{"id":8389,"date":"2013-11-02T13:52:18","date_gmt":"2013-11-02T13:52:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/11\/02\/on-misusing-the-word-lie\/"},"modified":"2013-11-02T13:52:18","modified_gmt":"2013-11-02T13:52:18","slug":"on-misusing-the-word-lie","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/11\/02\/on-misusing-the-word-lie\/","title":{"rendered":"On Misusing the Word ‘Lie’"},"content":{"rendered":"

Keith Burgess-Jackson rightly criticizes<\/a> Rush Limbaugh for using<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

. . . the terms "calculated lie," "purposeful lie," "intentional lie," and "knowing
\nlie" (while referring to Barack Obama's claim that Americans could, if they so
\nchose, keep their insurance policy and their doctor). Calculation, purpose,
\nintention, and knowledge are built into the concept of a lie, so qualifying the
\nterm "lie" in these ways is redundant and has the unfortunate effect of draining
\nthe word "lie" of its meaning. Limbaugh uses "lie" as though it meant
\n"falsehood." It means far more than "falsehood." A lie is a very special
\nfalsehood.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Right.  I will now take the ball and run with it.<\/span><\/p>\n

Every  lie is a false statement, but not every false statement is a lie.  A lie is a false statement made with the intention to deceive.  Since intention to deceive<\/em> is included within the concept lie<\/em>, 'intentional lie' and its cousins are pleonastic.  Someone who speaks of an intentional lie is treating the species as if it were a genus.  'Intentional lie' is like 'true fact.'  Use of these pleonasms marks one as uneducated or worse.  <\/span><\/p>\n

There are two related mistakes one must avoid.  The first is the redundancy mistake just mentioned.  The other is the use of 'lie' to mean a false statement.  The temptation to do so is strong indeed.  Many of us are inclined to think our opponents not just wrong, but culpably wrong: you lied!<\/em>   Michael Medved  speaks irresponsibly of ten big lies<\/em> about America.  But none of his ten falsehoods — and I agree with him that they are all of them falsehoods — is properly describable as a lie.  <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Here<\/a> is one: "The two-party system is broken, and we urgently need a viable third party."<\/span><\/p>\n

Like Medved, I consider that to be false.  But is it a lie?  Do the people who believe the quoted sentence know the truth but are out to deceive us?  Of course not.  I met a woman once who claimed that the moon was its own source of light.  Was she lying?  She uttered a falsehood, which is not the same as lying. Once I jokingly said to my wife that she was lying<\/em> when she said that the room was cold.  "You lie<\/em>!"  First of all, there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not the room is cold.  Her cold is my hot. So what's to lie about?  The only fact of the matter in the vicinity is wifey's feeling<\/em> cold.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Jethro claims that the bottle is half-empty while Earl maintains that it is half-full.  Is one of these yahoos lying?  Here there is a fact of the matter but one describable in two equivalent ways.<\/span><\/p>\n

If a person affirms (denies) the existence of God is the person lying?  Here there is a fact of the matter but one hard to make out.  It is rational to be a theist, but also rational to be an atheist.  So perhaps my definition needs augmenting:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

A lie is a false statement made with the intention to deceive about a definite matter of fact about which knowledge is possible.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

To lie is to misrepresent willfully the way things are when the way things are is ascertainable with a fairly high degree of certainty.  For example,  the way things are with respect to the content of PPACA is easily ascertained: you just read the law.  There is a matter of fact as to what is stated in the law and that fact is easily established.<\/span><\/p>\n

Suppose you and I are discussing some very difficult question in mathematics or metaphysics or cosmology.   I assert that p while you assert that not-p.  It follows that one of us is wrong.  But it does not follow that one of us is lying.<\/span><\/p>\n

Suppose that A and B each have the intention to deceive the other.  A asserts that p, while B asserts its negation.  It is a very interesting question whether both are lying.  One of them is lying, for at least one of them is saying  something false with the intention to deceive.  But are both lying?  Is the intention to deceive sufficient for lying, or must the content asserted also be false?  <\/span><\/p>\n

Here is a further nuance that will bore some of you.  The type-token distinction comes into play.  "The two-party system is broken, and we urgently need a viable third party" is not a statement but a statement type<\/em>.  You don't get a statement until some definite person utters or otherwise tokens the type.  (To token a type is to produce a token of the type.)  But no statement-type can be a lie.  For statement-types float free of language users, and to have a statement, an occurrent stating, a particular speaker must use the statement-type — must token the type — on a particular occasion.  This is another reason to deny that Medved's ten big falsehoods are lies.  Note that a falsehood is false whether or not anyone utters or otherwise tokens a sentence that expresses it.  But a lie is not a lie whether or not anyone utters or otherwise tokens the sentence that expresses it.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is also worth observing that the concept lie<\/em> as I have defined it is not a normative concept.  The definition merely tells us what a lie is.  A lie is a statement made with the intention to deceive.  But it is a further question whether deception is morally impermissible.  And if it is, is it so in all cases or only in some?  <\/span><\/p>\n

Is a liar one who lies?  No.  One can lie without being a liar just as one can get drunk without being a drunkard.  A liar is one who habitually<\/em> lies.  Does it suffice for a person to be a liar that he lie habitually about just one topic, or must he lie habitually about more than one topic?  Interesting question.<\/span><\/p>\n


\n\"Four<\/a>Obama lied repeatedly when he said that under his collectivist scheme every one would get to keep his health plan if he so desired.  May we infer that Obama is a liar?  Or to judge him to be a liar must we also adduce his other (repeated) lies?<\/span><\/p>\n

And then there is the epistemology of the situation.  How do I know<\/em> that Obama lied when he made his now-famous asseveration?  I didn't peer into his soul. I know, or at least I have good reasons for believing that he lied, because he knows the subject-matter of his false statement  and he had a very powerful motive for misrepresenting said subject-matter.  Had he spoken the truth, it is a very good bet that the PPACA would not have passed and become law.<\/span><\/p>\n

So plenty of evidence points in the direction of his being a damned liar.<\/span><\/p>\n

Addendum 3 November<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Dennis Monokroussos comments:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Apropos your post \u201cOn Misusing the Word \u2018Lie\u2019\u201d, it would be better to say that a lie is (among other things) a statement its utterer believes <\/em>to be false. Also, similarly, your augmented definition seems to require the same qualification; to wit, that it\u2019s about something believed<\/em> to be \u201ca definite matter of fact about which knowledge is possible\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

My initial definition was this<\/span><\/p>\n

1. A lie is a false statement made with the intention to deceive.  (That is to be understood as a biconditional: for any x, x is a lie iff x is a statement made with the intention to deceive.)<\/span><\/p>\n

DM suggests<\/span><\/p>\n

2. A lie is a statement believed by its utterer to be false that is made with the intention to deceive.<\/span><\/p>\n

(2), however, allows for the possibility of a true lie.  For suppose a statement is made with the intention to deceive but is falsely<\/em> believed by the utterer to be false.  In such a situation the utterer says something true with the intention to deceive.  Has he lied?<\/span><\/p>\n

Well, what are we trying to do here?  If we are trying to capture the ordinary language meaning of 'lie' and cognates, then I am inclined to say that (2) fails.  For in ordinary English, a lie is a falsehood, though not every falsehood is a lie. I am making an empirical claim about  English as she is spoken by people like me and Monokroussos (educated white male Americans not too far apart in age).  People like us do not use 'lie' in such a way that it is sufficient for x to be a lie that x be made with the intention to deceive.<\/span><\/p>\n

Having made an empirical claim, I am open to empirical refutation by a linguist.<\/span><\/p>\n

If, on the other hand, we are trying to elaborate a systematic theory of lying, bullshitting and related truth-sensitive phenomena, a project that involves replacing the ordinary language concept with a supposedly better one, then perhaps (2) is acceptable.<\/span><\/p>\n

But now we are headed for the metaphilosophical stratosphere.   What is the role of ordinary language analysis in philosophical theorizing?  Ought philosophy be theoretical and explanatory at all?  Should it perhaps content itself with description?  What is analysis anyway?  And what about the paradox of analysis?  And so on and so forth.<\/span> <\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/span><\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Liberals and Straw Men<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>The 'You Didn't Build That' Speech Revisited: Wieseltier Says Romney and Ryan are Lying<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Language<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Obama as Bullshitter<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Rush: Obama lie biggest ever of any president<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Bill Maher shuts down Wasserman Schultz: 'Come on. . . that is a lie'<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Truth and Truthfulness<\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Keith Burgess-Jackson rightly criticizes Rush Limbaugh for using . . . the terms "calculated lie," "purposeful lie," "intentional lie," and "knowing lie" (while referring to Barack Obama's claim that Americans could, if they so chose, keep their insurance policy and their doctor). Calculation, purpose, intention, and knowledge are built into the concept of a lie, … Continue reading “On Misusing the Word ‘Lie’”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,228,125],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8389","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-language-matters","category-truth","category-truthfulness"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8389","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8389"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8389\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8389"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8389"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8389"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}