Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

  • A Relativist Cannot Rationally Object to the Imposition of One’s Values on Others

    Here, at MavPhil Strictly Philosophical


  • Why the Right-Left Divide is Unbridgeable: Three Reasons

    One reason is that we differ over values.  That's bad. Worse still is that we differ over what is true and what is false.  Disagreements about values and norms are troubling but not surprising, but nowadays we can't even agree on what the facts are. Worst of all is that we differ over what truth is and whether there are any truths.  The point about values is obvious. I won't say more about it on this occasion. Here are some examples of how we differ over what is true and what is false:

    The left believes the president colluded with Russia to win the 2016 election. The reality is that there was no collusion. This is the conclusion of the Mueller report, but still, the left doesn’t accept it.

    The left is certain President Trump said the neo-Nazis are “very fine people” when referring to the protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia. The right is certain the president didn’t say there are good neo-Nazis any more than he said there are good “antifa” members. When he said there were “very fine people on both sides,” he was referring to those demonstrating on behalf of keeping Confederate statues and those opposed. See “The Charlottesville Lie” by CNN analyst Steve Cortes.

    The left believes socialism is economically superior to capitalism. But the reality is that only capitalism has lifted billions of people out of poverty.

    These examples are from Dennis Prager. I will now go Prager one better: we don't just disagree about what is true and false; we disagree about whether there is truth is the first place.  

    The Left is culturally Marxist, and part of that line is that there is no objective truth.  What there are are perspectives and power relations. 'True' is whatever perspective  enhances the power of some tribe. Thus the abominations 'our truth' and 'my truth.' 

    We are obviously in deep trouble and it is not clear how to avoid disaster.   Hot civil war would be a disaster. But we conservatives are not about to accept dhimmitude. Secession is unworkable. We need to find the political equivalent of divorce. But how to work this out in detail is above my pay grade.  And yours too.

    The consolations of philosophy, and of old age, are many.


  • ‘For’ and ‘Because’: A Linguistic Bagatelle

    My sense of the English language tells me that (1) below, but not (2), is good English.

    1) On presentism, what no longer exists, does not exist at all. For on presentism, only the present exists.

    2) On presentism, what no longer exists, does not exist at all. Because on presentism, only the present exists.

    As I see it, (1) is good English because 'for' in a context like this means 'it is because.'


  • The Augustinian Meta-Predicament

    The Augustinian predicament is that, if you don't ask me what time is; I know. But if you ask me, I don't know.

    The meta-predicament is that, if you don't press me too hard, I know what the main issues in dispute are, and what the main theories of time state; but if you press me and demand clear explanations, then I find that I don't know.


  • Custody of the Eyes

    You look at unworthy objects, objects that debase. Or you view worthy things through the distorting lenses of concupiscence and greed.


  • A Paltry Nobility

    A paltry nobility it is that extends only to a recognition of one's baseness. Such is a nobility of thought that cannot implement itself in action.


  • “Don’t Go Out in the Dark,” Said I

    "It's not dark yet," said she.

    "But it's getting there," I replied.

    She missed the allusion.


  • The Romantic Fool

    It has been my experience that the folly of the romantic fool  has an expiration date — at least with respect to any given object of his folly, if not with respect to his propensity to make a fool of himself in matters amorous.  The wayward heart is fickle. The older and wiser see the need for the custody of the heart, but to attain the insight is one thing, to play the custodian another.  Popular music testifies eloquently to the problem. 

    Fools rush in, where wise men never go;
    But wise men never fall in love;
    So how are they to know?

    Wise men say
    Only fools rush in;
    But I can't help
    Falling in love with you.


  • On a Roll

    America is on a roll with Trump in control, and I'm on a roll on my Facebook page beating lefties into the dirt.  All of my posts are public, so you should be able to read them if you have a FB account. To comment, though, you will have to send me a 'Friend ' request.  Hard experience has taught me that discussions with 'liberals' are a waste of time, such is their level of insolent ignorance and willful self-enstupidation; so no 'liberals' need apply.


  • Some Questions About Divine Simplicity

    This recently over the transom:
     
    Dear Dr. Vallicella, I'm a reader of your blog, and have really enjoyed much of your work. Since you wrote the Stanford Encyclopedia article on the topic of divine simplicity, I thought I might reach out to you to ask your opinions on some things. I am on an e-mail list with a Christian philosopher who is extremely critical toward the idea and I'd like to know what you think of the following:
     
    First, he argues that, while there are some rationally acceptable arguments for divine simplicity, they do not rise to the level of demonstration. Based on some of your recent work, I gather you might agree with this.
     
    BV: I do agree.  The doctrine cannot be demonstrated or proven. There are 'good' (rationally acceptable) arguments for the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), but they are not rationally compelling. To my mind this is but a special case of a general thesis: few if any substantive theses in philosophy are demonstrable or provable.
     
    It's the second part I'm curious about. Further to his argument is that divine simplicity rests on questionable metaphysical premises, and that many are far too confident in the position given their familiarity with metaphysics. He is exceptionally critical of James Dolezal, saying that consulting him on the topic "is like going to a bike shop to get your car repaired." He believes that, for one to really understand and engage with the ideas, academic training and great philosophical experience is required (which Dolezal may not possess, not having earned his Ph.D. under recognized philosophers). Since you cite Dolezal multiple times in your article, I assume you would disagree with this at least on some level. While I only have undergraduate philosophical training, I am familiar with the debates on the subject, and the metaphysics involved, to have at least some rational justification for my opinions. (The big exception is questions of simplicity and modal logic—I back off when things go into that territory). So, my actual questions: what level of philosophical training (especially official) is necessary to engage in these debates? And is his evaluation of Dolezal in particular correct?
     
    BV: Dolezal is competent, and your friend's 'bike shop' comment does nothing to show otherwise.  You don't really need any 'training' other than what you can provide for yourself by careful study of the literature on the topic, assuming you are above average in intelligence and have a strong desire to penetrate the problem. I don't set much store by training and trappings and academic pedigrees. What matters in philosophy is love of truth, intense devotion to her service, intellectual honesty, and the willingness to follow the arguments whither they lead.
     
    Second, he has a criticism of simplicity I haven't seen anywhere else. I'll have to summarize it as the paper has not been published.
     
    It goes like this: a key premise in the argument for simplicity is that whatever has parts depends on those parts, and so must be composed by something else. God is not dependent/composed by anything else, therefore he must be simple. He questions this idea and puts forward an "individuals first"  account, suggesting that parts are in some cases only definable by the wholes of which they are parts, thus actually making the parts dependent on the whole. He provides two possible examples: the notions of necessity and possibility, which are dependent on each other for their definitions; and the doctrine of the Trinity, where Father, Son, and Spirit are exclusively defined in terms of relations among them. This suggests, he argues, that we can conceive of wholes that have parts, the parts all being mutually dependent upon one another and thus not composed by anything else. And so, God might have parts while not being composed by anything else.
     
    What are your thoughts on this idea?
     
    BV: One kind of whole can be called compositely complex, while another can be called incompositely complex. A wall of stacked stones is a complex of the first sort: its parts (the stones) can exist without the whole (the wall) existing, and each stone can exist apart from any other. The parts can exist without the whole, but the whole cannot exist without the parts. Such a whole needs an ontological factor, a 'composer' to ground its unity and to distinguish it from a sheer plurality.  The wall is not a sheer manifold, a mere mereological sum of stones, but a unitary entity. It is one entity with many parts. God cannot be complex in this way. For then he would depend for his existence and nature on the logically/ontologically prior existence of his parts including his attributes (omniscience, omnipotence, etc.) if these are assayed as 'parts' or ontological constituents of God.  
     
    Now your friend's suggestion seems to be that God is an incompositely complex whole of parts.  God has parts, but these parts cannot exist apart from the whole of which they are the parts, and no part can exist apart from any other part. The parts are then mutually dependent and inseparable.
     
    I don't think this works.  Consider the 'composition' of essence and existence in a contingent being such as Socrates. The 'parts' — in an extended sense of the term — are mutually inseparable. The existence of Socrates cannot itself exist apart from his essence  and the essence of Socrates cannot exist apart from his existence.  And neither can exist apart from Socrates, the composite of the two.  But Socrates is a creature and God transcends all creatures. His absolute transcendence cannot be accommodated  by any scheme that allows God to be in any sense partite, not even if the parts are mutually inseparable.  God's absolute transcendence requires that he be absolutely simple.  God belongs at the fourth level in the following schema:
     
    Level I.  Pure manyness or sheer plurality without any real (as opposed to mentally supplied) principle of unity.  Mereological sums. The sum just is its members.
     
    Level II. Composite complexity.  A whole of parts the unity of which is contingent, as in the case of the stacked stones. There is one wall composed of many parts, but the parts can exist without the whole. The whole, however, cannot exist without the parts.
     
    Level III. Incomposite Complexity.  Wholes the parts of which are mutually inseparable, whether weakly inseparable or strongly inseparable.  Suppose a particular cannot exist without having some properties or other, but needn't have the very properties it in fact has, and (first-order) properties cannot exist without being had by some particulars or other, but not necessarily the particulars that in fact have them.  We then say that particulars and properties are  WEAKLY mutually inseparable.  If, however, particulars cannot exist without having the very properties they have, and these properties cannot exist without being instantiated by the very particulars that instantiate them, then particulars and properties are STRONGLY mutually inseparable.
     
    Level IV. Absolute Simplicity. The absolutely simple transcends the distinction between whole and parts.  Whereas in Socrates there is a real distinction between essence and existence despite their strong mutual inseparability, in God there is not even this distinction.
     
    In sum, God's absolute transcendence requires absolute simplicity. Your friend's suggestion as you have reported it is stuck at Level III and does not reach Level IV.

  • The ‘Progressive’

    A typical 'progressive' will insist that the law-abiding citizen exercising his constitutionally protected (not constitutionally conferred) right to keep and bear arms has no need of weapons since it is the job of the police to protect the citizenry against the criminal element. At the same time, this  'progressive' works to undermine the police and empower criminals. Examples are legion, e.g. the recent bail elimination in New York State.


  • Scruton Quits the Sublunary

    Sir Roger's earthy tenure lasted a mere 75 years.  Philosophy is an old man's game, as I heard it said in my youth; Sir Roger fell short of the Russellian by 22 years.   Steven Hayward of Powerline:

    In the introduction to his book The Meaning of Conservatism, Scruton writes that “Conservatism may rarely announce itself in maxims, formulae, or aims. Its essence is inarticulate, and its expression, when compelled, skeptical.”

    Why “inarticulate”? Because, as he explains elsewhere, the liberal has the easy job in the modern world. The liberal points at the imperfections and defects of existing institutions or the existing social order, strikes a pose of indignation, and huffs that surely something better is required, usually with the attitude that the something better is simply a matter of will. The conservative faces the tougher challenge of understanding and explaining the often subtle reasons why existing institutions, no matter how imperfect, work better than speculative alternatives.

    Well, an essence cannot be inarticulate, only a person or his literary production.  It would be better to say that the essence of conservatism is not wholly articulable. It cannot be made into a system, and the conservative is indeed skeptical of comprehensive theories. He stands on the terra firma of a gnarly reality which, though intrinsically intelligible, is only partially intelligible to him; a reality independent of human dreams, wishes, and wants.

    Hayward goes too easy on the contemporary liberal or 'progressive.'  He should have pointed out that the 'liberal' will tear down what provably works without assurance that anything better can be put in its place. 'Progressives' have shown their willingness to break millions of eggs for an omelet the  possibility of which they have no good reason to believe in. The Left is pointlessly destructive and ever on the slouch toward the big Nihil.

    Scruton


  • Saturday Night at the Oldies: Ambulo ergo Sum

    Dionne Warwick, Walk On By

    Leroy Van Dyke, Walk On By.  Same title, different song.

    Patsy Cline, Walkin' After Midnight

    Gus Cannon, Walk Right In, 1929.  Is that a kazoo I hear? Rooftop Singers' 1962 version.

    Rufus Thomas, Walking the Dog, 1965

    Ventures, Walk Don't Run. The boys are aging nicely.  A big hit back in 1960.

    Everly Brothers, Walk Right Back

    Four Seasons, Walk Like a Man. Sing like a castrato.  Walk or wop?

    Bangles, Walk Like an Egyptian.  Cultural appropriation! We need more of it. No day without political incorrectness. Walk like an Egyptian and smoke a cigar.

    Johnny Cash, I Walk the Line

    Ronnettes, Walkin' in the Rain

    Left Banke, Walk Away Renee

    Robert Johnson, Walkin' Blues.  

    Jimmy Rogers, Walkin' By Myself.  Butterfield and Bloomfield with the latter's solo at 3:42 ff.

    James Soriano sends this:

    You may have seen this, but there is sonic evidence of the voice of a  late 19th century castrato on YouTube.  Alessandro Moreschi (1858 –1922) sings the Bach/Gounod "Ave Maria" in a 1904 recording.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KLjvfqnD0ws
     
    Whatever the circumstances of his castration, Moreschi was the soprano at St. John Lateran by the time he was 13 years old.  

  • Elias Canetti and Greta Thunberg

    The former has the latter's 'number.'

    Zwei Tendenzen, die sich nur scheinbar widersprechen, kennzeichnen die Zeit: die Anbetung der Jugend and das Absterben der Erfahrung.

    Two trends, which only apparently contradict each other, epitomize this era: the worship of youth and the extinction of experience. (The Agony of Flies, Noonday, 1994, p. 168/169, emphasis in original.)

    Canetti


  • On the Loquacity of the Distaff Contingent

    Groucho loquacityI had the experience yet again yesterday.   It is easy to get a woman talking; hard to get her to stop.

    "Not always!" I didn't say 'always.' It's a generic statement.

    "Men too!" Not as many.

    "You're a misogynist!" So I hate women because I say something true about them?

    "You're a fool to say that to a woman!" Now I agree.



Latest Comments


  1. And then there is the Sermon on the Mount. Here is a list of 12 different interpretations: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sermon_on_the_Mount

  2. Bill, One final complicating observation: The pacifist interpretation of Matt 5:38-42 has been contested in light of Lk 22: 36-38…

  3. The Kant-Swedenborg relation is more complicated than I thought. https://philarchive.org/archive/THOTRO-12

  4. Ed, Just now read the two topmost articles on your Substack. I’m a Kant scholar of sorts and I recall…



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