{"id":8704,"date":"2013-06-17T04:54:13","date_gmt":"2013-06-17T04:54:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/06\/17\/could-god-and-the-universe-be-equally-real\/"},"modified":"2013-06-17T04:54:13","modified_gmt":"2013-06-17T04:54:13","slug":"could-god-and-the-universe-be-equally-real","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/06\/17\/could-god-and-the-universe-be-equally-real\/","title":{"rendered":"Could God and the Universe be Equally Real?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Not by my lights.  <\/span><\/p>\n

God is self-existent.  The universe is not.  As Hugh McCann puts it, unexceptionably, "the universe is directly dependent on God for its entire being, as far as time extends." (Creation and the Sovereignty of God<\/em>, Indiana UP, 2012, p. 27.) God is a sustaining causa prima <\/em>active at every moment of the universe's existence, not a mere cosmic starter-upper.  Now if God is self-existent or a se<\/em>, while the universe depends for its entire<\/em> being (existence, reality) at each instant of its career on the self-existent creator, then I say that God and the universe cannot be equally real.  God is more real, indeed supremely real.  The universe is less real because derivatively real.  The one has its being from itself, the other from another.  I say that there is a difference in their mode of existence:  both exist but they exist in different ways.  McCann, however, will have none of this:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Existence does not admit of degrees.  A world sustained by God is . . . as real as it could [would] be if it sustained itself. (Ibid<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Let's see if we can sort this out.<\/span><\/p>\n

0. To keep this short, I will not now worry about the difference, if any, between modes of existence and degrees of existence. <\/span><\/p>\n

1. The underlying question is whether it is intelligible to posit modes of existence or modes of being. I maintain that it is intelligible and that it is simply a dogma of (most) analytic philosophers to deny the intelligibility of talk of modes of existence.  See my "Existence: Two Dogmas of Analysis" in Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics<\/em>, eds. Novotny and Novak, Routledge Studies in Metaphysics<\/a>, forthcoming.  But not only is it intelligible to posit modes of existence, in several areas of philosophy it is mandatory.  The present subject is one of them.<\/span><\/p>\n

2.  One thing McCann and I will agree on is that there is a sense of 'exist(s)' according to which God and the universe exist in exactly the same way.  This is the quantifier sense.  Let 'g' be an individual constant denoting God and 'u' an individual constant denoting our universe.  We can then write<\/span><\/p>\n

For some x, x = g<\/span><\/p>\n

and<\/span><\/p>\n

For some x, x = u.<\/span><\/p>\n

Removing the individual constants and replacing them with a free variable yields the predicate expression 'for some x, x = y.'  I grant that this predicate is univocal in sense regardless of the value of 'y.'  In plain English the predicate is 'Something is identical to  ___.'  So in the quantifier sense of 'exist(s),' God and the universe exist in the same way, or rather in no way: they just exist.  In the quantifier sense of 'exist(s),'  it makes no sense to speak of modes of existence or degrees of existence.  Is-identical-with-something-or-other<\/em> does not admit of degrees.  So in the quantifier sense of 'exist(s),' It makes no sense to say that God is more real or more existent than the universe.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the quantifier sense of 'exist(s),'  then, existence does not admit of degrees and no distinction of mode or degree can be made between a universe sustained by God and a self-sustaining universe.  If this is what McCann is saying, then I agree.<\/span><\/p>\n

But please note that the quantifier sense presupposes a first-level sense.  It is trivially true (if we are not Meinongians) that Socrates exists iff something is identical to Socrates.  This presupposes, however, the singular existence of the individual that is identical to Socrates.  Now while there cannot be modes of quantifier or general existence, there can very well be modes of singular existence.  (The arguments aginst this are all unsound as I argue in my Routledge article.)  God and Socrates are both singular and both exist.  But they exist in different ways.  The same goes for God and the created universe as a whole<\/span><\/p>\n

That was but an assertion.  Now for an argument. <\/span><\/p>\n

3. McCann tells us that the universe U has the same reality whether it is self-existent or entirely dependent on God for its existence.  But then what would be the difference between U as self-existent and U as non-self-existent?  The things in it and their properties would be the same, and so would the laws of nature.  Perhaps I will be told that in the one case U has the property aseity<\/em> while in the other case it does not.  But what is aseity? Aseity is just the property of being self-existent.  Existence, however, is not a quidditative property, and neither is self-existence:  they do not pertain to what a thing is.  U is what<\/em> it is whether it exists from itself or from another.  It follows that aseity is not a quidditative property.  The conclusion to draw is that aseity is a way of existing or a mode of existence.  <\/span><\/p>\n

In sum:  there is a difference between U as self-existent and U as non-self-existent (dependent on God).  This difference is not a quidditative difference.  The nature of U is the same whether it self-exists or not. Nor is it a difference in general or quantifier existence: both are something. The difference is a difference in mode of singular existence.  God and the universe exist in different ways or modes.  These three questions need to be distinguished:  What is it?  Is it?  How is it?  <\/span><\/p>\n

4. Could one say that the difference between U as self-existent and U as non-self-existent  is that in the one case U is related to God but in the other case U is not?  This cannot be right since God confers existence upon U<\/em>.  (McCann very plausibly argues that secondary or natural causation is not existence-conferring; primary or divine causation is and must be, as McCann of course maintains.)  U is nothing apart from divine existence-conferral.  It is not as if God exists and U exists, both in the sdame way, and they are tied by a relation of creation.  Creation cannot be a relation logically subsequent to the existence of G and U:  U has no existence apart from this relation.  It is siply nothing apart from God.  But this amounts to saying that U exists is a different way than G.  U exists-dependently while G exists-independently.  One can abstract from this difference and say that both exist in the general or quantifier sense, but that is a mere abstraction.  U and G in their concrete singularity exist in different ways.<\/span><\/p>\n

5.  God is not a being among beings, but Being itself.  This is a consequence of the divine simplicity affirmed by McCann in his final chapter. God is self-existent in virtue of being Existence itself.  McCann's commitment to the divine simplicity is logically inconsistent with his claim that "A world sustained by God is . . . as real as it could [would] be if it sustained itself."<\/span><\/p>\n

In his excellent book McCann resurrects and defends certain Thomist themes without realizing that some of these themes are inconsistent with key tenets of analytic orthodoxy, chiefly, the dogma that there are no modes of existence. <\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Holes and Their Mode of Being<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>McCann, God, and the Platonic Menagerie<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Dallas Willard on Being and Modes of Being<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Abstracta: Omnitemporal or Timeless? An Argument from McCann<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>God, Socrates, and the Thin Theory<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Not by my lights.  God is self-existent.  The universe is not.  As Hugh McCann puts it, unexceptionably, "the universe is directly dependent on God for its entire being, as far as time extends." (Creation and the Sovereignty of God, Indiana UP, 2012, p. 27.) God is a sustaining causa prima active at every moment of the … Continue reading “Could God and the Universe be Equally Real?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,143],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8704","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-god"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8704","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8704"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8704\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8704"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8704"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8704"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}