{"id":8563,"date":"2013-08-11T18:26:01","date_gmt":"2013-08-11T18:26:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/08\/11\/of-primary-substances-and-accidental-unities\/"},"modified":"2013-08-11T18:26:01","modified_gmt":"2013-08-11T18:26:01","slug":"of-primary-substances-and-accidental-unities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/08\/11\/of-primary-substances-and-accidental-unities\/","title":{"rendered":"On Primary Substances and Accidental Unities"},"content":{"rendered":"

I asked genuinely, not rhetorically : What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis<\/em>, suppositum<\/em>)?  The latter figures prominently in the  philosophy of the School, as some call it, and I need to get clear about what supposits are, how they differ from primary substances, and whether there are any non-theological reasons for making the distinction.  In pursuit of the first question I thought it advisable to state what I understand a primary substance to be.  So I wrote:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

By 'substance' I mean an Aristotelian primary substance, an individual or singular complete concrete entity together with its accidents.  Among the characteristics of substances are the following: substances, unlike universal properties, cannot be exemplified or instantiated; substances, unlike accidents, cannot inhere in anything; substances, unlike heaps and aggregates, are per se<\/em> unities. <\/span>Thus Socrates and his donkey are each a substance, but the mereological sum of the two is not a substance.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I thought that was tolerably clear, but as so often happens, a commenter, ignoring my question, took issue with my set-up.  That is, he questioned my characterization of primary substance. Nothing wrong with that, of course.<\/span><\/p>\n

In his last comment, John the Astute Commenter wrote,<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

. . . I *am* saying that Socrates taken together with his accidents is not strictly identical to Socrates taken in abstraction from his accidents. But that point is obvious. What I am adding is this: Socrates taken together with his accidents is not a substance, but an accidental unity of a substance and some accidents. So I deny your claim that "it is only Socrates together with his accidents that is a complete concrete individual primary substance." Socrates together with his accidents may well be the only complete concrete individual, but he is not a primary substance. Nor is he prime matter; as you say, he is a compound of prime matter and substantial form, although in conjunction with his accidents he plays the *role* of matter in the accidental unity between him and his accidents. This would seem to be a debate about Aristotelian exegesis, so I'll leave it there and not continue to hijack your discussion. As I said, I thought the discussion in Z.4-Z.6 would prove relevant to that discussion, but it would seem that I was mistaken on that score, for which I apologize.      <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I will now continue in the second person.<\/span><\/p>\n

No need  to apologize, John.  You have raised an interesting challenge which I ought to be able to meet.  But I want to avoid the labyrinth of Aristotle exegesis to the extent that that is possible, for, lacking as we do the latter-day equivalent of Ariadne's thread<\/a>,  once we enter we are unlikely ever to find our way out again.<\/span><\/p>\n

The disagreement seems to be as follows.  I claim that, from a broadly Aristotelian perspective, which is the perspective of Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and other medievals who speak of substances and supposita, Socrates is a concrete, complete, individual, primary substance at a time t only when taken  together with his accidents at t.  I don't deny that a primary substance can be considered in abstraction from its accidents.  What I am claiming is that in concrete, mind-independent reality Socrates must have some set of accidents or other, and that, only when he is taken together with his accidents is he a primary substance.<\/span><\/p>\n

Your claim is that Socrates together with his accidents (at a time, presumably, if I may interpret you a bit) is not a primary substance but an accidental unity, a hylomorphic compound the 'matter' of which is Socrates as primary substance and the form of which is something like the conjunction of his accidents.  To put the disagreement as sharply as possible, I am claiming that Socrates counts as a primary substance only when taken together with his accidents, whereas you are claiming that Socrates so counts only when he is not<\/em> taken together with his accidents, but taken in abstraction from his accidents.  For one your view, Socrates taken together with his accidents is an accidental unity, not a primary substance.  To get beyond a stand-off we need to consider some arguments.<\/span><\/p>\n

Argument for My View<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Every primary substance is ontologically basic, where ontologically basic entities are those that exist per se<\/em> or independently  unlike secondary substances and accidents. <\/span><\/p>\n

2. Every ontologically basic entity is complete.<\/span><\/p>\n

Definition<\/em>:  x is complete =df<\/sub> for every predicate F, either x is F or x is not F.  (This is rough since some restrictions will have to be placed on the range of the predicate F.  But it is good enough for a blog post.)  Thus either Socrates is either seated at t or he is not.  If he is neither seated nor not seated at t, then he is an incomplete object.  But if he is an incomplete object, then he cannot exist.  Now every ontologically basic entity is possibly such that it exists.  Therefore, every ontologically basic entity is complete.  Every ontologically basic entity satisfies the predicate version of the Law of Excluded Middle.  (I don't think the converse is true, but then I am not affirming the converse.)<\/span><\/p>\n

 Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Every primary substance is complete. (from 1, 2)<\/span><\/p>\n

4. No primary substance minus its accidents is complete.<\/span><\/p>\n

5. No primary substance minus its accidents is a primary substance. (from 3,4)<\/span><\/p>\n

Argument for John's View<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

A. The complete individual Socrates is a hylomorphic compound of matter and form (Premise).<\/span>
B. The [primary] substance Socrates is the matter of the complete individual Socrates (Premise).<\/span>
C.  For all x and for all y, if x is a hylomorphic compound and y is the matter of x, then x is not strictly identical to y.<\/span>
Therefore,<\/span>
D. The complete individual Socrates is not strictly identical to the [primary] substance Socrates.<\/span><\/p>\n

Read charitably, John's argument is an enthymeme the suppressed or tacit premise of which is:<\/span><\/p>\n

S. The complete individual Socrates is an accidental unity of Socrates + his accidents.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Without suppressed premises (S), (B) is obviously false and the argument is unsound.  But with<\/em> (S), John's argument begs the question.<\/span><\/p>\n

Here is another wrinkle.  Some accidents are said to be 'proper.'  These are accidents that are entailed by the nature (essence) of the thing that has the nature, but they are, for all that, accidents.   A proper accident of a substance is one the substance cannot exist without.  To put it paradoxically, a proper accident of a substance is an accident that is 'essential' and therefore not 'accidental' to the substance whose accident it is.  But a better way to put it would be to say that a proper accident, though no part of the essence, is de re<\/em> necessary to the substance having the essence.  <\/span><\/p>\n

To adapt an example from John J. Haldane, if my cat Max is lounging by the fire, he becomes warm.  His warmth is an accident but not a proper accident or proprium<\/em>.  Max is warm both temporarily and contingently in virtue of his proximity to the fire.  But the warmth that flows from his metabolic processes is a proper accident without which Max could not exist.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Now let's suppose that this distinction is not a mere scholastic Spitzfindigkeit<\/em> but 'holds water.'  Then, clearly, and pace<\/em> John, Socrates together with his proper accidents cannot be an accidental unity.  So Socrates as primary substance must include at least his proper accidents.<\/span>  <\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>What is the Difference Between a Substance and a Supposit?<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Trying to Understand Ockham on Supposita in Light of the Incarnation<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Theology Wagging the Ontological Dog?<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Substance and Accident: The Aporetics of Inherence<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Accidents of a Substance: Simple or Complex?<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I asked genuinely, not rhetorically : What is the difference between an Aristotelian primary substance and a supposit (hypostasis, suppositum)?  The latter figures prominently in the  philosophy of the School, as some call it, and I need to get clear about what supposits are, how they differ from primary substances, and whether there are any … Continue reading “On Primary Substances and Accidental Unities”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[22,362],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8563","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aristotle","category-scholasticism-new-and-old"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8563","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8563"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8563\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8563"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8563"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8563"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}