Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

  • OTT

    Internet abbreviation: over-the-top.

    Abbreviations divide into acronyms, initialisms, and truncations. Or so say I.

    See Acronyms, Initialisms, and Truncations and Acronyms, Initialisms and Truncations: Another Look


  • A Bad Argument Against Originalism Refuted

    This canard is often repeated: "We need a living constitution to govern a modern society."

    In response, Neil Gorsuch distinguishes between MEANING and APPLICATION. The original meaning of the Constitution remains fixed; it is the range of applications that changes. Speech remains protected despite the fact that at the time of the founding electronic means of communication did not exist. (First Amendment). The Fourth Amendment still protects us against "unreasonable searches and seizures" despite the fact that there were no means of electronic surveillance in the early days of the Republic.

    An example Gorsuch does not give, but I will, pertains to the Second Amendment. There were no automatic or semi-automatic firearms back then; hell, there weren't any revolvers either. But "the right to keep and bear arms" has the meaning now that it had then. It is just that the application or extension of the term 'arms' has widened.

    I hope to refute other bad arguments against originalism later. See Neil Gorsuch, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT, Crown Forum, 2019, p. 111. An excellent book and an excellent counter to leftist claptrap.


  • Word of the Day: Oubliette

    Merriam-Webster: A dungeon with an opening only at the top.
     
    Used in a sentence:
    Since [Kamala] Harris is now on her way to the political oubliette, however, Schweizer’s discussion of her depredations is of less exigent interest than his discussion of other figures, especially Joe Biden, Elizabeth Warren, and Bernie Sanders, all, remarkably enough, leading contenders for the Democratic nomination for president. 
    French, from Middle French, from oublier to forget, from Old French oblier, from Vulgar Latin *oblitare, frequentative of Latin oblivisci to forget — more at oblivion.
     
    Addendum (1/27).  This just over the transom:
    I think I've been inside an oubliette, thought I didn't know what it was called at the time. It was quite unsettling. My brother, his son, and I were driving in southern Spain when we saw a ruined castle at the top of a hill. There was no sign or anything, but that's not unusual in Spain, so we hiked to the top of the hill and explored the ruins.
     
    The only sign of modern habitation was a fairly recent steel ladder going down into a sort of pit, about twenty feet deep and cylindrical with a diameter of about thirty feet, mostly covered, and with a round opening somewhat larger than a manhole. We couldn't figure out what the pit was, so my nephew climbed down the ladder to look around, then my brother followed.
     
    I asked one of them to come back up because it didn't seem safe for all of us to be down there (in case the ladder broke or something). My nephew came back up and I climbed down to look around. It was only moderately creepy until my nephew came back down and all three of us were down there together. No way could we have made a cell phone call from that location, and I had a sudden image of being stuck down in that hole with no way out.
     
    For just a moment, I imagine I felt what it would be like to be dropped into such a horrifying prison. It was one of those shocking moments when you really grasp viscerally how evil man can be to man.
    Regards,
    David Gudeman
    OublietteYou had a glimpse of the horror of this life, a glimpse that cut right through the optimistic palaver of the secular humanists. You saw the truth of homo homini lupus, and its finality in a godless universe in which the horrors go unredeemed.   If atheists and naturalists weren't such superficial people they would be anti-natalists.
     
    We are spiritual beings, and for a spiritual being the ultimate horror is the sense of utter abandonment by God and man. If Christ was fully man, that is what he experienced in his worst moment on the cross.

  • Avicenna’s God and the Queen of England

    A re-post from 12 September 2013. Re-posts are the re-runs of the blogosphere. You don't watch a Twilight Zone or Seinfeld episode only once do you?  

    …………………..

    For a long time now I have been wanting to study Frederick D. Wilhelmsen's hard-to-find The Paradoxical Structure of Existence.  Sunday I got lucky at Bookman's and found the obscure treatise for a measly six semolians.  I've read the first five chapters and and they're good.  There is a lack of analytical rigor here and there, but that is par for the course with the old-school scholastic philosophers.  They would have benefited from contact with analytic philosophers.  Unfortunately, most of the analysts of Wilhelmsen's generation were anti-metaphysical, being  logical positivists, or fellow travellers of same, a fact preclusive of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and mutual benefit  Imagine the response of a prickly positivist to one of Jacques Maritain's more effusive tracts.  But I digress.

    Wilhelmsen (1923-1996) must have been a successful teacher: he has a knack for witty and graphic comparisons.  To wit:

    Avicenna's God might be compared to the Queen of England, to a figurehead monarch.  No law in England has validity unless it bears the Queen's signature.  Until that moment the law is merely "possibly a law."  But Parliament writes the laws and the Queen signs them automatically.  Avicenna's order of pure essence is the Parliament of Being.  Avicenna's God gives the royal signature of existence; but this God, like England's majesty, is stripped of all real power and liberty of action.  (Preserving Christian Publications, 1995, p. 43.  First published in 1970 by U. of Dallas Press.)


  • Saturday Night at the Oldies: Songs of Self-Satisfaction and Braggadocio

    Frank Sinatra, My Way. A little too self-congratulatory, don't you think? 

    Bob Wills, I'm a Ding Dong Daddy from Dumas.  "Purty lil gurl tried to put me on the bum, had to burn her down with a Thompson gun. I'm a ding dong daddy from Dumas babe, ya ought to see me do my stuff."

    Chicago, I'm a Man

    Youtuber comment: "I'll be 68 in June, but when I hear this song time rockets back in a heartbeat. 'Our' music was absolutely phenomenal. Today's music can't hold a candle to it. But then again, you'd have to have been there to understand."

    Peggy Lee, I'm a Woman

    Willie Dixon and Robbie Robertson, Seventh Son

    Mississippi Sheiks, Sitting on Top of the World

    Joan Baez, Satisfied Mind


  • Frederick D. Wilhelmsen

    I am presently re-reading The Paradoxical Structure of Existence (University of Dallas Press, 1970) in preparation for the existence chapter of my metaphilosophy book.  Wilhelmsen's book is sloppy in the manner of the 20th century Thomists before the analytic bunch emerged, but rich,  historically informed, and fascinating.  Poking around on the 'Net for Wilhelmsen materials, I found this by one William H. Marshner, and I now file it in my Wilhelmsen category.


  • Why Did Trump Get the Religious Vote?

    A re-post from two years ago. Cognate question: Why do leftists keep asking the title question?

    ……………………………

    Why did Donald J. Trump receive the support of evangelicals and other religious conservatives?

    After all, no one would confuse Trump with a religious man.  Robert Tracinski's explanation strikes me as correct:

    The strength of the religious vote for Trump initially mystified me, until I remembered the ferocity of the Left’s assault on religious believers in the past few years—the way they were hounded and vilified for continuing to hold traditional beliefs about marriage that were suddenly deemed backward and unacceptable (at least since 2012, when President Obama stopped pretending to share them). What else do you think drove all those religious voters to support a dissolute heathen?

    Ironically, a pragmatic, Jacksonian populist worldling such as Donald J. Trump will probably do more for religion and religious liberty in the long run than a pious leftist such as Jimmy Carter.*  

    Mr. Carter famously confessed the lust in his heart in an interview in — wait for it – Playboy magazine.  We should all do likewise, though in private, not in Playboy. While it is presumptuous to attempt to peer into another's soul, I would bet that Mr. Trump is not much bothered by the lust in his heart, and I don't expect to hear any public confessions from his direction.

    But what doth it profit a man to confess his lust when he supports the destructive Democrats, the abortion party, a party the prominent members of which are so morally obtuse that they cannot even see the issue of the morality of abortion, dismissing it as a health issue or an issue of women's reproductive rights?  

    ______________________

    *My prediction, made on 19 January 2017, proved correct. In response to Trump's speech at the March for Life the other day, Bernie Sanders tweeted the vicious Orwellianism, "Abortion is health care." Way to go, Bernie, you have further galvanized our opposition to you and what you stand for.

    Note that at the present time no House Democrat is pro-life. The Dems have take a hard Left into the mephitic precincts of lunacy and evil. 


  • Reason Weak and Strong

    Reason proves weak in the search for truth, but strong in the rationalizing of behavior.


  • Word of the Day: Zaftig

    Peter_Paul_Rubens_-_Woman_with_a_Mirror_-_WGA20336-1-e1420157418851Said of a woman. Having a full, shapely figure. Voluptuous. Plump and vigorous. Rubenesque. A Yiddish word. Supposedly from the German saftig, juicy. More here. Trigger Warning! Snowflakes of the distaff persuasion will be offended.

    Time was when 'female persuasion' and the like were used figuratively as a kind of joke; after all, one cannot be persuaded to be female or male. Or recruited. One does not join the female club. Nor can one be assigned one's sex at birth. Being female is something biological, not political or social like a party affiliation. But the times they have a'changed. Nowadays everything is a social construction and a matter of arbitrary identification. So, being female is like being a Democrat!

    Nowadays there is no sex, only gender. How then can anything be sexist? And if, in reality, there are no races — race being a mere social construct — how can there be racism? Inquiring minds want to know.


  • CTRL-F

    Use this command to locate a bit of text in a document.


  • TL;DR

    Too long; didn't read.

    The hyperkineticism of present-day communication forces one to be pithy, which is good in many contexts. The downside you already know about.


  • Is Speech Violence? Culture War 1.0 and Culture War 2.0

    Peter Boghossian:

    The rules of engagement relate to how we deal with our disagreements. In Culture War 1.0, if an evolutionary biologist gave a public lecture about the age of the Earth based on geological dating techniques, creationist detractors would issue a response, insist that such dating techniques are biased, challenge him to a debate, and ask pointed—if unfairly loaded—questions during the Q&A session.

    In Culture War 2.0, disagreements with a speaker are sometimes met with attempts at de-platforming: rowdy campaigns for the invitation to be rescinded before the speech can be delivered. If this is unsuccessful, critics may resort to disrupting the speaker by screaming and shouting, engaging noise makers, pulling the fire alarm, or ripping out the speaker wires. The goal is not to counter the speaker with better arguments or even to insist on an alternative view, but to prevent the speaker from airing her views at all.

    Today’s left-wing culture warriors are not roused to action only by speakers whose views run afoul of the new moral orthodoxy. They combat “problematic” ideas anywhere they’re found, including peer-reviewed academic journals. In 2017, Portland State University Political Science Professor Bruce Gilley published a peer-reviewed article titled “The Case for Colonialism” in Third World Quarterly. Many academicians were enraged, but rather than write a rebuttal or challenge Gilley to a public debate (as they might have done in the era of Culture War 1.0), they circulated a popular petition demanding that Portland State rescind his tenure, fire him, and even take away his Ph.D. “The Case for Colonialism” was eventually withdrawn after the journal editor “received serious and credible threats of personal violence.”

    Christian organizations have a long history of censorship, and this has continued to some extent even in recent decades. All the same, such an attempt to suppress an academic article would have been almost unthinkable during Culture War 1.0. There were some analogous attempts on the part of Christians during precursors of this culture war, as for example in the incidents surrounding Tennessee’s Butler Act of 1925 and the subsequent “Scopes Monkey Trial.” And religious would-be censors during Culture War 1.0 did occasionally make attempts on novels and movies interpreted as blasphemous or obscene, such as The Last Temptation of Christ (1988). But for the most part, Creationists in the first Culture War didn’t want evolutionary biologists to lose their tenure and their doctorates. They wanted to debate and prove them wrong.

    One common theme running throughout Culture War 2.0 is the idea, endorsed by many well-meaning activists, that speech is violence. And if speech is violence, the thinking goes, then we must combat speech with the same vigor we use to combat physical violence. This entails that we cannot engage supposedly violent speech, sometimes referred to indiscriminately as “hate speech,” merely with words. If someone is being punched in the face, it’s futile to say, “Would you kindly stop?” or “This is not an ethical way to behave.” You need to take action. The rules of engagement change if speech cannot be met with speech—with written rebuttals, debates, and Q&A sessions. If speech is violence, it must either be prevented or stopped with something beyond speech, such as punching Nazis, throwing milkshakes, or using institutional mechanisms to smother unwanted discourse.

    Is Speech Violence?

    As the nursery rhyme goes,

    Sticks and stones may break my bones
    But words can never hurt me.

    No speech is physically violent, and so the first thing that ought to be said is that unwanted speech, offensive speech, dissenting speech, contrarian speech, polemical speech, and the like including so-called 'hate speech,' ought not be met by physical violence.  There are exceptions, but in general, speech is to be countered, if it is countered and not ignored,  by speech, not physical assaults on persons or property private or public.  The speech may be sweet and reasonable or ugly and combative.

    Here is an exception. Some speech is of course psychologically violent and psychologically damaging to some of those who are its recipients. The young, the impressionable, and the sensitive can be harmed, and in instances terribly, by psychologically violent speech.  Suppose one parent is verbally abusing a sensitive child in a psychological damaging way. ("You worthless piece of shit, can't you do anything right? I wish you were never born!") The other parent would be justified in using physical violence to stop the verbal abuse.

    A second exception. Blasphemers invade a church service.  It would be morally permissible to force them to leave by physical means.   A third exception. Protestors block a major traffic artery. The police would be justified in using physical force to remove the law breakers.  In this case it is not the speech that is being countered by physical violence but the protestors' illegal action of blocking the artery.

    But in general, no speech may be legitimately countered with physical violence to the person or property of the speaker.  Speech is not a form of physical violence and may not be countered by physical violence.

    That's one point. A second is that we of the Coalition of the Sane are justified is using physical violence against those who try to shut down our dissent by physical means if the authorities abdicate.  This is why Second Amendment rights are so very important.

    Finally, as I have said many times, dissent is not hate to those who can think straight and are morally sane.


  • Could it be Reasonable to Affirm the Infirmity of Reason?

    Any reasons one adduces in support of the thesis of  the infirmity of reason will share in the weakness of the faculty whose weakness is being affirmed.  Is this a problem for the proponent of the thesis? Does he contradict himself? Not obviously: he might simply accept the conclusion that the reasoning in support of the thesis is inconclusive.

    Suppose I argue that, with respect to all substantive philosophical theses, there there are good arguments  pro and good arguments contra, and that these arguments 'cancel out.'  Now my thesis is substantive, and so my thesis applies to itself, whence it follows that my meta-thesis has both good arguments for it and good arguments against it, and that they cancel out.

    Where is the problem? I am simply applying my meta-philosophical skepticism to itself, as I must if I am to be logically consistent.  Now I could make an exception for my meta-thesis, but that, I think, would be intolerably ad hoc.

    I am not dogmatically affirming the infirmity of reason; I am merely stating that there are reasons to accept it, reasons that are not conclusive.

    Deeper into this topic:

    Seriously Philosophical Theses and Argument Cancellation

    Thought, Action, Dogma, and De Maistre: The Infirmity of Reason


  • The Deep Thinker

    Elias Canetti, The Agony of Flies: Notes and Notations (Die Fliegenpein: Aufzeichnungen), Noonday 1994, tr. H. F. Broch de Rothermann, bilingual ed., p. 25:

    His thoughts have fins instead of wings.

    It flows better in German:

    Sein Denken hat Flossen statt Flügel.

    The title is my creation.

    Many of Canetti's notations express insights; others, however striking, are exercises in literary self-indulgence, not that there is anything wrong with that.

    Here are some good ones:

    No code is secret enough to allow for the expression of complete candor. (5)

    He will never be a thinker: he doesn't repeat himself enough. (13)

    He desires the existence of the people he loves, but not their presence and their preoccupations. (15)

    He wishes for moments that burn as long as match. (15)

    I read that as a protest against time's fugacity.

    He is as smart as a newspaper; he knows everything and what he knows changes from day to day. (19)

    Even the great philosopher benefits from exaggeration, but with him she must wear a tightly woven garment of reason. The poet, on the other hand, exposes her in all her shimmering nudity. (19)

    It's easy to be reasonable when you don't love anyone, including yourself. (21)

    On fair days he feels too sure of his own life. (23)

    That resonates with me.  But it is not an aphorism if an aphorism must present a universal truth.  This is an aphorism: On fair days one feels too sure of one's own life.  But this is the philosopher talking with his zeal to transcend the particular toward the universal. The poet is more at home, or entirely at home,  with the particular. There is an advantage to Canetti's formulation: it cannot be contradicted. He is reporting the feeling of a particular man, presumably himself.  The corresponding aphorism invites counterexamples.

    God does not like us to draw lessons from recent history. (23)

    I surmise that the thought driving the aphorism is that the horrors of the 20th century make theistic belief psychologically impossible. Who can believe in God after Auschwitz?

    Related: Susan Sontag on the Art of the Aphorism 

    Addendum.  Contrast

    On fair days he feels too sure of his own life

    with 

    He whose days are fair feels too sure of his own life.

    'He' in the second sentence functions as a universal quantifier, not as a pronoun.  Pronouns have antecedents: the 'he' in the second sentence has no antecedent.  Nor does it need one. The 'he' in the first sentence, however, could be called a dangling pronoun: its antecedent is tacit, and is presumably 'Canetti.'  If this is right, the two sentences express different thoughts and are not intersubstitutable salva veritate.  

    I rather doubt that Canetti would approve of this analysis. Too philosophical.


  • Saturday Night at the Oldies: Varia

    Bob Dylan, Cold Irons Bound. When your name is 'Bob Dylan' you have your pick of sidemen. A great band. "The walls of pride, they're high and they're wide. You can't see over, to the other side."

    Joe Brown, Sea of  Heartbreak.  Nothing touches Don Gibson's original effort, but this is very satisfying version.

    Elvis Presley, Little Sister 

    Carole King, You've Got a Friend

    Buddy Guy, et al., Sweet Home Chicago. Looks like everyone is playing a Strat except for Johnny Winter.

    Ry Cooder, He'll Have to Go.  A fine, if quirky, cover of the old George Reeves hit from 1959.

    Marty Robbins, El Paso. Great guitar work.



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