{"id":7383,"date":"2015-02-09T16:33:42","date_gmt":"2015-02-09T16:33:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2015\/02\/09\/a-new-probabilistic-argument-for-god\/"},"modified":"2015-02-09T16:33:42","modified_gmt":"2015-02-09T16:33:42","slug":"a-new-probabilistic-argument-for-god","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2015\/02\/09\/a-new-probabilistic-argument-for-god\/","title":{"rendered":"A New Probabilistic Argument for God"},"content":{"rendered":"

A reader sent me an argument expressed in an idiosyncratic and unnecessarily technical terminology.  But his idea is a very interesting one.  I'll present and then evaluate my version of the reader's argument.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

1. There are several actual and many possible positions on the nature and existence of God. Call them God-positions.  One who occupies a God-position takes a stand on the existence of God, yes or no.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. All but one of these God-positions are theistic: they affirm the existence of God, though they differ as to the divine attributes.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Only one of these God-positions is atheistic: only one affirms the nonexistence of God.<\/span><\/p>\n

4. Exactly one of these God-positions is true.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

5. The probability that one of the many theistic God-positions is true is much greater than the probability that the one atheistic God-position is true.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore<\/span><\/p>\n

6. The claim that God exists is much more likely to be true than the claim that God does not exist.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

I should think that the first three premises need no support: they are well-nigh self-evident. If support is wanted for (4), it can be found in logic.  By Bivalence, there are exactly two truth-values.  By Excluded Middle, every proposition is either true or not true.<\/span><\/p>\n

But how is (5) supposed to follow from  (1)-(4)? Here is where I think the problem lies.  Intuitively, (5) does not follow from the premises.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consider a parody argument.  There are several actual and many possible positions on the nature and existence of the Lost Dutchman Goldmine.  All but one of these LDM-positions are affirmative of the mine's existence; the remaining one is negative.  But only one LDM-position is true.  Therefore, it is more likely than not that the LDM exists.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is obviously a fallacious argument.  If it is, then so is the original argument. But this leaves us with the task of explaining why<\/em> both are fallacious.  This is not so easy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Either the LDM exists or it does not.  At most<\/em>, these contradictory propositions are equiprobable. (Given my knowledge of the geology of the Superstition Wilderness, I would deny that these propositions are equiprobable; but let's assume that they are.)  The number of different conceptions of the LDM has no bearing on the probability of its existence. One cannot raise (lower) the probability of the mine's existence by adding to (subtracting from) the conceptions of the LDM.  Why not?  Well, if the mine exists, then exactly one of the conceptions is instantiated, and all the other conceptions are uninstantiated.  And it seems obviously true that the probability of some concept's being instantiated does not vary with the number of similar concepts that might have been instantiated instead.<\/span><\/p>\n

The same goes for God even if the existence and nonexistence of God are equiprobable.  There are many different conceptions of God even within a broadly Abrahamic ambit.  On one conception, God is triune and simple; on another, triune but not simple; on a third, simple but not triune.  And so it goes.  Some hold God to be absolutely unlimited in power; others hold that logic limits God's power.  And so on.  Each of these conceptions is such that, if it is instantiated, then God exists.  But surely the number of God-conceptions has no bearing on the probability of one of them being instantiated.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A reader sent me an argument expressed in an idiosyncratic and unnecessarily technical terminology.  But his idea is a very interesting one.  I'll present and then evaluate my version of the reader's argument. 1. There are several actual and many possible positions on the nature and existence of God. Call them God-positions.  One who occupies … Continue reading “A New Probabilistic Argument for God”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[191,143],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7383","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-atheism-and-theism","category-god"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7383","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7383"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7383\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7383"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7383"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7383"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}