{"id":9502,"date":"2012-08-01T16:50:49","date_gmt":"2012-08-01T16:50:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/08\/01\/holes-and-their-mode-of-being-2\/"},"modified":"2012-08-01T16:50:49","modified_gmt":"2012-08-01T16:50:49","slug":"holes-and-their-mode-of-being-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/08\/01\/holes-and-their-mode-of-being-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Holes and Their Mode of Being"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Consider a particular hole H in a piece of swiss cheese.&#0160; H is not nothing.&#0160; It has properties.&#0160; It has, for example, a shape: it is circular.&#0160; The circular hole&#0160;has a definite radius, diameter, and circumference.&#0160; It has a definite area equal to pi times the radius squared.&#0160; If the piece of cheese is 1\/16th of an inch thick, then the hole is a disk having a definite volume.&#0160; H has a definite location relative to the edges of the piece of cheese and relative to the other holes.&#0160; H has causal properties: it affects the texture and flexibility of the cheese and its resistance to the tooth.&#0160; H is perceivable by the senses: you can see it and touch it.&#0160; You touch a hole by putting a finger or other appendage into it and experiencing no resistance.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Now if anything has properties, then it exists.&#0160; H has properties; so H exists.&#0160;<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">H exists and the piece of cheese exists.&#0160; Do they exist in the same way?&#0160; Not by my lights.&#0160; The hole depends for its existence on the piece of cheese; the latter does not depend for its existence on the former.&#0160; H is a particular, well-defined, indeed wholly determninate, absence of cheese.&#0160; It is a particular, existing absence.&#0160; As an absence of cheese it depends for its existence on the cheese of which it is the hole.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">So I say the hole exists in a different way than the piece of cheese.&#0160; It has a dependent mode of existence whereas the piece of cheese has a relatively independent mode of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">On the basis of this and other examples I maintain that there are modes of being.&#0160; To be precise, I maintain that it is intelligible that there be modes of being.&#0160; This puts me at odds with those, like van Inwagen, who consider the idea unintelligible and rooted in an elementary mistake:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">. . . the thick conception of being is founded on the mistake of transferring what properly belongs to the nature of a chair &#8212; or of a human being or of a universal or of God &#8212; to the being of the chair. (<em>Ontology, Identity, and Modality<\/em>, Cambridge 2001, p. 4)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Did I make a mistake above, the mistake van Inwagen imputes to thick theorists?&#0160; Did I mistakenly transfer what properly belongs to the nature of the hole &#8212; its dependence on the piece of cheese &#8212; to the being (existence) of the hole?<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">I plead innocent.&#0160; Perhaps it is true that it is the nature of holes <em>in general<\/em> that they depend for their existence on the things in which they are holes.&#0160; But H is a <em>particular<\/em>, spatiotemporally localizable, hole in a <em>particular<\/em> piece of cheese.&#0160; Since H is a particular existing hole, it cannot be part of H&#39;s multiply exemplifiable nature that it depend for its existence on the particular piece of cheese it is a hole in.&#0160; The dependence of H on its host is due to H&#39;s mode of existence, not to its nature.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Suppose there are ten quidditatively indiscernible holes in the piece of cheese: H1, H2, . . . H10.&#0160; Each exists.&#0160; Each has its own existence.&#0160; But each has the very same nature.&#0160; How then can this common nature be the factor responsible for making H1 or H2 or H3, etc., &#0160;dependent on the particular piece of cheese?&#0160; The dependence of each hole on its host is assignable not to the nature common to all ten holes but to each hole&#39;s existence as a mode of its existence.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Now of course this will not convince any thin theorist.&#0160; But then that is not my goal.&#0160; My goal is to show that the thick theory is rationally defensible and not sired by any obvious &#39;mistake.&#39;&#0160; If any &#39;mistakes&#39; are assignable then I &#39;d say they are assignable with greater justice to the partisans of the thin theory.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Talk of &#39;mistakes,&#39; though, is out of place in serious philosophy.&#0160; For apart from clear-cut logical blunders such as affirming the consequent, quantifier shift fallacies, etc. any alleged &#39;mistakes&#39; will rest on debatable substantive commitments.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Consider a particular hole H in a piece of swiss cheese.&#0160; H is not nothing.&#0160; It has properties.&#0160; It has, for example, a shape: it is circular.&#0160; The circular hole&#0160;has a definite radius, diameter, and circumference.&#0160; It has a definite area equal to pi times the radius squared.&#0160; If the piece of cheese is 1\/16th &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/08\/01\/holes-and-their-mode-of-being-2\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Holes and Their Mode of Being&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[487,142,477,218],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9502","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-constituent-ontology","category-existence","category-negativity","category-nothingness"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9502","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9502"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9502\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9502"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9502"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9502"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}