{"id":9381,"date":"2012-09-07T12:38:44","date_gmt":"2012-09-07T12:38:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/09\/07\/the-aporetics-of-existence-and-self-identity\/"},"modified":"2012-09-07T12:38:44","modified_gmt":"2012-09-07T12:38:44","slug":"the-aporetics-of-existence-and-self-identity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/09\/07\/the-aporetics-of-existence-and-self-identity\/","title":{"rendered":"The Aporetics of Existence and Self-Identity"},"content":{"rendered":"

Andrew B.<\/a> made some powerful objections to a recent existence post<\/a>.  His remarks suggest the following argument:<\/span><\/p>\n

Argument A<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Existence is self-identity<\/span>
2. My existence is contingent:  (\u2203x)(x = I) & Poss ~(\u2203x) (x = I)<\/span>
Therefore<\/span>
3. My self-identity is contingent:  I = I & Poss ~ (I = I)<\/span><\/p>\n

Argument A may be supplemented by the following consideration.  Since I am contingent, there are possible worlds in which I do not exist.  Not being in those worlds, I cannot have properties in them, including the property of self-identity. So it is not the case that I am necessarily<\/em> self-identical; I am self-identical only in those worlds in which I exist, which is to say: I am contingently<\/em> self-identical.  I am self-identical in some but not all worlds.<\/span><\/p>\n

The argument can be rationally resisted.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Consider a possible world w in which I do not exist.  In w, the proposition expressed by an utterance by me of 'I am not self-identical' is true.  But if it is true in w, then the proposition exists in w.  Now if the proposition exists in w, then so do its constituents.  On a Russellian view of propositions, I am one of the proposition's  constituents.  So for the proposition  *I am not self-identical* to be true in w, I must exist in w.  But if I exist in w, then of course I am self-identical in w, and the proposition is false in w.  But the same goes for every world in which I do not exist.  It follows that I am self-identical in every world and I exist in every world.<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, one needn't take a Russellian line on propositions.  One could take a Fregean view according to which propositions about me do not have me as a constituent but an abstract representative of me, a sense or mode of presentation.  But the first-person singular pronoun 'I' has the peculiarity that it cannot be replaced salva significatione<\/em> by any description; so even if there is an abstract representative of me in the Fregean proposition expressed by my utterance of  'I am not self-identical,' there still has to be a referent of the representative external to the proposition.  So I have to exist in w for the proposition *I am not self-identical* to be true in w.  But if I exist in w then I am self-identical in w.  This in turn implies that the proposition is not true.   <\/span><\/p>\n

The cognoscenti<\/em> will appreciate that what I have been doing in a rough and dirty way is reproducing some of the thoughts in Timothy Williamson<\/a>'s paper Necessary Existents<\/a>.  I am doing so to show that Argument A is not convincing.  Making use of materials from Williamson's paper, we can 'throw Argument A into reverse':<\/span><\/p>\n

Argument B<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Existence is self-identity<\/span>
~3. My self-identity is necessary: Nec (I = I)<\/span>
Therefore<\/span>
~2. My existence is necessary.<\/span><\/p>\n

In point of validity, there is nothing to choose between A and B: both are valid.  And both, I submit, have counterintuitive conclusions.  It seems to me that the arguments cancel each other out.  So I propose that we think very skeptically about the common premise that existence is self-identity, and the Quinean thin theory that commits us to it.  <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Andrew B. made some powerful objections to a recent existence post.  His remarks suggest the following argument: Argument A 1. Existence is self-identity2. My existence is contingent:  (\u2203x)(x = I) & Poss ~(\u2203x) (x = I)Therefore3. My self-identity is contingent:  I = I & Poss ~ (I = I) Argument A may be supplemented by … Continue reading “The Aporetics of Existence and Self-Identity”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21,142,346],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9381","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aporetics","category-existence","category-identity-and-individuation"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9381","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9381"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9381\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9381"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9381"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9381"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}