{"id":9733,"date":"2012-05-03T15:21:45","date_gmt":"2012-05-03T15:21:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/05\/03\/catalog-of-possible-responses-to-why-is-there-anything-at-all\/"},"modified":"2012-05-03T15:21:45","modified_gmt":"2012-05-03T15:21:45","slug":"catalog-of-possible-responses-to-why-is-there-anything-at-all","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/05\/03\/catalog-of-possible-responses-to-why-is-there-anything-at-all\/","title":{"rendered":"A Catalog of Possible Types of Response to ‘Why Is There Anything At All?’"},"content":{"rendered":"

By my count there are seven possible types of response to the above question, which I will call the Leibniz question.  I will give them the following names: Rejectionism, Mysterianism, Brutalism, Theologism, Necessitarianism,  Nomologism\/Axiologism, and Cosmologism.  As far as I can see, my typology, or rather my emendation of Rescher's typology,  is exhaustive.  All possible solutions must fall under one of these heads.  You may send me an e-mail if you think that there is an eighth type of solution.<\/span><\/p>\n

Either the Leibniz question is illegitimate, a pseudo-question, or it is a genuine question.  If the   former, then it cannot be answered and ought to be rejected.  Following Rescher, we can call this first response  <\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Rejectionism<\/em>.  The rejectionist rejects the question as ill-formed, as senseless.  Compare the question, 'How fast does time flow?'  The latter is pretty obviously a pseudo-question resting as it does on a false presupposition, namely, that time is a  measurable process within time.  Whatever time is, it is not a process in time. If it flows, it doesn't flow like a river at some measurable rate.  One does not answer a pseudo-question; one rejects it.  Same with such complex questions as 'When did you stop smoking dope?' The Leibniz question in its contrastive formulation — Why is there something rather than nothing? — may well be a pseudo-question. I gave an argument for this earlier<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

If the the Leibniz question is legitimate, however, then it is either unanswerable or answerable.  If unanswerable, then the question points to a mystery.  We can call this response<\/span><\/p>\n

Mysterianism<\/em>.  On this approach the  question is held to be genuine, not pseudo as on the rejectionist approach, but unanswerable.  The question has a clear sense and does not rest on any false presupposition.  But no satisfying answer is available.<\/span><\/p>\n

If the question is answerable, then there are five more possible responses.<\/span><\/p>\n

Brutalism or Brute Fact Approach<\/em>.  On this approach there is no explanation as to why anything at all exists.  It is a factum brutum<\/em>.  As Russell said in his famous BBC debate with the Jesuit Copleston, "The universe is just there, and that is all." (Caveat lector<\/em>: Quoted from memory!)  A brute fact may be defined as an obtaining state of affairs that obtains without cause and without reason.  If the Principle of Sufficient Reason holds, then of course there are no brute facts.  The principle in question, however, is contested.<\/span><\/p>\n

Theologism or Theological Approach<\/em>.  There is a metaphysically necessary and thus self-explanatory  being, God, whose existence and  activity explains the existence of everything other than God.  Why is there anything at all?  Because everything is either self-explanatory (causa sui<\/em>) or caused to exist by that which is self-explanatory.<\/span><\/p>\n

Necessitarianism.<\/em>  On this approach, the metaphysical necessity that traditional theology ascribes to God is ascribed to the totality of existents: it exists as a matter of metaphysical necessity.  It is necessary that there be some totality of existents or other, and (what's worse) that there be precisely this<\/em> totality and no other. There is no real contingency. Contingency is merely epistemic.  Why is there anything at all?  Because it couldn't have been otherwise!<\/span><\/p>\n

Nomologism\/Axiologism<\/em>. Theories of this type have been proposed by A. C. Ewing (Value and Reality<\/em>, 1973), John Leslie (Universes<\/em>, 1989), and Nicholas Rescher, The Riddle of Existence<\/em>, 1984).  I will provide a rough sketch of Rescher's approach. <\/span><\/p>\n

For Rescher, there is a self-subsistent realm of real possibilities or "proto-laws" whose mode of being is independent of the existence of substances.  This realm of real possibilities is  not nothing, but it is not a realm of existents.  Rescher's claim is that the proto-laws account for the existence of things "without being themselves embodied in some existing thing or things." (27)  Some facts, e.g., that there are things (substances) at all, is "Grounded in the nature of possibility." (27)  What is the nature of this grounding? R. speaks of "nomological causality" as opposed to "efficient causality." (21)  Somehow — and I confess to finding this all rather murky — the proto-laws nomologically cause the existence of physical substances.  How does this explain why there is something rather than nothing?<\/span><\/p>\n

R. argues, p. 31: (a) If every R-possible world is F, then the actual world is F. (b) Every R-possible world is nonempty. Therefore, (c) The actual world is nonempty: there is something rather than nothing (31).  That is, only nonempty worlds are really possible. As R. remarks, the reasoning here is like the ontological argument: only an actual God is really possible.  Rescher's view seems to be that, while there is a plurality of possible worlds, there is no possible world empty of physical existents.  But how does Rescher support premise (b): Every R-possible world is nonempty?  He gives a ridiculous question-begging argument (p. 32) that I won't bother to reproduce.<\/span><\/p>\n

Cosmologism<\/em>.  The above six approaches are listed by N. Rescher (The Riddle of Existence<\/em>, 1984, Ch. 1).  But I believe there is a seventh approach which I learned from my old friend Quentin Smith. (A later post will deal with this in detail.)    On this approach the Leibniz question is genuine (contra Rejectionism) and has an answer (contra Mysterianism).  Moreover, the answer has the form of an explanation (contra Brutalism).  But the answer do not involve any necessary substance such as God, nor does it take the line that the universe itself exists of necessity.  Nor does the answer ascribe any causal efficacy to abstract laws or values.  The idea is that the universe has the resources to explain its own existence:  it caused itself to exist.  Roughly, everything (space-time, matter, laws) came into existence 13.7 billion years ago; it was caused to come into existence; but it was not caused to come into existence by anything distinct from the universe.  How?  Well, assume that the universe is just the sum total of its states.   Assume further that if each state has an explanation, then this suffices as an explanation of the sum total of states.  Now each state has a causal explanation in terms of an earlier state.  There is no first state despite the fact that the universe is metrically finite in age: 13.7 billion years old.   There is no first state because of the continuity of time and causation: for every state there are earlier states in its causal ancestry.  Because every state has a cause, and the universe is just the sum-total of its states, the universe has  a cause.  But this cause is immanent to the universe.  So the universe caused itself to exist!<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By my count there are seven possible types of response to the above question, which I will call the Leibniz question.  I will give them the following names: Rejectionism, Mysterianism, Brutalism, Theologism, Necessitarianism,  Nomologism\/Axiologism, and Cosmologism.  As far as I can see, my typology, or rather my emendation of Rescher's typology,  is exhaustive.  All possible … Continue reading “A Catalog of Possible Types of Response to ‘Why Is There Anything At All?’”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,224,218],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9733","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-explanation","category-nothingness"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9733","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9733"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9733\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9733"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9733"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9733"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}