{"id":9778,"date":"2012-04-11T07:11:51","date_gmt":"2012-04-11T07:11:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/04\/11\/david-brightlys-weblog-and-a-punctilio-anent-predication-and-inclusion\/"},"modified":"2012-04-11T07:11:51","modified_gmt":"2012-04-11T07:11:51","slug":"david-brightlys-weblog-and-a-punctilio-anent-predication-and-inclusion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/04\/11\/david-brightlys-weblog-and-a-punctilio-anent-predication-and-inclusion\/","title":{"rendered":"David Brightly’s Weblog and a Punctilio Anent Predication and Inclusion"},"content":{"rendered":"

The unduly modest David Brightly has begun a weblog entitled tillyandlola<\/a>, "scribblings of no consequence."   In a recent post<\/a> he criticizes my analysis of the invalidity of the argument: Man is a species; Socrates is a man; ergo, Socrates is a species.  I claimed that the argument equivocates on 'is.'  In the major premise, 'is' expresses a relation of conceptual inclusion: the concept man<\/em> includes the subconcept species<\/em>.  In the minor premise, however, the 'is' is the 'is' of predication: Socrates falls under<\/em> man, he doesn't fall within<\/em> it.<\/span><\/p>\n

I am afraid that my analysis is faulty, however, and for the reasons that David gives.  There is of course a difference between the 'is' of inclusion and the 'is' of predication.  'Man is an animal' expresses the inclusion of the concept animal<\/em> within the concept man<\/em>.  'Socrates is a man,' however, does something different: it expresses the  fact that Socrates falls under<\/em> the concept man<\/em>.  <\/span><\/p>\n

But as David notes, it is not clear that species <\/em>is included within the concept man<\/em>.  If we climb the tree of Porphyry we will ascend from man<\/em> to mammal<\/em> to animal<\/em>; but nowhere in our ascent will we hit upon species<\/em>.  <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The unduly modest David Brightly has begun a weblog entitled tillyandlola, "scribblings of no consequence."   In a recent post he criticizes my analysis of the invalidity of the argument: Man is a species; Socrates is a man; ergo, Socrates is a species.  I claimed that the argument equivocates on 'is.'  In the major premise, 'is' … Continue reading “David Brightly’s Weblog and a Punctilio Anent Predication and Inclusion”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[108,84],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9778","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-logica-docens","category-predication"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9778","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9778"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9778\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9778"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9778"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9778"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}