{"id":8862,"date":"2013-04-12T15:04:11","date_gmt":"2013-04-12T15:04:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/04\/12\/on-the-meaning-of-life-peter-lupu\/"},"modified":"2013-04-12T15:04:11","modified_gmt":"2013-04-12T15:04:11","slug":"on-the-meaning-of-life-peter-lupu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/04\/12\/on-the-meaning-of-life-peter-lupu\/","title":{"rendered":"On the Meaning of Life: Lupu Contra Vallicella"},"content":{"rendered":"
Bill reveals in his post, Could the Meaning of Life Be the Quest for the Meaning of Life<\/a>, that he \u201ctoyed with the notion that the meaning of life just is the search for its meaning.\u201d He concludes that if the meaning of life were merely the searching for it, then there would be no meaning, strictly speaking. Why? In Part A I outline Bill\u2019s reasoning in the form of a reductio where (*) sentences are assumptions and (1*) is the assumption Bill entertains. In Part B I outline Bill\u2019s argument that he gives elsewhere that supports the crucial premises of his Reductio Argument. In Part C I will show that his argument outlined in Part B is not sound and briefly describe a theory that is not subject to his argument. <\/span><\/div>\n
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A. Bill\u2019s Reductio Argument<\/em><\/span><\/div>\n
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Suppose for the sake of the argument that<\/span><\/div>\n
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1*. The meaning of life is identical to the search for meaning;<\/span><\/div>\n
2. If the meaning of life is the search for it, then the meaning of life is subjective;<\/span><\/div>\n
3. If the meaning of life is subjective, then life has no meaning;<\/span><\/div>\n
4. If the meaning of life is the search for it, then life has no meaning; (from 2 and 3)<\/span><\/div>\n
Therefore,<\/span><\/div>\n
5. If life has meaning, then it cannot be identical to the search for meaning; (from 4)<\/span><\/div>\n
Suppose one holds that <\/span><\/div>\n
6*. Life has meaning.<\/span><\/div>\n
It follows that<\/span><\/div>\n
7. Necessarily, the meaning of life is not identical to the search for meaning. <\/span><\/div>\n
Therefore,<\/span><\/div>\n
7. (1*) is false.<\/span><\/div>\n
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BV responds:  So far, so good, except  that there is no call for the importation of the  modal operator 'necessarily' in (7).  (7) follows from the conjunction of (5) and (6), but from the necessity of the consequence<\/em> one cannot validly infer the necessity of the consequent<\/em>.  The modal fallacy is explained<\/span> here<\/span><\/a>.  I am not denying that (7) is necessarily true; I think it is.  My point is that its necessity is not supported by the premises Peter adduces. <\/span><\/span><\/div>\n
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Bill wholeheartedly endorses the view that the search for meaning is necessary in order to enjoy a meaningful life. He rejects, however, (1*) (his (1)), I suspect due to something like the argument I outlined above. However, I do not think that Bill\u2019s short post and my outline of his argument tells the most important part of the story; far from it. <\/span><\/div>\n
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B. Bill\u2019s Sling-Shot Argument<\/em><\/span><\/div>\n
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Bill\u2019s reductio<\/em> argument heavily depends upon premises (2) and (3). Both are in dire need of justification. Bill offers no such justification in this post, but he does in some others. What justifies premises (2) and (3)? I will outline what I take to be Bill\u2019s argument for (2) and (3) and call it \u201cBill\u2019s Sling-Shot Argument\u201d. <\/span><\/div>\n
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I think Bill has in mind an argument he gave in a previous post titled \u201cWe Cannot Be the Source of Our Own Existential Meaning<\/a>\u201d (Saturday, September 22, 2012 at 12:49 pm; henceforth, \u2018EM\u2019). We are assuming throughout that by \u2018meaning\u2019 we do not mean linguistic meaning<\/em>, but rather what Bill calls existential meaning<\/em>.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Bill thinks that any theory of meaning that identifies meaning with a source internal to the individual will ultimately collapse into an eliminativist theory<\/em>: i.e., a theory that denies that there is any meaning to life. Premises (2) and (3) together summarize this view. It follows, then, that if there is going to be any meaning to life, then its source must be external to the individual. <\/span><\/div>\n
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Why should one think that any internalist theory of meaning collapses into an eliminativist theory? Bill offers what I have called the \u201cSling-Shot-Argument\u201d in order to establish this claim. Bill thinks that all internalist theories are subject to the Sling-Shot Argument. Below is Bill\u2019s Sling-Shot-Argument: <\/span><\/div>\n
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(SI) All internalist theories are committed to the view that the source of meaning is some action (typically mental) of individuals.<\/span><\/div>\n
(SII) If the source of meaning is some action(s) of individuals, then meaning itself is a consequence of such actions. <\/span><\/div>\n
(SIII) If meaning is a consequence of actions of individuals, then there cannot be any meaning prior to, and independently from, the resulting consequences of such actions.<\/span><\/div>\n
(SIV) But \u201clogically and temporally\u201d (EM) individuals must exist prior to undertaking any meaning-bestowal actions and actions must exist prior to their consequences. <\/span><\/div>\n
The above entails that:<\/span><\/div>\n
(SV) \u201c\u2026the acts of meaning-bestowal and the subject whose acts they are, exist meaninglessly.\u201d (EM) 4th<\/sup> paragraph)<\/span><\/div>\n
Therefore:<\/span><\/div>\n
(SVI) \u201c\u2026my existence and my acts of meaning-bestowal are meaningless.\u201d (ibid)<\/span><\/div>\n
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The \u201cSling-Shot-Argument\u201dpurports to show that any internalist theory must collapse into an eliminativist theory. Is the Sling-Shot-Argument sound? I don\u2019t think so.<\/span><\/div>\n
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C. The Sling-Shot Criticized<\/em><\/span><\/div>\n
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I deny premise (SI) of Bill\u2019s Sling-Shot-Argument: i.e., I deny that all internalist theories must hold that the source of meaning is some action of individuals and that, therefore, meaning is a consequence<\/em> of such actions. I deny this premise because I think that it is compatible with an internalist theory to hold that the source of meaning (or its ground) is a certain kind of property that all individual agents possess; namely, the potential of self-reflection<\/em>. Actions (mental or otherwise) enter the picture only as the means to realize this potential. The picture is this. The meaning of life is the potential to self-reflect. All agents have the potential to self-reflect in virtue of being agents. Therefore, all agents have meaning to their life essentially and not merely as a result of the consequences of undertaking certain actions. The more one self-reflects (i.e., performs suitable mental actions), the more one realizes this potential and, therefore, the more one fulfills the meaning of his life. So far as I can see, this version of an internalist account, which we may call The Potentiality Account of Meaning<\/em> (PAM) is not vulnerable to Bill\u2019s Sling-Shot-Argument. Therefore, such an internalist theory does not collapse into an eliminativist theory. Hence, Bill\u2019s Sling-Shot-Argument is not sound. I view Thomas Nagel\u2019s theory of the meaning of life as a good example of an internalist theory which is at heart a PAM. <\/span><\/div>\n
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BV asks: reference?<\/span><\/div>\n
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Nevertheless, I agree with Bill that (1*) is too strong. The meaning of life is not identical to the search for meaning, if by \u2018search\u2019 we mean undertaking certain actions the consequences of which result in a meaningful life. On the other hand, if we think of searching for meaning as essentially a self-reflective activity, then searching for meaning is essential in order to realize the meaning of our life; namely, the potential we already posses. Therefore, viewed in this light, searching for meaning just is part of having meaning. <\/span><\/div>\n
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Response<\/span><\/div>\n
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Peter tells us that we have a certain power or potential, the potential to reflect upon our lives.  I of course agree. Peter then goes on to say, rather more controversially, that "The meaning of life is the potential to self-reflect."  His thought is that our lives have meaning in virtue of their possession of a certain dispositional property (the property of being disposed to self-reflect).  This is a property that we all have, and indeed essentially as opposed to accidentally.    Since we have the property essentially, it is not in our power to either possess it or not, which implies that our possessing it is not a consequence of anything we say or do.  The possession of theproperty is thus not a consequence of acts of meaning bestowal.  So if the meaning of life consists in the possession of this dispositional property, then the meaning of life is objective as opposed to subjective.  And yet on Peter's theory, meaning is endogenic rather than exogenic: it has its source in us, not in something outside of us such as God.  Peter's theory, then, is a theory on which the meaning of life is both objective and internal.  <\/span><\/div>\n
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If Peter is right, then I am wrong.  For what I maintain is that internalist theories of existential meaning, according to which meaning is conferred upon one's life by acts of meaning-bestowal, are unable to confer meaning upon the objective presupposition of meaning-bestowal, namely, the acts themselves and their subjects, which acts and subjects must be logically and temporally prior to the meanings bestowed.  In consequence, internalist theories deliver only subjective meaning.  But if the meaning of life can only be subjective, then there is no such thing as THE meaning of life.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Do I have a good reason to reject Peter's theory?  He tells us that "The meaning of life is the potential to self-reflect."  But surely the actual<\/em> meaning of my life — if it has one — cannot be identified with a power I possess, a power that is what it is whether or not it is ever exercised.  A man who lives the unexamined life, who goes through life unreflectively, never pondering the why or the wherefore, arguably lives a meaningless life despite his power to reflect.  I am assuming that one cannot live meaningfully without choosing and appropriating meanings – which acts require reflection.  But now suppose our man begins  to actualize his reflection potential.  Now his life begins to acquire actual meaning  by his choices and decisions.  But now the problem I raised arises again.  The decisions and choices whereby a person's life acquires actual and concrete meaning are, in themselves, meaningless, as is their subject.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Peter is telling us that there is a property objective and essential possession of which by individuals confers existential meaning upon them.  But of course they cannot have this or any property unless they exist.  Since their existence cannot be accounted for by their possession of this or any property, the meaning (purpose) of their existence cannot be accounted for by possession of this or any property.<\/span><\/div>\n
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I go to Peter.  I ask him, "What is the purpose of my existence?"  He tells me, "The purpose of your existence and of every agent's is to reflect on its existence."  That seems no better than saying: You exist for no purpose except to reflect on your purposeless existence.<\/span><\/div>\n
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\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
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\"\"<\/a>We Cannot Be the Source of Our Own Existential Meaning<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Could the Meaning of Life be the Quest for the Meaning of LIfe?<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Bill reveals in his post, Could the Meaning of Life Be the Quest for the Meaning of Life, that he \u201ctoyed with the notion that the meaning of life just is the search for its meaning.\u201d He concludes that if the meaning of life were merely the searching for it, then there would be no … Continue reading “On the Meaning of Life: Lupu Contra Vallicella”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[701,77],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8862","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-lupu-peter","category-meaning-of-life"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8862","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8862"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8862\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8862"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8862"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8862"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}