{"id":8932,"date":"2013-03-09T11:55:45","date_gmt":"2013-03-09T11:55:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/03\/09\/abstracta-omnitemporal-or-timeless-an-argument-from-mccann\/"},"modified":"2013-03-09T11:55:45","modified_gmt":"2013-03-09T11:55:45","slug":"abstracta-omnitemporal-or-timeless-an-argument-from-mccann","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/03\/09\/abstracta-omnitemporal-or-timeless-an-argument-from-mccann\/","title":{"rendered":"Abstracta: Omnitemporal or Timeless? An Argument from McCann"},"content":{"rendered":"

Is everything in time? Or are there timeless entities?  So-called abstracta are held by many to be timeless.  Among abstracta we find numbers, (abstract as opposed to concrete) states of affairs, mathematical (as opposed to commonsense) sets, and Fregean (as opposed to Russellian) propositions, where a Fregean proposition is the sense of an indexical-free sentence in the indicative mood.  The following items are neither in space, nor causally active\/passive, but some say that they exist in time at every time: 7, 7's being prime<\/em>, {7}, 7 is prime<\/em>.  If an item exists in time at every time, then it is omnitemporal<\/em>.  If an item is 'outside' time, then it is timeless<\/em> or eternal<\/em> or, to be helpfully pleonastic in the manner of McCann, timelessly eternal<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Let us agree that a temporalist is one for whom everything is in time, while an eternalist is one for whom some things are not in time.  <\/span><\/p>\n

On p. 55 of his Creation and the Sovereignty of God<\/strong> (Indiana University Press 2012), Hugh McCann argues that the temporalist cannot formulate his thesis without presupposing that there are timeless states of affairs, at least of the negative sort.  Here is how I see the argument.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Part of what the temporalist says is that<\/span><\/p>\n

1. There are no timeless states of affairs.<\/span><\/p>\n

How is 'there are no' in (1) to be understood?  The temporalist must intend it to be taken in a way consistent with temporalism, thus:<\/span><\/p>\n

2. There never have been, are not now, and never will be any timeless states of affairs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Unfortunately, the eternalist will agree with the temporalist on the truth of (2).  Consider 7's being prime<\/em>.  Both agree that at no time does this state of affairs exist.  The agreement is unfortunate because it shows that the bone of contention cannot be formulated in terms of (2).  The bone of contention must be formulated in terms of (1) taken tenselessly.  But then the temporalist ends up presupposing that there are timeless states of affairs.  For he presupposes that there is the timeless state of affairs, There being no timeless states of affairs<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Temporalism, when properly formulated, i.e., when formulated in a way that permits disagreement between temporalist and eternalist, refutes itself by implying its own negation.<\/span><\/p>\n

Is this 'Mavericked-up' McCann argument a good argument or not?  Have at it, boys.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Parallel with the Problem of Formulating Presentism<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

We have seen in previous posts that to avoid tautology the presentist must reach for a tenseless sense of 'exists.'  He cannot say, tautologically, that whatever exists (present-tense) exists now.  For that is not metaphysical 'news.'  It is nothing to fight over, and fight we must.  He has to say: Whatever tenselessly exists, exists now.  But then he seems to presuppose that there are times, as real as the present time, at which temporal individuals such as Socrates tenselessly exist.  The upshot is that when presentism is given a nontautological formulation, a formulation that permits disagreement beween presentist and anti-presentist, it refutes itself.  For if there are non-present times as real as the present time, then it is not the case that only present items exist.<\/span> <\/p>\n

Addendum (10 March):  Hugh McCann Responds<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

On the argument from my ch. 3 about timeless states of affairs, I of course stand by it (as of this moment, at least).  But I don\u2019t think this argument alone would suffice to show that there is a B-series.  It might be, for example, that the only timeless states of affairs that there are pertain to abstracta; things like Seven\u2019s being prime<\/em>, and so forth.  If that were so we would get no B-series, because abstracta exhibit no temporal features at all, whereas entities in a B-series share before and after relations.<\/span><\/p>\n

BV replies:  Well, I didn't claim that McCann's argument suffices to show that there is a B-series, a series of events related by the so-called B-relations: earlier than, later than, and simultaneous with.  Perhaps my use of 'eternalist' misled him.  All I meant by it above, as I stated,  is someone who holds that some entities are timeless.  I wasn't using it in the more commonly accepted sense in which it implies a commitment to the B-series. So we agree that the above argues does not suffice to show that there is a B-series.  It could be that there are timeless entities, and entities in time, but no B-series.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for the analogous anti-presentist argument you go on to give, I subscribe to it.  But all it shows, as far as I can see, is that we have to consider talk of tenseless states of affairs legitimate.  But to show that isn\u2019t to show very much.  It doesn\u2019t yet follow, for example, that we have to speak of Socrates as existing tenselessly.  Socrates is not a state of affairs, and there is nothing paradoxical about saying there neither is, was, nor will be a tenseless Socrates.  The question is just whether it is true, and there I am unsure of the answer.  Furthermore, I can imagine someone claiming that when it comes to the concrete world, tenseless states of affairs\u2014the B-series, in effect\u2014is just a necessary fiction, something we need in order to be able to keep proper track of our memories.  I have no knockdown argument for or against this position.  I am inclined to think, however, that it is a vast oversimplification, just as I think presentism is.<\/span><\/p>\n

BV replies: I think what McCann is getting at here is that an adequate formulation of presentism must presuppose the meaningfulness of  talk<\/em> of tenseless states of affairs, but needn't presuppose that there are<\/em> tenseless states of affairs involving entities in time.  If that is what he means, then my quick little argument seems unsound, and McCann shouldn't have subscribed to it.  I'll have to think about it some more.  What a miserably difficult topic this is!<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Defining Presentism<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>McCann, God, and the Platonic Menagerie<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Can a Thing Exist Without Existing Now?<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Time and Tense: Remarks on the B-Theory<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Presentism and Actualism, Tenseless Existence and Amodal Existence<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Is everything in time? Or are there timeless entities?  So-called abstracta are held by many to be timeless.  Among abstracta we find numbers, (abstract as opposed to concrete) states of affairs, mathematical (as opposed to commonsense) sets, and Fregean (as opposed to Russellian) propositions, where a Fregean proposition is the sense of an indexical-free sentence … Continue reading “Abstracta: Omnitemporal or Timeless? An Argument from McCann”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,83,204],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8932","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-nominalism-and-realism","category-time-and-change"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8932","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8932"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8932\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8932"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8932"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8932"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}