{"id":7705,"date":"2014-09-09T10:58:20","date_gmt":"2014-09-09T10:58:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/09\/09\/the-extremism-of-simone-weil\/"},"modified":"2014-09-09T10:58:20","modified_gmt":"2014-09-09T10:58:20","slug":"the-extremism-of-simone-weil","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/09\/09\/the-extremism-of-simone-weil\/","title":{"rendered":"The Extremism of Simone Weil"},"content":{"rendered":"

A longish essay of mine, Weil's Wager<\/a>, ends like this:<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Weil\"<\/a>Although Weilian disinterest may appear morally superior to Pascalian self-interest, I would say that the former is merely an example of a perverse strain in Weil\u2019s thinking. One mistake she makes is to drive a wedge between the question of the good and the question of human happiness, thereby breaking the necessary linkage between the two. This is a mistake because a good out of all relation to the satisfaction of human desire cannot count as a good for us. <\/span><\/p>\n

What \u201cgood\u201d is a good out of all relation to our self-interest? The absolute good must be at least possibly such as to satisfy (purified) human desire. The possibility of such satisfaction is a necessary feature of the absolute good. Otherwise, the absolute good could not be an ideal for us, an object of aspiration or reverence, a norm. But although the absolute good is ideal relative to us, it is real in itself. Once these two aspects (ideal for us, real in itself) are distinguished, it is easy to see how the absoluteness of the absolute good is consistent with its necessary relatedness to the possibility of human happiness. What makes the absolute good absolute is not its being out of all relation to the actual or possible satisfaction of human desire; what makes it absolute is its being self-existent, a reality in itself. The absolute good, existing absolutely (ab solus<\/em>, a se<\/em>), is absolute in its existence without prejudice to its being necessarily related to us in its goodness. If God is (agapic) love, then God necessarily bestows His love on any creatures there might be. It is not necessary that there be creatures, but it is necessary that God love the creatures that there are and that they find their final good in Him.<\/span><\/p>\n

But not only does Weil divorce the absolute good from the possibility of human happiness, she also makes a second mistake by divorcing it from existence. Thus we read:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

If God should be an illusion from the point of view of existence, He is the sole reality from the point of view of the good. I know that for certain, because it is a definition. \u201cGod is the good\u201d is as certain as \u201cI am.\u201d[viii] <\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

But this is surely incoherent: God cannot be a reality if He does not exist. At most, a nonexistent God could only be an empty and impotent ideal, not a reality but a mere cogitatum<\/em>, or excogitatum<\/em>, if you will. To say that a nonexistent God is yet a reality from the point of view of the good is to divorce the good from what exists, while misusing the word \u201creality.\u201d And although it is certain that \u201cGod is the good,\u201d this is a merely analytic truth consistent with the nonexistence of God. As such, \u201cGod is the good\u201d is wholly unlike \u201cI am,\u201d the truth of which is obviously not consistent with my nonexistence.<\/span><\/p>\n

In divorcing the good from existence, Weil makes the opposite mistake of Richard Taylor. Taylor identifies the good with what is desired, thereby collapsing ought<\/em> into is<\/em> and eliminating the normativity of the good. Weil, sundering the good from desire, cuts it off from everything that exists thereby exalting the normativity and ideality of the good while rendering it impotent. The truth of the matter is that God, the absolute good, is a unity of ideality and reality. As a real Ideal, the absolute good cannot be identified with any mundane fact; as an ideal Reality, the absolute good must exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

So although there may be no trace of self-interest in Weil\u2019s Wager, this gives us no reason to suppose it morally superior to Pascal\u201ds Wager. For the very absence of self-interest shows that Weil\u2019s Wager is built upon an incoherent moral doctrine.<\/span><\/p>\n

\nRelated articles<\/legend>\n
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\"\"<\/a>The Strange World of Simone Weil: God Does and Does Not Exist<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Credo<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>If Everyone Goes Straight to Heaven . . .<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>Leaping Through The Other Side<\/a><\/div>\n
\"\"<\/a>The Metaphysical Case for Abolishing Political Parties<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A longish essay of mine, Weil's Wager, ends like this: Although Weilian disinterest may appear morally superior to Pascalian self-interest, I would say that the former is merely an example of a perverse strain in Weil\u2019s thinking. One mistake she makes is to drive a wedge between the question of the good and the question … Continue reading “The Extremism of Simone Weil”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[143,50,222,179],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7705","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-god","category-good-and-evil","category-happiness","category-weil-simone"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7705","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7705"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7705\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7705"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7705"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7705"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}