{"id":9394,"date":"2012-09-03T13:11:39","date_gmt":"2012-09-03T13:11:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/09\/03\/could-a-universe-of-contingent-beings-be-necessary\/"},"modified":"2012-09-03T13:11:39","modified_gmt":"2012-09-03T13:11:39","slug":"could-a-universe-of-contingent-beings-be-necessary","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/09\/03\/could-a-universe-of-contingent-beings-be-necessary\/","title":{"rendered":"Could a Universe of Contingent Beings be Necessary?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">If everything in the universe is contingent, does it follow that the universe is contingent?&#0160; No it doesn&#39;t, and to think otherwise would be to commit the <a href=\"http:\/\/maverickphilosopher.typepad.com\/maverick_philosopher\/2012\/02\/composition-formal-or-informal-fallacy.html\" target=\"_self\">fallacy of composition<\/a>.&#0160; If the parts of a whole have a certain property, it does not follow that the whole has that property.&#0160; But it is a simple point of logic that a proposition&#39;s not following from another is consistent with the proposition&#39;s being true.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">And so while one cannot straightaway infer the contingency of the universe from the contingency of its parts, it is nevertheless true that the universe is contingent.&#0160; Or so I shall argue.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">The folowing tripartition is mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive:&#0160;&#0160; necessary, impossible, contingent.&#0160; A necessary (impossible, contingent) being is one that exists in all (none, some but not all) possible worlds.&#0160; I will assume an understanding of possible worlds talk.&#0160; See my <a href=\"http:\/\/maverickphilosopher.typepad.com\/maverick_philosopher\/modal-matters\/\" target=\"_self\">Modal Matters <\/a>category for details.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Our question is whether the universe U, all of whose members are contingent, is itself contingent.&#0160; I say it is, and argue as follows.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">1. Necessarily, if U has no members, then U does not exist. (This is because U is just the totality of its members: it is not something in addition to them.&#0160; If U has three members, a, b, and c, then U is just those three members taken collectively: it is not a fourth thing distinct from each of the members.&#0160; U depends for its existence on the existence of its members.)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">2. There is a possible world w in which there are no concrete contingent beings.&#0160; (One can support this premise with a subtraction argument.&#0160; If a world having n members is possible, then surely a world having&#0160; n-1 members is possible.&#0160; For example, take the actual world, which is one of the possible worlds, and substract me from it.&#0160; Surely the result, though&#0160; sadly impoverished, &#0160;is a&#0160;possible world.&#0160; Subtract London Ed from the result.&#0160; That too is a possible world.&#0160; &#0160;Iterate the subtraction procedure until you arrive at a world with n minus n ( = 0) concrete contingent members.&#0160;&#0160; One could also support the premise with a conceivability argument.&#0160; It is surely conceivable that there be no concrete contingent beings.&#0160; This does not entail, but is arguably evidence for, the proposition that it is possible that there be no concrete contingent beings.)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">3. W is a world in which U has no members.&#0160; (This follows from (2) given that U is the totality of concrete contingent beings.)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">4. W is a world in which U does not exist. (From (1) and (3))<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">5. U is a contingent being.&#0160; (This follows from (4) and the definition of &#39;contingent being.&#39;)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">6. The totality of contingent beings is itself contingent, hence not necessary.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">What is the relevance of this to cosmological arguments?&#0160; If the universe is necessary, then one cannot sensibly ask why it exists.&#0160; What must exist has the ground of its existence in itself.&#0160; So, by showing that the universe is not necessary, one removes an obstacle to cosmological argumentation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Now since my metaphilosophy holds that nothing of real importance &#0160;can be strictly proven in philosophy, the above argument &#8211; which deals with a matter of real importance &#8212; does not strictly prove its conclusion. But it renders the conclusion rationally acceptable, which is all that we can hope for, and is enough.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>If everything in the universe is contingent, does it follow that the universe is contingent?&#0160; No it doesn&#39;t, and to think otherwise would be to commit the fallacy of composition.&#0160; If the parts of a whole have a certain property, it does not follow that the whole has that property.&#0160; But it is a simple &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/09\/03\/could-a-universe-of-contingent-beings-be-necessary\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Could a Universe of Contingent Beings be Necessary?&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[551,20,235],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9394","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-cosmological-arguments","category-metaphilosophy","category-modal-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9394","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9394"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9394\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9394"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9394"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9394"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}