{"id":8450,"date":"2013-10-04T11:40:05","date_gmt":"2013-10-04T11:40:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/10\/04\/ontic-versus-alterity-theism-2\/"},"modified":"2013-10-04T11:40:05","modified_gmt":"2013-10-04T11:40:05","slug":"ontic-versus-alterity-theism-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/10\/04\/ontic-versus-alterity-theism-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Ontic Versus Alterity Theism"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">There is a problem that has occupied me on and off for years. <a class=\"zem_slink\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Mikael_Stenmark\" rel=\"wikipedia\" target=\"_blank\" title=\"Mikael Stenmark\">Mikael Stenmark<\/a>&#39;s Prague paper, &quot;Competing Conceptions of God: The Personal God versus the God beyond Being&quot; got me thinking about it again.&#0160; What follows, however, is not intended as commentary on Stenmark&#39;s paper.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">One way into the problem as I conceive it is via the following aporetic triad:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">1. There are things other than God that exist, and they all depend on God for their existence. <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">2.&#0160; For any x, y, &#0160;if x depends for its existence on y, and x exists, then y exists. (This implies that nothing can depend on God for its existence unless God exists.)<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">3. God is not one of the many things that exist, and so God does not exist.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">It is easy to see that the limbs of the triad cannot all be true. And yet each has some plausibility, at least &#39;in-house,&#39; i.e., among theists.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">(1) or something like it must be accepted by both ontic theists and alterity theists.&#0160; Roughly, an ontic theist is a theist who maintains that God is a being among beings while an alterity theist is one who maintains that God is radically transcendent, radically other, to such an extent that he cannot be identified with any being.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">(2) won&#39;t be accepted by the alterity theists, but it is to my mind exceedingly plausible!&#0160; <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">(3) won&#39;t be accepted by the ontic theist, but many find it plausible.&#0160; <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">But since the limbs cannot all be true, one of them must be rejected.&#0160; (I am assuming, of course, that there cannot be true contradictions.)&#0160; There are therefore three main ways of solving the problem.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">A. The quickest solution, call it Blanket Atheism, is by rejecting (1).&#0160; There is no God in any sense of the term.&#0160; No being is God, and there is no God &#39;beyond being.&#39;&#0160;&#0160; There is just the natural world (and perhaps abstracta) but nature is not God.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">B.&#0160; The alterity theist rejects (2) while accepting (3).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">C.&#0160; The ontic theist accepts (2) while rejecting (3).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">But there are two other C-options, two other options involving the acceptance of (2) and the rejection of (3).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">One could take a monistic tack, roughly along the lines of Spinoza.&#0160; Accordingly, (i) there is a sense in which God exists &#8212; God is not <em>natura naturata<\/em>, but <em>natura naturans<\/em> &#8212; ;&#0160;(ii) God exists in the primary sense of &#39;exists&#39;; (iii) God alone exists, hence is not one of many existents, and so does not exist in the sense in which Spinozistic modes exist.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">This is what I used to think, back in the &#39;80s.&#0160; See my &quot;Two Faces of Theism,&quot; <em>Idealistic Studies<\/em>, vol. xx, no. 3 (September 1990), pp. 238-257.&#0160; But I moved away from this position in the &#39;90s and took an onto-theological turn that found expression in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Paradigm-Theory-Existence-Onto-Theology-Philosophical\/dp\/1402008872\" target=\"_self\">my existence book<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">That is the other C-option.&#0160; Accordingly, God is not an existent&#0160;among&#0160;existents as the ontic theist maintains.&#0160; Nor is God somehow real but nonexistent as the alterity theist maintains.&#0160; Nor is God the one and only existent as the monist maintains.&#0160; Rather, God is self-existent Existence, yet transcendent, <em>pace<\/em> monism.&#0160; This is roughly akin to the position of Aquinas.&#0160; <em>Deus est ipsum esse subsistens.<\/em>&#0160; So God is Being (<em>esse<\/em>) but God also is.&#0160; God is Being but also the prime &#39;case&#39; &#8212; not instance! &#8212; of Being.&#0160; But God is in a mode of Being unlike the mode of Being of anything else. So God is not a being among beings, nor does he have properties in the way Socrates has properties.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">But this too has its difficulties.&#0160; So now I am contemplating the final step: Into the Mystic.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Roughly, the above triad is an<em> aporia<\/em>, an <em>insolubilium<\/em>.&#0160; One has to blast through it, as through a koan, into the Transdiscursive.&#0160; The philosopher, however, hovers at the boundary of the Unsayable, marking it without overstepping it, incapable qua philosopher of effing the Ineffable, but able &#8212; and this is his office &#8211;&#0160;&#0160;to point to it while refuting both denials of it and bad theories about it.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>There is a problem that has occupied me on and off for years. Mikael Stenmark&#39;s Prague paper, &quot;Competing Conceptions of God: The Personal God versus the God beyond Being&quot; got me thinking about it again.&#0160; What follows, however, is not intended as commentary on Stenmark&#39;s paper. One way into the problem as I conceive it &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/10\/04\/ontic-versus-alterity-theism-2\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Ontic Versus Alterity Theism&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21,191,20,41],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8450","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aporetics","category-atheism-and-theism","category-metaphilosophy","category-mysticism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8450","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8450"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8450\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8450"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8450"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8450"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}