{"id":9631,"date":"2012-06-17T17:07:20","date_gmt":"2012-06-17T17:07:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/06\/17\/the-modified-leibniz-question-the-debate-so-far\/"},"modified":"2012-06-17T17:07:20","modified_gmt":"2012-06-17T17:07:20","slug":"the-modified-leibniz-question-the-debate-so-far","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/06\/17\/the-modified-leibniz-question-the-debate-so-far\/","title":{"rendered":"The Modified Leibniz Question: The Debate So Far"},"content":{"rendered":"
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What follows is a guest post by Peter Lupu with some additions and corrections by BV. 'CCB' abbreviates 'concrete contingent being.'  The last post in this series is <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>.  Thanks again to Vlastimil Vohamka for pointing us to Maitzen's article, which has proven to be stimulating indeed.<\/span><\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/span><\/div>\n
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So far as I can see Steve Maitzen (in Stop Asking Why There's Anything<\/a>)  holds three theses:<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
A. Semantic Thesis<\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
1. As a general rule, dummy sortals such as \u2018thing\u2019, \u2018object\u2019, \u2018CCB\u2019, etc., are not referential terms, unless there is an explicit or implicit background presupposition as to which sortal term is intended as a replacement. This presupposition, if satisfied, fixes the referent of the dummy sortal. In the absence of the satisfaction of such a presupposition, sentences in which they are used (not mentioned) have no truth-conditions and questions in which they are used (not mentioned) have no answer-conditions.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
2. Examples such as \u2018Cats are CCBs\u2019 are no exception. Either this sentence has no truth-conditions because the term \u2018CCB\u2019 is merely a place holder for an unspecified sortal or it should be understood along the lines of: \u2018Cats are animals\u2019, etc., where \u2018animal\u2019 is (one possible) substitution term for the dummy sortal \u2018CCB.'<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
BV adds:  Right here I think a very simple objection can be brought against the semantic thesis.  We know that cats exist, we know that they are concrete, and we know that they are contingent.  So we know that 'Cats are concrete contingent beings' is true.  Now whatever is true is meaningful (though not vice versa). Therefore, 'Cats are concrete contingent beings' is meaningful.  Now if a sentence is meaningful, then its constituent terms are meaningful.  Hence 'CCB' is meaningful despite its being a dummy sortal.  I would also underscore a point I have made several times  before.  The immediate inference from the admittedly true (a) to (b) below is invalid:<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
a. The question 'How many CCBs are there?' is unanswerable, hence senseless<\/span><\/div>\n
ergo<\/span><\/div>\n
b. The question 'Why are there any CCBs?' is unanswerable, hence senseless.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
3. The semantic thesis is the driving force behind Steve M\u2019s view. It is the fallback position in all of his responses to challenges by Bill, Steven, and others. So far as I can tell, Steve M. did not defend the general form of the semantic thesis in his original paper. It is, therefore, surprising that it has been ignored by almost everyone in these discussions and that neither Bill nor Steven challenged the <\/span>semantic thesis. I have written an extensive comment<\/a> on this thesis and challenged it on several grounds.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
B.  Explanatory Thesis<\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/strong><\/span> <\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
1. As a general rule, Why-Questions are answered by giving an explanation. \u2018Why are there any CCBs?\u2019 <\/span>
is a [explanation-seeking<\/span>] Why-Question. [It is worth noting that the grammatically interrogative form of words 'Why is there anything at all?' could be used simply to express wonder that anything at all should exist, and not as a demand for an explanation.<\/span>]  Therefore, it invites an explanation. What sort of explanation? Steve M. holds two theses about this last question:<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
(MI) The Adequacy Thesis<\/em>: empirical explanations typical in science offer (at least in principle) adequate explanations for the Why-CCBs question, provided the Why-CCB questions are meaningful at all (and their meaningfulness is a function of satisfying the semantic thesis);<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
(MII) The Completeness Thesis<\/em>: Once an empirical explanation is given to Why CCBs?, there is nothing left to explain. And in any case there are no suitable forms of explanation beyond empirical <\/span>
explanations that could be even relevant to explain Why-CCBs?<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
2. Bill and Steven certainly deny (MII). They may also have some reservations about MI. What is the <\/span>
basis on which Bill and Steven challenge MII? They maintain that even if we assume that an adequate empirical explanation is offered (i.e., MI is satisfied) to each and every CCB, there is something else left over to explain. What is that \u201csomething else\u201d that is left over that needs explaining (Steve M. asks)?<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
3. It is at this juncture that the discussion either reverts back to the semantic thesis or it <\/span>
needs to be advanced into a new metaphysical realm.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
C. Metaphysical Thesis<\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
Dummy sortals do not pick out any  properties or universals (monadic or relational) except via the mediation of genuine sortals. i.e., there are no properties over and beyond those picked out by genuine sortals.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
1. Steven attempted to answer the challenge posed by the question at the end of B2 in one of his posts. <\/span>
His answer is this: what is left over after all empirical explanations favored <\/span>by Steve M. are assumed to have been given is a very general <\/em><\/span>property, feature, or aspect that all CCBs, and only CCBs, have in common. So why shouldn't <\/span>\u2018Why-CCBs\u2019 questions be understood as inquiring into an explanation of <\/span>this general feature that all and only CCBs share? Call this alleged general <\/span>feature \u2018X\u2019.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
2. The dispute has turned to whether X has any content, i.e., Steve M. challenged the contention <\/span>
that there is any phenomenon described by X that was not already accounted for by his favorite empirical explanations. Bill and Steven tried to articulate the content of X without (apparently) noticing that every such effort was rebutted by Steve M. either by appealing to the semantic thesis or to the explanatory thesis or both.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
3. So what could X be? I suggest the following: X is the (second-order) property such that the <\/strong><\/span>
property of *is a contingent being* is instantiated<\/strong> (or something along these lines).  [I would put it this way:  X is the being-instantiated of the property of being a contingent being.]<\/span><\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
4. Since the universal\/property *is a contingent being* need not be instantiated, the fact that it is in fact instantiated in the actual world (i.e., that X holds) needs explaining (So claim Bill and Steven). And whatever is the explanation (including a \u201cbrute-fact\u201d explanation) for this fact, it cannot take the form of an empirical explanation.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
5. The Metaphysical Thesis I am attributing to Steve M. of course rules out that there is a property <\/span>
such as X. Why? Two reasons: first, the property *is a contingent being* is not a sortal property; second, the predicate \u2018is a contingent being\u2019 (or any of its variants) contains a dummy sortal and therefore it does not pick out a property (nor does it have an extension) in the absence of a specific background presupposition of a specific sortal substituend.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
D. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/strong><\/span> <\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
Unless these three theses are clearly separated, the discussion will be going in circles. As one can see, the driving force behind the explanatory and metaphysical theses is ultimately the semantic thesis. No one challenged this thesis directly (except me in a comment that was ignored <\/a>by everyone with the exception of Bill).<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

What follows is a guest post by Peter Lupu with some additions and corrections by BV. 'CCB' abbreviates 'concrete contingent being.'  The last post in this series is here.  Thanks again to Vlastimil Vohamka for pointing us to Maitzen's article, which has proven to be stimulating indeed.     So far as I can see … Continue reading “The Modified Leibniz Question: The Debate So Far”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,224,408,723,701],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9631","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-explanation","category-language-philosophy-of","category-leibniz","category-lupu-peter"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9631","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9631"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9631\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9631"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9631"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9631"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}