{"id":9756,"date":"2012-04-22T17:04:00","date_gmt":"2012-04-22T17:04:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/04\/22\/is-every-concrete-being-contingent\/"},"modified":"2012-04-22T17:04:00","modified_gmt":"2012-04-22T17:04:00","slug":"is-every-concrete-being-contingent","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/04\/22\/is-every-concrete-being-contingent\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Every Concrete Being Contingent?"},"content":{"rendered":"

A reader experiences intellectual discomfort at the idea of a being that is both concrete and necessary.  He maintains that included in the very concept concrete being<\/em> is that every such being is concrete.  To put it another way, his claim is that it is an analytic or conceptual truth that every concrete being is contingent.  But I wonder what arguments he could have for such a view.  I also wonder if there are any positive arguments against it. <\/span><\/p>\n

1. We must first agree on some terminology.  I suggest the following definitions:<\/span><\/p>\n

D1.  X is concrete =df x is possibly such that it is causally active\/passive.  A concretum is thus any item of any category that can enter into causal relations broadly construed. <\/span><\/p>\n

D2. X is abstract =df X is not concrete.  An abstractum is thus any item that is causally inert.<\/span><\/p>\n

D3. X is necessary =df X exists in all possible worlds. <\/span><\/p>\n

D4. X is contingent =df X exists in some but not all possible worlds.<\/span><\/p>\n

The modality in question is broadly logical.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. Now if this is what we mean by the relevant terms, then I do not see how it could be an analytic or conceptual  truth that every concrete being is contingent.   No amount of analysis of the definiens<\/em> of (D1) yields the idea that a concrete being must be contingent.  God is concrete by (D1), but nothing in (D1) rules out God's being necessary.<\/span><\/p>\n

3.  Off the top of my head, I can think of three arguments to the conclusion that everything concrete is contingent, none of which I consider compelling.<\/span><\/p>\n

Everything concrete is physical<\/span><\/em>
Nothing physical is necessary<\/span><\/em>
Ergo<\/span><\/em>
Nothing concrete is necessary<\/span><\/em>
Ergo<\/span><\/em>
Everything concrete is contingent.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

The second premise is true, but what reason do we have to accept the first premise? <\/span><\/p>\n

Whatever we can conceive of as existent we can conceive of as nonexistent<\/span><\/em>
Whatever we can conceive of is possible<\/span><\/em>
Ergo<\/span><\/em>
Everything is such that its nonexistence is possible<\/span><\/em>
Ergo<\/span><\/em>
Everything is contingent<\/span><\/em>
Ergo<\/span><\/em>
Everything concrete is contingent.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

One can find the first premise in Hume.  I believe it is correct.  Everything, or at least everything concrete, is such that its nonexistence is thinkable, including God.  By 'thinkable' I mean 'thinkable without logical contradiction.' But what reason do I have to accept the second premise?  Why should my ability to conceive something determine what is possible in reality apart from me, my mind, and its conceptual powers?    If God is necessary, and exists, then he exists even if I can conceive him as not existing.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nothing is such that its concept C entails C's being instantiated<\/span><\/em>
A necessary being is one the concept C of which entails C's being instantiated<\/span><\/em>
Ergo<\/span><\/em>
Nothing  is necessary.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

The first premise is true, or at least it is true for concrete beings.  But what reason do we have to accept the second premise?  I reject that definition.  A necessary being is one the nonexistence of which is possible.  The existence of God is not a Fregean mark (Merkmal<\/em>) of the concept God.  <\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Is there some other argument? I would like to know about it.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A reader experiences intellectual discomfort at the idea of a being that is both concrete and necessary.  He maintains that included in the very concept concrete being is that every such being is concrete.  To put it another way, his claim is that it is an analytic or conceptual truth that every concrete being is contingent.  But … Continue reading “Is Every Concrete Being Contingent?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[143,235],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9756","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-god","category-modal-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9756","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9756"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9756\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9756"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9756"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9756"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}