{"id":7752,"date":"2014-08-22T16:53:49","date_gmt":"2014-08-22T16:53:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/08\/22\/beingless-objects-2\/"},"modified":"2014-08-22T16:53:49","modified_gmt":"2014-08-22T16:53:49","slug":"beingless-objects-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/08\/22\/beingless-objects-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Beingless Objects"},"content":{"rendered":"

For Meinong, some objects neither exist nor subsist: they have no being at all.  The stock examples are the golden mountain and the round square.
<\/span><\/p>\n

London Ed finds this contradictory. "The claim that some objects neither exist nor subsist is an existential claim, of course, so how can 'they' have no being?"<\/span><\/p>\n

But of course<\/em> it is not<\/em> an existential claim from a Meinongian point of view.  Obviously, if it is true<\/em> that some objects are beingless, then 'Some objects are beingless' is not an existential claim.  On the other hand, if it is true that sentences featuring the particular quantifier 'some' all make existential claims, then 'Some objects are beingless' is self-contradictory.<\/span><\/p>\n

So the Grazer can say to the Londoner: "You are begging the question against me!"  And the Londoner can return the 'compliment.'  The Phoenician stands above the fray, merely observing it, as from Mt. Olympus.<\/span><\/p>\n

So far, then, a stand-off.  Ed has not refuted the Meinongian; he has merely opposed him.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ed needs to admit this and give us a better argument against the thesis of Aussersein<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Kripke's Misrepresentation of Meinong<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>The Existent Round Square<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Merely Intentional Objects and the 'Existential Fallacy'<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>More on Ficta and Impossibilia<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>London Ed on Reference to What is Not<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>George F. Will and the Beach Boys Meet Alexius Meinong<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>A Cartesian Argument Against Meinong<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

For Meinong, some objects neither exist nor subsist: they have no being at all.  The stock examples are the golden mountain and the round square. London Ed finds this contradictory. "The claim that some objects neither exist nor subsist is an existential claim, of course, so how can 'they' have no being?" But of course … Continue reading “Beingless Objects”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[482],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7752","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-meinong-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7752","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7752"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7752\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7752"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7752"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7752"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}