{"id":7067,"date":"2015-06-28T17:40:57","date_gmt":"2015-06-28T17:40:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2015\/06\/28\/the-existence-of-god-cannot-be-proven\/"},"modified":"2015-06-28T17:40:57","modified_gmt":"2015-06-28T17:40:57","slug":"the-existence-of-god-cannot-be-proven","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2015\/06\/28\/the-existence-of-god-cannot-be-proven\/","title":{"rendered":"God, Proof, and Desire"},"content":{"rendered":"

From a reader:<\/span><\/p>\n

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. . . I\u2019m confused by some of your epistemic terms. You reject [in the first article referenced below] the view that we can \u201crigorously prove<\/em>\u201d the existence of God, and several times say that theistic arguments are not rationally compelling, by which you mean that there are no arguments \u201cthat will force every competent philosophical practitioner to accept their conclusions on pain of being irrational if he does not.\u201c<\/span><\/p>\n

Okay, so far I\u2019m tracking with you. But then you go on to say that \u201c[t]here are all kinds of evidence\u201d for theism (not just non-naturalism), while the atheist \u201cfails to account for obvious facts (consciousness, self-consciousness, conscience, intentionality, purposiveness, etc.) if he assumes that all that exists is in the space-time world. I will expose and question all his assumptions.  I will vigorously and rigorously drive him to dogmatism.  Having had all his arguments neutralized, if not refuted, he will be left with nothing better than the dogmatic assertion of his position."<\/span><\/p>\n

So how is the atheist not irrational on your view, assuming he is apprised of your arguments? Perhaps the positive case for theism and the negative case against naturalism don\u2019t count as demonstrations in a mathematical sense, but I\u2019m not sure why they\u2019re not supposed to be compelling<\/em> according to your gloss on the term.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The term 'mathematical' muddies the waters  since it could lead to a side-wrangle over what mathematicians are doing when they construct proofs.  Let's not muddy the waters.  My claim is that we have no demonstrative knowledge of the truth of theism or of the falsity of naturalism.  Demonstrative knowledge is knowledge produced by a demonstration.  A demonstration in this context is an argument that satisfies all of the following conditions:<\/span><\/p>\n

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1. It is deductive<\/span>
2. It is valid in point of logical form<\/span>
3. It is free of such informal fallacies as petitio principii<\/em><\/span>
4. It is such that all its premises are true<\/span>
5. It is such that all its premises are known<\/em> to be true<\/span>
6. It is such that its conclusion is relevant to its premises.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

To illustrate (6).  The following argument satisfies all of the conditions except the last and is therefore probatively worthless:<\/span><\/p>\n

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Snow is white<\/span>
ergo<\/span>
Either Obama is president or he is not.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

On my use of terms, a demonstrative argument = a probative argument = a proof = a rationally compelling argument.  Now clearly there are good<\/em> arguments (of different sorts) that are not demonstrative, probative, rationally compelling.  One type is the strong inductive argument. By definition, no such argument satisfies (1) or (2).  A second type is the argument that satisfies all the conditions except (5). <\/span><\/p>\n

Can one prove the existence of God?  That is, can one produce a proof (as above defined) of the existence of God?   I don't think so.  For how will you satisfy condition (5)?  Suppose you give argument A for the existence of God.  How do you know that the premises of A are true?  By argument?  Suppose A has premises P1, P2, P3.  Will you give arguments for these premises?  Then you need three more arguments, one for each of P1, P2, P3, each of which has its own premises.  A vicious infinite regress is in the offing.  Needless to say, moving in an argumentative circle is no better.<\/span><\/p>\n

At some point you will have to invoke self-evidence.   You will have to say that, e.g., it is just self-evident that every event has a cause.  And you will have to mean objectively<\/em> self-evident, not just subjectively self-evident.  But how can you prove, to yourself or anyone else, that what is subjectively self-evident is objectively<\/em> self-evident?  You can't, at least not with respect to states of affairs transcending your consciousness. <\/span><\/p>\n

I conclude that no one can prove the existence of God.  But one can reasonably believe that God exists.  The same holds for the nonexistence of God.  No one can prove the nonexistence of God.  But one can reasonably believe that there is no God.<\/span><\/p>\n

The same goes for naturalism.  I cannot prove that there is more to reality than the space-time system and its contents.  But I can reasonably believe it.  For I have a battery of arguments each of which satisfies conditions (1), (2), (3) and (6) and may even, as far as far as I know, satisfy  (4).<\/span><\/p>\n

"So how is the atheist not irrational on your view, assuming he is apprised of your arguments?"<\/span><\/p>\n

He is not irrational because none of my arguments are rationally compelling in the sense I supplied, namely, they are not such as to force every competent philosophical practitioner to accept their conclusions on pain of being irrational if he does not.  To illustrate, consider the following argument from Peter Kreeft<\/a> (based on C. S. Lewis), an argument I consider good, but not rationally compelling.  I will argue (though I will not prove!) that one who rejects this argument is not irrational.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Argument From Desire<\/span><\/h1>\n

\"Ecstasy<\/span><\/p>\n