{"id":9169,"date":"2012-12-06T11:58:00","date_gmt":"2012-12-06T11:58:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/12\/06\/constituent-ontology-and-the-problem-of-change-2\/"},"modified":"2012-12-06T11:58:00","modified_gmt":"2012-12-06T11:58:00","slug":"constituent-ontology-and-the-problem-of-change-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2012\/12\/06\/constituent-ontology-and-the-problem-of-change-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Constituent Ontology and the Problem of Change"},"content":{"rendered":"

In an earlier entry<\/a> I sketched the difference between constituent ontology (C-ontology) and relational ontology (R-ontology) and outlined an argument against R-ontology.  I concluded that post with the claim that C-ontology also faces serious objections.  One of them could be called the 'argument from change.'<\/span><\/p>\n

The Argument from Change<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n


\n\"Avocado\"<\/a>Suppose avocado A, which was unripe a week ago is ripe today. This is an example of alterational (as opposed to existential) change.  The avocado has become different. But it has also remained the same. It is different in respect of ripeness but it is one and the same avocado that was unripe and is now ripe.<\/span><\/p>\n

Alterational change  is neither destruction nor duplication. The ripening of an avocado does not cause it to cease to exist. The ripening of an avocado is not the ceasing to exist of one particular (the unripe avocado) followed by the coming into existence of a numerically distinct avocado (the ripe one).<\/span><\/p>\n

It is also clear that one cannot speak of change if there are two avocados, A and B, indiscernible except in respect of ripeness\/unripeness, such that A is unripe at time t while B is ripe at time t* (t*> t). If my avocado is unripe at t while yours is ripe at t*, that circumstance does not constitute a change.  Alteration requires that one and the same thing<\/em> have incompatible properties at different times. This is necessary for alteration; whether it is sufficient is a further question.<\/span><\/p>\n

That there is alterational change is a datum.  That it requires  that one and the same thing persist over an interval of time during which it has incompatible properties follows from elementary  'exegesis' or 'unpacking' of the datum.<\/span><\/p>\n

The question before us is whether any C-ontology can do justice to the datum and its exegesis.<\/span><\/p>\n

All C-ontologists are committed to what Michael J. Loux calls "Constituent Essentialism."  ("What is Constituent Ontology?" Novak et al. eds., p. 52) It is the C-ontological analog of mereological essentialism.  We can put it like this:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Constituent Essentialism<\/strong>: A thing has each of its ontological parts necessarily.  This implies that a thing cannot gain or lose an ontological part without ceasing  to be same thing.<\/span><\/p>\n

Mereological Essentialism<\/strong>: A thing has each of its commonsense parts necessarily.  This implies that a thing cannot gain or lose a commonsense part without ceasing to be the same thing.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

To illustrate, suppose an ordinary particular (OP) is a bundle of compresent universals.  The universals are the ontological parts of the OP as a whole.  The first of the two principles entails that ordinary particulars cannot change.  For (alterational) change is change in respect of properties under preservation of numerical diachronic identity.  But preservation of identity is not possible on Constituent Essentialism.  The simple  bundle-of-universals theory appears incompatible with the fact of change.<\/span><\/p>\n

I agree with Loux that Constituent Essentialism is a "framework principle" (p. 52) of C-ontology.  It cannot be abandoned without abandoning C-ontology.  And of course the fact of change and what it entails (persistence of the same thing over time)  cannot be denied.  So the 'argument from change' does seem to score against primitive versions of the bundle-of-universals theory.<\/span><\/p>\n

Can the Objection Be Met?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The foregoing objection can perhaps be met met by sophisticating the bundle theory and adopting a bundle-bundle theory.  Call this BBT.  Accordingly, a thing that persists over time such as an avocado is a diachronic bundle of synchronic or momentary bundles.  The theory  has two stages.  <\/span><\/p>\n

First, there is the construction of momentary bundles from universals.  Thus my avocado at a time  is a bundle of universals. Then there is the construction of a diachronic bundle from these synchronic bundles. The momentary bundles have universals as constituents while the diachronic bundles do not have universals as constituents, but individuals.  This is because a bundle of universals at a time is an individual.  At both stages the bundling is contingent: the properties are contingently bundled to form momentary bundles and these resulting bundles are contingently bundled to form the persisting thing.<\/span><\/p>\n

Accordingly, the unripe avocado is numerically the same as the ripe avocado in virtue of the fact that the earlier momentary bundles which have unripeness as a constituent  are ontological parts <\/span>
of the same diachronic whole as the later momentary bundles which have ripeness as a constituent.  <\/span><\/p>\n

A sophisticated bundle theory does not, therefore, claim that a persisting thing is a bundle of properties; the claim is that a persisting thing is a bundle of individuals which are themselves bundles of properties.  This disposes of the objection from change at least as formulated above. <\/span><\/p>\n

There are of course a number of other objections that need to be considered — in separate posts.  But on the problem of change C-ontology looks to be in better shape than Loux makes it out to be.<\/span><\/p>\n

I should add that I am not defending the bundle-bundle theory.  In my Existence book I take a different C-ontological tack.<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
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\"\"<\/a>Constituent Ontology Versus Relational Ontology and an Argument Against the Latter<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In an earlier entry I sketched the difference between constituent ontology (C-ontology) and relational ontology (R-ontology) and outlined an argument against R-ontology.  I concluded that post with the claim that C-ontology also faces serious objections.  One of them could be called the 'argument from change.' The Argument from Change Suppose avocado A, which was unripe … Continue reading “Constituent Ontology and the Problem of Change”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[487,346,204,86],"tags":[721,720],"class_list":["post-9169","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-constituent-ontology","category-identity-and-individuation","category-time-and-change","category-wholes-and-parts","tag-change","tag-constituent-ontology"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9169","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9169"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9169\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9169"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9169"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9169"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}