{"id":9668,"date":"2012-05-29T15:44:54","date_gmt":"2012-05-29T15:44:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/05\/29\/more-on-c-j-f-williams-on-existence\/"},"modified":"2012-05-29T15:44:54","modified_gmt":"2012-05-29T15:44:54","slug":"more-on-c-j-f-williams-on-existence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/05\/29\/more-on-c-j-f-williams-on-existence\/","title":{"rendered":"More on C. J. F. Williams on Existence"},"content":{"rendered":"

I have been arguing with London Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' about existence for years.  Here is part of  a post from the old blog dated 25 January 2006.  Ed has never said anything to budge me from my position.  So why continue?  One reason is to clarify and deepen one's understanding of one's own position.  I am also fascinated by the problem of disagreement in general.  Why do intelligent and sincere people disagree?  What can be done about it?  What does protracted disagreement say about us and our condition?<\/span><\/p>\n

…………..<\/span>
     <\/span>
I reject nonexistent objects in Meinong's sense. (But note well: to reject Meinongian possibilia<\/em> and<\/span>
impossibilia<\/em> is not to reject non-epistemic possibilities and impossibilities. One can be a modal realist without being a possibilist; one can be an actualist. I am an actualist.) Given my rejection of Meinongian nonexistent objects, I cannot take negative existentials at face value.<\/span><\/p>\n

'Frictionless planes do not exist,' for example, cannot be interpreted to be about nonexistent frictionless planes; it must be interpreted in some other way. In the language of Bertrand Russell circa 1918, one <\/span>might say this: The propositional function 'x is a frictionless plane' is never true. Or one could say that the concept frictionless plane<\/em> has no instances. Or: the property of being a frictionless plane is <\/span>not instantiated. The point here is that the property does<\/em> exist, and so is there to have a property predicated of it, the second-level property of being uninstantiated.<\/span><\/p>\n

So I agree with Williams and 'Ockham' that there are no nonexistent objects and that apparent reference to them must be paraphrased away. There is no individual of which  we can say: it does not  exist, is not actual, is not real. But why should it follow that there  is no individual of which we can say: it exists, is actual, is real?<\/span><\/p>\n

In my book, this is a non sequitur<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Williams assumes a sort of symmetry thesis: if there are no individuals that do not exist, then there are no individuals that exist. But my A Paradigm Theory of Existence<\/a> rejects this symmetry thesis (pp. 114-116). Here is the way I put it in my book:<\/span><\/p>\n

     If an individual exists, then no doubt it instantiates properties,<\/span>
     satisfies descriptions and saturates concepts. But its existence<\/span>
     cannot consist in, be identical with, its doing any of those<\/span>
     things. However, if a putative individual does not exist, then its<\/span>
     nonexistence can easily consist in a property's being<\/span>
     uninstantiated. For a nonexistent individual is not a genuine<\/span>
     individual, contra Meinong, but the mere absence of something of a<\/span>
     more or less complete description. Thus there is no individual<\/span>
     Pegasus to lack existence or to have nonexistence. [ . . .]<\/span><\/p>\n

     Nonexistence is therefore always general nonexistence as opposed to<\/span>
     singular nonexistence. But existence is primarily singular<\/span>
     existence, the existence of individuals. Thus the asymmetry of<\/span>
     existence and nonexistence. There is singular existence (the<\/span>
     existence of individuals) and general existence (the<\/span>
     being-instantiated of concepts) which latter presupposes singular<\/span>
     existence: a first-level concept cannot be instantiated unless<\/span>
     there exists an individual that instantiates it. But there is no<\/span>
     such thing as singular nonexistence, e.g., the nonexistence of<\/span>
     Cerberus. Thereis only general nonexistence, which is a<\/span>
     second-level property.<\/span><\/p>\n

So to Williams and 'Ockham' I say: You are right that there are no nonexistent objects. But you are wrong to infer that existence cannot  belong to individuals. It is well-nigh self-evident that existence <\/span>belongs to individuals and can be predicated of them, as I do when, enacting the Cartesian cogito<\/em>, I conclude, sum<\/em>, 'I exist.'It is therefore a mistake to think that 'exist(s)' can only be used as a second-level predicate.<\/span><\/p>\n

'Exist(s)' has both legitimate second-level and legitimate first-level uses.  Suppose I spy a mountain lion in my back yard.  I exclaim, 'There are mountain lions around here.'  That is a general existential sentence.  I could just as well have said, 'Mountain lions exist around here.'  The latter sentence sports a second-level use of 'exist.'  The sentence is not about any particular mountain lion even though based on the observation of a particular such critter.  Suppose I dub the distinctive cat, 'Monty.'  I can then say 'Monty exists,' and if he dies, 'Monty no longer exists.'  These latter two sentences feature first-level uses of 'exists.'<\/span><\/p>\n

The attempt to reduce all first-level uses to second-level uses is throughly wrongheaded and impossible to carry out.  For details, see C. J. F. Williams' Analysis of 'I Might Not Have Existed.'<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I have been arguing with London Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' about existence for years.  Here is part of  a post from the old blog dated 25 January 2006.  Ed has never said anything to budge me from my position.  So why continue?  One reason is to clarify and deepen one's understanding of one's own position.  I am … Continue reading “More on C. J. F. Williams on Existence”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9668","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9668","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9668"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9668\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9668"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9668"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9668"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}