{"id":8466,"date":"2013-09-28T13:08:25","date_gmt":"2013-09-28T13:08:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/09\/28\/existence-blindness-or-double-vision\/"},"modified":"2013-09-28T13:08:25","modified_gmt":"2013-09-28T13:08:25","slug":"existence-blindness-or-double-vision","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/09\/28\/existence-blindness-or-double-vision\/","title":{"rendered":"Existence-Blindness or Double-Vision?"},"content":{"rendered":"


\n\"Ed<\/a>I had the pleasure of meeting London Ed, not in London, but  in Prague, in person, a few days ago.  Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' and I have been arguing over existence for years.  So far he has said nothing to budge me from my position.  Perhaps some day he will.  The following entry, from the old Powerblogs site, whose archive is no more, was originally posted 25 May 2008.  Here it is again slightly redacted.<\/span><\/p>\n

…………….<\/span><\/p>\n

I am racking my brains over the question why commenter 'Ockham' cannot appreciate that standard quantificational accounts of existence presuppose rather than account for singular existence. It seems so obvious to me! Since I want to put off as long as possible the evil day when I will have to call him existence-blind, I will do my level best to try to understand what he might mean.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consider the following renditions of a general and a singular existence statement respectively, where 'E' is the 'existential' or, not to beg any questions, the particular<\/em> quantifier:<\/span><\/p>\n

   1. Cats exist =df<\/sub> (Ex)(x is a cat)<\/span><\/p>\n

   2. Max (the cat) exists =df<\/sub> (Ex)(x = Max).<\/span><\/p>\n

Objectually as opposed to substitutionally interpreted, what the right-hand sides of (1) and (2) say <\/span>in plain English is that something is a cat and that something is (identical to) Max, respectively. Let D be the domain of quantification. Now the right-hand side (RHS) of (1) is true iff at least one member of D is a cat. And the RHS of (2) is true iff exactly one member of D = Max. Now is it not perfectly obvious that the members of D must exist if (1) and (2) are to be true? To me that is obvious since if the members of D were Meinongian nonexistent items, then (1) and (2) would be false. (Bear in mind that there is no logical<\/em> bar to quantifying over Meinongian objects, whatever metaphysical<\/em> bar there might be. Meinongians, and there are quite a few of them, do it all the time with gusto.) <\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore, 'Something is a cat' is a truth-preserving translation of 'Cats exist' only if 'Something is a cat' is elliptical for 'Something that exists<\/em> is a cat.' And similarly for 'Something is Max.' But here is where 'Ockham' balks. He sees no difference between 'something' and 'something that exists' where I do see a difference.<\/span><\/p>\n

I am sorely tempted to call anyone who cannot understand this difference 'existence-blind' and cast him into the outer darkness, that place of fletus et stridor dentium<\/em>, along with qualia-deniers, eliminative materialists, deniers of modal   distinctions, and the rest of the terminally benighted. But I will resist this temptation for the moment.  <\/span><\/p>\n

And were I to label 'Ockham' existence-blind he might return the  'compliment' by saying that I am hallucinating, or suffering from double-vision. "You've drunk so much Thomist Kool-Aid that you see a <\/span>distinction where there isn't one!" But then we get a stand-off in which we sling epithets at each other. Not good for those of us who would like to believe in the power and universality of reason. It should be possible for one of us to convince the other, or failing that, to prove that the issue is rationally undecidable.<\/span><\/p>\n

The issue that divides us may be put as follows. (Of course, it may be that we have yet to locate the exact bone of contention, and in our dance around each other we have succeeded only in 'dislocating' it.)<\/span><\/p>\n

BV: Because the items in the domain of quantification exist, there has to be more to existence than can be captured by the so-called 'existential' quantifier. Existence is not a merely logical topic. Pace<\/em> Quine, it is not the case that "Existence is what existential quantification expresses." Existence is a 'thick' topic: there is room for a metaphysics of existence. One can legitimately ask: What is it for a concrete contingent individual to exist? and one can expect something better than the blatantly circular, 'To exist is to be identical to something.' To beat on this drum one more time, this is a circular explanation because D is a domain all of whose members exist.  One moves in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter if one maintains that to exist is to be identical to something that exists. Note that I wrote circular explanation<\/em>, not circular definition<\/em>.  Note also that I am assuming that there is such a thing as philosophical explanation, which is not obvious, and is denied by some.<\/span><\/p>\n

O: Pace<\/em> BV, the items in the domain of quantification admit of no existence\/nonexistence contrast. Therefore, 'Something is a cat' is indistinguishable from 'Something that exists is a cat.' There is no <\/span>difference at all between 'something' and 'something that exists,' and 'something' is all we need. Now 'something' is capturable without remainder using the resources of standard first-order predicate logic <\/span>with identity. 'Exist(s)' drops out completely. There is no (singular) existence and there are no (singular) existents. There are just items, and one cannot distinguish an item from its existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Now if that is what O means, then I understand him, but only on the assumption that for individuals<\/span><\/p>\n

    3. Existence = itemhood.<\/span><\/p>\n

For if to exist = to be an item, if existence reduces to itemhood, then there cannot be an existence\/nonexistence contrast at the level of items. It is a logical truth that every item is an item, and therefore an item that is not an item would be a contradiction: 'x is an item' has no significant denial. Therefore, on the assumption that existence = itemhood, there is no difference between 'Some item is a cat' and 'Some item that exists is a cat.' And if there is no such difference, then existence is fully capturable by the quantifier apparatus.<\/span><\/p>\n

But now there is a steep price to pay. For now we are quantifying over items and not over existents, and sentences come out true that ought not come out true. 'Dragons exist,' for example, which is false, becomes 'Some item is a dragon' which is true. To block this result, O would have to recur to a first-level understanding of existence as contrasting with nonexistence. He would have to say that every item exists, that there are no nonexisting items. But then he can no longer maintain that 'something' and 'something that exists' are indistinguishable.<\/span><\/p>\n

In defiance of Ed's teacher, C. J. F. Williams, I deny that the philosophy of existence must give way to the philosophy of someness. (Cf. the latter's What is Existence?<\/em> Oxford, 1981, p. 215)  The metaphysics of existence cannot be supplanted by the logic of 'exist(s).'  Existence is not a merely logical topic.<\/span><\/p>\n

Here<\/a> is an obituary of Williams written by Richard Swinburne.
<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Can a Thin Theorist Experience Wonder at Existence?<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>'Something is Self-Identical' Cannot Translate 'There are Objects': Another Argument Against the Thin Theory<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>More on C. J. F. Williams on Existence<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Another Round on the Circularity of the Thin Conception of Existence<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Existence, Circularity, and Metaphysical Grounding<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Could God and the Universe be Equally Real?<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>The Circularity of the Fressellian Account of Existence: Objections and Replies<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Existentials and Their Equivalents: Aid and Comfort for the Thin Theory?<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Van Inwagen on Quine on Existence<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Nausea at Existence: A Continental Thick Theory<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I had the pleasure of meeting London Ed, not in London, but  in Prague, in person, a few days ago.  Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' and I have been arguing over existence for years.  So far he has said nothing to budge me from my position.  Perhaps some day he will.  The following entry, from the old … Continue reading “Existence-Blindness or Double-Vision?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,108],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8466","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-logica-docens"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8466","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8466"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8466\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8466"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8466"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8466"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}