    What is to be Done? Oppose Multiculturalism!

    Conservatives have been dazed by Trumpism. Even those conservatives who now acknowledge that Trump has accomplished some good things are not certain what is to be learned from Trumpism that might inform the future of the conservative movement.

    The lesson is this: get right with Lincoln. He made opposition to slavery the non-negotiable center of the Republican party, and he was prepared to compromise on all else. Conservatives should do likewise with multiculturalism. We should make our opposition to it the center of our movement. Multiculturalism should guide our rhetorical strategy, provide a conceptual frame for interpreting events, and tie together the domestic dangers we face. We must understand all these dangers as part of one overarching thing.

    This approach, however, will not work unless conservatives begin to think about politics like Lincoln did. That they do not may explain why so many of them missed the meaning of the 2016 election. This topic is complex but I think it comes down to this: As compared to Lincoln’s thinking about politics, conservative thinking tends to be too narrow (i.e., excludes too much) and too rigid.

    What for Lincoln was the single most important political thing—the public’s understanding of justice—many of today’s conservatives think not important at all. It should not then be surprising why they missed, or underappreciated, the political dangers of multiculturalism with its assault on the American understanding of justice. Having missed or underappreciated multiculturalism, conservatives could not see that those attributes of Trump that in conventional times would have been disqualifying were in these times just the ones needed to take on multiculturalism. Trump was not a conventional conservative, yet his entire campaign was about saving America. This is where conservatism begins.

    Education is another area that conservatives believe is less politically important than Lincoln did. Conservatives must relearn what Lincoln knew, and what, until the mid-twentieth century, our universities and colleges also knew: the purpose of higher education, in particular elite higher education, is to train future citizens on behalf of the common good. If the elite universities are promoting multiculturalism, and if multiculturalism is undermining America, then the universities are violating their obligation to the common good no less than were they giving comfort to the enemy in time of war. In such a case, the government, the federal government if need be, can rightfully impose any remedy as long as it is commensurate with the risk posed to the country and is the least intrusive option available.

    Reorienting the conservative movement is a formidable undertaking, but we have a few big things in our favor: for starters, most of the country, including many who are not Trumpsters, appear to object to multiculturalism and its accompanying speech codes. In addition, multiculturalism, as with abolition, has the potential to energize the conservative movement. Conservatives, who are in the business of conserving things, come to life when there is something important to conserve because this allows them to stake out a very distinctive and morally powerful position with enough room to accommodate a broad coalition. In this case, that really important “something” is our country.

    is a principal in the investment firm of Cohen, Klingenstein, LLC and the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Claremont Institute.

  • Norman Podhoretz on Trump and Never-Trumpers

    Via Ace of Spades

    Norman Podhoretz praises Trump for being a — yes — fighter, while the soft-handed crew of the S.S. Cuck all counsel surrender.

    One disagreement I have: NeverTrumpers are, in fact, willing to fight. They're willing to fight viciously and bitterly — so long as the opponents are conservatives. Then the knives come out, then the eye-gouges and low-blows begin raining, then the shivs start getting sharpened.

    But they won't fight this way against their neighbors — physical neighbors — in the leftwing cities and tony suburbs. For them, the seek compromise and understanding.

    Have they ever tried to seek compromise with Trump supporters?

    No, them they brand as Nazis and Deplorables.

    They are among the most tribal people on earth — it's just that their real tribe is, and has always been, the cosmopolitan intellectual class of the left. They share most of their political, cultural, and social DNA with the left.

    CRB: Some people say that Trump has a blue collar sensibility. Do you see that?

    NP: I do see it and even before Trump–long before Trump–actually going back to when I was in the army in the 1950s, I got to know blue-collar Americans. I'm "blue collar" myself, I suppose. I’m from the working class–my father was a milk man. But in the army I got to know people from all over the country and I fell in love with Americans–they were just great!

    . . .

    That's one of the things–it may be the main thing–that explains his political success. It doesn't explain his success in general, but his political success, yes. Also–I often explain this to people–when I was a kid, you would rather be beaten up than back away from a fight. The worst thing in the world you could be called was a sissy. And I was beaten up many times. Trump fights back. The people who say: "Oh, he shouldn't lower himself," "He should ignore this," and "Why is he demeaning himself by arguing with some dopey reporter?"

    I think on the contrary–if you hit him, he hits back; and he is an equal opportunity counter puncher. It doesn’t matter who you are. And actually Obama, oddly enough, made the same statement: "He pulls a knife, you pull a gun."

    Norman Podhoretz


  • A Double Standard or an Alinskyite Tactic?

    One mistake I have corrected in my own political thinking — thanks in part to Malcolm Pollack and 'Jacques' — is the tendency to confuse the double standard with a hard-Left Alinskyite tactic the name of which, if it has one, I don't know.

    Suppose you and I are politically opposed but agree on certain values or standards. We are, for example, both strongly committed to free speech and open inquiry.  But your behavior suggests a tacit commitment to "Free speech for me but not for thee." This is an example of a double standard. The moniker is infelicitous in that there are not two standards but one; what makes the  standard 'double' is that it is inconsistently applied.  While sincerely professing a commitment to free speech you tend to take it more seriously in your own case and less seriously in the cases of those with opposing views. You really do accept the value of free speech; it is just that you have a hard time in the heat of conflict applying it fairly and consistently to all parties.

    But there is something far worse than the double standard.

    The most vicious and mendacious type of leftist will feign an interest in our conservative standards and then use them against us.  In many cases  they don't even feign the interest. 

    Sex is a source of examples. By  and large, leftists do not value chastity, sexual purity, traditional marriage (as opposed to same-sex 'marriage'), marital fidelity.  Talk of lust as a deadly sin is a joke to them. They have a pronounced libertine wobble and are entirely too 'sophisticated' for the above. They celebrate 'alternative sexual lifestyles.'  Bestiality is not a grave sin but something to joke about (Al Franken). 

    Since they do not share our standards when it comes to sexual behavior, it is a mistake to accuse them of a double standard when they pillory Trump while giving Teddy Kennedy and Bill Clinton a pass.  The truth is, they see politics as war and will do anything to win including using our standards against us while mocking those very standards.

    The same with free speech. The Alinskyite hard Left doesn't give a damn about free speech except insofar as they can use it it to destroy free speech. These tactics are at least as old as V. I. Lenin, and people need to be aware of them.

    Our political opponents on the Left are not fellow citizens but domestic enemies and the sooner we admit this fact the better.


  • Once More on Romans 1: 18-20 and Whether Atheism is Morally Culpable

    Brian writes,

    In Van Til and Romans 1: 18-20 you accused Paul of begging the question in Romans 1 when he characterizes the natural world as ‘created’. The question you have in mind – the one presumably being begged by Paul – is whether the world is a divine creation.

    BV: That's right, but let's back up a step.

    Paul is concerned to show the moral culpability of unbelief.  He assumes something I don't question, namely, that some beliefs are such that, if a person holds them, then he is morally culpable or morally blameworthy for holding them. We can call them morally culpable beliefs as long  we understand that it is the holding of the belief, not its content, that is morally culpable.  I would even go so far as to say that some beliefs are morally culpable whether or not one acts on them. 

    So I don't question whether there are morally culpable beliefs. What I question is whether atheism is a  morally culpable belief, where atheism in this context is the thesis that there is no God as Paul and those in his tradition conceive him.

    So why does Paul think atheism is morally culpable? The gist of it is as follows. Men are godless and wicked and suppress the truth. What may be known about God is plain to them because God has made it plain to them. Human beings have no excuse for their unbelief. "For since the creation of the world, God's invisible qualities — his eternal power and divine nature — have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made . . . ."

    We can argue over whether there is an argument here or just some dogmatic statements dressed up as an argument. (The word 'for' can reasonably be taken as signaling argumentative intent.)  Suppose we take Paul to be giving an argument. What is the argument? It looks to be something like the following:

    1) It is morally inexcusable to refuse to acknowledge what is known to be the truth.

    2) That God exists is known to be the truth from the plain evidence of creation.

    Therefore

    3) It is morally inexcusable to refuse to acknowledge that God exists.

    This argument is only as good as its minor premise, (2). But right here is where Paul begs the question.  If the natural world is a divine creation, it follows analytically that God exists and that God created the world.  Paul begs the question by assuming that the natural world is a divine creation.  Paul is of course free to do that. He is free to presuppose the existence of God, not that he, in full critical self-awareness, presupposes the existence of God; given his upbringing he probably never seriously questioned the existence of God and always took his existence for granted.

    And having presupposed — or taken for granted — the existence of God, it makes sense for him to think of us as having been created by God with an innate  sense of the divine — Calvin's sensus divinitatis — that our sinful rebelliousness suppresses. And it makes sense for him to think  that the wrath of God is upon us for our sinful self-will and refusal to acknowledge God's reality and sovereignty.

    For him to have begged the question here, wouldn’t Paul’s burden of  proof have to be that the world is a divine creation? This does not seem to be his burden in Romans 1. It seems to me that Paul is accounting for why people are under the wrath of God. His answer is that: (1) they know God; and (2) they fail to honor Him as God. If (1) and (2) are the case, then this accounts for why they are under God’s wrath.

    Your talk of burden of proof is unclear. You seem to think that the burden of proof is the proposition one aims to prove.  But that's not right. So let's not muddy the waters with 'burden of proof.' 

    We may be at cross purposes.  What interests me is the question whether atheist belief is morally blameworthy. I read the passage in question as containing an argument that it is. I presented the argument above, and I explained why it is a bad argument: it commits the informal fallacy of petitio principii.  To answer my own question: it is not in general morally blameworthy to hold characteristic atheist beliefs, although it may in some cases be morally blameworthy.  

    What interests Brian about the passage in question is the explanation it contains as to why the wrath of God is upon us.  Well, if you assume that God exists and that venereal disease and the other bad things Paul mentions are the effects of divine wrath, then, within the presupposed framework, one can ask what accounts for God's wrath. It would then make sense to say that people know that God exists but willfully suppress this knowledge and fail to honor God.  Therefore, God, to punish man for his willful refusal to acknowledge God's reality and sovereignty, sends down such scourges as AIDS.

    I have no problem with this interpretation.

    So far so good. But, this is not all that Paul says. The key section for our purposes is how Paul argues for (1), the proposition that people know God. Paul claims that they all know God because He made Himself evident to them through creation. Is Paul now be begging the question because of his use of ‘creation’? Again, I do not think so. Here is the pertinent passage:

    For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made…(Rom. 1:20 NASB).

    But now I do have a problem. Brian has not appreciated the point that, to me, is blindingly evident.  What is MADE by God is of course made by GOD.  But this analytic proposition give us no reason to think that nature is MADE, i.e., created by a divine being that is transcendent of nature. It ought to be obvious that one cannot straightaway infer from the intelligibility, order, beauty, and existence of nature that 'behind' nature there is a supernatural personal being that is supremely intelligent, the source of all beauty, and the first cause of all existing things apart from itself.  One cannot 'read off' the being instantiated of the divine attributes from contemplation of nature.

    Suppose I see a woman. I am certain that if she is a wife, then there is a person who is her husband. Can I correctly infer from those two propositions that the woman I see is a wife?  Can I 'read off' from my perception of the woman that she is a wife?


  • Weimar Villanova

    Dreher reports

    I am finding it harder and harder these days to resist Kulturpessimismus.

    As for Notre Dame de Paris, it would be irresponsible to speculate as to its cause. Let the facts emerge. Whatever the cause, there is something deeply symbolic about its destruction: the de-Christianization of Europe.

    A Fox News commentator this morning opined that the world watched in horror yesterday.  Really? The Islamic world? The leftist world?  

    UPDATE (4/18):

    William Kilpatrick, Notre Dame: A Fiery Sign


  • Presentism and Existence-Entailing Relations: A Problem and Feser’s Solution

    The is is the second installment in my critique of Edward Feser's defense of presentism in his latest book, Aristotle's RevengeHere is Part I of the critique.

    …………………………………….

    It is plausibly maintained that all relations are existence-entailing. To illustrate from the dyadic case: if R relates a and b, then both a and b exist.   A relation cannot hold unless the things between which or among which it holds all exist.  A weaker, and hence even more plausible, claim is that all relations are existence-symmetric: if R relates a and b, then either both relata exist or both do not exist. Both the stronger and the weaker claims rule out the possibility of a relation that relates an existent and a nonexistent. So if Cerberus is eating my cat, then Cerberus exists. And if I am thinking about Cerberus, then, given that Cerberus does not exist, my thinking does not relate me to Cerberus.  This implies that  intentionality is not a relation, strictly speaking, though it is, as Franz Brentano says, relation-like (ein Relativliches).

    But if presentism is true, and only temporally present items exist, then no relation connects a present with a non-present item, whether a wholly past item or a wholly future one. This seems hard to accept for the following reason.

    I ate lunch  an hour ago. So the event of my eating (E) is earlier than the event of my typing (T). How can it be true that E bears the earlier than relation to T, and T bears the later than relation to E, unless both E and T exist? But E is non-present. If presentism is true, then E does not exist.  It's not just that E does not exist now, which is trivially true, but that E does not exist at all. And if E does not exist at all,  then E does not stand in the earlier than relation to T which does exist, and not merely in the present-tensed sense of 'exists,' but in the sense in which E does not exist.   If, on the other hand, there are events that exist but are non-present, then presentism is false.

    The principle that all genuine relations are existence-symmetric seems inconsistent with presentism.  Now which of these two principles is more reasonably believed?  I should think it is the first.

    How might the presentist respond? Since E does not exist on his view, while T does, and E is earlier than T, he must either (A) deny that all relations are existence-symmetric, or (B) deny that earlier than is a relation. He must either allow the possibility of genuine relations that connect nonexistents and existents, or deny that T stands in a temporal relation to E.

    To  fully savor the problem we  cast it in the mold of an aporetic tetrad:

    1. All genuine relations are either existence-entailing or existence-symmetric.

    2. Earlier than is a genuine relation.

    3. Presentism: only temporally present items exist.

    4. Some events are earlier than others.

    Each limb of the tetrad is exceedingly plausible.  But they cannot all be true:  any three, taken together, entail the negation of the remaining limb.  For example, the first three entail the negation of the fourth.  To solve the problem, we must reject one of the limbs.  Now (4) cannot be rejected because it is a datum.

    Will you deny (1) and say that there are relations that are neither existence-entailing nor existence-symmetric?  I find this hard to swallow because of the following argument.  (a) Nothing can have properties unless it exists.  Therefore (b) nothing can have relational properties unless it exists. (c) Every relation gives rise to relational properties:  if Rab, then a has the property of standing in R to b, and b has the property of standing in R to a.  Therefore, (d) if R relates a and b, then both a and b exist.

    Will you deny (2) and say that earlier than is not a genuine relation?  What else could it be?

    Will you deny presentism and say that that both present and non-present items exist?  Since it is obvious that present and non-present items cannot exist in the present-tense sense of 'exists,'  the suggestion has to be that present and non-present (past or future) items exist in a tenseless sense of 'exist.'  But what exactly does this mean? 'Eternalism' is also problematic and I am not endorsing it. 

    The problem is genuine, but there appears to be no good solution, no solution that does not involve its own difficulties.

    But if there is a solution it would have to be by rejecting presentism since it is the least credible of the four propositions above.

    Feser's Response

    Feser maintains that objections to presentism along the foregoing lines rest on the assumption that "for a relation to hold between two things, they both have to exist now." (301) But this is not the operative assumption. The operative assumption is simply that for an n-adic relation to hold between or among n relata, all the relata have to exist, period. They have to exist simpliciter; they don't have to exist now.  The eternalist can easily satisfy the demand by saying that events E and T exist simpliciter despite E's being earlier than T.  Whatever problems eternalism has, it has this going for it: it can explain how a past event can stand in a relation to a present event.  

    It is important to bear in mind that the presentist too must make use of the notion of existence simpliciter.  The thesis of presentism is not the logical truth that whatever exists (present-tense) exists now.  It is the thesis that whatever exists simpliciter exists now.  Equivalently: only present items exist simpliciter.  From this it follows that wholly past items such as the event of my having eaten lunch do not exist simpliciter. But then the objection is up and running.

    I conclude that Feser has not defused the objection to presentism from trans-temporal relations.

     


  • Slavery, Abortion, and ‘Skin in the Game’

    Slavery is is widely and rightly regarded as among the worst of moral evils. Abortion is not. On the contrary: the latter is now celebrated in some circles. Why the difference? Why the difference when both are grave moral evils? 'Skin in the game' plays an explanatory role. Not the whole role, perhaps, but a major one.

    No one owns slaves or has an economic interest in them. There's no  skin in the game. But everyone is naturally concupiscent. There's plenty of skin in that game both literally and figuratively.  Add to the natural the social: Western societies do little or nothing  to restrict, and quite a lot to facilitate, the pursuit of sexual gratification for its own sake.  Now add to the social the technological: safe and reliable birth control and safe and reliable abortion. The resulting trifecta of mutually reinforcing factors has brought us to the current decadent and hedonistic pass.

    It is easy to think clearly and disinterestedly about slavery and its immorality since we have no stake in it. There are no passions or interests to suborn the intellect. Denunciation of slavery and its real or imagined consequences such as 'institutional' or 'systemic' racism also allows one a cost-free way of displaying one's supposedly high moral status. One doesn't have to give up anything or do anything. One signals one's virtue by one's bien-pensant attitude. At most one will be called upon to mouth some politically correct pieties.  One's 'thinking' merges easily with thoughtless groupthink.

    To think clearly about the immorality of abortion on demand at any stage of fetal development for any reason, however, requires one courageously to cut against the grain of groupthink and to resist one's natural desire for unlimited sex without consequences.

    For one whose mind  is in the grip of the Zeitgeist and his loins in the grip of concupiscence, rational argument arrives too late. 


  • Troubled

    Troubled people are often trouble. Do you need more? Avoid the troubled, avoid trouble.


  • Perfectionism

    Some, of modest ability, publish too much; others, of greater ability, are stymied by perfectionism.

    Perfectionism is a curse!

    Leave perfection to the gods. The most that can be asked of a mortal is that he strive for excellence within the limits of time, talent, and circumstance. Striving is not achieving, and excellence is not perfection.

    You will never get to the point where you have read all the literature on a topic, even a well-defined one. Some of the material is out of print or otherwise unavailable, some of it is in foreign languages. Should you hold off on writing something about mereology until you can read Polish?

    Too much reading blocks the channels of one's own creativity. Forever reading, never read. 

    Writing is the best way of working out your ideas; so if you wait until you know exactly what you want to say before writing, you will miss the best way of determining exactly what you want to say.


  • Saturday Night at the Oldies: Render unto Caesar . . .

    Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's . . .

    Have you stateside readers settled accounts with the Infernal Revenue Service?  If yes, order up one scotch, one bourbon, and one beer and enjoy this live version of Taxman  featuring Harrison and Clapton.  Stevie Ray Vaughan's blistering version

    . . . and render unto God the things that are God's.

    Herewith, five definite decouplings of rock and roll from sex and drugs.

    Norman Greenbaum, Spirit in the Sky

    Johnny Cash, Personal Jesus. This is one powerful song.

    Clapton and Winwood, Presence of the Lord. Why is Clapton such a great guitarist? Not because of his technical virtuosity, his 'chops,' but because he has something to say.

    George Harrison, My Sweet Lord

    George Harrison, All Things Must Pass. Harrison was the Beatle with depth.  Lennon was the radical, McCartney the romantic, and Ringo the regular guy.

    Good YouTuber comment: "Immortal song, even if all things must pass . . . " 


  • Truth-Bearers and Truth-Makers: Disjoint Classes?

    Wesley C. writes,
     
    Today I read your critique of Feser on presentism. I am curious about something you said: A truth-bearer cannot serve as a truth-maker.
     
    If that's right, how would you handle obvious truths that are about propositions. Take the following: "The proposition that Humphreys Peak is the tallest in Arizona is true and believed by many." 
     
    That sentence would seem to express a proposition which has another proposition (the one about Humphreys Peak) as its truth-maker; it is about that proposition; that proposition, and nothing else, makes it true. But of course all propositions are truth-bearers. So it would seem that we have a case of some thing which bears truth and makes truth. How would you understand that sentence in a way that is consistent with the claim that a truth-bearer cannot serve a truth-maker? 
     
    As always, I enjoy your philosophical contributions. 
    I didn't go into this because it would have expanded and complicated an already long and difficult entry. But the point is well-taken: it seems that some truth-bearers are truth-makers.  Let us assume that truth-bearers are abstract items, propositions in roughly Frege's sense.

    In the typical case of truth-making, it is correct to say that if x makes-true y, then x is not a proposition, only y is. But if propositions exist, then doesn't the existence of any proposition make-true various propositions? The proposition expressed by 'The Earth has only one moon' exists. By its very existence it makes-true the proposition that there are propositions. So it seems that a proposition can serve as a truth-maker and that not every truth-maker is a non-proposition. One response is that it is not the Earth proposition qua true that makes-true the proposition that there are propositions, but the Earth proposition qua existent. But this response does not seem quite adequate.  Perhaps the following works.

    The intuition behind the truth-maker principle (TM) is that truth-makers are 'in the world' where the world is the totality of concrete extra-linguistic and extra-mental particulars (unrepeatables) including e.g. Socrates, and the concrete fact of Socrates' being wise.  Representations are not part of the world in this sense. Representations are either mental or abstract. Mental representations are mind-dependent in the sense that they cannot exist except in or for minds as their contents or accusatives. Abstract representations are not dependent for their existence on finite minds, but they are accessible or graspable or understandable by such minds. Abstract propositions are representations in this sense. Thus the (abstract, Fregean) proposition expressed by 'Snow is white' represents snow as having a certain color. Abstract propositions are therefore not 'in the world' in the sense just defined. But truth-makers are. Therefore, abstract propositions are not truth-makers. And so truth-bearers and truth-makers form disjoint classes. But if course a lot depends on what we pack into the notion of a truth-maker.

    The basic idea behind TM is that for every truth, or at least for every contingent truth, there must be at least one (though there could be more than one) item distinct from the truth that 'makes' it true, an item that is not itself a truth and is not some finite person's say-so. As Michael Dummett puts it in his 1959 article “Truth,” “. . . a statement is true only if there is something in the world in virtue of which it is true.” (Dummett 1980, 14) He tells us that this is “one important feature of the concept of truth.” (ibid.) TM implies a commitment to realism, as correspondence theories of truth do, but without sharing the specific commitments of the latter, where “Realism consists in the belief that for any statement there must be something in virtue of which either it or its negation is true . . . .” (ibid.) This something must be 'in the world,' which for present purposes means that it must be extra-mental, extra-linguistic, and extra-propositional, if propositions are abstract objects.

     


  • A Reader Proposes a Puzzle

    This from Cyrus:

    Suppose there is a possible world in which only God exists. Further suppose that that world is actual instead of this one. Further suppose divine simplicity. What is the truthmaker for the proposition “God exists, and nothing more” in that world?

    If God alone exists, and God is simple, then there are no propositions in that world, and hence no true propositions, and therefore no need for truth-makers.  Too quick?


  • Existence Simpliciter

    Here is London Ed, recently returned from his African sojourn, raising some good questions anent my entry, A Critique of Edward Feser's Defense of Presentism, Part I:

    >> the presentist idea is not adequately captured by saying that wholly past items no longer exist, since all who understand English will agree to that. The presentist idea is that wholly past items do not exist at all.

    But what does ‘exist at all’ mean?

    BV: That's part of the problem and part of the fun. You are not saying anything metaphysical when you say that Boston's Scollay Square no longer exists. You are simply pointing out an historical fact.  You are not committing yourself to presentism or any version of anti-presentism such as 'eternalism' (a howling misnomer if you want my opinion).  You are not 'committing metaphysics' if I may coin a phrase. Committing metaphysics, the presentist is saying that Scollay Square does not exist at all: it is NOTHING because it is wholly past.  That is surely not obvious or commonsensical or the view of the man in the street.

    To see that, consider that Scollay Square is, as we speak, the intentional object of veridical memories, and the subject of true predications, e.g., 'Scollay Square attracted many a horny young sailor on shore leave.'  How then could it be NOTHING?  It seems obviously to be SOMETHING, indeed something wholly determinate and wholly actual despite being wholly past. If you say the famous square exists tenselessly at times earlier than the present time (the time simultaneous with my writing), then you uphold its existence but open yourself up to questions about what exactly tenseless existence is, questions that are as easy to formulate as they are hard (or impossible) to answer satisfactorily. Cashing out 'exists at all' in terms of 'exists tenselessly ' is the main way of explaining it. 

    >> it does not exist, period

    Same question. What do ‘period’ and ‘at all’ add?

    BV:   'Period,' 'full stop,' 'at all,' simpliciter, sans phrase — I am using these as stylistic variants of one another. See above response.

    >> But note carefully that the second formulation is accurate only if 'exists' is not read as present-tensed, in which case the formulation is tautological, but as 'exists simpliciter,' in which case it is not.

    So what does simpliciter add?

    BV: See the first response.

    >> What exactly it means to 'exist at all' or to 'exist 'simpliciter' is part of the problem of formulating a coherent version of presentism that can withstand close scrutiny. For present purposes we will assume that we understand well enough what these phrases mean.

    Yes to the first sentence, no to the second (speaking for myself, perhaps others understand).

    BV:  But surely, Ed, you understand more or less and well enough to have this discussion. Or are you feigning incomprehension? Or petering out (insider jargon that alludes to Peter van Inwagen's habit of saying that he doesn't understand something.)  I will assume that you are not feigning or petering, but doing what analytic philosophers do, namely, demanding CLARITY.  Fine. But can't you see that there is a difference between holding that the wholly past is nothing at all and holding that the wholly past is not nothing at all?  This is the great problem of the reality of the past.  My view is that it is a genuine problem, not a pseudo-problem, but that it is insoluble by us. I don't mean that one cannot give a solution to it. I mean that one cannot give a finally satisfactory solution to it.  That makes me a solubility skeptic about this problem.

    >> As Feser himself says, on presentism, "there are no past events,"

    OK, but there clearly were past events. I wonder if the whole problem rests on an equivocation. We read "there are no past events" as "there were no past events" which has the whiff of paradox and mystery. I caught myself in that equivocation exactly as I was reading it, followed by a double take. Well of course there are no past events, because they have passed over. But there were such things.

    Of course you are well aware of that, and we have been on opposite sides of the question for many years. You feel there is some non-trivial sense in which "there are no past events" can be true. I fail to grasp that sense.

    BV: You think the following are both obvious: (a) There were past events, and (b) There are no past events.   I will grant you that (a) is practically self-evident although not perfectly obvious.  Could not the universe have started up right at the beginning of the present with dusty books, etc, as Russell once suggested? Is that not a logical possibility? I can't take that seriously as a real possibility because it implies that there were no past presents — which seems to commit us to the Solipsism of the Present Moment.  

    But I disagree with you about (b).  You think (b) is obvious.  In one sense it is.  It is obvious if 'there are' is in the present tense.   For then you are saying, trivially, that there are now no (wholly) past events. But in another sense (b) is not obvious, although it might be either false or incoherent. Distinguished philosophers have maintained that there are tenselessly events that are past in the sense that they are earlier than present events, where the A-determination (McTaggart) 'present'' is cashed out B-theoretically.

    Is there some non-trivial sense in which 'there are no past events' could be true?  You say that if there is such a sense, you cannot grasp it. I say that there is such a sense and that I can grasp it.  

    I can grasp it because I can grasp what the (unqualified) presentist is saying. He is saying that when a temporal item such as an event loses the A-determination presentness, it becomes nothing at all. It is annihilated.  I can understand that because I can understand how it might not be annihilated. It would not be annihilated if (i) there are no irreducible A-determinations, where such a determination is irreducible if irreducible  to a B-relation, or (ii) there are irreducible A-determinations but they have no bearing on the tenseless existence of events and other temporal items.

    Alles klar?

    Gotta meet a man for lunch. 

    Scollay Square novel


    5 responses to “Existence Simpliciter


Latest Comments


  1. And then there is the Sermon on the Mount. Here is a list of 12 different interpretations: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sermon_on_the_Mount

  2. Bill, One final complicating observation: The pacifist interpretation of Matt 5:38-42 has been contested in light of Lk 22: 36-38…

  3. The Kant-Swedenborg relation is more complicated than I thought. https://philarchive.org/archive/THOTRO-12



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