{"id":7342,"date":"2015-03-02T06:23:27","date_gmt":"2015-03-02T06:23:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2015\/03\/02\/theism-meets-metaphysical-naturalism\/"},"modified":"2015-03-02T06:23:27","modified_gmt":"2015-03-02T06:23:27","slug":"theism-meets-metaphysical-naturalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2015\/03\/02\/theism-meets-metaphysical-naturalism\/","title":{"rendered":"Theism Meets Metaphysical Naturalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following is an excerpt of an e-mail from the Barcelona lawyer, Daniel Vincente Carillo<\/a>.  As I mentioned to him in a private e-mail, I admire him for tackling these great questions, and doing so in a foreign language.  The pursuit of these questions ennobles us while humbling us at the same time.  Carillo writes,<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
In the contest between theism and metaphysical naturalism we have only four possible scenarios:<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
1st.<\/strong> <\/span>An uncaused and necessary universe:<\/span><\/strong> It doesn't exist by another being and it cannot cease to exist (absolute and eternal universe).<\/span><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
BV:  This is indeed a doxastic possibility.  (By calling the possibility doxastic, I leave it open whether it is a real possibility.)  But one ought to distinguish between omnitemporality and eternality.    The omnitemporal exists at every time, and is therefore 'in time.'  The eternal does not exist 'in time.'  A universe that cannot cease to exist is in time and therefore not eternal. This could be a merely terminological matter.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
\n
2nd. A caused and necessary universe:<\/span><\/strong> It exists by another being but it cannot cease to exist (infinite series of universes).<\/span><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
BV: It is true that what is caused to exist is caused by another, since nothing can cause itself to exist,  not even God.  To say that God is causa sui<\/em>, then, does not mean that he causes himself; it  means that he is not caused by another.  'Causa sui,' shall we say, is a privative expression.  So far, so good.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
But Carillo may be conflating the necessary with the omnitemporal.  To say that a universe is necessary is to make a modal claim, one that is much stronger than the merely temporal claim that the universe in question exists at every time.  Suppose time is actually infinite in both past and future directions and that the universe (or a universe) exists at every time.  Then the universe is omnitemporal: it exists at every time.  But it doesn't follow that the universe is necessary.  Metaphysical necessity is a modal, not temporal notion.  The necessary is that which cannot not exist.  An omnitemporal universe could well be contingent, i.e., possibly nonexistent.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
In the jargon of 'possible worlds,' a necessary being is one that exists in all possible worlds.  An omnitemporal being is one that exists at every time in a world in which there is time.  Clearly, if x is omnitemporal, it does not follow that x is necessary. <\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
\n
3rd. An uncaused and contingent universe:<\/span><\/strong> It doesn't exist by another being but it can cease to exist (universe from nothing).<\/span><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
BV: But even if an uncaused universe could NOT cease to exist, it might still be contingent.  Suppose that there is an uncaused universe U which is such that: if it exists, then it cannot cease to exist.  U's being contingent is not ruled out.  If it is necessary that U continue to exist if it does exist,it does not follow that U necessarily exists.  For there might not have been that universe at all.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
\n
4th. A caused and contingent universe:<\/span><\/strong> It exists by another being and it can cease to exist (created universe).<\/span><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
BV:  But again, if U exists ab alio<\/em>, this is logically consistent with U's never ceasing to exist.  Suppose God creates a universe which has the essential property of being  omnitemporal.  He creates a universe out of nothing that exists at every time.  Since it exists at every time, there is no time at which it does not exist.  And because there is no time at which U does not exist, it never ceases to exist.  (If x ceases to exist, then there are two times, t and t*, t < t*, such that x exists at t but does not exist at t*.)  So a universe can depend for its existence on God even if it cannot cease to exist.<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
\n
The first three options characterize atheism\/naturalism, while the last one is peculiar to theism. But are they equally rational? Definitely not.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
BV: A minor point is that atheism and naturalism are not the same.  The latter entails the former, but the former does not entail the latter. (The case of McTaggart, atheist but non-naturalist).<\/span><\/div>\n
 <\/span><\/div>\n
Despite my criticism above, the three naturalist options Carillo lists do seem to exhaust the possibilities if we assume that a metaphysical naturalist is also a metaphysical realist, an assumption which is quite 'natural.'  But if one were a naturalist and some sort of anti-realist or idealist, that would be a further option.<\/span><\/div>\n

Now how does Carillo exclude the third option?  He writes:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

It looks like the 3rd possibility is the weakest, since nothingness cannot create anything at all. The act of creation, like any other act of producing something, presupposes that the creator and the creature exist simultaneously at least in some moment<\/em>. However, by its very notion, nothingness cannot exist simultaneously with the universe at any moment. Therefore, a universe from nothing is impossible . . . .<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is entirely too quick.  True, nothingness cannot create anything.  But someone who holds that the universe just exists as a matter of brute fact, i.e., contingently without cause or reason, is not committed to maintaining that nothingness has creative power.  As I recall from Russell's debate with Copleston, Russell ends up saying that the universe just exists and that is all!  That is not a good answer, in my opinion, but one cannot refute it by pointing out that nothingness cannot create anything.  The whole point of naturalism is that there are neither creatures nor creator.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The following is an excerpt of an e-mail from the Barcelona lawyer, Daniel Vincente Carillo.  As I mentioned to him in a private e-mail, I admire him for tackling these great questions, and doing so in a foreign language.  The pursuit of these questions ennobles us while humbling us at the same time.  Carillo writes, … Continue reading “Theism Meets Metaphysical Naturalism”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[191,235,238,204],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7342","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-atheism-and-theism","category-modal-matters","category-naturalism","category-time-and-change"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7342","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7342"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7342\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7342"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7342"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7342"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}