{"id":8271,"date":"2013-12-18T10:18:01","date_gmt":"2013-12-18T10:18:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/12\/18\/on-multiplying-modes-of-existence\/"},"modified":"2013-12-18T10:18:01","modified_gmt":"2013-12-18T10:18:01","slug":"on-multiplying-modes-of-existence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2013\/12\/18\/on-multiplying-modes-of-existence\/","title":{"rendered":"On Multiplying Modes of Existence"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Unicorn\"<\/a>Am I committed to an uneconomical multiplication of modes of existence?  I said that the following set of propositions is logically consistent:<\/span><\/p>\n

a. Tom is thinking of a unicorn<\/span>
b. Unicorns do not exist in reality<\/span>
c. Tom's mental state is object-directed; it is an intentional state.<\/span>
d. The object of Tom's mental state does not exist in reality.<\/span>
e. The merely intentional object is not nothing.<\/span>
f. The merely intentional object enjoys intentional existence, a distinct mode of existence different from existence in reality.<\/span><\/p>\n

David Brightly in a comment constructs a similar set:<\/span><\/p>\n

By analogy with your (a)–(f) can we not also consistently assert the following? <\/span><\/p>\n

a. This tapestry<\/a>, rather beautifully, depicts a unicorn.<\/span>
b. Unicorns do not exist in the (C1)-sense.<\/span>
c. The tapestry is object-directed; it is a depictional entity.<\/span>
d. The object of the tapestry does not (C1)-exist.<\/span>
e. The merely depicted object is not nothing.<\/span>
f. The merely depicted object enjoys depictional existence, a distinct mode of existence different from (C1)-existence. <\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Likewise, <\/span><\/p>\n

Whereas my view is that when Tom thinks of a unicorn, he is thinking of something, an item that exists merely as the object of Tom's act of thinking, but does not exist mind-independently,<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

has the analogy, <\/span><\/p>\n

When the tapestry depicts a unicorn, it is depicting something, an item that exists merely as the object of the tapestry's depicting, but does not exist tapestry-independently.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Three points.<\/span><\/p>\n

First, the intentionality of Tom's thinking is original while the intentionality of the tapestry is derivative.  The tapestry is not intrinsically  intentional, but derives its intentionality from a mind's taking of the merely physical object as a picture or image of something else.  By itself, the tapestry depicts nothing.  It is just a piece of cloth.<\/span><\/p>\n

Given the first point, my second is that there are not two kinds of intentionality or object-directedness, but only one, the intentionality of the viewer of the tapestry who takes it as representing something, a unicorn. 'Derivative' in 'derivative intentionality' is an alienans<\/em> adjective.<\/span><\/p>\n

Third, if there are not two kinds of intentionality, then there is no call to distinguish, in addition to (C1)-existence (real existence) and intentional existence, depictional existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this way I think I can avoid multiplying modes of existence by the multiplicity of types of physical things (scribbles on paper, trail markers, grooves in vinyl, etc.) that can be taken to represent something.<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Merely Intentional Objects and the 'Existential Fallacy'<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>More on Ficta and Impossibilia<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Do Merely Intentional Objects Have Being of Their Own? With a Little Help from Ingarden<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Are Propositions Counterexamples to Brentano's Thesis?<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Phenomenon and Existence<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Holes and Their Mode of Being<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Imagining X as Real versus Imagining X as Unreal and a Puzzle of Actualization<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Am I committed to an uneconomical multiplication of modes of existence?  I said that the following set of propositions is logically consistent: a. Tom is thinking of a unicorn b. Unicorns do not exist in reality c. Tom's mental state is object-directed; it is an intentional state. d. The object of Tom's mental state does … Continue reading “On Multiplying Modes of Existence”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,100,54],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8271","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-intentionality","category-mind"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8271","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8271"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8271\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8271"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8271"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8271"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}