{"id":7621,"date":"2014-10-26T18:04:43","date_gmt":"2014-10-26T18:04:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/10\/26\/peter-van-inwagen-on-burden-of-proof-in-philosophy\/"},"modified":"2014-10-26T18:04:43","modified_gmt":"2014-10-26T18:04:43","slug":"peter-van-inwagen-on-burden-of-proof-in-philosophy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/10\/26\/peter-van-inwagen-on-burden-of-proof-in-philosophy\/","title":{"rendered":"Peter van Inwagen on Burden of Proof in Philosophy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.andrewmbailey.com\/\" target=\"_self\">Andrew Bailey<\/a> sends the following quotations for our delectation:<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&quot;(When a philosopher says, &quot;The burden of the proof lies on you&quot;, he means, &quot;You must deduce your conclusion from the truths of immediate sensory experience by means of an argument that is formally valid according to the rules of elementary logic; I on the other hand may employ any dialectical tactic I find expedient&quot;.)&quot;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">-PvI, <em>An Essay on Free Will<\/em>, p.18<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&quot;Where does the burden of proof lie in a philosophical debate? In a debate of the type we are imagining, the answer is clear&#8211;in fact, trivial. The burden of proof lies on the person who&#39;s trying to prove something to someone.&quot;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">-PvI, <em>The Problem of Evil<\/em>, p.46<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Notice that the thesis encoded in the second is a little different (and much more plausible) than &quot;he who asserts must prove&quot;.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">I&#39;d have to examine the context, but the second quotation seems to support what I was saying <a href=\"http:\/\/maverickphilosopher.typepad.com\/maverick_philosopher\/2014\/10\/are-burden-of-proof-considerations-relevant-in-philosophy.html\" target=\"_self\">yesterday<\/a>, namely, that burden-of-proof considerations have no non-trivial role to play in philosophical discussions.&#0160;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">It is quite otherwise in the law, which is where we get the notion of burden of proof (BOP) and the correlative notion of defeasible presumption (DP).&#0160; As N. Rescher remarks (<em>Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition<\/em>, p. 13),&#0160; both are at root legal conceptions dating back to Roman law.&#0160; Now court-room proceedings are essentially both practical and adversarial:&#0160; what is in dispute is not a matter of theory, but a matter bearing upon such things as a person&#39;s wealth and liberty.&#0160; Thus it makes perfect sense that the BOP should be placed on the plaintiff in a civil case and the state in a criminal case, which is equivalent to granting to the accused a defeasible presumption of innocence.&#0160; The <em>onus probandi<\/em> rests on those who make allegations.&#0160; Thus it makes sense <em>within the law<\/em> to maintain that<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;<\/span><\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\"><em>Necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui dicit non ei qui negat.<\/em><\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">The need for proof lies with him who affirms, not him who denies.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Now to my way of thinking, philosophy-as-inquiry is never adversarial, and is primarily theoretical.&#0160; This is part of my reason for thinking that the fundamentally legal notions of BOP and DP ought not be imported into philosophy-as-inquiry.&#0160; It strikes me as very clear that one who makes an accusation bears the burden of proof.&#0160; But it is not so clear that one who makes an assertion bears a burden of proof.&#0160; <\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\">&#0160;<\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Indeed, it is either false or meaningless. For if van Inwagen asserts that there are no modes of being, and I assert that there are, then we both make assertions.&#0160; So if he who asserts bears a burden of proof, then we both bear the burden of proof &#8212; which trivializes the very notion of BOP.<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\">&#0160;<\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">So I am skeptical about the importation of the fundamentally legal concept of BOP from that essentially adversarial and practical dialectical context into philosophy-as-inquiry.&#0160; But this is a complicated topic.&#0160; I&#39;ll say some more tomorrow.<\/span><\/div>\n<div style=\"text-align: justify;\">&#0160;<\/div>\n<div><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Comments are enabled!<\/span><\/div>\n<fieldset class=\"zemanta-related\">\n<legend class=\"zemanta-related-title\">Related articles<\/legend>\n<div class=\"zemanta-article-ul zemanta-article-ul-image\" style=\"margin: 0; padding: 0; overflow: hidden;\">\n<div class=\"zemanta-article-ul-li-image zemanta-article-ul-li\" style=\"padding: 0; background: none; list-style: none; display: block; float: left; vertical-align: top; text-align: left; width: 84px; font-size: 11px; margin: 2px 10px 10px 2px;\"><a href=\"http:\/\/maverickphilosopher.typepad.com\/maverick_philosopher\/2014\/10\/are-burden-of-proof-considerations-relevant-in-philosophy.html\" style=\"box-shadow: 0px 0px 4px #999; padding: 2px; display: block; border-radius: 2px; text-decoration: none;\" target=\"_blank\"><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"\" src=\"https:\/\/i.zemanta.com\/305972913_80_80.jpg\" style=\"padding: 0; margin: 0; border: 0; display: block; width: 80px; max-width: 100%;\" \/><\/a><a href=\"http:\/\/maverickphilosopher.typepad.com\/maverick_philosopher\/2014\/10\/are-burden-of-proof-considerations-relevant-in-philosophy.html\" style=\"display: block; overflow: hidden; text-decoration: none; line-height: 12pt; height: 80px; padding: 5px 2px 0 2px;\" target=\"_blank\">Are Burden-of-Proof Considerations Relevant in Philosophy?<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/fieldset>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Andrew Bailey sends the following quotations for our delectation: &quot;(When a philosopher says, &quot;The burden of the proof lies on you&quot;, he means, &quot;You must deduce your conclusion from the truths of immediate sensory experience by means of an argument that is formally valid according to the rules of elementary logic; I on the other &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2014\/10\/26\/peter-van-inwagen-on-burden-of-proof-in-philosophy\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Peter van Inwagen on Burden of Proof in Philosophy&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[451,20,128],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7621","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-burden-of-proof","category-metaphilosophy","category-reason-and-rationality"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7621","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7621"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7621\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7621"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7621"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7621"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}