{"id":7742,"date":"2014-08-26T13:52:03","date_gmt":"2014-08-26T13:52:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/08\/26\/begging-the-question-against-meinong\/"},"modified":"2014-08-26T13:52:03","modified_gmt":"2014-08-26T13:52:03","slug":"begging-the-question-against-meinong","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/08\/26\/begging-the-question-against-meinong\/","title":{"rendered":"Begging the Question Against Meinong"},"content":{"rendered":"

For Meinong, some objects neither exist nor subsist: they have no being at all.  See Kripke's Misrepresentation of Meinong<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

London Ed finds Meinong's characteristic thesis contradictory. "The claim that some objects neither exist nor subsist is an existential claim, of course, so how can 'they' have no being?"<\/span><\/p>\n

I say that Ed begs the question against Meinong, but Ed denies that he does.  Let us see if we can sort this out.<\/span><\/p>\n

To simplify the discussion and to avoid being  sidetracked by the question about modes of being and whether existence and subsistence are distinct modes of being, let us focus on what is characteristically Meinongian, namely, the claim that some objects have no being at all.  Earlier philosophers had held that there are modes of being, but what is characteristically Meinongian is that claim that some objects, or better, items<\/em>, have no being whatsoever.<\/span><\/p>\n

We can therefore simplify Ed's rhetorical question as follows, "The claim that some objects have no being is an existential claim, so how can 'they' have no being?"  This question suggest the following argument:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1. The claim that some objects have no being is an existential claim.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. An existential claim is one that affirms the being or existence of one or more items.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

3. The claim that some objects have no being is self-contradictory since it is equivalent to 'There exist objects that do not exist' or 'There are objects that are not' or 'Some existing objects do not exist.'<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

It is this argument that I claim begs the question against the Meinongian. It begs the question at premise (1).  For (1) is precisely what the Meinongian denies when he affirms that some objects have no being.<\/span><\/p>\n

There is no need for the phrase 'beg the question' lest that be a further stumbling block for Ed and bone of contention between us. The point is simply that Ed assumes what the Meinongian denies.   If you merely oppose me, or contradict me, then you haven't refuted me.
<\/span><\/p>\n

The Meinongian runs the above argument in reverse:  he grants (2), but then argues from the negation of (3) to the negation of (1).   Or we can put the matter in terms of an antilogism or inconsistent triad:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1. The claim that some objects have no being is an existential claim.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. An existential claim is one that affirms the being or existence of one or more items.<\/span><\/p>\n

~3. The claim that some objects have no being is not self-contradictory.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The limbs cannot all be true.  (2) cannot be reasonably disputed.  The Meinongian solves the problem by rejecting (1), Ed by rejecting (~3).<\/span><\/p>\n

I say there is a stand-off.  I would like Ed to concede this.  The concession would be minimal since it does not prevent him from providing independent reasons for rejecting Meinong's Theory of Objects.  But I know Ed and I am not sanguine about him conceding anything, even the most self-evident of points.<\/span><\/p>\n

I fear that he will say that 'some' by its very meaning is ontologically loaded, that 'Some Fs are Gs' MEANS 'There exists an x such that x is F and x is G.'<\/span><\/p>\n

But I will not respond to this until and unless Ed verifies my fear.
<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
\n
\"\"<\/a>Kripke's Misrepresentation of Meinong<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>A Cartesian Argument Against Meinong<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Beingless Objects<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Merely Intentional Objects and the 'Existential Fallacy'<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>More on Ficta and Impossibilia<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

For Meinong, some objects neither exist nor subsist: they have no being at all.  See Kripke's Misrepresentation of Meinong. London Ed finds Meinong's characteristic thesis contradictory. "The claim that some objects neither exist nor subsist is an existential claim, of course, so how can 'they' have no being?" I say that Ed begs the question … Continue reading “Begging the Question Against Meinong”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[482],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7742","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-meinong-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7742","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7742"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7742\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7742"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7742"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7742"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}